A FRESH LOOK AT SHARK DEPREDATION

 

Most sharks eat fish.  And like any predator, while they are capable of successfully hunting healthy prey, they are attracted to the easy kill, to prey that is sick, wounded, disabled—or tethered by an angler’s line.

As fishery management efforts show some success, and depressed populations of some shark species begin to rebuild, shark depredation—the term used to describe sharks striking a fish already hooked on an angler’s line or caught in a commercial fisherman’s gear—is becoming a bigger and bigger issue.  It seems that, while fishermen have no compunctions about catching and keeping fish that constitute the sharks’ usual prey, they get very upset when the tables are turned and a shark snatches a fish from an angler’s line.

Thus, we now have Congress debating the so-called “SHARKED Act,” which would create a “shark depredation task force” which would

“develop ways to improve coordination and communications across the fisheries management community and shark research community to address shark depredation,”

identify research priorities and funding opportunities related to topics relevant to the depredation issue,

“develop recommended management strategies to address shark depredation; and coordinate the development and distribution of educational materials to help the fishing community minimize shark interactions including through changed angler behavior and expectations.  [original formatting omitted]”

The Act also calls for the development of

“Projects to better understand shark depredation, including identifying what causes increases in shark depredation and determining how to best address shark depredation.”

Although the SHARKED Act has yet to pass the Senate, and its provisions have not yet been signed into law, it seems that a biologist employed by the Bonefish and Tarpon Trust has been conducting his own project to understand shark depredation in the Florida Keys and, at least with respect to one important corner of Florida Bay, he may be coming up with some interesting answers.

Dr. Jose Emilio Trujillo set about his task two years ago, working with anglers and fishing guides in the region to gather their experiences with shark depredation, focusing on the most popular recreational species:  snook, tarpon, red drum, bonefish, and permit.  He found that, throughout the Keys, about 10% of hooked bonefish, permit, and tarpon fell victim to shark depredation.  But he also found something else—in the popular fishing grounds near Flamingo, Florida, 31% of hooked snook and 23% of hooked red drum were lost to depredating sharks.

While four shark species—great hammerheads, blacktips, bull sharks, and lemon sharks—were responsible for the depredation events, it was lemon sharks that snatched most of the snook and red drum lost in the Flamingo area.

Not all lemon sharks engaged in that behavior.  According to an article in the South Florida SunSentinel, Dr. Trujillo found that

“there were two groups of lemon sharks using Flamingo—‘resident’ that were Flamingo homebodies and ‘transient’ who would often leave the area.

“About 28% of those sharks focused their time on known fishing hot spots that anglers would use on a regular basis.

“Fishing boats show up at those hot spots about 8 a.m.  The sharks tended to show up just before that.

“One shark tracked for more than 100 days came ‘over and over’ to a specific hot spot.”

So for that particular group of lemon sharks, at least, depredation might be a learned behavior.

But it may also be a behavior that has been forced on the sharks as a result of changes to the ecosystem in the Flamingo region, where sea grasses have experienced significant die-offs.  As Dr. Trujillo observed,

“Changes in the seagrass basically resonate in the whole community, in the whole ecosystem.  And we know that seagrass die-offs have resulted in declines in prey.”

It’s very possible that the lemon sharks around Flamingo have turned to depredating anglers’ fish because their more usual prey has become less abundant.  Dr. Trujillo has pointed to studies, conducted during the 1990s, which found that lemon sharks fed on small fish typical of the seagrass ecosystem, such as pinfish, toadfish, and mullet, and rarely preyed upon snook or red drum.  But in his recent studies, he has found that about 30% of the lemon sharks had been feeding, at least in part, on snook, something that he characterized as “very odd.”

He noted that

“No study until now has reported lemon sharks eating large prey like gamefish that are a high trophic level species.  The fact that we are finding snook in their diet is…not normal.  That indicated that they are obtaining this resource through a new way of hunting, which we believe is depredation.”

A stock assessment released in 2021 reported,

“Results suggest Lemon Shark stock abundance [off the southeastern United States] has been relatively stable since the mid-1990s, with some estimates of prior depletion.  Estimates of relative fishing mortality indicate earlier periods of overfishing with a decrease in fishing mortality since the early 2000s.”

At the same time,

“Life history characteristics suggest the Lemon Shark is vulnerable to exploitation.  In recent years, there is some evidence that Lemon Shark catch rates have declined and nursery sites have been negatively impacted by anthropogenic pressures off the southeastern USA.  These factors have increased conservation concerns and led to changes in fishery management.  For example, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission added Lemon Sharks to the prohibited species list in 2010, preventing their harvest in Florida state waters.  [citations omitted]”

Thus, the increased levels of depredation by lemon sharks seems driven by a change in behavior rather than a change in lemon shark abundance.

Still, the knee-jerk reaction of many recreational fishermen to the depredation is to call out for more sharks to be killed, in order to decrease the competition for limited marine resources.  I was appointed to the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Highly Migratory Species Advisory Panel in 2024, and in the four meetings I’ve attended so far, none have passed without someone in the recreational fishing community complaining about shark depredation, and calling for some sort of effort to reduce shark numbers.

The same sentiments exist in southwest Florida; the SunSentinel article quotes a local angler named Collin Ross, who complained that

“You can’t get away from the sharks.  They’re all over the place.  It is a huge issue…

“You used to be able to fish without any type of issues, and now you fish some areas and you have to leave immediately because of the sharks.”

Mr. Ross admits that he doesn’t know why shark depredation has increased.

“All we know is there are a lot more sharks in areas where people are fishing.  Why are they congregating?  Is there an overpopulation?  I don’t know.”

Yet, while he admits that he doesn’t know why depredation is occurring, he seems to think that he knows how to address it.

“We’re hoping that the [Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission] allows changes to federal law around lemon sharks, and then the guides can take it into their own hands and they can cull sharks as they see fit.”

“Cull sharks.”  Just kill them off because, I suppose, it is always easier to blame the sharks for the problem, and start killing them, than it is to address the real issue of seagrass loss.  One United States Geological Survey publication suggests that restoring the seagrass of the Florida Bay and Everglades watersheds would take about 20 years and cost approximately 7.8 billion dollars, and would not only require restoring fresh water flows into Florida Bay, but also ensuring that the water flowing in doesn’t carry pollutants that would increase the Bay’s nutrient load, and actually make the current problems worse.

