STRIPED BASS: WHAT COMES AFTER ADDENDUM II

 

Last week, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board approved Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.  Addendum II incorporated the emergency measure that the Management Board adopted last May—a 31-inch maximum size, which effectively created a 28- to 31-inch slot limit in the recreational ocean fishery—while also imposing a modest reduction in the recreational fishery in the Chesapeake Bay and cutting commercial quotas—but not necessarily commercial landings—by 7%.

While those measures are certainly a step in the right direction, in themselves, they will probably neither reduce fishing mortality to the target level nor fully rebuild the spawning stock biomass by the 2029 rebuilding deadline.

Additional management measures will almost certainly be needed, and now that Addendum II is behind us, it’s probably time to start thinking about what such measures should be.  An update to the striped bass stock assessment is scheduled for next fall.  Should that update suggest that there is less than a 50% probability that the stock will rebuild pursuant to Addendum II’s management measures, some sort of management action will be in order.  If that proves to be the case, the new Addendum grants the Management Board the authority to act without the need to go through the long, time-consuming process of putting out a draft addendum for public comment, holding public hearings, and finally settling on a suite of management measures to be implemented by the states.

Whether the Management Board will elect to exercise such authority remains an unanswered question, for a number of Management Board members expressed reservations about acting outside of the normal process, even though public comment might be obtained through less formal means.  The severity of the striped bass’ plight might guide their final decision; if the assessment update finds that the probability of timely rebuilding falls only a little bit short of 50%--say, better than 45%, or perhaps even better than 40%--the Management Board might well decide to embrace the formal addendum process.  On the other hand, if the probability falls in the 25% to 30% range, expedited management action is more likely to occur.

At this point, any further management measures will very probably include some sort of closed recreational season, if only because the Management Board is unlikely to further narrow the current, already narrow slot limits, either for the Bay or ocean recreational fisheries, and the 1-fish bag limit is already as low as a bag limit can go. 

That makes a season the only remaining option.

Of course, the Devil is always in the details, and figuring out what such season should look like is not an easy task.  About the only thing that we can be sure of is that the same season—that is, closing the fishery at the same time, for all states along the coast—is not a viable approach.  The fishery peaks in different places at different times; a midsummer closure would have a very different impact in Maine than it would have in Virginia.  Balancing the closures so that everyone shares the pain in a more-or-less equitable matter will be no easy task.

Even within a single state, different interests will favor different closures.  Using New York as an example, closing the season in May and November would have a real, but less significant impact on Long Island’s East End than it would have off New York City and western Long Island, where anglers enjoy some of their best fishing during those two months and see very few bass during the dog days of summer, when, anglers fishing from boats out at Montauk typically do fairly well. 

It might seem that the simple solution to that would be to set a target reduction—let’s say, solely for the purposes of argument, that the Management Board decided to reduce fishing mortality by 20%--and call on the states to each decide on their own seasons, which the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Technical Committee would then review to determine whether the proposed seasons would lower fishing mortality by the required amount.

Yet, while such an approach would relieve the Management Board of the duty to set a season acceptable to all, it creates the new issue of adjacent states adopting widely differing seasons, which lead to enforcement issues if boats from one state, where the season is open, venture into another state’s closed waters.

Setting up regional seasons could solve much of that problem, although there would still be some conflicts around the edges of such regions.  For example, placing Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts into a single region would probably make sense, even if the bass fishery in southern Massachusetts is more like that of Rhode Island.  Similarly, grouping Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York together would seem a good fit, as boats from all three states often fish together in Long Island Sound, the edges of Block Island Sound, and around Block Island Sound.

But then, what do you do with New Jersey, which shares Raritan Bay with New York, and Delaware Bay with Delaware?  Grouping it with the latter state probably makes the most sense, given that all striped bass fishing must be done in state waters, and the greater expanse of shared water is to the south, but such a split wouldn’t sit well with some New York anglers, who watch their New Jersey counterparts prosecute the spring fishery in Raritan Bay, while they can only sit on the sidelines and wait for the bluefish to show.

Which brings up another big question:  If seasons are put in place, will such seasons merely prohibit anglers from keeping striped bass, or would they also prohibit targeting the fish?

From a practical standpoint, no-harvest seasons which still permit catch-and-release fishing, are the only viable option, since no-target closures are not readily enforceable.  That was made very clear when Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass was being developed in 2021.  It is just about impossible to prove to a court beyond a reasonable doubt—the standard that enforcement would have to meet to convict someone for targeting bass out of season--that that an angler who is fishing for striped bass during the closed season is not actually targeting something else.

How can one prove that the angler casting a chunk of menhaden from a Long Island beach isn’t really fishing for bluefish?  How can one demonstrate that the angler drifting eels near the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel isn’t seeking cobia, instead of striped bass?  So long as they aren’t foolish enough to put a bass in the cooler, both anglers would almost certainly escape a fine.

No-harvest closures that allow catch-and-release also make economic sense, as they allow tackle shops, marinas, charter boats, and other angling-oriented enterprises to still benefit from an active fishery.  Some businesses argue that anglers won’t fish if they can’t bring bass home, and so incomes will suffer, but as Capt. John McMurray wrote in a recent blog post for the Marine Fish Conservation Network,

“Starting that first week of October here, there were an increasing number of large striped bass targeting adult menhaden schools.  Not unusual for this time of the year, although the numbers certainly were.  What was very different is that for most of October, in my region, you really couldn’t find a ‘keeper’ (28 to 31” slot fish).  It was, for all intents and purposes, a catch-and-release fishery.

“Yet, the daily crowds were undoubtedly the largest I’ve ever seen them.  If the weather was nice, you could honestly count 200+ boats.  We’re not gonna get into the ‘no one works anymore’ stuff here, but the point is, there was a ton of traffic when it was really clear that no one was catching any keepers.

“Sure, those folks could have been out there simply to try and get a keeper, however low the chances were, but I don’t think so.  More than likely, they were out there for sport, and/or to get their hero pics (which was certainly why we were out there).”

