OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE: A LOOMING THREAT TO STRIPED BASS

 

Over the past year or so, striped bass fishermen have been focused on efforts to rebuild the currently overfished striped bass spawning stock biomass back to its target level by the 2029 deadline specified in the fishery management plan; on the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board’s failure to adopt a 12% harvest reduction, to make such rebuilding more likely, last October, and on the past seven years of record-low striped bass recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay, as well as the possibility that 2026 will become the eighth straight year of poor spawns.

Thus, they might be excused if they failed to notice another, stealthier threat to the health of the Atlantic migratory stock of striped bass, and that is the federal government’s efforts to initiate striped bass aquaculture in federal waters more than three miles from shore.

The issue has been rattling around the Commerce Department, and the National Marine Fisheries Service, for a few years, but it finally entered the public consciousness at the February meeting of the Management Board, where Danielle Blacklock of NOAA Fisheries Office of Aquaculture explained the administration’s interest in farming striped bass offshore:

“…we know we have a marketplace that is needing more seafood.  This has been acknowledged by the Trump administration in two executive orders.  On the right-hard side, we have Executive Order 1391…

“This came out in 2020, it called for a whole host of aquaculture-related activities, and we have done them.  There is one that is still underway, which is identification of aquaculture opportunity areas…

“We anticipate that we will continue to move around the country.  The Executive Order on the left, Executive Order 14276 calls for restoring America’s seafood competitiveness.  This has a lot of wild harvest drivers in it, but it also calls for an America First seafood strategy, which asks us to increase domestic aquaculture production and create more marketing and export opportunities.

“Those are backdrop drivers that bring us to today.  Why striped bass?  Well, there are a number of reasons.  One is that we know a lot about striped bass…It is a species that has been farmed for a long time, and we have great information feeding into the knowledge base.  We also at NOAA have been doing over the past eight years a process of identifying top marine candidate species…

“…Through voting and process of prioritizing all of those species, Atlantic striped bass has consistently risen to the top as a candidate species of interest…

“We are now in generation 8 of selective breeding, and it grows significantly faster than hybrid [with white bass] striped bass…Well, Atlantic striped bass has a higher price point.  It has a different marketplace, because hybrid striped bass is typically sold as a whole fish, and Atlantic striped bass farmed or wild is typically sold as a fillet.

“But the market value is so much higher that we are watching hybrid striped bass farms switch to Atlantic striped bass…What I flagged in 2024 is still true, that Atlantic striped bass is being farmed and it’s entering our markets today.  It’s just not coming from the Atlantic seaboard, it’s not coming from the federal waters along the Atlantic, or course, because of the moratorium on possession.”

So up to that point, Ms. Blacklock made a purely economic argument for farming striped bass, which was fine, particularly if folks who are currently farming hybrid striped bass on their inland ponds and aquaculture facilities think that they can make some more money by raising pure-strain striped bass instead.

But what Ms. Blacklock didn’t demonstrate is why striped bass ought to be farmed in the federal waters of the Exclusive Economic Zone.  After all, if folks can grow them out inland, or in the Gulf of Mexico, there’s no need to start introducing some sort of genetically manipulated “generation 8” fish into the striped bass’ natural range, where those fish could—and almost certainly would—escape and threaten the genome of the native population.

But then, Ms. Blacklock uttered the words that ought to put everyone on high alert, and make them understand that aquaculture’s threat to native fish is very, very real:

“The goal here is to balance aquaculture development with protection of wild striped bass populations and the fisheries they support.  [emphasis added]”

Because as soon as the aquaculture promoters start talking about “balance,” it’s a clear signal that they’re planning to increase the risk to the wild striped bass population, removing some existing protections in order to make it easier to successfully develop striped bass farms,

What sort of risks might the striped bass face? 

Ms. Blacklock herself mentions

“concerns about illegal harvest and enforcement; Ocean use conflicts, economic feasibility, market competition, aquatic animal health and disease, environmental impacts and escapement and genetics.”

She was quick to offer solutions for the some of the first issues on that list, but when it came to disease, escapement,  and genetics, the conversation as to why they weren’t a problem began to become far more hypothetical than concrete.

“Disease, when it comes to disease in fish nobody wants it.  It is the nightmare of the farmer, it is the nightmare of the regulator, it is very scary to everyone involved.  The way that in the United States typically we deal with disease is prevention.  We have a lot of rules and regulations about stocking density, overcrowding, water flow.

“All of these things are managed to make sure that the fish have the highest level of ability to stay healthy.  In addition, we create vaccines…We are an agency of prevention and that is where I would anticipate anything goes with Atlantic striped bass. 

“There are very few therapeutants available…It is extremely rare to use antibiotics.  But it is still something that we would have to work on for Atlantic striped bass.  [emphasis added]”

So from a disease perspective, offshore striped bass farms remain a work in progress.

The same seems to hold true about genetic concerns.

“A lot of farms currently are applying, not for striped bass but in other species, are applying for just F-1s, right having wild broodstock.”

That doesn’t seem to be the case with striped bass, where specially-bred strains of fish are being used to populate the farms.  As Ms. Blacklock noted,

“selective breeding is critical to be able to grow fish faster, having them be meatier, lighter skeletons, all of that, lower food intake.”

But those sort of custom-designed fish aren’t necessarily fish fit to survive in the wild, which can be a problem should farmed striped bass escape and their artificially selected genes enter the genome of the wild population. 

“The way that we can protect the wild population, there is a whole host of tools in the toolbox.  We have everything from many salmon farms are female only.  That is not 100% right, females can still put off eggs.  There are tools like triploidy, where you make a fish have three chromosomes so that they are sterile.

“That has a 99% effectiveness rate.  It’s not 100.  But now there is new technology that has come online that we are using with other species.  It has not been applied to striped bass yet, which is 100% effective.  Through genetic knockdown G-knockdown technologies, we have the ability to just make them not grow gonads, 100% effectiveness.

“Now again, we have not done that for Atlantic striped bass yet.  That research would take 4 to 7 years maybe, but the tool is there.  Another tool that we have is better understanding of what the potential impact would be through genetic risk assessments.

“…We again can put a farm in the water, know what kjnd of species it is, you need to know what the population outside is.  Is it a big population, a small population?  It’s actually arithmetic, not just big or small that we use.  You can model how much risk there is…

“If you have a small population and a net, and a huge population outside, the risk is probably not very high of there being any challenges or changes in the external population.  On the converse of that, if you have a big farm and a small wild population, the genetic risk becomes much higher, if you’re not putting in sterile fish…

“In the final piece on genetics is, genetics become a risk not only from gametes, potentially, but also from escapes, right?  We don’t want any escapes.  We don’t want spillage, which is just a couple of fish every time you are feeding or treating or anything like that.  You also don’t want a catastrophic event where the whole population is released at once.

“We have also heavily invested in, as has the industry, in engineering for offshore, to make sure that you are building things in a robust nature, so that they can handle extreme weather.  We’re seeing sinking cages as becoming more of the norm.  Things aren’t staying on the surface the way they used to, so that you can get under the waves and under the swell…

“Finally, a lot of that backdrop of the science tools was not striped bass specific.  But it started with, we know a lot about Atlantic striped bass…  [emphasis added]”

So yes, the risks offshore striped bass farming poses to the wild population are very real, and come in many different forms.  Ms. Blacklock admitted that

“There are applications in the Gulf of [Mexico] for Atlantic striped bass that will use their eighth generation, ninth generation by the time they get there.  There is also a number of farms on land that are farming Atlantic stripe [sic] bass….   

“A number of farms in Texas that farm red drum are seeing mortalities, because it is so cold.  But a number of them have already switched to farming Atlantic striped bass, and the stripers are surviving.”