Killing sharks is certainly quicker and cheaper than that, so it has many supporters, even if it is the wrong response to the problem.

 

CONGRESS TO MAINTAIN NMFS FUNDING

 

2025 was a bad year for the National Marine Fisheries Service, as the incoming administration made sharp personnel cuts, which reduced staff throughout the agency, including at the regional fisheries science centers.  As a result, stock assessments of important species were cancelled or delayed, fisheries data could not be gathered and analyzed, and NMFS was rendered less able to protect the nation’s living marine resources while also serving the needs of the nation’s fishermen.

For a while, it looked like 2026 was going to be worse.

Last September, the House of Representatives released a budget that would have cut NMFS funding by about 40%, an action that the Ocean Conservancy, a conservation group that focuses on marine issues, said, “would spell disaster for fisheries.”  The House proposal would have cut funding for fisheries science by 42%, cut the budget for fisheries management by 44%, reduced funding for habitat protection and restoration by 38%, and slashed the allocation for “protected species,” that is, marine mammals and endangered species, by 55%.

The Trump administration proposed a smaller, 30%, cut to NMFS budget, but also contemplated moving the agency out of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—which the administration was effectively gutting because of the President’s dislike of climate science—and merging it into the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

Either way, the outlook for the agency appeared to be bleak.

Fortunately, the Senate took a more rational approach to the funding issue, and over the course of the budget negotiations, convinced the House to do the same.  As a result, 2026 NMFS funding will be roughly the same as it was in 2025, and about $300 million in cuts originally proposed by the House will not occur.   The total amount provided for NMFS Operations, Research, and Facilities will be $1,121,703,000.

According to the website civileats.com, which reports on food-related issues and frequently covers topics affecting the commercial fishing industry,

“On the Senate floor, Senate Appropriations Committee Chair Susan Collins (R-Maine) said the bill reflected months of work involving significant bipartisan compromise.  It will also support the lobster and fishing industries of particular concern in Maine, she said.  ‘The Commerce bill also supports our oceans and fisheries and weather programs that are enormously important to our working waterfronts.’”

Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) noted that the compromise bill, which provides funding not just for NMFS, but for “Commerce, Justice, Science, & Related Agencies,” also provides

“Funding for NOAA [that] includes $32 million for the National Ocean and Coastal Security Fund and $81.5 million for Coastal Zone Management Grants, which improve the resilience of coastal communities around the country.  It also includes $7.1 million for the NOAA Chesapeake Bay Office, including $3.25 million for oyster restoration activities—an increase of $1.5 million—and $80 million for the National Sea Grant College program and $14 million for Sea Grant Aquaculture program, all of which support improved health and productivity of the Chesapeake Bay.  The bill also includes $2.5 million for a new menhaden survey in the Chesapeake Bay to ensure the sustainability of a critical species.”

While it’s only natural for a Maryland senator to emphasize the benefits the bill brings to his home waters, the programs mentioned in Sen. Van Hollen’s press release will have impacts that reach far beyond the Chesapeake Bay.  NOAA’s Chesapeake Bay Office, for example, engages with scientists to conduct ongoing striped bass research within the Bay, which is, by far, the species’ most important spawning ground.  And, hopefully, funding a new menhaden study for the Chesapeake Bay will finally end the decades-long debate as to whether “localized depletion” of menhaden is taking place in the Bay and, if it is, open the door to efforts to correct the situation, something that the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board is already exploring.

The House has already passed the bill that includes the NMFS funding.  The Senate might pass it as soon as tomorrow.

But, then again, it might not.

Last month, the Trump administration took action to shut down the National Center for Atmospheric Research, which is located in Colorado.  Along with its work related to better predicting the weather, the Center housed the largest federal climate change research program, which apparently made it a target of the science-averse administration, which seems to believe that it can ignore climate trends simply by pretending that they don’t exist.  Thus, while calling the Center

“one of the largest sources of climate alarmism in the country,”

and citing

“two instances of the lab’s ‘woke direction’ that wastes taxpayer funds on what [an] official called frivolous pursuits and ideologies,”

including an experiment that

“traced air pollution to [according to an administration official] ‘demonize motor vehicles, oil and gas operations,’”

the administration set about dismantling it.

That action didn’t sit right with at least one Colorado senator, so it is possible that the funding bill might be delayed while the question of whether the Center should be closed or maintained can be straightened out.

Hopefully, that will happen soon.  For while the pending bill still doesn’t give NMFS all of the funding it needs to perform stock assessments and collect needed data on the 400-plus species that it manages, it nonetheless maintains funding at a level that will not cripple the agency and will allow it to go about its work of conserving and managing the nation’s fish stocks.

Given our current political environment, that is enough to be deemed good news.

 

 

 

 

 

 

NMFS PROPOSES NEW RECREATIONAL SHARK REGULATIONS

 

For many years, if you were an Atlantic- or Gulf-Coast angler, a shark was a shark, at least for regulatory purposes.  There was no distinction made between species at all.

Then, in 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service implemented regulations that designated five shark species as “prohibited species” that may not be retained.  But for all other sharks, with the exception of dogfish and the Atlantic sharpnose shark, the rules were the same, with a 2-fish per boat limit and no minimum size.

Over the years, more species were added to the prohibited list, and recreational regulations became more restrictive, with a one-shark-per-boat limit and a 54-inch (fork length) minimum size.  Owners of boats participating in the recreational shark fishery are now required to obtain an Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Permit before going fishing, and to watch a brief on-line video, and pass a brief on-line quiz, to obtain or renew such permit each year.  Along most of the coast, shark fishermen fishing with bait—which includes most of the fishery—are also required to use non-offset, non-stainless steel circle hooks to minimize the number of sharks that are fatally hooked in the gut or gills.

A sharp decline in the number of hammerheads resulted in the minimum size for them being increased to 78 inches, and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, reacting to a sharp decline in the abundance of shortfin mako sharks in the North Atlantic, prohibited fishermen in member states from landing any shortfin makos at all.  But outside of those changes, and with the exception of a couple of inshore species, the 54-inch size limit and 1-fish-per-boat bag applied to all other non-prohibited sharks, regardless of their size at maturity or their abundance.