Such commentary from a very successful, experienced Long Island charter boat captain provides solid evidence that if the Management Board imposed significant no-harvest closures, fishing-related businesses could still survive.  Some bass would certainly be lost to release mortality, but the Management Board could account for that simply by extending the length of the season when harvest would not be allowed.

The question then, of course, would be how long the closed season should be extended to account for such mortality.  That might be a more difficult question to answer than one might think.  For as Capt. McMurray also noted,

“While sure there were guys throwing plugs or dropping flutter-spoons, it was pretty clear that most of the fleet were ‘snag-and-drop’ fishing.  In other words, ripping a weighted treble hook through a menhaden school, sticking one, letting it swim and waiting for a striped bass to eat it.  What do I mean by most?  I dunno, I’d guess around 80-90%?

“If you’re up on your regs, which you should be, that’s illegal in New York, and, well, everywhere else.  In fact, fishing any live or dead bait on a treble is prohibited…Which I suppose makes sense, as it’s more likely you’re going to gut-hook a striper on a treble…A solid regulation intended to reduce dead discards.  IF…it were at all enforceable.

“The problem is, it’s efficient, and unless there are repercussions, there’s no reason for anglers NOT to do it.  If there were any boardings during the run—which I may be wrong, but there sure didn’t appear to be, and if someone were to have gotten called for snag-and-drop, well, all the angler had to say is that they were targeting bluefish (even though there weren’t really bluefish around, but enforcement officers don’t know that, nor could they prove it even if they did).

“Even before this ‘feel-good’ regulation went into place, law enforcement reps were clear, on the record, about the enforcement and compliance problems such regs cause.  Many folks, Commissioners specifically, claimed that regardless of the enforcement issues, most anglers would be compliant just because it was the right thing to do.  From what I see though, that just isn’t true.

“In case you haven’t drawn the conclusion on your own, there were a LOT of dead discards this October.  Every day we’d see several floaters, plus a LOT of fish that came over the boats’ gunnels pretty darn bloody.  [emphasis added]”

Such observations certainly cast doubt on the 9% release mortality rate generally used when calculating the impact of management measures on striped bass; there is certainly reason to suspect that, at least in the case of big bass, the mortality rate will be higher.

But such observations also lock us into a perplexing conundrum when it comes to no-harvest versus no-target season closures.

No-harvest closures make sense because they are far more enforceable, and still permit extensive recreational and economic activity.  Yet if anglers frequently engage in illegal activity to catch bass during those closed seasons, and so cause excessive release mortality, while the regulations they’re violating are not practically enforceable, no-target closures that just shut all bass fishing down may seem the best way to ensure that fishing mortality remains within acceptable bounds.

Yet if no-target closures aren’t enforceable…

That problem alone may be enough to dissuade the Management Board from taking quick action in response to bad news in the upcoming stock assessment update, in order to glean enough input from law enforcement, state regulators, and stakeholders as to which path to take.  But eventually, unless something unexpectedly happens that boosts the stock’s prospects, the seasons are going to come.

My guess is that, when it finally decides, the Management Board will opt for no-harvest closures, and leave the enforceability questions up to the states.  If that happens, some states may decide that no-target closures are manageable, as Maryland already has, and prohibit all striped bass fishing during some portion of the year.  Others will take the Board’s actions at face value and just put no-harvest closures in place.

Others might even attack the root of the problem and, along with their choice of closures, ban the use of treble hooks while fishing with bait, regardless of the target species, taking the “I’m fishing for bluefish” excuse off the table.

And, given the lack of remaining options, maybe that’s the sort of thing we ought to be thinking about:   management measures that are enforceable, but go beyond the usual size limits, bag limits, and seasons.  In that regard, two proposals that were briefly considered bother proposals that were briefly considered but quickly discarded during the development of Amendment 7 might deserve another look: requiring the in-water release of larger striped bass and requiring anglers to stop fishing once they but a striped bass in the cooler

Florida already prohibits anglers from removing tarpon more than 40 inches long from the water during the release process, and such rule is apparently being observed by most anglers.  The objections to adopting such rule for striped bass centered around the possible hazards of practicing in-water release when waves are running high.  However, whether releasing a large bass from surf or shore, such bass are often exhausted by the fight, and require the angler to spend some time reviving the fish in the water.  If the sea is too rough to allow in-water release, it is also to rough for such revival, meaning that anglers would probably be returning some number of exhausted fish to the water to die.

Thus, in-water release is a viable option, so long as anglers keep one thing in mind:  If the sea is rough enough to put either the bass or the angler at risk during the release process, no one should be fishing there and then in the first place.

Requiring anglers to stop fishing after keeping a bass is even more controversial, since it forecloses the opportunity to fish for other available species once such bass is retained.  However, such regulations work well in Alaska’s Kenai River king salmon fishery (where removing any salmon over 20 inches in length from the water prior to release is also illegal), preventing anglers from mortally wounding a fish that they will not be able to retain.

Granted, there are far more different species of fish caught all along the striper coast than there are in the Kenai, but anglers intent on a multi-species trip can always target striped bass later in the day, when their fluke or sea bass or drum or croaker are already on ice.  That might mean fishing when time and tide make landing a legal bass far less likely, but given the current state of the striped bass population, along with the threats that it faces, it might still be a viable option.

For the ocean is a changeable place, and it is possible that a successful spawn this year, if it occurs, could put a very different spin on the bass’ immediate prospects.  But until some good news emerges, the Management Board would be wise to strike a precautionary stance, and to think long and hard about any action that might better ensure the future health of the striped bass stock.

 

 

 

ASMFC APPROVES STRIPED BASS ADDENDUM II: IT'S NOT PERFECT, BUT IT'S ALSO NOT BAD

 

Yesterday, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board approved the final version of Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.  While the Addendum is far from perfect, and doesn’t do enough to protect or rebuild the striped bass stock, the final version is nonetheless a better management document that I expected it to be.

And that’s probably good enough, because Addendum II was always intended to be an interim management measure, that constrains fishing mortality to a reasonably low level through 2024, and then is replaced by a new Addendum III, which will be guided by the results of the stock assessment update that will be released next fall.  Addendum II was intended to reduce overall fishing mortality by 14.5%, which would get it down close to F_target, although the final measures adopted at yesterday’s meeting probably won’t quite be enough to attain that goal.

