RATIONAL VOICES BEGIN TO INFILTRATE SOUTH ATLANTIC RED SNAPPER DEBATE

 

Over-the-top hyperbole and intemperate rhetoric has characterized the debate over recreational red snapper fishing in the South Atlantic, even before the National Marine Fisheries Service bowed to political pressure and issued exempted fishing permits that failed to comply with the agency’s own regulations, not to mention federal law.

The extreme rhetoric originated in the press releases of organizations representing the recreational fishing industry, including the American Sportfishing Association, Coastal Conservation Association, and the Center for Sportfishing Policy.  For example, Jeff Angers, president of the Center for Sportfishing Policy, raged that

“The South Atlantic has long been trapped in a broken bureaucratic federal system that limits opportunity to a plentiful public resource,”

completely ignoring the fact that anglers have been catching and killing about half a million South Atlantic red snapper every year—which seems like pretty good “access”—but that they’re killing about 475,000 of them during the closed red snapper season, when the fish must be released any many fall victim to barotrauma caused by being hauled up from depths where the pressure of the surrounding water is much higher than it is at the surface.

The fishing tackle industry tries to hide from that truth by attacking the federal data collection system, the Marine Recreational Information Program, with one industry group, the Coastal Conservation Association, alleging that the number of discards are overstated and saying that

“When NOAA Fisheries argues that recreational discards of red snapper are driving an overfishing problem, it is important to emphasize that the discard data comes from the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) survey and is the only non-validated data in the catch survey.  It is well known that that these self-reported numbers are subject to digit bias, and perhaps extreme digit bias.  When many fish are being caught and released on a trip, people have a tendency to stop counting by individual fish and start counting by number blocks (fives and tens) and they generally round upwards.  Additionally, recall bias can exaggerate the digit bias.  Whether this bias runs high or low is uncertain, although individuals familiar with these survey methods believe that this process and anglers’ natural behavior (exaggeration) skews it in the high direction.”

It was a heroic effort, and might even have been convincing had the CCA not stated, earlier in the same comment letter, that

“Anecdotal evidence from anglers indicates that red snapper are the only species which can be reliably encountered virtually everywhere in the region, and it is almost impossible to get a fish other than a red snapper to take a bait,”

presumably because the snapper are so numerous that they beat other fish to anglers’ offerings. That presumption seems to be confirmed by at least one piece of anecdotal evidence, a fisherman commenting on a charter boat’s Facebook page,

“giving REC guys two days [season] for a fish that there’s zero chance of your [sic] not catching them, shit you probably going to burn a ton of gas money just to go throw away Red snapper all day.”

For if red snapper are so abundant that it is “almost impossible to get a fish other than a red snapper to take a bait,” even during the closed season, if South Atlantic anglers “throw away Red snapper all day,” and if the release mortality rate for South Atlantic red snapper—even when a descending device is used—is really 29%, and 46.8% without a descender, as a recent study conducted in the heart of north Florida’s red snapper waters reported, then the release numbers, and the calculated number of dead discards, reported by NMFS don’t seem unreasonable at all.

They might even be a little low.

But then, reason has never been a big part of the recreational fishing industry’s arguments.  That same lack of reason was reflected in a letter written by Roger Young, executive director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, to U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, urging the issuance of the exempted fishing permits.

I won’t quote too much of the letter here, because it has appeared in previous posts, but I have to note the use of language like

“rein in bureaucracy,”

his saying that

“career NOAA staff will inevitably create a bureaucratic blockade at the behest of status-quo defending adversarial interests,”

and his reference to a supposed

“weaponization of NOAA under President Obama.”

And yes, all of that breathless bold type and underlining was in the original letter.

Like the language coming out of the various recreational fishing industry groups, it was the sort of thing that no one with a sense of propriety, or even a sense of effective writing, would ever stoop to.

And that was before a federal district court judge temporarily enjoined the exempted fishing permits after he determined that they failed to meet some basic legal standard.

At that point, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis called the federal judge “disrespectful” because he did his job, interpreting and applying federal fisheries law.

The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission whined that

“a rogue federal judge sided with activists,”

and made a social media post picturing a red snapper along with the words,

“Come and take it.”