But in the case of shark regulations, one size (or bag limit) really doesn’t fit all.

Now, NMFS has taken its first big step toward developing management measures that are more tailored to the species being managed.

On January 5, the agency published a set of proposed regulations that could make a big difference in how the recreational shark fishery is managed (the same proposed regulations would also revise some aspects of the commercial fishery for blacknose sharks, but that need not be addressed today).  If adopted, the proposed rule would separate shark species into groups, based on appearance, habitat, size other factors, and tailor management measures to the species within each group. 

The proposed groups would include

“Atlantic sharpnose, bonnethead, and smoothhound sharks:  Atlantic sharpnose and bonnethead sharks could be caught in similar areas using similar fishing techniques.  Currently, Atlantic sharpnose, bonnethead, and smoothhound sharks are similarly managed in the recreational shark fishery (i.e., no minimum size limit)…Thus, these species are grouped together.

 “Blacknose and finetooth sharks:  Blacknose and finetooth sharks have similar sizes at maturity.  Additionally, they look similar and can be very difficult to distinguish.  To avoid misidentification during recreational fishing activities, these species are grouped together.

“Blacktip and spinner sharks:  Blacktip and spinner sharks look similar and can be very difficult to distinguish.  To avoid misidentification during recreational fishing activities, these species are grouped together.

“Great hammerhead, scalloped hammerhead, and smooth hammerhead sharks:  Hammerhead species have similar sizes at maturity.  Additionally, they look very similar and distinguishing hammerhead sharks from each other is quite difficult even for the most seasoned fishermen.  However, hammerhead species can be distinguished easily from other [large coastal sharks].  Thus, these species are grouped together.

 “Bull, lemon, nurse, and tiger sharks:  These [large coastal sharks] are grouped together because most of them have similar sizes at maturity, and they could be caught in similar areas using similar fishing techniques.”

“Blue, common thresher, and porbeagle sharks:  These pelagic shark species are grouped together because they have a similar size at maturity and they could be caught in similar areas using similar fishing techniques.”

With those species groups established, NMFS would have the ability to abandon its current one-size-limit-fits-all approach, and adopt limits more appropriate for each species group.  As the proposed rule states,

“[T]he default recreational minimum size limit would be based on a midpoint value of the female sizes at maturity for the shark species in that group, or else it would remain constant with the current HMS regulations…The recreational minimum size limit range would encompass the female sizes at maturity for all shark species in each group, and allow the minimum size limit to be set above the female sizes at maturity for each group.  This proposed approach is a change from the status quo…where all sharks, unless otherwise specified, must be at least 54 inches (137 cm) [fork length]; and there is no size limit for Atlantic sharpnose, bonnethead, or smoothhound sharks.”

Such an approach is long overdue, because all sharks just aren’t the same.

Consider blacktip and spinner sharks, one of the proposed species groups.  Female blacktips mature, on average, at about 123 centimeters fork length, just over 48 inches, and the species reaches a maximum size of about 180 cm (71 inches).  Spinner sharks get a little bit bigger, reaching a maximum fork length of around 200 cm (79 inches), with females maturing when about 140 cm (55 inches) in length.

For blacktips, the current 54-inch minimum size is arguably overly conservative, although it seems to fit the spinner shark pretty well.

On the other hand, the common thresher shark, which is probably the most sought-after shark, grows quite a bit larger.  Ever since ICCAT prohibited landings of shortfin makos, it is the most targeted shark in the northeast and upper mid-Atlantic, and also the species most often taken home for food (although porbeagles are frequently landed, if they’re encountered, up off New England).  Female common threshers don’t mature until they’re about 83 inches long, fish that would weigh somewhere between 250 and 300 pounds.

That makes the 54-inch size limit an extremely ineffective conservation measure; over the nearly 50 years that I’ve been chasing sharks off New York and Rhode Island, most of the common threshers that I’ve encountered probably weighed more than 250, but I’ve only seen a very few that would have measured less than 54 inches.

So the proposed rule, which would establish a default minimum size of 48 inches, with a possible minimum as large as 70 inches, for spinners and blacktips, while allowing a minimum size as large as 95 inches for common threshers, is a step in the right direction—although the 54-inch default size for threshers that has long been in effect should be replaced by a higher limit that provides immature females with some real protection.

The proposed rule would also allow NMFS to make mid-season adjustments to the bag limit for the different species of sharks.

“At the start of each fishing year…the default recreational limits will apply.  During the fishing year, NMFS may adjust retention limits within the range specified…based on the inseason trip limit criteria listed [elsewhere in the existing regulations]…The adjusted retention limit(s) will remain in effect through the end of the fishing year or until otherwise adjusted.”

The default bag limit for most shark species which may currently be landed is one per vessel per trip, consistent with the existing management measures, although for each species the range may vary between zero and one (shortfin mako), zero and three (most non-prohibited species), zero and four (Atlantic sharpnose and bonnethead), and zero and five (blacktip).  For sandbar sharks, silky sharks, and any of the prohibited species, there is no permissible range; the only option is zero retention.

The flexibility allowed by the proposed rule would let NMFS increase the bag limit for abundant species such as blacktips, which can probably sustain a higher recreational harvest, while also allowing it to easily prohibit landings of any species that appears to be overfished or otherwise imperiled. 

I sit on NMFS’ Highly Migratory Species Advisory Panel and, the last time these issues were discussed there, happily supported a number of the management changes embodied in the proposed rule, most particularly grouping species with similar characteristics into distinct species groups, and better matching the minimum size limit to the female size at maturing for the different species—particularly the common thresher, which is attracting more directed attention from recreational fishermen than it attracted a decade ago.

The proposed rule can be found at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/05/2025-24264/atlantic-highly-migratory-species-revisions-to-commercial-atlantic-blacknose-and-recreational, where interested parties can also find instructions on how to submit public comment.

The public comment deadline is March 6, 2026.

