"CORPORATE GREED" IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

 

We’ve all heard, or perhaps read, the comments that inevitably arise whenever a fish stock declines or management measures are hotly debated.  The conversation never goes on for long before some apparently outraged angler gets up and starts yelling, “This is all about greed!”

Such claims emerged in recent striped bass debates, when the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Striped Bass Management Board was deciding whether to reduce striped bass landings, first in January 2024, and then again in December 2024 and October 2025.  A comment that appeared on a New Jersey saltwater fishing forum was typical:

“The incessant focus on economics and political and state greed versus the prudent management of stocks continues to put another nail in the coffin of many of the remaining fisheries.  Nothing is sustainable if the regulations don’t support that outcome and protect stocks from exploitation, commercial and corporate greed and any issues like natural predation (dogfish) and the declining water quality conditions of the Chesapeake Bay which threaten a stock’s survival.”

We’re seeing the same thing in the current uproar over the National Marine Fisheries Service issuing exempted fishing permits for the recreational red snapper fishery in the South Atlantic.  One Facebook post by North Carolina charter boat captain and self-proclaimed “content creator” Jake Hiles took the “greed” narrative to new, conspiracy-theory-fueled heights, declaring that

“2 weeks ago President Trump took the regulatory power away from NOAA and National Marine Fisheries because the red snapper fishery had been regulated by corporate greed.  Basically a few wealthy stakeholders in the fishery control the entire coastwide resource and corruption at NMFS has allowed this to happen for years.  So Trump gives the red snapper resource back to the states because the federal system is corrupt and immediately the few wealthy stakeholders in the fishery sue and get the courts to give corrupt NMFS control of the red snapper fishery.  This is corporate greed and political corruption.”

Over the years, similar comments have been made in various fisheries.  In each case, the underlying assumption is that the commercial fishery is some huge, corporate monolith, that has the money, the political clout, and the public relations talents needed to control the entire fisheries management process, and take the lion’s share of the resource, while leaving the angling public with little more than dregs.

And in some fisheries, that assumption is almost true.  The North Pacific fishery for walleye pollock, the largest single fishery, commercial or recreational, in the United States (3.14 billion pounds landed in 2024), is certainly controlled by a relatively small number of influential corporations.

The same thing can probably be said about the menhaden reduction fishery, various mid-water trawl fisheries targeting high-volume, relatively low-value species such as herring and mackerel, and distant-waters boats such as Pacific tuna seiners and some pelagic longliners.

But all those fisheries tend to be defined by a few characteristics:  They are all big boat fisheries.  Many of them target fish that are either not recreational species or, at the least, are not highly valued by most recreational fishermen.  When they do target recreational species—generally tuna, swordfish, and sometimes certain species of sharks—they do so on distant grounds, in places or at times where anglers don’t commonly venture.

But when it comes to “mixed use” fisheries—those that are pursued by both commercial and recreational fishermen—the commercial fishermen tend to be far less imposing.  Although there are commercial fishing associations in most if not every coastal state, and some fishermen and, more often, fish buyers can be locally important, the commercial fishery for species such as striped bass, red snapper, or summer flounder is hardly the kind of economic and political colossus that most anglers imagine.  The typical commercial fisherman, working alone or with one or two crewmen to tend a gillnet, pinhook striped bass, or employ bandit rigs to pull some snapper off a southern reef only wishes that they had the kind of social, political, and economic clout that so many recreational fishermen believe that they do.

But that doesn’t mean that real corporate money, real corporate lobbyists, and real corporate greed aren’t distorting fisheries management process.  It’s just that anglers are looking in the wrong place to find it.

They ought to stop scrutinizing the commercial fishery, and start looking for evidence of corporate influence and corporate greed far, far closer to home.

Last fall, many striped bass anglers, concerned over record-low recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay and elsewhere, were closely following the progress of the Draft Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Public Comment, which among other things proposed cutting striped bass fishing mortality by 12%, and instituting the first-ever coastwide recreational striped bass season.