The fact that bass can be and are being farmed in existing on-shore facilities, and in farms located outside the range of the coastal migratory stock, raise questions about why it is necessary to consider farms on the Atlantic coast, which could cause some level of harm to the wild population.  That’s particularly true when one considers Ms. Blacklock’s comments that few farms would likely be located north of North Carolina, because water temperatures would probably be too low to support robust year-round growth.

Yet such Atlantic coast farms in federal waters are being considered, despite the fact that a technical memorandum created by NOAA advises

“For offshore operations, it is useful to distinguish between chronic, low-level seepage of escapees and rare, high magnitude catastrophic releases, because these pathways differ in detectability, dispersal potential, and the timing of exposure that drives genetic risk.  Seepage most often results from small holes, net abrasion, predator related tearing, and routine activities such as handling and lifting, creating a persistent trickle of escapees that can be difficult to detect directly yet still sustain contact with wild conspecifics.  Catastrophic events are more commonly linked to structural failure or mooring failure, collisions, and extreme weather, and they can release large numbers of fish over short periods, overwhelming recapture capacity and increasing the likelihood that mature escapees enter migratory corridors or spawning habitats during sensitive windows. 

“Escape events are among the most widely recognized ecological risks associated with marine finfish aquaculture, with outcomes shaped by species behavior, farm design and durability, siting and hydrodynamic conditions, operational practices, and interactions with predators such as sharks, marine mammals, and seabirds.  Ecological consequences have been well documented across freshwater, estuarine, and marine systems, including competition with conspecifics, habitat displacement, disease and parasite transmission, and genetic introgression.  Although domesticated fish often show reduced individual fitness and survival compared to wild stocks, even limited interbreeding can erode local adaption, homogenize genetic structure, and reduce the long-term resilience of wild populations.

“For offshore aquaculture of native striped bass, these risks warrant particular attention.  Striped bass are highly mobile and migratory, with populations ranging from the Gulf of St. Lawrence (Canada) to the St. John’s River (Florida).  Resident populations occur in southern systems such as Albemarle Sound, North Carolina, while northern populations migrate extensively along the Atlantic coast.  Escaped individuals could therefore disperse widely, interact with multiple genetically distinct subpopulations, and introduce risks of maladaptation or loss of genetic structure…  [emphasis added, references omitted]”

Given those very real and very significant risks, and give the fact that alternative siting of striped bass farms is available on land and in the Gulf of Mexico, far from the Atlantic coastal migratory stock, the administration’s efforts to establish striped bass farms in federal waters off the East Coast seem to make very little sense.

Certainly, members of the Management Board expressed some concerns about the proposal.

For Virginia fisheries manager Joeseph Grist, it was a matter of fish farms potentially squeezing out traditional commercial fishermen.  He expressed concern that

“this almost sounds like we’re popping up the next Walmart in the ocean versus all of our generational traditional inland fisheries and families, the mom and pops that depend on striped bass harvest and the price point they get to survive through the year.

“…This could be a huge risk to the individual watermen that are out here in the various states that depend on this as part of their business plan during the year…once one of these gets up and running and they start making the profit, I can see the price of striped bass going down at a point they could take it out to compete [sic] everybody else.”

Ms. Blacklock assured Mr. Grist that NOAA doesn’t plan on that sort of thing happening, but never suggested that it wouldn’t.  And reality doesn’t always stick to the plan.

Dr. Jason McNamee, the Rhode Island fishery manager, made a supposedly tongue-in-cheek comment, saying

“I had a thought.  It’s funny to me, I don’t know if it’s going to be funny to anyone else.  But when you offered a comment about 100% effectiveness of some of the genetic, you know manipulation that you can do on these animals, I was just wondering if you saw Jurassic Park.  It’s a joke, sorry.”

And maybe it was a joke, but in the movie Jurassic Park, the “100% effective” genetic safeguards weren’t 100% effective, and that led to all sorts of problems.  I suspect that Dr. McNamee’s “joke” contained a deeper message.

Emerson Hasbrouck, Governor’s Appointee from New York, was also a skeptic of offshore striped bass aquaculture, saying,

“My concerns are very similar to what Joe and Jay just voiced.  You know all morning here we’ve been talking about rebuilding a wild stock of striped bass.  It may not be officially the intent of NOAA to compete with wild harvest.

“But the reality is that once all these additional striped bass, if they come into the market or when they come into the market, they are going to compete with wild harvest striped bass, and they are going to compete with our commercial fishing industry…There is going to be a market impact here.

“Is there kind of a hidden message here that we don’t need to rebuild striped bass wild stock for commercial harvest, because we’re queuing up aquaculture to replace wild harvest in the marketplace.  That doesn’t sit very good with me.  The offshore culture that we’re talking about here is going to have an impact on markets and market conditions…”

Again, Ms. Blacklock denied any hidden messages, and denied any intention to undercut the commercial fishery in the marketplace.  But as the old saying goes,

“The road to Hell is paved with good intentions.”

Other Management Board members raised other concerns, but the discussion soon reached its end, only to be continued at the May Management Board meeting, where some sort of response to NOAA’s presentation and technical memo was contemplated.  The discussion began with Toni Kerns, the ASMFC’s Fisheries Policy Director, making some suggestions for items that the Management Board might want to include in a comment letter.

“I just want to point out a couple of areas where I think the Board may want to go back and reread the memo and focus potential comments on…

“Then I’ll propose a timeline for receiving those comments.  In terms of economic analysis, the Board did request an economic analysis from NOAA.  I’m not sure at this time they’re prepared to do an economic analysis, unless they know they are going to be moving forward with some sort of plan.

“But the report doesn’t have any published U.S. production costs and economic analysis that they do have in there relies on cost estimates that have been extrapolated from other species like red drum, greater amberjack and salmon operations.  But we don’t have any cost study for striped bass.

“The report talks about using sterilization technologies, in order to make sure the popuations that are in the net pens aren’t breeding with wild fish, but the report also states that the technologies have not been tested…If those technologies haven’t been tested then what types of risk does that put on the wild stock with possible escapement?

“The report looks at thermal modeling, but it only uses data from 2020 to 2023, so four years of ocean temperature data is a pretty short baseline for a long-term [siting] decision, especially given our known uncertainty with climate…especially when those [siting] areas are mostly off our southern states.

“…Some of the disease therapy information that is being suggested, in terms of what would be put into the water has not been tested by the FDA in marine striped bass…

“Then lastly is the habitat and protected species.  For some of the areas that are being suggested for [siting], it is critical right whale habitat that overlaps along the Atlantic coast, so offshore permitting processes may face a lot of scrutiny under Section 7 consultations, as well as containment risks…  [emphasis added]”

The comment letter, addressed to Ms. Blacklock, was ultimately drafted, and approved by the Management Board at its August meeting.  It cited several important concerns, including

“Enforcement Concerns

“Enforcement capacity in the EEZ is currently limited, and aquaculture sites would create additional enforcement responsibilities, either increasing costs or diverting resources from other enforcement priorities.  Since the EEZ is currently closed to striped bass fishing, there is potential for offshore aquaculture to be used as cover for some illegal fishing.  The memorandum’s discussion of traceability, monitoring, compliance, and enforceability lacks sufficient detail to evaluate whether these programs would be practical or effective…

“The memorandum does not clearly identify which agencies would be responsible for carrying out these monitoring and enforcement activities or how they would be funded.  Historically, federally permitted activities often result in states and interstate commissions assuming substantial administrative, regulatory, enforcement, and financial responsibilities without corresponding federal resources.  Additionally, there is the question of whether all states on the Atlantic coast have the authority to enforce and monitor striped bass aquaculture operations…Many states’ enforcement capabilities are already stretched very thin with limited resources.  These implementation burdens must be fully evaluated before advancing any offshore striped bass aquaculture program…