Although I expressed my views on some of these topics at the Advisory Panel meetings, I intend to submit favorable comments on the proposed rule, and urge those interested in the recreational shark fishery on the Atlantic coast, or in the conservation of Atlantic shark species, to do the same.

 

 

 

A NEW THREAT TO STRIPED BASS CONSERVATION

 

The American Sportfishing Association is the largest trade organization representing the fishing tackle industry.

Twenty-five or so years ago, it was an active advocate for fisheries conservation.  I still recall when, back in the late 1990s, I was very involved with the Coastal Conservation Association, and we worked with the American Sportfishing Association and The Billfish Foundation to advocate for legislation that would allocate funds for buying out a significant part of the pelagic longline fleet, in order to reduce its bycatch and dead discards of billfish and other non-target species.

The legislation had a decent chance of passing until recreational fishing organizations from New Jersey, led by the now-defunct Recreational Fishing Alliance, went out of their way to lobby against it, seemingly for no better reason than the fact that it wasn’t originally their idea.

There was no question that the ASA was a legitimate conservation advocate back then, and a little bit later, too, when it again joined with CCA and other organizations to ensure that the 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act didn’t roll back the conservation provisions that had been made a part of the law a decade before.

But times have changed, and the recreational fishing industry has, for the most part, turned its back on conservation concerns.  The change can probably traced back to the creation of the Center for Sportfishing Policy (originally, the Center for Coastal Conservation) in 2006, which brought the ASA, CCA, the National Marine Manufacturers Association, and a number of other industry and “anglers’ rights” groups together within a single umbrella organization. 

While the original intent of the Center was benign—I was around at the beginning, and it really was intended to focus on conservation work when it started out—it soon became an industry-dominated voice for the tackle and boating industries, dedicated to dismantling the federal fisheries management system in order to win more “access”—a euphemism it often employs, in lieu of “more dead fish”—for recreational fishermen, which it hopes will translate into more profits for angling-related industries.

Conservation is no longer a concern.

So we have seen the ASA and its affiliated organizations attack federal red snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic, as it seeks more “access”  for recreational fishermen.  And we have seen it actively support “Recreational Management Reform” in the mid-Atlantic, advocating for a management approach that would allow anglers to exceed the recreational harvest limit, and even the annual catch limit, with complete impunity, in the name of increased “access.”

Thus, as someone who has been a striped bass fisherman for more than 60 years, and who has been very active in striped bass management issues for a very long time, I have to admit that I felt more than a little trepidation when I read an American Sportfishing Association press release that outlined the organization’s “policy priorities” for the upcoming year.

Some of its priorities would be good for everyone, such as reauthorizing the Dingell-Johnson Act, which assesses a 10% excise tax on fishing tackle and some sales of motor boat fuel, and passes that money on to the states to fund recreational fisheries management.

Some are the sort of self-serving priorities one would expect of any trade organization, intended to provide economic benefits to its members, even if they don’t necessarily serve the public interest.

But down toward the bottom of that list, amongst some of the small print, was the priority that set alarm bells off in my head:

“improve access to striped bass.  [emphasis added]”

Not “rebuild the striped bass stock.”

Not “address poor striped bass recruitment.”

Not even “seek ways to reduce the number of striped bass that die after release.”

Instead, it was “improve access to striped bass,” which, when the euphemisms are all stripped away, means “find ways for anglers to kill more striped bass (so ASA members can sell more striped bass stuff).”

And when you see the ASA saying that, knowing that its efforts to derail striped bass conservation efforts have in the past been and will in the future be supported by such well-funded and politically savvy groups as the Coastal Conservation Association, National Marine Manufacturers Association, and other members of the Center for Sportfishing Policy, the threat to the bass’ future becomes clear.

For a very long time, striped bass seemed to fly under the American Sportfishing Association’s radar; the ASA rarely commented at the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board’s meetings, and rarely if ever mentioned striped bass in its press releases.  But that all began to change in 2024, during the American Sportfishing Association’s annual trade show, ICAST, when Michael Waine, ASA’s Atlantic Fisheries Policy Director, appeared on a podcast, where he said, among other things,

“the question becomes like how far are we willing to go from a management and policy side to meet these very ambitious conservation goals, and you can see the byproduct of that, we have a very narrow slot limit.  And so where we, where we’re currently focused is where do we go from here?  We want to avoid the scenario like southern flounder and a scenario like red snapper [where recreational landings are sharply curtailed].  We want to make sure that management…is aware of the headwinds but also allows for access for anglers to go out and catch a fish, and so how do we balance these values?  How do we balance building back a population to a conservation level that we can all agree on, which we never likely will, with the ability to actually go out and catch these fish, and what worries me, worries on this specifically is like we’ll go too far, meaning we’ll actually tell people to stop fishing for striped bass, which is where I think everyone loses…  [emphasis added]”

It was a relatively innocuous statement, which expressed concerns about the impact of needed conservation measures on recreational fishing effort (with less effort, of course, likely to mean lower revenues for the fishing tackle industry), but didn’t yet take a hard stand against striped bass conservation efforts.  Yet it marked a line where, for the first time, an ASA spokesman suggested that there was a point where conservation efforts might need to be curtailed to “[allow] for access for anglers to go out and catch a fish,” regardless of how such curtailment might impact stock rebuilding.

Waine, and so the American Sportfishing Association, took a harder line when the Management Board met on December 16, 2024, to decide whether to adopt management measures intended to reduce fishing mortality and protect the slightly above-average 2018 year class as it grew into the recreational slot size limit in 2025; with striped bass recruitment over the previous six years the worst that had ever been recorded (poor recruitment in 2025 has now extended the recruitment drought to seven years), most fishery managers believed that the 2018 year class would be needed to rebuild the stock by the 2029 deadline imposed by the management plan.

An overwhelming majority of the public comment on the issue supported reducing landings in order to better protect the 2018s; out of 3,370 comments received, 2,853—84.7%--favored reductions that would protect the 2018s and the striped bass stock as a whole.