In previous years, recreational fishermen overwhelmingly supported such harvest reductions, even though they would sharply reduce anglers’ landings.  We saw that in 2021, when 2,746 public comments supported maintaining the biological reference points used to gauge the health of the stock, and only 18 supported a change that might increase landings at the expense of abundance.  At the same time, 529 comments supported the existing 10-year rebuilding deadline, while 45 wanted rebuilding to occur faster, even if it meant lower landings; no one argued for higher landings at the cost of slower rebuilding.

We saw it again in 2022, when over 4,000 comments supported the current management triggers that require fishing mortality to be reduced to target within one year when overfishing occurs, and requires a rebuilding plan—with a rebuilding period of 10 years or less—to be put in place when the stock becomes overfished, with barely 100 supporting a less vigorous response.  About the same proportion supported the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Technical Committee using a more conservative “low recruitment assumption” and corresponding lowered fishing mortality rate if striped bass recruitment in the major spawning areas fell below a fixed benchmark for three consecutive years, and also supported allowing the Management Board to adopt more restrictive fishing measures without first sending a proposed plan addendum out for public comment, should an upcoming stock assessment update suggest the need for fast action.

And we saw it for a third time in 2024, when 2,289 comments supported reducing the coastal recreational slot size limit to just 28 to 31 inches, compared to only 199 who preferred more liberal options; 2,249 supported a commercial quota reduction of up to 14.5%, with only 159 opposed; and 2,150 again supported giving the Management  Board the freedom to adopt more restrictive measures for the 2025 fishery, if the stock assessment update suggested they were needed, while only 90 disagreed.

But last fall, for the first time, something different happened.  Anglers didn’t overwhelmingly support the proposed 12% reduction.  Part of that was probably due to the fact that, on the coast (as opposed to the Chesapeake Bay), that reduction was going to have to be achieved through a closed season, and some people were talking quite loudly about a closure when even catch-and-release would not be allowed.

Part of it was probably also due to uncertainty in the recreational landings data; there was little more than a year of data to show the impacts of the last regulatory change, and what data there was suggested that the stock might rebuild by the 2029 deadline even if no action was taken.

Yet there was also something else going on.  Among the comment letters sent in was one signed by six organizations, the American Sportfishing Association, the National Marine Manufacturers Association, the Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, the Center for Sportfishing Policy, the Boat Owners Association of the United States, and the Coastal Conservation Association.  For the first time, the recreational fishing and boating industry was making an industry-wide effort to involve itself in striped bass conservation issues.

And in its debut, the industry opposed the proposed striped bass conservation measures, writing, in part,

“…Imposing new restrictions under these circumstances risks unnecessary economic harm and sows division within the recreational community, without offering measurable or scientifically meaningful biological results…

“Instead of acknowledging that status quo and a 12% reduction are scientifically equivalent, Draft Addendum III shifts the burden of [Marine Recreational Information Program] uncertainty onto anglers by forcing a choice between two unpalatable season closures: no-targeting closures, which ban fishing altogether and impacts both harvest and catch-and-release anglers, or no-harvest closures, which fall solely on anglers who keep fish.  We believe forcing anglers into this divisive choice, when science does not justify action, will cause significant economic and social impacts while not meaningfully improving striped bass conservation.

“We have serious concerns with no targeting closures because they prohibit fishing entirely.  At the same time, we must recognize that the burden of rebuilding has already fallen disproportionately on harvest anglers, even though fishing mortality is roughly evenly split between catch-and-release and harvest activities.  Draft Addendum III offers no option that addresses this inequity, other than prohibiting fishing altogether.  Given that the proposed 12% reduction is scientifically indistinguishable from status quo, we reject the premise that anglers must pick winners and losers and instead support maintaining current seasons as the best and most equitable alternative…

“The economic value of the striped bass fishery cannot be overstated…

“The proposed season closures—whether prohibiting harvest or targeting—will undoubtedly erode those substantial economic benefits and disproportionately impact coastal small businesses, bait and tackle shops, marinas, boat manufacturers, charter operators, and the entire recreational fishing and boating supply chain.