The American Sportfishing Association issued a press release announcing that

“ASA and CCA Respond to Court Decision Blocking South Atlantic Red Snapper Pilot Programs,”

(because the CCA seems to sit on the American Sportfishing Association’s knee like a ventriloquist’s dummy, giving voice to whatever message the ASA wants it to say), which included statements like

“Economic consequences of this decision will be substantial throughout the South Atlantic region.  ASA and CCA are currently working with partners and stakeholders to gather information that demonstrates the full scope of these impacts,”

even though, with the exempted fishing permits enjoined, the recreational fishing industry in the South Atlantic would end up with the very same thing that they had for the previous decade or so—either no recreational red snapper season, or one that only lasts for a couple of days.  So to say that the judge’s injunction did anything worse than maintain the status quo is somewhat disingenuous.

But among all the hyperbole, exaggerations, and just plain dishonesty swirling around the South Atlantic red snapper issue, we’re beginning to see the emergence of a few responsible spokesmen for the recreational fishing industry and the broader recreational community.  It’s probably important to note that those voices don’t come from industry giants like the ASA or the Center for Sportfishing Policy, where big war chests and political connections lead to a sort of institutional arrogance, that seems to make them believe that they can bulldoze the management system into adopting their preferred measures.

Instead, the rationality leaking into the debate is coming from far smaller entities, such as the Ponce Fish Network, a group of northeast Florida charter boat captains who posted an extensive essay on South Atlantic red snapper on its Facebook page.  There, the group started out saying that

“This is an in-depth analysis of why the Atlantic red snapper EFP permits stalled, where the legal and management issues appear to sit, and why believing the 2026 season was secure may have been ill advised.  The goal is to look honestly at the structure underneath the promise.  The missing pieces that made it vulnerable, and what this moment should teach us before the next fight begins.

“It is important to note that the court didn’t reject better recreational data, state involvement, or the need to fix red snapper management.  In fact, the order recognized that better data collection serves an important public interest.  What the court rejected was the way this particular EFP was approved, without harvest estimates required by NMFS’ own regulations, without enough explanation of how expanded seasons would avoid overfishing, and without a structure strong enough to survive the legal system it was operating inside.”

That kind of language is refreshing to hear.  No screaming about rogue judges, bureaucratic blockades, broken bureaucratic federal systems, or the weaponization of NOAA.  Just a calm acceptance of the fact that, in rushing through exempted fishing permits without due concern for applicable law, the various recreational fishing organizations, state officials, and the high-level administration personnel who compelled NMFS to take illegal action effectively dropped the ball, and brought legal defeat upon themselves.

Of course, the folks actually responsible for the debacle aren’t going to admit that they were the ones at fault.  The American Sportfishing Association has already issued a press release announcing that

“Florida’s Last-Minute Atlantic Red Snapper Closure Caused Immediate Harm to Fishing Businesses and Coastal Communities,”

in which Martha Guyas, Southeast Fisheries Policy Director for the organization, said

“The Atlantic red snapper stock is healthy and abundant, yet anglers and businesses were denied meaningful access with almost no warning.  ASA calls on federal and state agencies, as well as state and federal lawmakers, to do everything possible to salvage a meaningful 2026 season and prevent this kind of economic harm from happening again.”

But just what kind of “economic harm” are we talking about?

Remember that, even with the temporary injunction in place, nothing would prevent recreational fishermen in the South Atlantic from enjoying about the same sort of red snapper season that they’ve had for the past decade or so—maybe a little shorter than some years, definitely a little longer than others, but essentially the status quo.  So to say that maintaining the status quo caused some sort of economic harm seems like a bit of a stretch.

However, because of the sloppy work done by all concerned, including the ASA, in putting the flawed exempted fishing permits in place—and given the quality of the attorneys and staff maintained by the big recreational organizations, it is difficult to believe that they didn’t know that the EFPs were legally flawed—they did create false hopes and unreasonable expectations for anglers and those operating fishing-related businesses.  So when a charter boat business complains that

“The State of Florida and NMFS told us in writing that we would have 39 days to fish for Red Snapper.  I booked all days as my clients were anticipating the opportunity.  Literally 4 hours before the opening day, the federal government said no.  My livelihood depends on charter fishing,”

the real grievance isn’t with the judge, or with the commercial fishermen who brought the lawsuit trying to protect their interest in a healthy red snapper population, but in a federal agency that engaged in sloppy and legally defective rulemaking, in a Florida government more concerned with “bureaucratic blockades,” “status-quo defending adversarial interests,” and “weaponization of NOAA” than in submitting a permit application that complied with all of NMFS’ applicable requirements, and in recreational industry advocacy groups that pressured agency staffs to get things done in a hasty fashion.