But Waine, and the ASA, demurred, arguing that no action should be taken for the 2025, season; instead, Waine argued that a new addendum, which would become Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, should be initiated.  He effectively asserted that the Management Board should discount the great majority of public comment in support of a harvest reduction, saying

“I look at the public comments, and I know there’s millions of striped bass anglers out there.  Millions.  And I’m only seeing twenty five hundred comments from a lot of the same people that we know have been commenting.  And so, as an organization, we’re going to work with our members to try to get more people integrated into this process.  We know that the recreational fishery is very diverse, and I don’t feel the public comments really are a good reflection of that diversity…Don’t talk to the same folks you’ve been talking to all the time.  Find the people who care about this resource in a way that their voices should be heard, too.  And that’s what we’ll do as an organization ourselves.”

Once again, the motivation for the ASA’s position was perfectly clear.  For many years, striped bass have been the single most important recreational fish on the New England and mid-Atlantic coasts, and people who fish for striped bass collectively buy a lot of fishing tackle.  To the extent that regulations which make it harder to take a striped bass home discourage some anglers from going fishing, imposing more regulations for the 2025 season would probably mean less income for ASA members.

In the end, the Management Board decided to adopt no new management measures for 2025, and instead move forward with Addendum III, as Waine had hoped.  And when the debate on Addendum III came to a head at the October 2025 Management Board meeting, the American Sportfishing Association was very well prepared to oppose the proposed conservation measures. 

It had used its “Keep America Fishing” website to argue against any further restrictions, and convinced 660 individuals to sign onto its form letter opposing any harvest reductions; another 269 persons altered the form letter in some regard, and were counted as individual comments opposing the conservation measures (how many of those individuals actually participated in the striped bass fishery, and how many just clicked on the link to send in a form letter because they subscribed to the website, but had no real interest in striped bass, is something that we can’t know).  In addition, it had rallied the Center for Sportfishing Policy, Coastal Conservation Association, Boat Owners Association of the United States, Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, and National Marine Manufacturers Association to join them in a letter that argued against the proposed measures, writing, in part, that

“The economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery cannot be overstated:

·       In 2016, striped bass trip and equipment spending across Atlantic coastal states generated approximately $13 billion in total economic output, supported over 104,000 jobs, and contributed more than $7.7 billion to regional GDP.

·       On a per-pound basis, the recreational sector generates 17 times more retail sales value, 8 times more economic activity, and nearly quadruple the jobs compared to the commercial sector.

The proposed season closures—whether prohibiting harvest or targeting—will undoubtedly erode these substantial economic benefits and disproportionately impact coastal small businesses, bait and tackle shops, marinas, boat manufacturers, charter operators, and the entire recreational fishing and boating supply chain.

We represent the entire recreational fishing and boating community, including businesses that serve all anglers regardless of economic background or preferred fishing technique.  Maintaining consistent seasons is the most equitable solution: it preserves both regional economic stability and angler access across preference lines, without inflicting unnecessary economic hardship.  [emphasis added]”

So there is clearly a lot of money at stake for ASA members, and the ASA’s response to Addendum III has made it completely clear that it will do its very best to oppose striped bass conservation measures that might have negative economic impacts on the recreational fishing industry.

But it’s not just about opposing new management measures.  Remember that, when it listed its 2026 policy priorities, the American Sportfishing Association expressed its intent to “improve access to striped bass.”  That “improve access” language suggests that the ASA isn’t going to be happy just maintaining the status quo; it seemingly plans to be proactive, and find ways to pile more dead striped bass on the dock—because that’s what “improve access” really means.

In addition, the Management Board has no current plans to adopt additional management measures before the next benchmark stock assessment is released in the first half of 2027.

So how can the ASA work to “improve access” in the meantime?

There are two ways, both of which have greater long-term implications for the striped bass stock than merely opposing one harvest reduction.

The first would involve influencing the “Work Group” created at the October Management Board meeting, which will be tasked with considering various issues related to striped bass management, and providing advice on issues, which could include changing the reference points used to manage the striped bass stock, that will inform the Management Board when it decides to draft—or not to draft—its next set of management measures.  If the ASA could push the Work Group into recommending a lower biomass target and threshold, it would be in a better position to advance its arguments for higher recreational striped bass kill (which it would, of course, describe as “improved access”).

The second, and potentially more harmful, influence it could have would be to convince the Management Board to amend the terms of reference used in the stock assessment itself, by choosing lower reference points for the spawning stock biomass target and threshold.  By essentially “moving the goalposts,” and lowering the biomass reference points, the Management Board would be able to declare that the stock was no longer overfished, and perhaps even fully recovered, which would in turn allow more liberal regulations that would let anglers bring more dead bass home (and so, “improve access”).

There is a particularly high risk of that happening in the striped bass stock assessment, because the current reference points are not biological reference points derived from the population model used in the assessment, but rather “empirical reference points” based on spawning stock biomass in 1995, the year that the stock was declared fully recovered after it collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Because the reference points are not model-derived, it is very easy for the ASA, and other advocates for higher landings, to argue that another base year, when the population was lower, could be used to determine the reference points, thus damning the striped bass stock to a smaller spawning stock biomass, with a truncated age structure, that is more vulnerable in the long term.

Based on its conduct over the past two years, the American Sportfishing Association and other affiliates of the Center for Sportfishing Policy could well emerge as the greatest obstacle to striped bass conservation over the next few years.  Should that occur, they will prove a formidable opponent, as the organizations are well-funded, employ capable lobbyists, and have purchased the attention of many members of Congress through the Center’s political action committee.

The only thing that conservation advocates have on their side is the weight of striped bass science, and their determination to prevent the stock from ever collapsing again.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARINE FISHERIES 2026: THE CLOUDS CONTINUE TO GATHER--PART II

 

Last Thursday, I posted the first part of an overview of the 2026 marine fisheries management landscape, and the issues likely to arise over the next year.  That post focused on the highest federal government levels, the administration and Congress, which drive federal fisheries policy, but rely on the regional fishery management councils to turn that policy into practice.

However, with a few exceptions, federal fishery managers lack the authority to manage fish in state waters, so the actions of state managers also can have a significant impact on the health and sustainability of fish stocks.  Along the East Coast, states have joined together to manage fish stocks cooperatively through the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, which manages some species that are not governed by federal fisheries management plans while acting cooperatively with the National Marine Fisheries Service to manage others.