“Economic Concerns

“The memorandum does not adequately address or consider the economic consequences of potential offshore aquaculture on the wild fishery.  Increased production of aquaculture-raised striped bass has the potential to flood seafood markets, reducing the value of wild-caught striped bass—a premium product that supports commercial fishermen throughout the Atlantic coast—and directly impacting the wild-caught striped bass harvest fisheries (the mom-and-pop businesses)…

“Rather than creating new economic opportunities, offshore striped bass aquaculture may shift economic benefits from traditional fishing communities to private aquaculture operations… 

“User Conflicts

“User conflicts must be addressed in greater detail.  The memorandum downplays user conflicts that offshore aquaculture for striped bass would present, especially at a time when user conflicts due to other ocean uses (e.g., offshore wind) are at the forefront.  Access to traditional fishing grounds would be reduced for commercial and recreational fisheries, particularly for mobile gear users and for year-round fisheries in warmer waters…

“To inform this issue, more details are needed regarding what offshore farms would look like in practice, and which uses would be allowed or restricted within these shared-use areas.  NOAA should clarify whether exclusion zones would be established around farm infrastructure, and if farms are expected to aggregate pelagic finfish species, whether recreational or commercial fishing would be prohibited in the surrounding area.  Regarding vessels, available data on the frequency or risk of vessel collisions with offshore aquaculture infrastructure should be considered…

“Project Siting

“The current description provides limited detail beyond general, high-level considerations, and appears to underestimate the engineering and operational challenges associated with locating striped bass net pens in offshore environment…

“The areas identified are also highly susceptible to severe weather events, including hurricanes and winter storms.  Notably, the strongest hurricanes often stay offshore, which could result in aquaculture facilities taking a direct hit.  NOAA should evaluate and describe the expected resilience of offshore aquaculture operations under extreme storm conditions, including the measures that would be implemented to minimize infrastructure damage, fish escapes, and environmental impacts.

“Aquaculture Industry Specifics

“Additional information is needed regarding the level of industry interest in offshore striped bass aquaculture and the basis for pursuing this initiative.  It is unclear whether there is currently an interested party seeking to develop an offshore striped bass aquaculture operation, or whether the interest is to establish a regulatory framework for potential future applicants…

“Ecological Concerns

“The memorandum does not address one of the longstanding concerns associated with farming high-value carnivorous marine fish species:  dependence on fish-based feeds.  Although feed technology continues to evolve, forage fish remain an important component of diets used to optimize growth and product quality.  The ecological tradeoffs associated with diverting forage resources into aquaculture deserve careful consideration.  Maintaining healthy forage fish populations benefits not only wild striped bass but also numerous marine mammals, seabirds, and other ecologically and economically important species.

“Regarding habitat, offshore units/structures tend to act as fish ‘attractor’ devices through complex structure, food availability or prey availability and could have unforeseen effects on essential fish habitat (EFH) in close proximity to other bottom structure or pelagic species…Management plans for any offshore facility should require permittees to have adequate funds (e.g., assurance bond) committed to ensure removal of fish and decommissioning of the facilities that are abandoned, obsolete, or storm-damaged or had their permits revoked…

“Protected Species

“Offshore aquaculture operations create the potential for entanglement and other interactions with species protected under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).  The current information in the memorandum is limited on this issue and remains a potentially significant ongoing concern…

“Biological Risks:  Escapement, Genetic Concerns, and Disease

“Significant biological risks remain unresolved.  Disease transmission, parasite transfer, escape of cultured fish, and genetic interactions with wild striped bass populations continue to present legitimate concerns.  Likewise, questions remain regarding the adequacy and consistency of federal oversight related to therapeutants, antibiotics, and other chemicals that may be used in commercial aquaculture operations.  Wild fish in close proximity to facilities could be exposed to therapeutics environmentally or through excess feed escapement and potential parasitic infection with unknown effects.  This also applies to therapeutics used to prevent parasitic infections, which can be a problem in culture facilities.  These issues warrant additional scientific evaluation before large-scale offshore production is considered.

“The memorandum should explain how genetic tracking would be implemented in practice.  If ‘pure-strain’ stocks are non-interbreeding (e.g., sterile), NOAA should evaluate whether this would affect the economic viability of production, particularly if such fish are considered genetically modified…If pure-strain stocks are not sterile, there are concerns regarding the risk of escapement and potential impacts on wild striped bass populations and information is needed on average escapement rates from similar net-pen aquaculture systems…

“Information should also be provided regarding how disease events would be managed given the apparent lack of approved antibiotics for striped bass…

“The memorandum notes that there may be some small losses (escapements) that may mingle with the wild population, but that risk should be given more weight and consideration, as well as the risk of a catastrophic failure (which would be a real risk considering weather events and potential vessel interactions).  There is no way to guarantee that aquaculture striped bass would not mix with the wild population, and these risks are much greater in open water systems.  Containment rules as well as genetic modification of cultured fish (triploids and diploids) or potential sterilization techniques are not necessarily validated for striped bass in large-scale production culture situations.

“Policy and Regulatory Roles

“Strong regulatory barriers for starting these types of operations exist, as they should if they are to be done properly.  Many of the regulatory concepts presented in the memorandum remain vague with respect to implementation.  There appears to be limited direct regulatory authority by NOAA or the Commission over offshore aquaculture operations…

“The memorandum notes that the Commission may wish to consider whether existing authorities could be used to develop monitoring and enforcement programs specific to striped bass aquaculture.  However, it is indicated that such actions would serve primarily to ‘influence’ federal partners rather than to establish mandatory requirements…

“Conclusion

“In summary, offshore net pen aquaculture of striped bass has a very limited operational history and no demonstrable record of large-scale, long-term success in the United States.  The Commission has substantial concerns including risks to wild striped bass populations, commercial fisheries, seafood markets, marine ecosystems, and protected species, enforcement concerns, as well as the potential for significant regulatory and financial obligations for states.  Based on the information currently available, those risks are not adequately balanced by the potential public benefits described in the memorandum.  Given these risks and unresolved issues described above, the Commission does not support moving forward with consideration of offshore striped bass aquaculture at this time…  [emphasis in original sector headings, added to text]”

NOAA and the current administration clearly want to move forward with offshore striped bass aquaculture, although it is not clear that anyone has yet applied for permission to engage in such activities off the U.S. Atlantic coast.  The ASMFC has responded with appropriate caution, acting as a responsible steward for the striped bass resource, and as a responsible representative for existing striped bass fisheries.

It is not at all clear how NOAA will respond to the ASMFC’s letter to Ms. Blacklock.  However, we can only hope that the ASMFC will continue its present, risk-averse approach to offshore striped bass aquaculture, and continue to protect the interests of the striped bass and striped bass fishermen, whether commercial or recreational.

RECREATIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT: 'TIL THEY MANAGE TO DRAG IT ALL DOWN

 

Federal fisheries managers have gotten so good at their jobs that they’re not only taken for granted, but are too often held in contempt.

In the not-quite quarter-century between 2000 and 2024, federal fisheries managers, relying on the science-based provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, fully rebuilt 51 once-overfished stocks, and have put other stocks onto the road to recovery.  As of the end of 2024, 42 stocks remain overfished, while 23 are still experiencing overfishing.

To put those numbers into perspective, the National Marine Fisheries Service, either on its own, in conjunction with the states, or in conjunction with international organizations such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, manages 522 fish stocks and stock complexes.  Of those 522 stocks, it has adequate scientific information to determine the health of 263, or just over half of the total.  Of those 263 stocks with a known status, 84% are not overfished, while 16% still are.