Addendum II addressed four primary issues—constraining fishing mortality in the ocean recreational fishery, constraining fishing mortality in the Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery, constraining fishing mortality in the commercial fishery, and providing the Management Board the authority to respond quickly to the findings of upcoming stock assessments, in the event such assessments suggest that, under existing management measures, the striped bass stock is unlikely to rebuild by the 2029 deadline specified in the management plan.

However, there were ancillary issues primarily impacting the recreational fisheries that were also important to the debate; another ancillary issue—the deadline for implementing the provisions of Addendum II—also had very real implications for the commercial fishery.

With one not-too-important exception, all of the issues presented by the Addendum were resolved in a way that advanced both the public interest and the health of the striped bass resource.

The first issue addressed was the ocean recreational fishery, where there was very strong stakeholder support (2,289 comments), from individual anglers as well as some charter boat and tackle shop owners, for formally adopting the current emergency measure—a 28- to 31-inch slot limit applicable to all anglers, whether they fished from private boats, for hire boats or from the shore—into the striped bass management plan.  However, a much smaller contingent of party and charter boat owners (158 comments) supported a related option that would apply the current slot limit to private boat and shore-based anglers, but grant special privileges to anglers fishing from for-hire vessels, and allow them to take fish that fell within a wider, 28- to 33-inch slot size.

The debate between the two options pitted those who were primarily concerned with the health of the striped bass resource and providing a fair angling environment for all anglers against those who prioritized the economic well-being, and perhaps the survival, of the for-hire fleet above other concerns.

Of course, as in most debates, things were not that black and white; many folks supporting the former option were very sympathetic to the problems besetting the for-hire operators, while many of those who supported the latter option were concerned with the state of the striped bass stock.  Nevertheless, everyone was forced to pick a position based on what they believed was the most important priority at this point in time.

The ocean recreational fishery

Dr. Michael Armstrong, a Massachusetts fishery manager, started off the debate by moving that Option B, the universal 28- to 31-inch slot limit, be adopted; his motion was seconded by Dennis Abbot, New Hampshire’s Legislative Proxy.  In supporting his motion, Dr. Armstrong declared that

“There’s a whole ton of reasons why this is the right way to go.”

He noted that maintaining the current slot limit for all anglers, regardless of platform, is the best way to maintain the fishing mortality reduction achieved by this year’s emergency measure, and observed,

“Now is not the time, with a looming disaster, to start carving out exceptions for special fisheries.”

In his view, carving out special regulations for the for-hire fleet represented a “paradigm shift” in the fishery, although he wouldn’t say whether he might support such action under other, more typical circumstances.

Mr. Abbott noted that the original purpose of both the emergency action and Addendum II was to reduce fishing mortality, and that any relaxing of that size limit

“marks a setback from what we were trying to do.”

Immediately after Mr. Abbott spoke, Dr. Justin Davis, Connecticut’s fishery manager, rose to amend Dr. Armstrong’s motion by replacing “Option B” with “Option C,” which would create the special, 28- to 33-inch slot limit for for-hire anglers.  His motion to amend was quickly seconded by Emerson Hasbrouck, the Governor’s Appointee from New York.

While Dr. Davis recognized that both sides of the debate made valid arguments, he admitted that

“I’ve been swayed by the outpouring of comments that I’ve gotten from the for-hire sector in Connecticut.”

He said that the comments he heard from for-hire operators exceeded the number of comments that he’d ever received on any other issue, and expressed concern for the future of the industry, particularly because of recent restrictions on all six inshore fisheries important to the for-hire fleet, and, for charter boats that venture offshore, the closure of the mako shark fishery.  Mr. Hasbrouck noted that Option C would lead to a fishing mortality reduction only 0.1% less than that provided by Option B, and said such option would help the for-hire fleet while having a minimal impact the striped bass.

Similar sentiments were expressed by Dr. Jason McNamee, Rhode Island’s fishery manager, who admitted that he was worried about the future of his state’s for-hire fleet, and wished that mode splits had been considered earlier in the management process.

But David Sikorski, the Legislative Proxy from Maryland, spoke against the proposed amendment, arguing that

“This motion is chasing the 2015 year class as they grow,”

and is contrary to the purpose behind Addendum II.

Another member of the Maryland delegation, fishery manager Michael Luisi, disagreed, arguing that both the emergency action and Addendum II were proposed and put in place quickly, with no consideration for the needs of the for-hire businesses.

At that point, Max Appelman of NOAA Fisheries noted that he had difficulty supporting Option C not because of the mode splits per se, but because of the uncertainty inherent in the effects of the change on fishing mortality.  He observed that successful rebuilding depends on successfully limiting fishing mortality, something that managers have so far been unable to do for any extended period.

He was followed by, Mr. Abbott, who said that he opposed Option C for multiple reasons, and that

“I see a basic unfairness.  There are millions of people who fish for striped bass, and only a few in the for-hire sector.”

He felt it was wrong for an angler who fishes from a private boat to be limited to the current slot, while someone who can afford to pay for a for-hire trip can take advantage of a more permissive size limit.  Mr. Abbott said that he had been on the Management Board for 28 years, and made an impassioned comment in which he noted

“We are not paying attention to the canary in the coal mine…We continue to do the things that I called ‘death by a thousand cuts’…We always tend to take the easy path, and the easy path has taken us to where we are today.”

He said that it was time to stop making exceptions to the management measures in order to please special interests in the various states, and instead

“do what’s right for the resource,”

finally observing that

“We tend not to do what we should be doing.”

Mr. Abbott’s comments were challenged by Adam Nowalsky, Legislative Proxy from New Jersey and probably the most aggressive advocate of recreational catch-and-kill fishing on the Management Board, who claimed that the “easy path” was placing more restrictions on anglers, and that the harder route was finding a way to conserve the fish while still maximizing the economic benefits from the fishery.  He also claimed that the true inequity in the striped bass fishery was emphasizing the sport fishery over recreational harvest.