Today’s post will address issues that they will probably confront in 2026.

At the regional fishery management councils

One of the biggest issues that all of the regional fishery management councils will face in 2026 is a lack of timely scientific advice, resulting from the cuts in federal funding for NMFS regional fishery science centers and the resultant layoffs and voluntary departures of many fisheries scientists.  As noted in a press release issued by the New England Fisheries Management Council,

“The Council held an update on recent reductions to federal science and management resources including a total loss of 545 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) positions, including 50 staff positions within the Northeast Region alone.  These reductions have not only delayed management actions, but directly affected stock assessments, surveys, and data streams.

“In 2025, several planned stock assessments were replaced with ‘data updates,’ which are ‘summaries of new data that have become available since that last management track assessment.  Specifically, they update (1) U.S. catch (landings and discards) by commercial and recreational sector, as appropriate, and (2) aggregated [Northeast Fisheries Science Center] survey indices.’  Data updates are expected for many stocks in 2026 as well…  [emphasis in original]”

Such cuts can only render fisheries management more uncertain and less responsive to changes affecting fish stocks, creating greater risks to long-term sustainability and making it more likely that overfishing may occur, that overfished stocks may not recover, and that already stressed stocks will decline further and possibly become overfished, thus causing long-term harm not only to the stocks themselves, but to the recreational and commercial fisheries that they support.

Given the ongoing debate over federal spending, the January 30 deadline to put an appropriations bill in place, and both parties’ apparent intent to avoid a government shutdown, it appears unlikely that significantly more money will be available for fisheries science in the upcoming year, so the current situation is likely to fester for a while.

With that in mind, these are the issues likely to arise at some of the regional fishery management councils over the course of the year.

Atlantic herring/river herring

After a federal district court vacated Amendment 8 to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan in 2022, deciding that its findings of localized depletion and the need to create nearshore areas that excluded midwater trawlers were not supported by substantial evidence, the New England Fishery Management Council decided to address the issue again in the pending Amendment 10 to the herring management plan.

Amendment 10 was originally intended to

“minimize user conflicts, achieve [optimum yield], and support rebuilding of the herring resource,”

as well as create catch caps and time and area closures intended to protect river herring and shad.

Although Amendment 10 is still considered a “multi-year priority,” it was subordinated to an omnibus amendment intended to address management flexibility measures in 2025.  Now, in view of it being specifically mentioned by stakeholders as a measure contrary to the President’s April 17, 2025 Executive Order, there is a significant possibility that Amendment 10 could be abandoned in 2026, and that the proposed additional protections for shad and river herring will not be put in place.

Private anglers to be subordinated in the Mid-Atlantic

Since 2019, the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council, working in conjunction with the ASMFC, has been engaged in what it calls its “Recreational Reform Initiative,” which has essentially been an effort to “increase management flexibility,” which might be interpreted by some (and I’m among them) as an effort to sidestep some of the management provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act in order to allow recreational fishermen to kill more bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass than a strict application of the law would otherwise allow.

Needless to say, the recreational fishing industry has been very supportive of the Initiative, as it views larger annual catch targets as necessary for increased sales and higher profits.  But whether or not the Initiative was in the long-term interest of anglers and the fish they pursue, one thing that could be said was that, up to now, it treated all anglers equitably.

In 2026, that may no longer be the case.

The Council and the ASMFC are now engaged in developing a “Recreational Sector Separation Amendment” that would apply to the bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass fisheries.  As the Council describes it,

“the amendment may consider options for managing for-hire recreational fisheries separately from other recreational fishing modes (referred to as sector separation), as well as options related to for-hire permit and reporting requirements.”

Right now, the Council’s fishery management plans recognize only the commercial and recreational sectors, with anglers fishing from for-hire vessels subject to the recreational rules.  However, along with definitions for “commercial fishing” and “recreational fishing,” Magnuson-Stevens also includes a definition for “charter fishing,” which reads

“The term ‘charter fishing’ means fishing from a vessel carrying a passenger for hire…who is engaged in recreational fishing.”

So, if what the Council and ASMFC were planning to do was to separate the charter fishing sector from the rest of the recreational sector, allocate it its own annual catch limit based on its recent share of recreational landings, and give it regulations different from those governing the recreational sector, which would keep the sector’s landings at or below its ACL, it probably would not present a problem.

But that’s not what’s going on.

The for-hire fleet doesn’t want to be locked into its current landings levels; instead, it is seeking to stay within the recreational annual landings target, but to enjoy more favorable regulations that will allow its share of the landings to expand at the expense of the private-boat and shore based fishermen.  That intent was made clear in various comments made at the November 3, 2025 meeting of the Bluefish and the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass advisory panels.  The report of that meeting noted that Connecticut charter boat captain Michael Pirri

“recalled when he first entered the for-hire fishery, it was widely understood that for-hire vessels harvested more than 10% of the total scup, black sea bass, and summer flounder.  Currently, those estimates have dropped to around 3-4%, depending on the fishery.  He noted that a key goal of the amendment should be to ‘privilege’ the for-hire fleet enough to result in a share of harvest closer to that 10%.  [emphasis added].”

Another way of expressing that is that he wanted to disadvantage the majority of recreational fishermen enough that they surrendered six or seven percent of overall landings to the much smaller group of anglers who fish from the for-hire boats.

So how small is the for-hire fleet’s contribution to the relevant fisheries?  The Council has historically compared the for-hire and private sectors by comparing landings, noting that

“scup and black sea bass have a higher percentage of harvest from the for-hire modes (11% of pounds harvested) compared to summer flounder (5% of pounds harvested).”

But one would expect anglers benefitting from the knowledge and skill of a professional captain and crew to land a disproportionately high share of the catch compared to recreational fishermen, who must depend on their generally more limited skills.  A more accurate gauge of public participation, and indirectly of each sector’s contribution to the social and economic benefits gleaned from each fishery, can be found in the number of trips taken.

There, data from the 2024 season (complete 2025 data is not yet available) shows that in the mid-Atlantic region, the for-hire fleet accounted for 15,485 (0.62%) out of an estimated 2,492,355 trips primarily targeting bluefish, 135,796 (1.60%) of the estimated 8,465,850 trips targeting summer flounder, 52,976 (3.94%) of the estimated 1,346,101 trips targeting scup, and 93,376 (11.83%) of the estimated 789,468 trips targeting black sea bass.