NMFS has slightly better information about fishing mortality rates, and is able to determine whether or not 372 of the 522 stocks are subject to overfishing.  As it turn out, only 6% are, while 94% are being fished at sustainable levels.

It’s clear that a lot more work needs to be done, in order to determine the status of the remaining stocks, although that work won’t come cheap.  Probably little more will be done until we finally get a Congress that is willing to fund the needed science, as well as a presidential administration that doesn’t just issue executive orders that give lip service to the idea of sustainable fisheries, but is also willing to staff a National Marine Fisheries Service with enough biologists and professional fisheries managers to make such sustainable fisheries a realistic goal.

Still, fully rebuilding 51 stocks over 24 years, reducing the number of overfished stocks to 16% of those stocks with known status, and ending overfishing for all but 6% of known-status stocks is a real accomplishment.  Our fisheries are certainly in better shape than they were 30 years ago, when the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 was passed, finally putting NMFS into the conservation and management business in a big way.

But it turns out that some fishermen, or at least some of the people who represent recreational fishermen, aren’t particularly happy with the way NMFS has managed fish stocks.  Foremost among them is the Center for Sportfishing Policy, an organization composed of fishing tackle and boating industry interests, including the American Sportfishing Association, the largest fishing industry trade group in the nation, and the National Marine Manufacturer’s Association, along with large “anglers’ rights” groups such as the Houston-based Coastal Conservation Association.  The Center for Sportfishing Policy states that its

“mission is to maximize opportunity for saltwater recreational anglers by organizing, focusing and engaging recreational fishing stakeholders to speak with one voice to shape federal marine fisheries management policy.  As an organization of individuals and institutions, CSP promotes sustainable fishing, protects the American angling tradition, supports the economic impact of recreational fishing and boating, works with all stakeholders to fix broken marine fisheries management policies, and advocates for fair fishing rights for anglers.  The recreational fishing and boating industries work hand in hand, with nearly 70 percent of all boats purchased so owners can fish from them.  [emphasis added]”

Jeff Angers, the president of the Center, once wrote,

“As you might expect, the strongest proponents of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the flawed policy that governs federal fisheries management, hail from the North Pacific region, where commercial fishing is king and the original legislation was born.  Since 1976, the law has worked well for fisheries and fishermen in that region, but for few others across the United States…

“Put simply, a one-size-fits all management approach has harmed coastal communities, put a major dent in the recreational fishing industry’s economic output, and left too many Americans stranded at the dock unable to enjoy one of the nation’s favorite pastimes…  [emphasis added]”

Yes, you read that right.  The Center for Sportfishing Policy is calling the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the law that fully rebuilt 51 once-overfished fish stocks—most of which were not in the North Pacific region—and made substantial progress toward ending overfishing and rebuilding other overfished stocks, is a “flawed policy” that leads to “broken marine fisheries management policies.”

It’s hard to conceive of the sort of Bizarro World, if I might steal a quote from the 2000 court decision in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Daley, the lawsuit that gave Magnuson-Stevens real teeth, where a law that led to a more vital ocean and more abundant fish stocks would be deemed “flawed” and “broken.”

That is, it’s hard until you realize who the people attacking the federal management system really are.  The Center’s Chairman is Thom Dammrich, the recently-retired president of the National Marine Manufacturers Assocition.  The two Vice Chairmen are Tommy Hancock, President of Sportsman Boats, and Dave Pfeiffer, the Vice Chairman of Shimano North America Fishing, Inc., one of the largest fishing tackle companies operating in the United States.  The Secretary is Glenn Hughes, the President of the American Sportfishing Association, while the Treasurer is Jason Schratweiser, the President of the International Game Fish Association, the organization that maintains recreational fishing world records and sets the code of conduct for competitive angling.

Of the Center’s 30 directors, 19 represent the boatbuilding and boating equipment industry, 5 represent the fishing tackle industry, 4 represent angling-related organizations that regularly receive donations in kind or in cash from the boating and fishing tackle industries, and two are high net worth individuals associated with such organizations.

The Center can talk as much as it likes about “sustainable fisheries,” “angling tradition,” “fair fishing rights,” and apple pie.  But what we—and, more importantly, federal fisheries managers—are really dealing with is a super trade association, where “the recreational fishing and boating industries work hand in hand” to “support the economic impact of recreational fishing and boating.” 

The problem, from the Center’s perspective, is that the same sort of science-based fisheries management that has federal managers so successful also leads to seasons, size limits, and bag limits that restrict anglers’ ability to go out and catch—or, at least, catch and bring home—as many fish as they’d like to.  In Anger’s words, well-regulated federal fisheries “left too many Americans stranded at the dock unable to enjoy one of the nation’s favorite pastimes” and, far more important from a trade association’s point of view, far less likely to purchase fishing tackle, electronics and other boating gear when the season is closed.  Depending on the fishery, regulations might even cause people to put off the purchase of a new boat.

Thus, federal fisheries management might undercut the fishing and boating industries’ short-term profits, and anything that would do that is naturally, in the eyes of an industry member, a “flawed” and “broken” management system.

Thus, what we’re now seeing is a concerted effort to undercut federal fisheries management and replace it with a patchwork of state management.  After all, while federal fisheries managers are legally required to rebuild overfished stocks within a time certain, end overfishing, and base management actions on the best available science—all actions that can limit angling activity and so industry cash flow—state fisheries managers don’t have to do any of those things.  They can—and not infrequently have—allowed stocks to languish and overfishing to continue, while ignoring the science in favor of whatever political influences happened to prevail at the time.

Yet Angers, and other industry spokesmen, continue to promote the false message that

“the states have proven the ability to balance conservation and access…over many decades,”

even though the biological needs of a species are not negotiable, and allowing “just a little bit” of overfishing in order to provide higher recreational landings—thus, “balancing” conservation and access—is still going to eventually drive a stock into decline.

The myth of the superiority of state management systems was decisively shattered just last Monday, when a North Carolina state judge found, in a lawsuit challenging the adequacy of North Carolina’s state saltwater fisheries management program, that

“The State was forced to concede, as the uncontroverted evidence showed, that not a single species managed by the State exhibits long-term viability,”

“Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions on the State’s management failures were entirely unrebutted,”

and that

“On the full trial record, the evidence overwhelmingly established that the State breached its obligations [to manage marine fisheries for the benefit of the public as a whole] under the public trust doctrine and the North Carolina Constitution.”

Ironically, the lawsuit was brought by the North Carolina chapter of the Coastal Conservation Association.  The CCA was one of the founding members of the Center for Sportfishing Policy—which was actually called the “Center for Coastal Conservation” when it was first formed—and one of the greatest advocates for state management of recreational fisheries.  The only hitch is that, in North Carolina, state management was thought to favor the commercial fishery, making a lawsuit against the state, brought by an angling group, seem like a viable option.

One may only wonder whether, had the state’s management failures favored the recreational sector rather than the commercials, the suit would have ever been brought.

Be that as it may, the Center and its component organizations have been aggressively pushing the myth of state superiority, and trying to put state managers in charge of federal waters fisheries, for years.  It might be instructive to look at what happened when they succeeded.

Probably their first success came with Amendment 50 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico, which maintained the annual recreational red snapper catch limit set by NMFS, but allocated that limit among the five Gulf Coast states, and allowed the states to set seasons that would supposedly constrain state recreational landings to that ACL.

The various organizations that belong to the Center hyped Amendment 50 as “a resounding success,” and in 2025, Florida announced a 126-day-long season, the longest in many years.  People were doing a lot more fishing than they were a few years ago, and one can only presume that they were buying a lot more gear as a result, and so making the industry happy.