With that, it was time for a vote.

Going into the meeting, I suspected that Option C would pass on a fairly narrow vote, but in the end, the opposite happened.  While seven jurisdictions—Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and the Potomac River Fisheries Commission—supported Option C, nine—Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, NOAA Fisheries, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service—opposed it, so the motion failed.

Once that occurred, Option B was adopted on a vote of 14 to 2, with only New York and New Jersey opposing.

The Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery

The debate over recreational management measures in the Chesapeake Bay followed similar lines, but had its own unique twists.  It began when Michael Luisi made a motion to adopt Option C2, which would establish a slot size limit of 19 to 24 inches, with a 1-fish bag limit for shore and private boat anglers and a 2-fish bag for those fishing from for-hire boats.  Ingrid Braun-Ricks, executive director for the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, provided a second.

Mr. Luisi attempted to justify his motion by noting that the 2-fish bag for for-hire vessels had already been adopted for Maryland through the conservation equivalency process, and that for-hire vessels participated in an electronic data program that provided much information which he deemed to be “incredibly valuable.”  He also argued that the “sport fishery” (i.e., shore and private boat anglers) and the for-hire fishery were “not one in the same,” and so shouldn’t be governed by the same rules.

Virginia fishery manager Pat Geer disagreed with the motion, saying that while he was happy to support consistent recreational rules throughout the Bay, Virginia’s Finfish Advisory Panel strongly opposes any sort of mode split, and has for many years.  He also noted that Virginia’s for-hire fleet, many of which fish in the Chesapeake Bay, were already subject to a 1-fish bag limit and had no problem with it.

Dr. Armstrong noted that stock assessments benefit from uniform regulations, and that when biologists try to analyze data where different modes have different rules,

“We’re slicing the [Marine Recreational Information Program] baloney awful thin.”

At that point, Mr. Sikorski again split with his state’s fishery manager, moving to substitute Option B2 for Option C2.  The two options were the same except for one very big difference:  Option B2 established a 1-fish bag limit for everyone, including for-hire anglers.  Mr. Geer seconded the motion.

In support of his motion, Mr. Sikorski explained that most of the 2018 year class will be larger than 24 inches in the upcoming season, and that Option B2 would thus help protect the last strong year class produced in the Bay.  He noted the problems besetting the Bay’s bass fishery, emphasized the need for consistent regulations, and then argued that

“Chesapeake Bay regulations have done a disservice to this resource…One fish for all could have been how we prosecuted our fishery for the past four years”

instead of

“chasing a snowball downhill.”

He acknowledged his concern for the impact a 1-fish bag limit might have on the for-hire fishery, but also noted that because Maryland had closed its traditional April striped bass fishery so that it might have a 2-fish for-hire bag, other businesses have suffered, including an Annapolis tackle shop that saw revenues decline by 23%.  Instead of breaking the recreational sector into pieces, Sikorsky said that

“I prefer to define us as the general public,”

while warning that if current trends persist,

“the dark days are coming.”

When a vote was finally taken on the motion to amend, it passed 13 to 3, with New Jersey, Maryland, and the Potomac River fisheries commission dissenting.

The lopsided vote didn’t stop Michael Luisi from trying again, this time proposing that the Management Board approve Option C2 only for 2024, and adopting Option B2 for 2025 and beyond; once more, his motion was seconded by Ms. Braun-Ricks. 

This time, he argued that retaining the 2-fish for-hire bag limit in 2024 would give the for-hire fleet time to adjust their business plans to account for a smaller bag, while also giving Maryland a chance to figure out how to maintain the data being accrued through electronic for-hire reporting, before such data was lost to “retribution” from an upset for-hire fleet.

New Jersey’s Nowalsky supported the motion, noting that for-hire boats often book trips well ahead of the season, when customers believe that fishing rules will not change, and so already have commitments to customers; more restrictive rules, he claimed, would lead to cancelled trips, while Doug Grout, proxy for New Hampshire’s Governor’s Appointee, opposed it, arguing that Addendum II was intended to reduce fishing mortality in 2024, not in 2025.

Other comments were made, but when the vote was taken, Michael Luisi’s motion was defeated, this time by a vote of 4 to 14, with New Jersey, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, and Virginia its only supporters.

Still, Luisi tried one more time, making a motion to substitute Option C1, which would reduce the slot size to 19 to 23 inches, achieving a greater fishing mortality reduction while still giving the for-hires a second fish.  This time, Dr. Davis seconded the motion, calling it “a reasonable compromise.”

Nowalsky challenged the Management Board to choose between Option C1, which achieved an even greater fishing mortality than Option B2 did, and their opposition to mode splits, which would allow more fish to be killed.  In response, Mr. Sikorsky noted that the narrower slot would increase release mortality, disagreed with those who sought special privileges for a “small group,” and plead,

“Let’s stop trying to divide people by how they participate in the fishery.”

With that said, a vote was taken, and Mr. Luisi lost again, this time on a vote of 6 in favor, 9 opposed, and a single abstention.  Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland were among the supporters.

With no new motions put on the table, Option B2 was adopted by a vote of 14-2, with only New Jersey and Maryland voting against.

Recreational law enforcement

Before moving away from the recreational fishery, the Management Board also needed to consider a measure intended to assist law enforcement, which would require anyone who filleted a bass at sea or at a shoreside location to retain the rack—that is, the carcass—so that law enforcement agents could determine whether the filleted bass complied with the relevant slot limit.  The same provision would require skin to remain on the fillet to facilitate species identification, and would set a possession limit of two fillets for every rack retained.

A motion to remove the requirement to leave the fillet unskinned passed with little opposition.  The amended motion found wide support, with 14 in favor, no opposition, and the two federal agencies abstaining.

The commercial fishery

The next agenda item called for the Management Board to decide whether the commercial quota should be reduced and, if so, by what amount.  Addendum II contemplated quota reductions that might range from 0 to 14.5%.

