A peer-reviewed stock assessment represents
the gold standard for fisheries management, a document representing the best
scientific information available, which will form a firm foundation for
management measures.
Or so we always believed.
Admittedly, there have been
doubters. It is a virtual certainty that
every time a new stock assessment is released, if that assessment suggests that
the stock is in decline, and that more restrictive management measures are
needed to conserve and rebuild the fish population, a motley assortment of
commercial and recreational industry members will come out of the woodwork to
cry, “The science is wrong!,” because any science, no matter how thoroughly
peer-reviewed and how carefully done, will always be wrong if it threatens
those folks’ short-term cash flows.
In such cases, we will be regaled
with tales of fish being abundant somewhere, whether farther offshore than they
typically travel, for farther north, or south, or anywhere else than where the
scientists were looking, usually salted with comments about how “people who are
out on the water every day” have a far better idea of the health of fish stocks
than “scientists who don’t know where the fish are and spend their time sitting
behind computers.”
But regardless of the precise nature
of the comments, the underlying assumption that such people make is always
that the assessment is wrong, because there are really more fish
in the ocean than the assessment suggests.
Recently, a team of scientists
published a paper which suggests that the truth lies in the opposite direction—that
assessments have historically been somewhat biased toward optimism, and
overstate the size of fish stocks, particularly those that are suffering from
overfishing.
“For stocks that were overfished, low
value, or located in regions with rising temperatures, historical biomass
estimates were generally overstated compared with updated assessments. Moreover, rising trends reported for
overfished stocks were often inaccurate.
With consideration of bias recognized retrospectively, 85% more stocks
than currently recognized have likely collapsed below 10% of maximum historical
biomass. The high uncertainty and bias
in modelled stock assessments warrants much greater precaution by managers.”
That is certainly a startling
finding. As the editor of the article
noted,
“Assessment of the status of fisheries
stocks is a key component of their management.
Although there has been much debate around how to do fishery
assessments, there has been a general belief that estimates are roughly
accurate.”
If the article’s authors are
correct about many assessments having an optimistic bias, their findings could
place the efficacy of many fishery management programs in doubt.
The authors argue that
“Best practice methods for assessing
fisheries involve complex models integrating past catch data with biological
and other information. Complex stock
models can include more than 40 different parameters and setting related to
fish life history (e.g., natural mortality, length and age at maturity, and
growth rate), catch (e.g., landings, gear selectivity, and discards), effort
(e.g., days fished and number of hooks), and management controls (e.g., fleet
allocations and allowable catch). The many
estimated parameters and settings can lead to model overfitting, whereby
uncertainty accumulates with each additional estimate. Accuracy of simpler stock assessment approaches
is typically evaluated relative to complex models; however, the accuracy of
complex stock models remains unknown because the true fish biomass is not
directly observed.”
In their study, the authors took
advantage of the fact that the most recent year in any stock assessment is the
year that tends to be plagued by the most uncertainty, as the estimates are
only based on a single year of data. As
time passes and additional years of data are added to the available data set, the
uncertainty surrounding earlier estimates is steadily reduced. Thus, in evaluating the precision of earlier assessments,
and determining whether such assessments’ conclusions tended to overestimate stock
size, the researchers noted that
“In the absence of accurate biomass data,
a retrospective analysis of differences in estimated stock biomass reported
over time can indicate the magnitude of uncertainty and test for systematic
bias.”
Thus, they wrote,
“we relate past stock assessments to the
most recent assessment. Our reasoning is
that modeled output of the most recent assessment should, on average, be the
most accurate because estimates are hindcast using the longest time series and
with the most knowledge for defining model structure.”
Their goal was to determine
“whether systemic bias exists between past
and most recent assessment estimates and how that bias varies with stock status,”
observing that
“Bias matters because overfished stocks
might not be identified for recovery actions if stock size is overestimated, or
recovery actions may have unnecessary economic consequences if stock size is
underestimated.”