The only problem was, the red snapper weren’t holding up their end of the deal.

It turns out that when you have a longer season, and people fish more, a lot more red snapper get caught (whether or not the supposedly superior state data collections pick up the mortality), the size and abundance of snapper decline, and legal fish get harder to find.

Charter and party boat captains, at least those in Florida and Alabama, were starting to complain about the downturn in the red snapper fishery.  In 2024, captains in Destin, Florida were already talking about a red snapper season that was the

“Worst I have seen in a long time,”

with one saying that

“The snapper fishing was by far the toughest snapper season I’ve ever fished.  They were tought from the get-go, and became almost non-existent at the end of the season.”

Another noted that

“We were able to find snappers throughout the season, but it wasn’t necessarily easy and for sure the overall size average was smaller than I’d like.”

Because when states “balance conservation with access,” the end result is fewer and smaller fish.

But states are still jumping aboard the “access” bandwagon, and trying to justify the results.  In Alabama, Dr. Sean Powers, Director of the University of South Alabama’s School of Marine and Environmental Sciences, said,

“During the last five or six years, we’ve seen the average size or red snapper decrease.  We believe that is because of fishing pressure.”

Then he dismissed any concerns about that trend.

“But we have tons of new fish coming in every year.  It may very well be that, without the large snapper on the reef, it makes more room for small snapper.

“…If you look at the total weight number [of all the snapper on a reef], it’s about the same over the past five years.  But instead of having big, medium, and small snapper, we now have small and medium snapper…

“If they want to go back to where the average size is 10 pounds, then we have to go back to nine-day seasons…I am confident that everybody can go out there and get their two 16-inch snapper relatively easily.  For the really big snapper, you have to target them.  You have to have better sites that aren’t fished that much, and you have to be a fisherman again…

“But everything is a balance.  If you want a snapper season that consistently lasts through the summer, then you’re going to have to accept that it’s going to be a little more difficult to catch a legal snapper.  You’re really going to have to be a skilled fisherman and do your research to catch a big snapper.”

In other words, when you start managing for access, in the form of longer seasons, instead of for the long-term health and sustainability of the stock, you are going to have to artificially truncate the age and size structure of the red snapper stock, removing most of the larger fish that generally don’t survive when fishing mortality begins to rise.  And because much of the spawning potential of the red snapper stock is produced by the older, larger females, when you increase access, you decrease fecundity, and render the stock less productive, which seems counter to what one should do if you’re trying to increase landings.

It’s not yet clear what the implications of the truncated age and size structure might be.  The last assessment of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper stock was completed in 2024, but did not pass peer review.  However, given the trends of declining abundance and declining fish size in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, it is far from unlikely that when the next assessment is completed later this year, it will find that the current level of “access” is contrary to the long-term interests of the red snapper stock.

Should that occur, we’ll quickly learn whether the Center, and its member organizations, prioritizes “sustainable fisheries” and “angling tradition” over “the economic impact of recreational fishing and boating” and avoiding “a major dent in the recreational fishing industry’s economic output.”

Although I suspect that we already know what the answer will be.

Certainly, the recreational fishing and boating industry seem to be tipping their hand in the South Atlantic, where they convinced NMFS to violate both the provisions of Magnuson-Stevens and its own regulations, and issue exempted fishing permits that would have allowed the four South Atlantic states to manage red snapper in federal waters, and might have allowed anglers to overfish South Atlantic red snapper by as much as 2,000%.

Allowing overfishing at anything approaching that level—or even at an order of magnitude less—would, sooner or later, do meaningful harm to the red snapper resource, but the industry seemed to be less concerned about potential harm to the resource than it was about the

“confusion, frustration and economic disruption for anglers, for-hire operators, marinas, tackle shops, and coastal communities,”

and the

“economic consequences”

that ensued after a federal judge enjoined any fishing under the illegally issued permits.

Now, the same players are returning to the scene of their previous defeat, again seeking the existence of exempted fishing permits, only this time, in a striking example of circular logic, they’re trying to use the catch, effort, and landings data from the Florida State Reef Fish Survey to demonstrate that overfishing would not occur if exempted fishing permits were issued in order to determine whether the same Florida State Reef Fish Survey could be used to gauge recreational red snapper catch, effort, and landings.

The absurdity of that probably didn’t escape their attention, but neither did the potential tackle sales, should they manage to get the permits issued.

Determining whether the Florida State Reef Fish Survey accurately predicts the level of fishing mortality, or whether issuing the permits will, in reality, lead to overfishing, doesn’t seem to be one of their priorities.  Opening the season and selling more product—as long as the snapper population lasts—is.

And we shouldn’t believe that this sort of thinking is limited to red snapper, or to the South.  Back in 2023, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, acting in concert with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, developed a management approach that would allow recreational fishermen to exceed their annual catch limits for bluefish (once the stock is rebuilt), summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass, and even allow the combined recreational and commercial sectors to overfish those stocks under certain circumstances, without anglers suffering any penalty at all.

Unfortunately, a federal district court ruled against a challenge to that approach, so it is now the law of the land, with recreational landings for black sea bass, in particular, well above the sector’s annual catch limit, and sometimes above the acceptable biological catch for the stock.

Even though the black sea bass spawning stock biomass is high, at about 280% of the target level, we’re already seeing the consequences, much as we are with Gulf red snapper, in the form of a population composed mostly of smaller, younger fish.  Here on Long Island, where I was regularly catching black sea bass in the three- to four-pound range—and sometimes larger—a dozen years ago, today I have problems finding even a single fish that exceeds the current 16-inch minimum size, and perhaps two pounds.

Anglers throughout New York and southern New England are reporting the same sort of problems; even in New Jersey, where the size limit is a mere 12 ½ inches, there are rumblings of discontent with the state of the stock.

Once again, trying to “balance conservation and access,” rather than tailoring management to the needs of the stock, has come at a price, and with most of the population, and most of the spawning potential, concentrated in sea bass no more than four years old, we can only speculate on what might happen if recruitment—which has been exceptionally good in recent years—declines, and doesn’t feed enough young fish into the population to replace the not-that-much-older fish that are being taken out.

Declining Gulf of Mexico red snapper and efforts to sidestep recreational red snapper catch limits in the South Atlantic, along with the incredible shrinking black sea bass along the New England and mid-Atlantic coasts, are warning signs of what we may see, should we allow the recreational fishing and boating industries to successfully undercut the federal management system.

If they get their way, they will certainly increase angler access.

And increased angler access will undoubtedly be good for the industry, at least for a while.

But if it comes at the price of depleted fish stocks, as it almost inevitably will, those industry profits will be completely subsidized by the public’s—and the resource’s—pain.

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE ASMFC PUNTS ON TAUTOG MANAGEMENT--AGAIN

 

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission has never been known for its fast responses to fisheries issues.

We saw that in 2014, when the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board ignored its own management plan, and failed to initiate a ten-year rebuilding plan even after a so-called “management trigger” requiring them to do just that was tripped in the 2013 benchmark stock assessment.\

We saw it again in 2019, after a new benchmark assessment also tripped a trigger requiring a striped bass rebuilding plan, and the Bass Board decided to initiate a full-blown Amendment 7—a process that took two full years—before addressing the rebuilding issue (although, to be fair, it did at least adopt the emergency regulations in 2023, after high recreational landings in 2022 rendered timely rebuilding, without additional management action, unlikely).

And we saw it last October, when the Bass Board took a wait-and-see approach to rebuilding the stock by the 2029 deadline, rather than impose the 12% reduction in fishing mortality that would have made rebuilding more likely.

I mention striped bass because they’ve been called the ASMFC’s “flagship species,” but the history of ASMFC delays extends well into the past, and touches on multiple species.