Given that data, there seems to be little reason to disadvantage the vast majority of recreational fishermen, and relegate them to the status of second-class anglers, in order to provide special advantages to what can only be described as a privileged few.

Yet that may be what we see in 2026.

 A draft of the sector separation amendment is almost certain to be completed in the first half of 2026, and go to public hearings soon after that.  Given that recreational fishermen are virtually unrepresented on the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, with just about all of the supposedly “recreational” seats being held by members of the for-hire fleet or others closely tied to the recreational fishing industry, despite that fleet’s relatively tiny contribution to the overall fishery, the disadvantaging of the private-boat and shore-based angler is very likely to occur.

South Atlantic red snapper

The problem besetting the South Atlantic red snapper fishery is very easy to describe but not at all easy to remedy:  Too many red snapper are being caught by recreational fishermen during the closed season, and are subsequently discarded dead.  As a result, recreational and commercial red snapper regulations are extremely restrictive.

On paper, that’s easy to fix.  All NMFS has to do is close an area of the ocean off Georgia and northern Florida for three months or so, to drive down the number of snapper caught as bycatch in other recreational fisheries, which would actually allow the number of red snapper taken home by recreational fishermen to nearly triple.

In the real world, a fix is nearly impossible, as the recreational fishing industry and militant recreational fishing organizations refuse to take responsibility for their own excesses.  Thus, we see the recreational sector continually trying to impeach the federal fisheries management system and transfer red snapper management to the states, where managers are much more vulnerable to political pressure, and have far more authority to ignore overfishing.

Efforts to replace the Marine Recreational Information Program, used to collect recreational data, with unproven state programs are well underway, as are efforts to transfer management authority from NMFS to state fisheries managers.  At the federal level, NMFS seems willing to give in to at least some of the recreational demands; last June, it reneged on an agreement to settle a lawsuit challenging its tolerance for recreational overfishing, backing off a proposed regulation to put the needed area closure in place.

In 2026, with a sympathetic federal administration, a regional management council that is also sympathetic to the recreational sector, and state managers willing to accept responsibility for managing red snapper, along with local congressmen that have already designated a willingness to support recreational demands, we can expect efforts to undermine federal red snapper management not only continue, but accelerate.

A transfer of some or all of the management authority to the states could very well take place.

And the South Atlantic red snapper stock could easily decline again.

Gulf of Mexico Amberjack

Greater amberjack in the Gulf of Mexico have suffered from severe overfishing.  In 2024, recreational fishermen caught more than twice their allocated quota, which meant that, pursuant to the accountability measures contained in the management plan, the 2025 recreational amberjack season should not have opened at all.

However, NMFS failed to prevent the season from opening, and allowed it to run for an entire month before shutting it down on September 27.  Most Gulf states followed NMFS lead, and also shut their seasons down in late September.  The one exception was Louisiana, which allowed fishermen to continue to land amberjack supposedly caught in state waters through October 31, the originally-scheduled close of the federal season.

As part of the announcement that Louisiana would not close its season in concert with the federal closure, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries said,

“Governor Jeff Landry and Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) Secretary Tyler Bosworth sent a letter to NOAA Fisheries earlier this month, requesting that management of Greater Amberjack be transferred to the state level.”

Not surprisingly, on its Facebook page, the Louisiana chapter of the Coastal Conservation Association, an “angler’s rights” organization that is very closely affiliated with the fishing tackle and boating industries, stated that it

“applauds the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and Governor Jeff Landry for their actions and stance on Greater Amberjack.”

Given that the Coastal Conservation Association is one of the organizations most aggressively supporting state management of South Atlantic red snapper, and given that it had taken a similar position with red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico, it is highly likely that, in the event that the 2026 Gulf amberjack season is either curtailed or completely cancelled, we will see another effort to undercut federal fisheries managers and the federal management system, by a group of people who know that state management provides the easiest route to evading science-based management measures, and avoiding the consequences of their own overfishing.

And in the current political environment, they could well succeed.

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission

Although striped bass will never be a low-profile species at the ASMFC, it will probably not be the most controversial topic at the management table in 2026, as members of the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board look toward the benchmark stock assessment scheduled for release in the first half of 2027.

Atlantic menhaden

Instead, Atlantic menhaden will probably take the spotlight.  Last October, faced with data that suggested that total allowable catch would have to be cut by well over 50% in order to keep landings at or below the fishing mortality target, the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board only set the total allowable catch for a single year, 2026, rather than for the full three-year period, as was originally planned.  While the 2026 TAC is 20% lower than the total allowable catch in 2025, it did not reduce landings, as menhaden landings have been about 80% of the TAC in recent years.

So, in 2026, the menhaden management board will have to decide whether to further reduce the total allowable catch and, if their answer is yes, whether to reduce it all the way down to the point that would probably keep fishing mortality below the target level. 

There will undoubtedly be substantial public comment, driven by the conservation and angling communities, to make the full cut; if this year’s debate is any guide, the same interests will call for a complete prohibition on the so-called “reduction fishery,” the fleet of large purse seine vessels that dominate the commercial menhaden fishery, catching fish that will be “reduced” into fish meal, oil, and other industrial products.

That fleet is based in Virginia, where it provides employment for hundreds of individuals in an area where good-paying jobs can be hard to find.  It is certain that the reduction industry will strenuously resist a significant cut in the menhaden TAC, and it would obviously do all it can to oppose a complete closure of the reduction fishery.  Whether the other members of the Management Board will insist that landings reductions are taken, or whether the majority will accede to Virginia’s demands, cannot yet be predicted.

But the overall menhaden quota is not the only issue that will be on the table in 2026.  The Atlantic Menhaden Management Board has also agreed to initiate a new addendum to the management plan, which might reduce the cap on reduction fishery landings within the Chesapeake Bay by as much as 50%.