The study encompassed 128 species
or species complexes, 230 stocks, and 986 stock assessments; on average, the biomass estimates for each stock spanned 47 years. It found that annual estimates of biomass often
swung wildly from year to year, with such swings sometimes “greatly exceeding”
the uncertainty levels calculated in the stock assessments. The study also found that there was a general
trend indicating a rebuilding/recovery of fish stocks, although
“The recent over-all rise was driven by
sustainable stocks…whereas overfished stocks remained low in recent years on
average.”
It also revealed that older stock
assessments tended to be more optimistic, when compared to the most recent assessments
of stock status, with the level of optimism growing as the researchers looked farther
back in time.
“[P]lots for overfished stocks generally
featured upward slopes in the final 2 years of older assessments—suggesting improving
stock size—that were no longer evident in the most recent assessments. Such phantom recoveries progressed across
assessments as updated stock assessments were released.
“…Large downward revisions in stock
biomass in later assessments, and a consistent tendency for phantom recoveries,
typified overfished stocks.”
The researchers found that
“Uncertainty associated with stock
assessments include interrelated process, observation, model, and estimation
uncertainties. These uncertainties led
to high interannual variability and consistent bias evident in our analyses,
raising doubts about the accuracy of integrated stock assessment models regardless
of sophistication. Bias erred toward
stable stocks, with overestimation of biomass for overfished stocks and
underestimation for sustainable stocks.”
They suggested that
“The tendency for bias to inaccurately
imply stable stock trajectories for both increasing and declining stocks
suggests systematic technical issues or confirmation bias, where overfitted
models align with modeler’s expectations.
Some model parameters are particularly relevant in this context,
including natural mortality and the steepness of the stock-recruitment
relationship…Subjective decisions on such highly uncertain parameters provide a
possible pathway for systematic bias and management failures. In particular, poor parameter choices can
delay recognition of collapsing stocks, which become obvious only with
subsequent data and hindsight.”
And noted,
“Although some stock assessment reports
candidly discuss parameter adjustments needed to avoid projections of stock
collapse, parameter tweaking is rarely well communicated to managers and policy
makers. Modeled output presented in
reports typically depicts uncertainty generated through randomization routines included
in the model algorithms. By contrast,
the much higher uncertainty contributed by model adjustment, choice of model
structure (including spatial dynamics), input parameters, and inadequacy of
input data is frequently overlooked…Nevertheless, recognition of
uncertainty by managers is not enough unless it also elicits precaution,
such as reducing catch quotas to allow for assessment errors. [emphasis added]”
The researchers also warned,
“Although inadequate precaution can
generate short-term catch benefits, it erodes long-term societal interests through
loss of species with immense economic, environmental, cultural, recreational,
and spiritual value. Considering just
the economic value, an inability to reverse decline when fish numbers are
decreasing ultimately has far-reaching negative impacts on the fisheries
workforce, ecosystems and their stability, and the world’s capacity to provide
protein to an increasing population.”
So will the recent paper spur
fisheries managers to employ greater precaution when analyzing stock
assessments and setting management measures?
Probably not.
“said that the study breaks new ground in
revealing a bias toward optimism,”
while Dr. Ray
Hilborn of the University of Washington was unimpressed.
“Many fishery managers, he explained, already
look back at historical trends to correct for a possible tendency to over or
undercount fish populations.”
And Dr. Steven Cadrin at the
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth went a step farther than that, calling
the paper’s findings “invalid,” in part because the researchers assumed that
the most recent stock assessments were the most accurate when, in his view,
that was not necessarily true.
So at this point, the impact that
the paper might have on fisheries management is not particularly clear,
although given the institutional inertia found in any government body, the odds
are probably against it inspiring managers to adopt a greater level of
precaution when setting annual catch limits in United States fisheries.
Still, the very fact that the
paper is out there will spur some discussion, and that alone would be a good
thing.
No comments:
Post a Comment