I was down in Alexandria, Virginia for the January 1999 meeting of the Winter Flounder Management Board, and so was a witness when that Board approved a motion to

“suspend consideration of any state’s compliance with the F40 contained in Addendum I, as amended by Addendum 2 [sic], pending development of a new amendment to the [fishery management plan], as long as a state maintains and continues to implement and enforce its current regulations,”

and in doing so perhaps dashed the last hope of preventing the collapse of the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock.

And a lot of us were listening to the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board meeting last October when, despite knowing that the fishing mortality rate was far above the fishing mortality target (although not above threshold), and that fecundity (total egg production, used in lieu of a spawning stock biomass reference point) was well below target and only 5% above the threshold that defines an overfished stock, the Board took no meaningful action to reduce menhaden landings, merely reducing the annual catch limit by 20%--when the fishery was already falling 20% short of catching its quota—setting it at 186,840 metric tons, rather than beginning the process of reducing the total allowable catch to the 108,000 metric tons needed to achieve a 50% probability of constraining the fishing mortality rate to or below its target.

So no, the ASMFC isn’t particularly quick to take action to rebuild stocks or reduce fishing mortality to levels that are sustainable in the long term.  But even within the ASMFC universe, some species seem to be singled out for greater delays and less management action. 

Of those, American lobster have probably suffered the most malign neglect, with the American Lobster Management Board presiding over the collapse of the Southern New England stock, pointedly ignoring repeated scientific advice to shut down the fishery for at least five years, and expressing far more concern for the short-term interests of lobster fishermen than the lobster resource itself.  Recently, as recruitment in the Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank stock declined, we see history repeating itself there, although in that case, the ASMFC was also plagued with a political climate that might well have frustrated the an efforts that it might have decided to make.

But right behind American lobster, we find the tautog, a fish that the ASMFC has managed since 1996 and, after 30 years, still can’t seem to get right.

The original fishery management plan, adopted in 1996, begins with the statement,

“The Plan defines overfishing as a rate of fishing mortality exceeding the natural mortality rate (M=0.15).  This overfishing definition is consistent with the slow growth and long lifespan of this species.  In addition, this conservative reference point is warranted given the uncertainty in stock structure and in the spawning biomass required to maintain at least average recruitment.”

That seemed like a pretty good start, because managers didn’t know very much about the tautog resource.

“The primary reason for the development of a tautog [fishery management plan] is the vulnerability of tautog to overfishing…Fisheries managers lack most of the biological and fisheries data necessary for effective management of the tautog resource.  Estimates of recreational and commercial catches are poor.  Information on migration and critical habitat utilization are lacking in most of the species range.  Inadequate data are available on size and age distribution, natural and fishing mortality rates, and recruitment.  Little information is available on critical habitat availability, current habitat status, or the capability of artificial habitats to expand species abundance…Because of the uncertainties associated with all aspects of the tautog resource, an interstate cooperative effort is needed to effectively manage this species.  [emphasis added]”      

Managers were effectively caught up in a fog of uncertainty, and as anyone who has ever run a boat in the fog knows all too well, when you can’t see where you’re going, you need to exercise extreme caution at all times to avoid running aground.

While biologists know more about the tautog’s life history today than they did 30 years ago, even in 1996, the ASMFC was already aware of the basic principles—conservative management based on the life history of the species, as well as the scientific (and later management) uncertainty surrounding the tautog and the tautog fishery—that should guide tautog management.

But as we soon learned, there was a big difference between the ASMFC knowing how to properly approach tautog management, and actually putting that knowledge into practice.

Management stumbled right from the start.  While the management plan defined overfishing as a fishing mortality rate that exceeded F=0.15, it also explicitly allowed overfishing to occur in 1997 and 1998, setting the target fishing mortality rate for those years at F=0.24, after which it was supposed to be lowered to the fishing mortality threshold of F=0.15.

And yes, the target fishing mortality was set to equal the overfishing threshold; the Tautog Management Board decided to skate along the razor’s edge, setting management measures that resided right at the threshold level.  It left no margin for error at all.

Thus, it set a commercial and recreational size limit of 13 inches in 1997 and 14 inches in 1998 and beyond, and left it up to the states to adopt whatever additional measures were needed to achieve the required reduction in fishing mortality.  It wasn’t quite clear what those additional management measures needed to be, but with the fishing mortality rate estimated at somewhere between F=0.58 and F=0.77, it was clear that very substantial restrictions were needed.

Facing the uncertainties inherent in the fisheries data, and the difficulties states would have in crafting management measures, it didn’t take long before the ASMFC decided to punt.

Stating that

“The implementation schedule approved in the original Tautog [Fishery Management Plan] may be problematic because (1) data are not available to evaluate scheduled regulatory obligations, and (2) the implementation schedule is not consistent for all states.  The FMP required all states to submit a commercial fishery management proposal in October 1996 for review by the Technical Committee and approval by the Board.  During this review it became apparent that the data are insufficient to satisfactorily evaluate the current fishing mortality in a number of states and to properly evaluate state fishing mortality reduction proposals.  Fortunately, many states began increased data collection efforts in 1996 that will lead to more accurate estimation of fishing mortality on both a coastwide and regional basis.  It will take time for this data to be analyzed and incorporated into the management program.  Also, some states have indicated that the differential compliance schedule is inequitable,”

the Tautog Management Board adopted Amendment 1 to the management plan in 1997.

Amendment 1 stood for the proposition that, instead of imposing some almost certainly imperfect management measures, that could later be amended, to reduce fishing mortality right away, the Board would allow overfishing to continue at a rate three, or four, or maybe even five times the overfishing threshold, allowing the stock to decline further until, in 1998, overfishing would continue at only a rate of F=0.24.  Finally, in 2000, states would have to reduce the fishing mortality rate to F=0.15, where the slightest miscalculation would subject the stock to overfishing once again.

It wasn’t a strategy designed for success, and it probably wouldn’t have worked, but we’ll never know, because in 1999, the ASMFC punted again, adopting Addendum II to the management plan, which stated that

“The implementation schedule in Addendum I has been a problem given the life history of tautog and the relatively short duration that the current regulations have been implemented.  According to Addendum I the states were required to implement management measures to meet the F=0.24 requirement by April 1, 1998.  Therefore, as of September 1999, these regulations have only been implemented for about 17 months.

“Addendum I also requires that the states submit proposals to meet the F=0.15 target by October 1, 1999.  The Technical Committee is developing a stock assessment to evaluate the effects of the current regulations and determine the extent of reductions that will need to be made by the states to meet the F=0.15 target.  During the development of the assessment the Technical Committee has often noted that the effects of the current regulations may not be reflected in the assessment.

“The assessment will use the data that has been collected through 1998.  Therefore, only nine months (April-December 1998) of data reflecting the new management regime will be included in the assessment.  Given the fact that the assessment will supply limited advice on the effects of the current regulations, the Management Board approved delaying the implementation of the F=0.15 target for two years, until April 1, 2022.  [emphasis added]”

So, once again, the Management Board was willing to let overfishing continue, rather than impose some sort of precautionary management that might get it under control.

By this time, we’re starting to see a pattern emerge where, when faced with uncertainty, the Tautog Management Board is far more willing to let overfishing continue, and risk further harm to the stock, than it is to impose more restrictive management measures that might end up reducing the fishing mortality rate more than is absolutely necessary.

That bias toward risking overharvest, rather than reducing landings more than might be required, has often haunted ASMFC deliberations, but has been a particular trait of the Tautog Management Board for the past three full decades.