Similarly, when another charter boat operator complained that

“It completely destroyed my year.  The buildup for red snapper season stemming from Nov. 2025 had my calendar filling up very quickly.  When the closure happened, people began cancelling immediately and began changing plans to travel to the Gulf,”

it also evidences the harm done by the people and organizations who created false expectations. 

After all, the exempted fishing permits weren’t issued by NMFS until around the first of May, so anyone who began booking trips before then—apparently, as early as November 2025, was doing so based on promises made by someone.  And if those promises were based on the issuance of  legally insufficient exempted fishing permits, as seems to be the case, the folks who made them owe a lot of people apologies, particularly those charter boats who booked red snapper trips based on the promise, when they could have booked trips to pursue other species, and ended up tied to the dock when the red snapper trips cancelled.

That would represent real economic harm, but it wasn’t caused by the judge’s decision.  It was caused by the folks who promised something that they should have known that they probably couldn’t deliver.

Thus, we go back to the Ponce Fish Network:

“Fishermen were asked to believe that state managed EFPs would bring access, access would produce better data, better data would expose the discard problem, and exposing that problem would finally force the system to admit what people on the water have been saying for years.  In theory, that sounds like a breakthrough, but in reality, that is a tremendous amount of legal and political weight to place on an experimental permit still operating inside the same federal system everyone already claims is broken.

“The question that keeps coming back is simple: why wasn’t the Atlantic pilot built with the same kind of recognizable accounting structure that made Gulf state management harder to attack?  The Gulf did not arrive at expanded red snapper access by simply declaring the federal system wrong and opening the gates.  Its model came with clearer management structure, state by state accountability, monitoring, allocations, reporting, and an accounting system that the federal structure could recognize.  It had numbers, limits, accountability, and a defined way to measure harvest.”

Of course, the unspoken truth was that limits and accountability were exactly what the proponents of the South Atlantic red snapper EFPs were trying to avoid.  The letter accompanying the Georgia EFP application, for example, explicitly stated that

“At this time, Georgia is apprehensive about providing a number for Red Snapper harvest that will be included in our EFP…Our greatest concern is the number will be used punitively to shorten the requested season, define a regional quota, and/or establish state allocations.”

The South Atlantic states, along with the angling industry groups, were hoping to use the EFPs to get around the annual catch limits and other conservation measures of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.  Numbers, limits, and accountability were definitely not a part of their agenda.

So, the Ponce Fish Network goes on:

“The Atlantic EFP felt different from the start.  It was not just state management, it was state management plus access, access plus discard reduction, discard reduction plus better data, better data plus political celebration, and political celebration plus legal risk.  Somewhere inside that pile, the actual question got buried: could this survive the very system it was trying to challenge?

“This is the part that borders on absurd, because this was not some dockside rumor that got ahead of itself.  This was built with the involvement of the very agencies responsible for fisheries management, the people who should have known what the legal blueprint required.  Yet somehow, with every agency in the room, the plan somehow still walked into court missing the pieces that a judge was always going to ask for first: harvest estimates, accountability, and a clear explanation of how expanded access would stay inside the law…

“…The court’s problem was painfully simple:  NMFS’ own EFP regulations required the applications to include the amount of harvest expected or necessary under the permit, and the states did not provide that number.  They did not just fail to sell the idea politically, they left blank the exact accounting question a court was always going to ask.

“You cannot manage fish without numbers.  You cannot walk into a legal fight over annual catch limits without numbers, and you cannot tell a court harvest will stay under control when the applications themselves refuse to estimate how much harvest the permits may produce…

“To be clear, that does not magically make the federal data right…But no numbers is not a legal strategy.  If the Atlantic wants to defeat flawed federal math, it has to bring better math to the table, not just a political promise and a behavioral theory.”