Dr. Armstrong put a motion on the table for a 14% reduction, saying that Addendum II should include commercial reductions

“Because we need to be moving in that direction,”

and that the commercial reduction ought to approximate that taken in the recreational fishery.  Cheri Patterson, New Hampshire’s Legislative Appointee, seconded the motion.  Delaware fisheries manager John Clark quickly responded by making a motion to substitute Option A, which called for status quo commercial landings.  Mr. Hasbrouck seconded his motion.

Mr. Clark argued that excessive recreational landings made Addendum II necessary, and that recreationally-related fishing mortality comprised the largest part of overall fishing mortality.  He said that a quota reduction would “make life very difficult” for Delaware’s commercial fishermen, who had experienced an aggregate 40% quota cut since 2014, and claimed that at some point, such reductions would no longer allow them to make a living as commercial fishermen.  He also opined that cutting the commercial harvest did a disservice to seafood consumers.

Other Management Board members supported Mr. Clark’s statement, but Mr. Appelman disagreed, saying that NOAA Fisheries supported some level of reduction, although not necessarily 14%.

On the other hand, Rhode Island’s Legislative Proxy, Eric Reid, expressed concerns that any cut could destroy the commercial striped bass fishery.  He called striped bass “a seasonal specialty,” produced by a “boutique fishery” for a “boutique market,” and believed that if the fish was not available to restaurants when they wanted it, they would substitute another species and, having moved on, would not buy the bass when it came on the market again.

Mr. Sikorski addressed the question from a Chesapeake Bay perspective, noting that the Bay produced about 80% of all commercial landings, when measured in numbers of fish, that fishing mortality is not only currently too high, but also focused on fish needed to rebuild, and that Addendum II was all about rebuilding the stock.  He thus opposed the motion for status quo quota.  Mr. Luisi, his colleague from the Maryland delegation, said that he wouldn’t support the substitute motion or a 14% cut, but would support a reduction that fell between the two.

In the last comment before the vote on the substitute motion, Joseph Cimino, New Jersey’s fisheries manager, noted that the Management Board was making “huge assumptions” about the effectiveness of the recreational measures, and that imposing recreational restrictions while leaving the commercial quota at status quo would be inequitable.

The final vote found only New York, Delaware, and Virginia supporting the motion, which failed 3-13.

At that point, Mr. Luisi moved to substitute a 7% reduction for the 14% in Dr. Armstrong’s original motion.  Jeff Kaelin, Governor’s Appointee from New Jersey, seconded the motion, which only received comment from Chris Batsavage, a North Carolina fisheries manager, who argued that 7% was too small of a reduction to promote rebuilding, and noted that when different levels of reduction are mandated for different sectors, the fish that aren’t caught by the more restricted sector often end up being caught by the sector with less stringent restrictions.

Despite that comment, the motion to substitute a 7% commercial quota reduction passed on a vote of 8 jurisdictions—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission and Virginia—in favor, 6 opposed, and the federal agencies abstaining.  When the final motion came up for a vote, it passed 13 to 1, again with two abstentions, and only North Carolina voting against.

Management response to stock assessments

Because the formal addendum process typically takes at least a year between the time a new addendum is proposed and the time when its management measures become effective, the draft Addendum II contained a provision that would allow the Management Board to fast-track management action, without going through the formal process, should a stock assessment indicate that there was less than a 50% probability that the stock would rebuild by the 2029 deadline if management measures were left unchanged.  Absent such power, the Management Board would be unable to quickly respond to any new threats to the rebuilding process.

Dr. Davis moved to grant such authority, a motion that was seconded by David Borden, Rhode Island’s Governor’s Appointee.  Little opposition was voiced, although Maryland’s Luisi was an exception, saying that

“This Board shouldn’t be acting fast, in my opinion,”

and expressing support for the addendum process.

However, multiple Management Board members expressed concern that the fast-track process didn’t provide sufficient opportunity for stakeholder input, and made it clear that they hoped that such input be provided by alternate means, if the Board chose to fast-track an addendum—something that it was not compelled to do, even if it had the authority to do so.

Despite such misgivings, the motion passed on a vote of 11-5, with New Jersey, Maryland, the District of Columbia, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, and Virginia taking the minority view.

Implementation dates

One of the critical aspects of any Addendum, and particularly of Addendum II, is when such Addendum’s measures will have to be implemented by the states.  Addendum II, after all, was intended to govern the 2024 fishery, so there would be little use implementing its measures when the year was nearly over.

Thus, Dr. Armstrong moved that the states would have to present their implementation plans to the Management Board by sometime in March, and make such measures effective no later than May 1, 2024.  Mr. Borden seconded the motion.  

Dr. Armstrong noted that the Management Board decided to reduce the commercial quota by only 7%, rather than the 14% originally suggested, and advised compounding the problem by delaying the implementation of even that small reduction.  He recognized that fisheries had already begun in such states, but noted that such states had the ability to hold back a portion of their quota from fishermen, knowing that their quotas might be reduced, and that if they chose not to do so, and exceeded the reduced quota in 2024, they could always pay back the excess with a smaller quota in 2025.

Mr. Sikorski supported the motion, agreeing that the smaller reduction in commercial quota justified a quick implementation.  He noted that, although the Maryland and PRFC fishing seasons had already begun, they would close on January 31 and February 29, respectively, and wouldn’t restart until June, providing an opportunity to call back excess commercial striped bass tags. 

That drew an immediate response from Luisi, who said that recalling tags would be like giving someone $1,000, and then asking for $70 back.  He maintained that Maryland was unable to recalculate the number of tags to be issued under the reduced quota, and observed that some fishermen might have already used their entire tag allocation.  With respect to calling back 7% of the already issued tags, he said that

“It can’t and will not happen…We’re not able to do that administratively.”

Mr. Geer made similar comments, saying that

“We’re in the same situation.  Our season started on the 16^th,”

while reminding the Management Board that it had been warned by the Bay states that such issues would arise if Addendum II wasn’t adopted at the October 2023 Board meeting.  He then moved to amend the motion, to require all recreational management measures to be adopted by the states no later than May 1, 2024, but giving the states until January 1, 2025 to adopt commercial measures.  The motion was seconded by Mr. Clark.