By 2002, when fishing mortality was supposed to have been reduced to F=0.15, biologists had finally amassed some meaningful information on the tautog’s life history, which suggested that the stock could sustain a fishing mortality rate of F=0.29.  A recent stock assessment indicated that fishing mortality had been reduced from F=0.71 to F=0.41, so additional management measures were still needed, but it appeared that abundance had increased modestly, although spawning stock biomass had declined.

In response, the Tautog Management Board adopted Addendum III to the management plan, which placed all of the conservation burden on the shoulders of the recreational fishery, requiring states to adopt regulations that would reduce the overall fishing mortality rate to F=0.29.  The commercial fishery would not be affected at all.

It turned out that Addendum III was a little too optimistic, although it didn’t appear to do any harm.  So, in 2007, the Management Board adopted Addendum IV to the management plan, which backtracked on the fishing mortality target, reducing it to F=0.20.  But Addendum III had successfully reduced the fishing mortality rate to F=0.28, just below Addendum III’s fishing mortality target, and biomass and recruitment showed what Addendum IV called a “slight increase.”

Things seemed to still be headed in the right direction, albeit very slowly.  But later in the same year, the Management Board decided to rethink its decision to make the recreational sector pay the full price of rebuilding the tautog stock, while commercial fishermen got a pass.  It adopted Addendum V to the management plan, which allowed states to achieve the required 25.6% reduction in fishing mortality by imposing new measures on both recreational and commercial fishermen.

But by 2011, all of those good feelings came crashing down, and fisheries managers realized that they had been overly optimistic all along.  Another management action, Addendum VI to the management plan, was needed.  That addendum began by admitting the failure of previous efforts:

“The 2011 tautog stock assessment update estimated that the tautog stock is overfished with overfishing occurring.  Spawning stock biomass (SSB) has remained at low levels for the last decade.  A reduction in the target F is necessary to rebuild the stock.  [emphasis added]”

It turned out that the original tautog management plan, adopted in 1996, had gotten things right all along, despite the lack of needed biological information.  To rebuild the stock, the fishing mortality rate needed to be reduced to the same F=0.15 proposed in that original plan.  Raising the target fishing mortality rate in the interim, although done in good faith, ultimately resulted in nothing more than a stalled rebuilding timeline.

Finally, in 2017, fisheries managers finally had enough information to make a comprehensive, and somewhat successful, change to the tautog management program, which came in the form of Amendment 1 to the management plan.  Amendment 1 admitted that

“Based on the 2015 Benchmark Stock Assessment and Peer Review Report, tautog is overfished and overfishing is occurring on a coastwide scale,”

so it became clear that Addendum VI, despite its reduced fishing mortality target, was nowhere near restrictive enough to turn things around. 

Up in New England, Massachusetts and Rhode Island were acting on their own, putting more restrictive regulations in place in an effort to recover their local tautog population.  Their efforts seemed to be working, with spawning stock biomass increasing and the fishing mortality rate trending down.

Amendment 1 made that sort of thing easier to do, as it recognized that the coastwide tautog stock is made up of local populations that don’t engage in extensive migrations.  The Amendment broke the stock up into four regional populations, Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Long Island Sound, New Jersey/New York Bight, and Delaware/Maryland/Virginia, each of which would have different, regionally-appropriate biological reference points for spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate, and be governed by different regulations.

Amendment 1’s new approach held a lot of promise, and was arguably the first truly meaningful effort to manage tautog in over 20 years.  Before Amendment 1, tautog management could be characterized as a light-handed approach, where half-measures were imposed in an effort to minimize disruptions to the fishery.  Amendment 1, on the other hand, seemed an earnest effort to overhaul tautog management and fully rebuild all four local populations.

At the same time, Amendment 1 didn’t go as far as it should have to reduce fishing mortality and rebuild the stock, due to substantial opposition from the for-hire fishing industry, which took an aggressive stand against any landings reductions. 

I attended the hearing on Amendment 1 that was held at the offices of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Division in June17, where the room was packed—standing room only—with party and charter boat operators who showed no respect for the forum or for the process as they loudly opposed any additional restrictions, hooted and cheered when one party boat captain told the ASMFC representative that “We don’t care about your science.  Your science is bullcrap,” regularly interrupted the proceedings with various hostile comments, threatened to sue somebody—it wasn’t completely clear who—for lost profits resulting from any new restrictions, claimed that “fraud was committed” and, in one case, yelled and screamed and cursed at the hearing officer, and somehow got away with it all.

More than got away with it, as things turned out, because they convinced New York’s ASMFC delegation to oppose any management measures with a measurable probability of success.

And New York wasn’t alone, as at the October 2017 Tautog Management Board meeting, where Amendment 1 was approved, Toni Kearns, the ASMFC’s Fisheries Policy Director, noted that

“As a reminder of the option in the document itself, for the probability of achieving the F target.  The addendum [sic] had two options; either status quo, which was no probability or Option B, which was a 50 percent probability of achieving the F target.

“There was a range of support for status quo throughout the different hearings, as well as some support for the 50 percent probability.”

What that basically meant is that most of the stakeholders who commented wanted an amendment more likely to fail than succeed, just so long as they could keep killing tautog.  And in some places, such as Long Island Sound and New Jersey/New York Bight, they got exactly what they asked for.

That sort-of worked out for Long Island Sound, where the stock is no longer overfished nor subject to overfishing, but it didn’t do so well for the New Jersey/New York Bight population, which still experiences overfishing (as did the Delaware/Maryland/Virginia population, although there, the best estimates are that overfishing no longer occurs).

So, the Management Board set about drafting a new Addendum I that would impose a 40% reduction in fishing mortality, and have a 50% probability of getting the fishing mortality rate down to or below target by the year 2030.

I have to admit that I was happy about that, as the New Jersey/New York Bight population is the one that we catch here on the South Shore of Long Island.  I have fond memories of hooking up to one of the pilings of the Robert Moses Bridge back in the mid-1980s, and going through four dozen—sometimes six dozen—green crabs on a single tide while fishing alone, hooking up tautog almost as soon as my bait hit the bottom.  Yes, many were throwbacks, but there were enough 2- to 5-pounders in those old, no-bag limit days to put enough fish in the freezer to last well into the winter.  While I never expect to see that kind of fishing again, the ability to get out and reliably put even a couple of blackfish on ice would certainly be a good thing,.

But at the same time, given the history of tautog management, and the ASMFC’s tendency to delay action on all things tautog, I have to admit that, deep in my gut, I had doubts that Addendum I would move go anywhere.

And, unfortunately, my gut turned out to be right.

Once again, uncertainty in the data gave members of the Management Board pause.

And, once again, given the choice between doing nothing, and perhaps allowing overfishing to continue, or taking action, and perhaps adopting regulations that were overly restrictive, and might allow a few more tautog than needed to remain alive, the Management Board opted for overfishing, apparently considering it the lesser evil of the two.

The problem was that the proposed 40% reduction was based on the average landings in the years 2022 through 2024.  While 2022 and 2023 landings were fairly high, 2024 landings were lower and 2025 landings a little lower yet.  So folks began to worry that the 40% reduction might have a greater than 50% probability of reducing fishing mortality to target, and create more than the minimum acceptable probability of success, and might even achieve the target fishing mortality level ahead of the 2023 deadline.  To avoid those possible outcomes, New York’s administrative representative on the Board, Jesse Hornstein, moved

“that further action on Tautog Addendum I is postponed until projections to determine the reduction required to meet a 50% probability of achieving the F target in 2030 are updated using the most recent three-year average removals from 2024-2026 (in the current MRIP currency) after final 2026 MRIP estimates are released.  An option to allow the Board to take management action via Board action following the results of the Benchmark Assessment should be developed by the [Plan Development Team].  Board action can only be used if the upcoming Benchmark Assessment shows that Fishing Mortality needs to be reduced or that it can be liberalized by 10% or greater to have a 50% probability of achieving the F-target by 2030.  [emphasis added]”

The motion was seconded by New Jersey fisheries manager Joseph Cimino.