The current Bay cap of 51,000 metric tons was adopted in order to avoid the possibility of localized menhaden depletion in the Chesapeake Bay.  That has been a hot issue over the past couple of years, with some arguing that a shortage of menhaden in the Bay, allegedly due to reduction fleet landings, has led to a host of ills, ranging from a decline in striped bass abundance to nesting failure impacting the Bay’s osprey population.

The problem is that, while a lot of people talk about localized depletion, no one has ever been able to demonstrate that it exists.  So, while it is likely that the debate over a reduced Bay cap will be long on emotion, it is not clear whether a reduced cap will be supported by any hard data.  And it is unclear whether, should hard data be lacking, emotion will be enough to put a Bay cap in place when the Management Board meets to decide the issue in October 2026.

The federal threat

Regardless of the species that it is attempting to manage, the ASMFC has no inherent authority to require its member jurisdictions to comply with its fisheries management plans.  Instead, it must rely on a provision of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act that reads,

“Within 30 days after receiving a notification from the Commission [that a state has failed to comply with an ASMFC management plan] and after review of the Commission’s determination of noncompliance, the Secretary [of Commerce] shall make a finding on (1) whether the State in question has failed to carry out its responsibilities [to comply with a management plan], and (2) if so, whether the measures that the State has failed to implement and enforce are necessary for the conservation of the fishery in question…

“Upon making a finding…that a State has failed to carry out its responsibilities [to comply with a management plan] and that the measures it failed to implement and enforce are necessary for conservation, the Secretary shall declare a moratorium on fishing in the fishery in question within the waters of the noncomplying State.  [formatting omitted]”

And that may turn out to be a problem when it comes to enforcing its fisheries management decisions this year, as the current administration is more concerned with deregulating fisheries than in conserving fish stocks.

Consider the two menhaden issues discussed above.

Say that the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, at its October meeting, decides to phase in a reduction in menhaden landings over the next few years, dropping landings from somewhere around 186,840 metric tons in 2026 to 108,450 metric tons in 2029.  And say that Virginia, which is allocated about three-quarters of all commercial menhaden landings, decides that such cuts would do too much harm to its menhaden fishermen, refuses to put the new, lower landings levels in place, and goes out of compliance, arguing to the Secretary of Commerce that the 186,840 metric ton annual catch limit does not lead to overfishing, and thus further reduction are not “necessary for the conservation of the fishery.”

And say that, in considering Virginia’s noncompliance, the Secretary looks to the Executive Order that President Trump signed on April 17, 2025, notes its intent to “unburden our commercial fishermen from costly and inefficient regulations” and to “promote…sale and export of United States fishery and aquaculture products,” recognizes that most of the menhaden  caught by Virginia fishermen are sold to a Canadian buyer, and decides that such considerations override the Management Board’s preference to reduce fishing mortality to the target level, because even a 186,840 metric ton harvest will not lead to overfishing, so the reduction is not necessary for the conservation of the Atlantic menhaden fishery.

Under such hypothetical conditions, the Secretary of Commerce could easily excuse Virginia’s noncompliance.

Or, instead of a Virginia refusing to comply with a reduced annual catch limit, consider what would happen if it refused to comply with a reduction in the cap for reduction fishery harvest within the Chesapeake Bay, particularly if no one can provide statistically valid data supporting the claim that the reduction fishery is causing localized depletion in the Chesapeake Bay.

Under such conditions, it would almost be expected that the Secretary would find that a reduced Bay cap is not necessary to conserve the menhaden resource.

And menhaden are only one example.  Given the last April’s Executive Order, and given the current administration’s propensity to monetize natural resources for the highest possible short-term gain, it is very possible that the Secretary will tend to support states that go out of compliance with ASMFC fishery management plans.

That possibility is likely to have a chilling effect on ASMFC management actions, and make the ASMFC less willing to adopt even modestly precautionary management measures in 2026, regardless of the species in question.

An increasingly aggressive recreational fishing industry

One of the things that we have seen over the past decade is a recreational fishing industry that is becoming more and more aggressive in its opposition to conservation-oriented fishery management measures, and in its promotion of new approaches to fisheries management that will lead to increased recreational landings and, at least in theory, to higher industry profits.

The industry and industry-affiliated organizations such as the Coastal Conservation Association and the Theordore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership first targeted the red snapper fisheries in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, seeking to weaken  the federal fisheries management system in favor of state managers who are more susceptible to political pressure and more likely to tolerate overfishing if that’s what local stakeholders want.

However, in recent years the industry and its fellow travelers have become more and more aggressive.  If Social Security has been deemed the “third rail” of the political process—that is, the program that no one can contest if they want their political career to survive—then striped bass could reasonably be called the third rail of fisheries politics on the upper East Coast; no organization who wanted to have a viable presence among salt water anglers could take a stand against striped bass conservation.

But that changed in 2025, when industry and industry-affiliated organizations such as the American Sportfishing Association, the Center for Sportfishing Policy, Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, National Marine Manufacturers Association and others opposed a 12% reduction in striped bass fishing mortality needed to better ensure that the stock would be fully rebuilt by 2029.

We can expect the sportfishing industry to take advantage of the current administration’s hostility toward conservation measures, and its support for corporate profits, and become ever more aggressive in weakening federal fisheries management while trying harder to warp state and regional fisheries management toward greater exploitation and greater short-term economic benefits for the fishing industry, regardless of the long-term impacts on fish stocks.

The bottom line

The current political environment is extremely hostile to fisheries conservation efforts and to precautionary management approaches that are most likely to benefit fisheries in the long term.

Conservation advocates are being forced to take a defensive stance, with emphasis on limiting their losses rather than making any meaningful gains.  This situation existed throughout 2025, and even under the best circumstances is likely to extend into the first few weeks of 2029.  Depending on who ends up in the White House and in Congress, it could last far longer.

The one ray of hope on the horizon is the 2026 mid-term elections.  If control of at least one house of Congress can pass to persons who aren’t actively trying to tear apart the federal fishery management system, and who might actually care about the long-term health of fish stocks, we might not see any progress on important conservation issues, but we are at least likely to enjoy a deadlock where, at the legislative level at least, no more harm is being done.

It's sad that such is the best we can hope for, but that is the current reality for everyone who cares about the long-term health of the nation’s fish stocks.