Mr. Nowalsky made the only comment on the motion to amend, saying that while he was sympathetic to the administrative concerns, the originally proposed commercial reduction was nonetheless cut in half, and if implementation of that reduction was delayed until 2025, it had the effect of cutting the reduction in half again.  He warned that if Mr. Geer’s motion passed, he would seek to reopen the vote on the commercial quota, and seek an increased reduction.

With that, Mr. Geer’s motion was put to a vote, in which seven jurisdictions—Maine, New Hampshire, Delaware, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, Virginia, and North Carolina—voted in favor, seven voted against, the federal agencies abstained, and the motion narrowly failed, because it did not win a simple majority.

With that, Dr. Armstrong’s motion was back on the table, and passed ten in favor, four against, and the federal agencies abstaining, with Delaware, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission and Virginia casting the dissenting votes.

Final approval of the entire Amendment II came on a 12-4 vote, with the same four jurisdictions voting against adoption.

Thoughts and observations

Addendum II, standing on its own, will probably not be enough to rebuild the striped bass spawning stock biomass by the 2029 deadline.  However, it marks an important step on the way to rebuilding, particularly since it gave the Management Board authority to fast-track some future management measures.

Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts remain steadfast supporters of striped bass conservation, while Pennsylvania and North Carolina--and to a surprising degree, the District of Columbia--are also proving themselves to be good and responsible stewards of the striped bass resource.

New Jersey and Delaware, on the other hand, consistently elevate short-term exploitation over long-term stock health.  Unfortunately, that duo has now been joined by New York, which had previously been a champion of striped bass conservation; while New York’s state fisheries management agency continues to care for the resource and tries to consider all stakeholders when making decisions, both New York’s Governor’s Appointee and its new Legislative Appointee have strong biases in favor of the commercial and for-hire sectors, and give short shrift to private recreational fisherman.  That bias was made extremely clear by Mr. Hasbrouck’s efforts to discount recreational comments early in the meeting, when he asked whether most public comments were made by recreational fishermen, and asked whether the Advisory Panel, which presented contrary recommendations far more favorable to the commercial and for-hire sectors, had “more balanced” representation between the three sectors.  

I suppose “balance” is in the eye of the beholder.  Given that the recreational sector accounts for at least 85% of striped bass fishing mortality, with the precise percentage varying from year to year, and given that surf and private boat anglers are responsible for about 98.5% of all recreational striped bass trips, and thus the lion’s share of the economic contributions from the fishery, it’s not hard to argue that true “balance” would weigh the responses according to each sector’s participation in the fishery. 

But that wouldn’t fit Mr. Hasbrouck’s aims.

With respect to the tension between the for-hire fleet and the rest of the recreational fishery, it’s becoming clear that both New Jersey’s Nowalsky and Maryland’s Luisi have a particular disdain for anglers who tend to emphasize recreation, and release most of their catch, and favor the catch-and-kill segment of the recreational fishery championed by the for-hire fleet.  While that disdain doesn’t appear to be shared by any other state managers, nor any of the other recreational representatives, it is something to monitor as time goes on.

Also with respect to such tensions, it seems that the idea of “mode splits,” or “sector separation,” is gaining some support among Management Board members.  While, speaking personally, I don’t believe that fisheries managers should create an aristocracy within the recreational sector, members of which are granted privileges not available to the general public, I am also not entirely opposed to true “sector separation,” if it is done correctly.  That is, if the for-hire fleet is given special consideration because it represents businesses, then managers should focus on the for-hire businesses themselves, and not on their customers, by giving the sector a separate quota reflecting its recent historical share of recreational landings, issuing tags to be attached to all for-hire fish, and then shutting down the fishery when the quota is reached, with paybacks required if the quota is exceeded.  Such a management approach would be similar to the commercial management system, and would take advantage of the electronic reporting systems already in use by for-hire boats along much of the coast, which make real-time management and, if needed, in-season closures a realistic possibility not available to the rest of the recreational sector.

My final observation may, in the end, be the most sobering. 

While Addendum II may help make it possible to rebuild the striped bass stock by 2029, it cannot maintain the stock at its target level.  Only nature, assisted by fisheries managers, can achieve that goal.  In recent years, we have seen unusually low striped bass recruitment, presumably due to unfavorable spawning conditions.  Unless such conditions improve—we can only hope that this winter’s cool and wet conditions extend through the spring, and possibly lead to higher juvenile abundance in the coming year—the health of the bass stock will inevitably decline. 

Should that occur, the best that managers can do is try to preserve the spawning stock through the hard times—what Dr. Armstrong called a “looming disaster” and Mr. Sikorski “dark days”—until favorable conditions recur.

While we can hope for the best for the bass, but until such conditions return, such hope is mere wishful thinking.

 

 

 

 

A CONCERTED ATTACK ON CATCH-AND-RELEASE

 

One of the more interesting things about writing this blog is that in doing my research for one post, I often come across things that are new, fascinating, sometimes maddening, and sometimes just weird.

That happened last week, for as I was looking over the comments on the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s pending striped bass management measures in advance of writing last Thursday’s piece, I found a link to a website called “fish4food.com.”

It’s a very odd website, that announces to the world

“Fish are not a game, but the game is getting Personal [sic].”

Whatever that means.

The website looks like it belongs to an organization.  It includes the motto

“Keep Them On The Dinner Plate,”

declares its mission as

“Preserving Sustainable Fish Harvest”

and bears a logo consisting of a whole striped bass lying on a dinner plate lying atop a crossed knife and fork.

It has the usual links an organization’s website would have: “About Us,” “Join Us,” “Sign Petition” and, of course, “DONATE” (the group also sells a boat decal for the not insignificant sum of $150.00).

But who, and what, would someone be donating to?

One of the most curious aspects of the website is that nowhere, neither on its home page nor on its other pages, does it list a single name.  Most organizations will provide a list of board members, officers, or at least a press contact to let people know who is running the show.  Fish4dinner.com seems to be an exception to that rule.