And so, a full 30 years after the ASMFC decided to involve itself with tautog management, much remains unchanged.  Uncertainly still plagues the management process, particularly with regard to current landings, and the Tautog Management Board is still biased against taking action to protect the stock, if there is a risk that, by doing so, they might unnecessarily limit landings.

Mr. Hornstein’s rationale for making the motion was straightforward.

“…in 2024, removals in the Bight and in the DelMarVa region as well declined and they were even lower in 2025 in the Bight.  The projection that we used to calculate the required reduction in fishing mortality use the 2022 to 2024 average to estimate removals in 2025 and 2026.  And now that we have the final 2025 removals, we know that the estimate used in the projections was an overestimate.  And given the decline in removals over the last two years, we’re potentially responding to a level of fishing mortality that may no longer be occurring to the same magnitude that it once did.  Generally speaking, there is a lot of uncertainty around tautog.  MRIP plays a big role in our assessments.  Tautog has higher [percent standard error] compared to other popular fisheries, and removals are highly variable from year to year.  In addition, New York data is split between—our MRIP data is split in a way that was never intended to be for MRIP data to be used between the Sound and the Bight, so we can manage those two stocks separately.  We’re going to be receiving calibrated MRIP data and get a new assessment in the next couple of years which will include new regional surveys and further evaluation of the large retrospective pattern that we see in the assessments. So there’s a lot changing that should improve our confidence and our understanding of the tautog population.”

And everything that he said was completely true.  But that still begs the critical question.

Uncertainty cuts both ways.  If there is a lot of room for error in the recreational landings estimates, we can’t assume that landings are, and will always be, lower than previously predicted.  It is very possible, given the higher percent standard error in the MRIP estimates, that recreational landings in 2024 and 2025 were actually higher than the point estimates, and that the uncertainty that managers are facing could be masking a greater level or removals than previously believed.

In such a highly uncertain environment, doesn’t it make sense to adopt more precautionary regulations, that hedge against unexpectedly high landings, rather than to potentially allow overfishing to continue, and erode the tautog stock, perhaps at a faster than expected rate?

Maybe so, but the Tautog Management Board, over the last three decades, has never thought that way, and has consistently avoided the more risk-averse outcomes.

Mr. Hornstein at least acknowledged the risk, although he immediately dismissed it, saying,

“While there’s risk involved in waiting another year to take action, there’s a high probability that [spawning stock biomass] is not in danger of becoming overfished during this time.  And although this will delay action likely until the annual meeting in 2027, it will still allow for the implementation of new measures by 2028 as required by the [fishery management plan].”

But one part of Mr. Hornstein’s motion did seem a little odd, and that was allowing the Management Board to liberalize tautog regulations without going through the addendum and public hearing process.  Such unilateral Board action is unusual, and generally disfavored by members of ASMFC management boards; we saw that in December 2024, when the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board decided not to take unilateral action to protect the large 2018 year class from recreational harvest in 2025, when it would be entering the slot size limit, even though the survival of the 2018s is needed if the currently overfished striped bass stock is to be rebuilt. 

Usually, such unilateral Board action is reserved for those rare times when it is needed to stem a stock decline; using Board action, rather than the addendum process, to allow fishermen to increase their landings might well be unprecedented in the history of the ASMFC.

Yet, if such a precedent is being broken, it doesn’t surprise me that it is the Tautog Management Board who is doing so.  It just fits in with how they’ve managed the stock from the very start.  Mr. Hornstein ultimately laid out what seems to be the Tautog Management Board’s guiding philosophy for the last 30 years:

“Cuts to any fishery always inflict some economic pain and we owe it to the public not to cause more pain than is necessary…This is still a cautious approach as SSB is not at risk of changing status, and we’re taking a justifiable path to make sure that we’re getting it as right as we can.  And I think this is, you know, help build trust between the public and management.  And I’m concerned that if we continue to move forward without pausing to rerun these numbers, we’re in a less defensible position, especially if the next assessment completely changes our understanding of the population.”

Fair enough.

But once again, the traditional Tautog Management Board bias is all too apparent.

Yes, unnecessary harvest reductions do inflict unnecessary economic pain.  But so does the failure to impose necessary harvest reductions.  Just consider the economic losses attributable to fishery managers’ failure to avoid the collapse of the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock.  The failure to initiate a striped bass rebuilding plan in 2014, which could well have positioned the stock to better endure the its current recruitment problems.  And yes, the Tautog Management Board’s failure to buckle down and adopt precautionary measures back in 1996, which could have rendered Amendment I completely unnecessary.

A lot of potential economic benefits were lost when those three fisheries went into decline.

But the Tautog Board always worries about the economic consequences of reducing landings, and ignores the economic consequences of declining fish stocks, even though the latter consequences are just as real and can endure for a far longer time.

The same sort of bias attends the notion of “building trust,” because at this point, the only thing that I, and other folks whom I know, trust the Tautog Management Board to do is delay, and fail, and then delay again, because that’s just what it’s done for the past 30 years, demonstrating that they are more afraid of being blamed for declining landings than they are of being blamed for declining tautog abundance.  The Board might want people to trust that it won’t require unneeded landings reductions, but doesn’t seem to care if no one trusts them to return the stock to full and sustainable health.

Even with respect to the stock assessment, we see the same sort of thing; a Management Board worried that the next stock assessment will reveal that the stock is healthier than they believed.  But there seems to be no worry that the next assessment will show a stock in worse shape than managers thought, even though, if that occurred, it would seem to cast even more doubt on their credibility as competent fisheries managers.

At least a few of the Board members disagreed with that risk-prone approach.  Dr. Jason McNamee, the Rhode Island fishery manager, acknowledged that the motion didn’t affect his state’s fishery, but asked that, since none of the data appeared problematic, why would the Board want to delay the management process until new data might be obtained. 

He went on to say that

“This just feels like a really bad idea.  This is not a species that you can knock down.  It does not come back quickly.  So, I am nervous for us and the folks that may be having issues with their fishery.”

Unfortunately, Dr. McNamee held the minority view. 

Adam Nowalsky, New Jersey’s Legislative Proxy, argued that

“to go ahead and essentially penalize the fishing community in the New Jersey/New York Bight region, which does not have an overfished status, with 40% reductions that were based on at least one year of projections that we know now are not correct, I think that’s a very valid data issue.”

Nowalsky’s comments were interesting, given that he seemed willing to give full credence to the 2025 MRIP tautog data, saying that, based on that data, we have “one year of projections that we know now are not correct.”  But at the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board meeting last October, he struck a very different pose, making it a point to oppose a projection using just one year of MRIP data to support a 12% landings reduction.

It seems that he’s only willing to rely on one year of data when it can be used to justify killing more fish.

But the discussion went on from there, and in the end, a thin sort of compromise was reached. 

Mr. Hornstein’s motion was divided, and then the first half was amended by Dr. McNamee, so that instead of waiting for final 2026 data, Addendum I’s reductions would be based upon projections derived from landings in 2023, 2024, and 2025.  That motion passed on a vote of 8 in favor and 1 opposed.

So Addendum I isn’t dead, and there is a very real hope that we might see a new draft of that addendum approved for public comment in the not-too-distant future, maybe this fall, or maybe in the first half of 2027.

But given the history and the biases of the Tautog Management Board, and its 30-year trend of subordinating the long-term health of the tautog stock to the short-term interests of fishermen, you still might not want to hope too hard.

Things can always be delayed again.