And that, of course, was the problem.  The Gospel of the recreational fishing industry—the core of the catechism that it preaches online and in the press—is that federal recreational fishing data, derived from the Marine Recreational Information Program, is “fatally flawed,” and should be replaced by state data programs.  And there is no question that MRIP has, in the past, overestimated recreational fishing effort, and so also overestimated both recreational harvest and live releases (although, the way most stock assessment models work, that also means that spawning stock biomass is also overestimated, making the whole thing more-or-less a wash), although that ought to be corrected by Labor Day.

The industry advocates aren’t producing any state landings data that can be peer reviewed and compared with the MRIP data; instead, they basically just say, “Trust me,” and insist that the state data is free of meaningful flaws, without any proof that is the case.

At that point, the Ponce Fish Network started turning over stones that the industry, and its allies in government, would rather leave untouched.

“The plaintiffs’ public case was about legality, accountability, and stock protectgion.  But the quieter fear may have been that the EFP would fully expose the true scale of recreational red snapper interaction, and once that number was on paper, NMFS could use it to justify even tighter restrictions.  That fear was not imaginary either.  It was evidenced in the states’ own refusal to submit expected harvest numbers, with some openly concerned those numbers could be used to shorten the season, define quotas, or create allocations.  That cuts both ways.  It could have helped prove that the current data system is broken, but it also could have handed managers the ammunition to shut the door harder.

“This is where the public argument becomes especially painful.  It is easy to turn this into a sector fight and say that the commercial sector killed the season, but that is not what the court order says.  The harder truth is that the law was not followed closely enough for the permits to survive.  The blame should not fall solely on the people who noticed the legal weakness and challenged it.  It should also fall on the people and agencies who had the responsibility to build the plan correctly in the first place.

“That may be the most heart wrenching part of all.  Instead of accountability landing where it belongs on the structure that failed, the anger has been redirected towards the people who pointed out the crack in the foundation.  Fishermen are now fighting each other over the collapse of a plan they did not design, while the agencies and decision makers who should have known what the law required are allowed to fade into the background…

“Instead of fixing the numbers first and then opening access on a stronger foundation, the plan appeared to open access first and use the season to prove why the numbers needed to be fixed.  That may be politically appealing, but legally it is vulnerable.  Magnuson Stevens, ACL requirements, environmental review, allocation fights, discard mortality estimates, rebuilding timelines, and the NGO legal playbook do not disappear just because political momentum finally shows up.

“This does not mean the movement was worthless.  It means the movement may have been mispackaged.  The Atlantic does not need a shiny headline as much as it needed a foundation.  It needed a real quota fight, a real discard fight, a real data fight, and then a state management plan built on numbers strong enough to survive court instead of politics strong enough to survive a press conference…

“This is why ‘we were bamboozled’ resonates, even if the more precise word may be ‘we were oversold.’  The fishing community was not wrong to hope, the industry was not wrong to prepare, and Captains were not wrong to tell customers that access appeared to be coming back.  But the plan was sold with the emotional weight of a confirmed rescue while the legal structure underneath it still looked like a gambling at a poker table.”

The Ponce Fish Network went on for a ways more, speculating on what could have been done better and what might be done in the future.  But the foregoing says all that really needs to be said.

The South Atlantic red snapper EFPs were, at their heart, always something close to a con, with the recreational fishing industry, aided and abetted by state regulators and high-level administration officials, making assertions that weren’t supported by objective data, and ultimately producing exempted fishing permits that failed to meet minimum legal standards.

Because they were quick to trumpet their alleged success, they—and I will use the word—bamboozled the charter boats, tackle shops, and angling public, convincing them that the illegally-issued EFPs would usher in longer recreational red snapper seasons and increased red snapper landings, when they knew—or at least should have known—that those EFPs were unlikely to survive judicial review.

The Ponce Fish Network told the entire story, probably better than I ever told it myself, and did so in sober prose that laid out the facts, and the Network’s opinion, without hyperbole, name calling, or straying from the truth.  Hopefully, as the South Atlantic red snapper debate continues, we will see more rational spokesmen for the recreational community emerge, and use similarly sober language to overcome the hyperbole, exaggeration, and untruths that have been repeatedly voiced by both the recreational fishing industry and, sadly, by government officials convinced or compelled to echo the industry’s words.

Because there is a funny thing about truth.  Even spoken softly, it can drown out the most loudly spoken lies.