Its home page includes three purported testimonials, all supporting catch-and-kill.  One allegedly comes from a shore-based fisherman in Massachusetts, one from a Connecticut charter boat captain, the third from a private-boat fisherman in Rhode Island.  The wording of each is different, but one feature of each is the same:  The testimonials are all anonymous, lending a reader to wonder who provided them and, perhaps, if the reader is as cynical and suspicious as I am, whether such people really even exist.

But those are just the cosmetic aspects of the site.  Its core message is real and it’s troubling.  The “About Us” page reads

“For far too long the voice of those who wish to harvest fish for dinner has been an afterthought in the regulatory process.  Our mission is to help regulators understand the cultural, social and economic importance of the recreational food fishery.  Killing more than half of the recreationally caught fish through discarding them to die is not the answer.  We can do better.

“To date the deciding voice in fishery management has been driven by an [sic] small, elite, well off, [sic] segment of the recreational fishing community who have pushed for management practices that demand abundance at the expense of harvest, never considering the mortality caused by releasing millions of fish, never offering to help contribute to a single rebuilding effort.  This needs to change.

“The fish we catch recreationally are as important on the dinner table as they are in the water.  Healthy stocks are a good thing, sustainably harvested fish is a good thing, the thrill you feel when you catch your own dinner is a good thing.  The economic benefits created by your pursuit of dinner is a good thing.  We work to make sure these simple concepts are not forgotten.

“Please join us in our mission to preserve your ability to bring a few fish home to eat.”

It sounds like a coherent message, but let’s take it apart one paragraph—even, at times, one sentence—at a time, to see how it misleads the reader and tries to push emotional buttons in order to obscure the facts.

Let’s begin with the very first line, which asserts that “the voice of those who want to harvest fish for dinner has been an afterthought in the regulatory process,” for nothing can be farther from the truth.  Saltwater fishery management is all about harvest.  It is in most cases based on the concept of maximum sustainable yield—the greatest number of fish that can be removed from the population on a long-term basis without causing the stock to decline—and when it isn’t, as in the case of striped bass, it’s because the model used in the stock assessment does not provide a reliable estimate of MSY and/or, as is also the case with striped bass, because the stock is overfished, and lower landings are temporarily needed to allow the stock to rebuild to a point where MSY can, again, be achieved. 

Of course, there is always some uncertainty inherent in fishery management, so calculating regulations to achieve MSY, expressed as the fishing mortality threshold, could easily lead to overfishing, so most regulations are calculated to achieve a slightly lower fishing mortality target, and provide a buffer that makes overfishing less likely.

But despite that buffer being in place, maximizing the number of fish that may be killed and taken home is a constantly recurring theme in saltwater fisheries management.  That’s why so many management proposals, including the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s pending Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, only seek a 50% probability of achieving their goals; a higher probability of success would necessarily reduce the number of fish that are landed, and so managers disfavor that path.

On the other hand, at least in the case of striped bass, catch-and-release fishing does produce a substantial number of discards.  In 2022, striped bass anglers took home, and hopefully ate (although that, unfortunately, is not a given) slightly less than 3.5 million striped bass, while releasing about 29.6 million which, applying the accepted release mortality rate of 9%, would lead to somewhat under 2.7 million fish that didn’t survive release which, although well below the claimed “more than half of recreationally caught fish” (it’s a lot closer to 40%) is still a substantial amount.

But where the fish4dinner folks fall short is when they start talking about the “cultural, social and economic importance of the recreational food fishery.”  Yes, those things do matter, but with anglers killing and taking home 3.5 million bass in 2022, there’s still plenty of catching and killing going on.  However, the catch-and-release fishery also has cultural, social, and economic importance, and when one realizes that such fishery is about 8 ½ times larger than the catch-and-kill fishery, and that while each bass caught by a catch-and-kill fisherman can only be enjoyed once, a released bass, if not harvested somewhere else along the way, can provide cultural, social, and economic benefits not just once, to a single angler, but 11 times on average, to multiple people, before it is removed from the population, it becomes clear that the value of each individual fish that is released is far greater than one which is killed.

As the late angler and writer Lee Wulff once noted,

“Game fish are too valuable to be caught only once.”

But the fish4dinner folks, whoever they may be, don’t seem to care about the value of a released gamefish or the benefits that accrue from the catch-and-release fishery.  Instead, they make the allegation that “an [sic] small, elite, well-off, [sic] segment of the recreational fishery” is “the deciding voice in fisheries management.”

Trying to play on feelings of economic envy and what might be deemed “class warfare” is a ploy that demagogues often employ, hoping that emotion will serve them better than fact.  Because the plain fact is that the angling community as a whole strongly supports fisheries conservation.  That is particularly true in the case of striped bass management, where, in the period leading up to adoption of Amendment 7 to the ASMFC’s management plan, stakeholders had the opportunity to comment on whether they wished to change the reference points used to calculate regulations, in order to increase landings while necessarily decreasing striped bass abundance.  Thousands of stakeholders responded, and their sentiments were very clear.  98.7% of the comments received opposed changing the goals and objectives of the plan away from abundance and toward larger harvests, while an even larger proportion, 99.6%, opposed any change in the reference points.

Thus, it was not the views of a “small, elite…segment of the recreational fishery” that was the deciding voice” in striped bass management; instead, it was the collective views of the vast majority of striped bass fishermen from every state between Maine and Virginia that decided the issue.

It’s fish4dinner that represents the minority view. 

That doesn’t mean that a lot of bass fishermen don’t want to occasionally bring a fish home; most of those whom I know—and I know a lot of them—will keep a fish from time to time.  But what the majority will not do, as demonstrated by their comments on Amendment 7, is subordinate their desire for a healthy bass stock to the opportunity for larger short-term landings.

And we can only laugh at the claim that catch-and-release anglers never offer to contribute to striped bass rebuilding.  Every fish that they return to the water has a 91% chance of surviving and contributing to the next season’s spawn, while a fish tossed in a cooler is lost to the stock, and to the future of the fishery.  Yes, some fish are lost to release mortality, and we still have some way to go before all anglers release fish the right way.  But I have yet to hear the catch-and-kill crowd speak up at a hearing—and I attend every hearing held here on Long Island—even once, ask for their harvest to be cut for the good of the stock.  Instead, they always sing the same song as the fish4dinner crowd, and its chorus is “We want more dead fish.  More.  More!”

I’ll end this analysis by addressing the ludicrous claim that fish “are as important on the dinner table as they are in the water.”  After all, if there are no—or at least far too few—fish in the water, the chances of catching one, much less putting one on the dinner table, are going to be close to nil. 

Abundance is a prerequisite to maximizing the long-term social, ecological, and economic benefits that accrue from a resource, whether those benefits come in the form of food or recreational opportunity.

As I have noted before, if you want a recreational fishing industry, it helps to have fish.  Anglers don’t like to fish in an empty ocean, and even a cursory review of angler effort shows that such effort follows fish abundance; when fish are abundant, people do more fishing, and generate more economic activity.  Correlating striped bass abundance with angling effort, from 1995 until now, shows that to be true.

So, with that said, just who are the fish4dinner folks, and what do they want?  And why should anyone donate hard-earned cash to folks who won’t even disclose who they are?

Answering the easy question first, the fish4dinner folks seem to want weaker regulations, that allow a larger recreational harvest at the expense of the long-term health of the stock.  Three statements on their website’s home page make that perfectly clear:

“Advocates for ‘Catch and Release’ Fisheries, and ‘Game Fish’ status’s [sic] have been preached for so long it’s become household terminology amongst the public.  We must educate the public as to why this has been preached and also why it is wrong.”

Our current method of collecting data is flawed.  Those that wish to see our fisheries shut down enjoy this method as it highlights only statistics that align with their goals.  However what we see on the water just does not match up.  We believe a better way is out there.”

And

“We all believe in regulations and see the value they provide to sustain healthy fisheries.  However blindly agreeing to stricter regulations based on bad data does not make them appropriate.  We want the regulations to align with the science and the different ways we each fish.”

The parties behind the website seem to be part of a relatively new organization called the “East Coast Fisheries Coalition,” which claims to represent charter boat associations between Massachusetts and Maryland.  That makes sense, given that I found the site by clicking on a link included in comments submitted by that organization.  According to the best information I can find, the Coalition is a Rhode Island not-for-profit corporation, organized as a trade association that would qualify under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.  Its registered agent for service of process is Richard Bellavance, a Rhode Island charter boat captain and president of the Rhode Island Party and Charter Boat Association.  The “specific purpose” of the group is declared to be:

“we intend to advocate for the ability to sustainably harvest fish for dinner,”

which is fine, and would seem to be just what the ASMFC also wants.  While 2023 landings are likely to be lower than those of 2022 (which is intentional, as 2022 landings were too high to represent a sustainable harvest), about 1.7 million striped bass were landed through October 31 of last year.  While landings through December 31 won’t be available until the middle of February, the active fishery that New York and New Jersey enjoyed during the last two months of 2023 will almost certainly push landings well over two million fish, and demonstrate that plenty of people had “the ability to sustainably harvest fish for dinner” last year.

The interesting thing in the fish4dinner comments was the disparaging reference to “Gamefish Status’s.” “Gamefish status” is usually understood to mean outlawing commercial harvest and sale of s species, so it not only shouldn’t impact an angler’s ability to take a bass home, it should actually make it easier for a recreational angler to take home a fish, as the current commercial quota would probably be reallocated to anglers.  The fact that the reference is there suggests some input from the commercial sector, which might also feel threatened by conservation-minded anglers. 

Of course, those commercial fishermen might take the form of party and charter boat operators who also hold commercial licenses, as many do, and thus have an inherent conflict of interest if they claim to speak for the recreational sector.

Which finally gets us to the last question:  Why should anyone donate to fish4dinner?

The answer is that, if they’re a surfcaster or private-boat angler, they probably shouldn’t, particularly if they want to see fisheries that are fully rebuilt and sustainable in the long term, because what fish4dinner really represents is not the typical angler but—ironically, given some of its statements—a small, elite group of for-hire operators, who appear ready to hide their objections to fisheries data and fisheries science, and their opposition to conservative, science-based fisheries management, behind a seeming defense of anglers fishing for food.

But anglers should not be fooled.  Although fish4dinner makes fatuous, self-serving arguments, it is nonetheless a serious threat.

Capt. Rick Bellavance and the Rhode Island Party and Charter Boat Association are unapologetic supporters of “mode splits,” or “sector separation,” the notion that passengers on for-hire vessels should be granted special privileges not available to the great majority of recreational fishermen.  Such sector separation policies have already given bluefish anglers on for-hire boats a 5-fish bag limit, as opposed to a 3-fish limit for everyone else.  In the scup fishery, they have created a special “bonus season” which allows for-hire anglers a larger bag limit than those in the shore and private-boat sectors.  Now, in Addendum II, they are again seeking special privileges, in the form of a 28- to 33-inch bag limit, as opposed to the 28- to 31-inch slot that governs the other sectors.

Although, in 2022, shore and private-boat anglers accounted for 98.5% of all recreational fishing trips taken the northeast and mid-Atlantic regions, and so undoubtedly also accounted for the lion’s share of the economic benefits accruing from the recreational fishery, the fish4dinner folks seem intent on creating a small, elite group of for-hire vessels, that will be governed by special rules less restrictive than those that govern everyone else who, despite their economic contributions, will be relegated into a sort of fishing-related peasantry.

The aspersions cast on catch-and-release anglers also demeans the many forward-looking for-hire captains who have embraced conservation and fishing for the pure joy that the sport provides.  They merely provides cover for those in the for-hire fleet who refuse to change with the times, and continue to believe that the only proper gauge of a good day at sea is the number of dead fish tossed on the dock at the end of the trip.

While the desperation shown by such tactics is clear, fish4dinner may well prevail, unless anglers don’t tell fisheries managers at the state, ASMFC, and federal levels, that while taking fish home for dinner is a worthy and laudable goal that almost all of us, at some point, pursue, the primary goal of the fishery management system must be to sustain the long-term health of fish stocks.

For if they fail at that task, there will, in time, be nothing left to take home.