“We represent the entire recreational fishing and boating community, including businesses that serve all anglers regardless of economic background or preferred fishing technique.  Maintaining consistent seasons is the most equitable solution: It preserves both regional economic stability and angler access across preference lines, without inflicting unnecessary economic hardship…”

A similar letter, containing some nearly identical language, was submitted by the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership.  In addition, the American Sportfishing Association circulated a form letter containing much of the language included in the six-signatory letter quoted above, which was signed in its original form by 660 individuals, and in a modified form by 269 others, although it is not clear how many of those signatories reside on the Atlantic coast or fish for striped bass.

It’s important to note some themes that appear in the quoted letter, including the emphasis on economic issues, the emphasis on anglers’ ability to “access” and kill striped bass, the non-specific and non-supported attacks on the scientific data underlying the draft addendum, the non-specific attacks on the recreational fishing data produced by the Marine Recreational Information Program, and the allegations of significant harm to the entire coastal economy—the “entire recreational fishing and boating supply chain”—from restrictions involving a single species, because we’ll see the same claims resurface in other contexts.

It’s also important to understand who is standing behind the comments, for all of the organizations mentioned, both those who signed the six-signatory letter and the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, are active members of the Center for Sportfishing Policy, an aggressive trade organization which freely admits that

“Our mission is to maximize the opportunity for saltwater anglers by engaging stakeholders to speak with one voice to shape federal fisheries policy.”

In addition,

“[The Center for Sportfishing Policy] is organized under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code; accordingly, donations are not tax-deductible.  Additionally, CSP has established the Center for Sportfishing Policy Political Action Committee (Center PAC), so that its members can fully participate in elective politics.  CSP and Center PAC work to elect candidates to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives who share our concern for America’s marine resources and support recreational fishing and boating.”

So what we’re dealing with is a trade organization created to influence federal fisheries policy, with a fully-funded political action committee intended to influence the actions of federal legislators.  Things get even more interesting when one takes a look at who is running the organization—that is, its Board of Directors.

It turns out that the Board includes representatives from the following corporations: Gemlux, which calls itself

“The world’s largest stainless steel marine hardware supplier,”

Mercury Marine, Butler Marine (a large South Carolina boat dealer), Garmin International (manufacturer of electronics for marine and other applications), Dometic Marine Americas (manufacturer of a variety of high-dollar marine products ranging from air conditioners to hydraulic control systems to gyroscopic stabilizers), Maverick Boats, Sportsman Boats, Viking Yachts, Release Marine (manufacturer of fighting chairs, rocket launchers, and other high-end marine furniture), Vectorply Corporation (manufacturer of “composite reinforcement fabrics,” the stuff that we usually think of as “fiberglass cloth,” but which is in reality far more varied and far more technically advanced), OneWater Marine (a publicly-traded company with a diverse portfolio of brands and products), Regulator Marine, Bass Pro Shops, Contender Boats, Shimano North America Fishing, Inc., Pure Fishing, Inc., AFTCO Fishing Apparel and Tackle, Yamaha Marine (including both Yamaha Engines and Yamaha Boats), Scout Boats, and Everglades Boats, along with representatives of two trade associations American Sportfishing Association and National Marine Manufacturers Association and a handful of angling groups.   

That’s a whole lot of corporate self-interest (it’s not polite to call it “greed”) and political clout all bunched up in one place, and it’s fair to say that all of those folks, along with the other members of the Center that are not on the Board, are going to support fisheries policies that will maintain and preferably increase their cash flow, even if that policy might not do the same thing for the nation’s fish stocks.

Anybody who thinks that some guy out in the bay on a garvey, tending a pound net or fishing hook-and-line—or even an entire fleet of such small-scale commercials—has as much political influence as the folks on the Center for Sportfishing Policy’s board is living in a fantasy world.

It really isn’t the commercial fishery’s money that is warping the fishery management process.

Now, I’m not going to pretend that the Center’s opposition was the reason that the 12% landings reductions wasn’t approved by the striped bass management board.  There were many factors that contributed to the management board’s decision and, in fact, the ASMFC is probably the most difficult structure for an entity such as the Center to influence. 

Because of the way the ASMFC’s management boards are structured, with each state sending a professional fisheries manager, a governor’s appointee, and a legislative appointee (or proxy), and with each state delegation caucusing to determine how it will vote, trying to influence a management board vote is an exercise in cat-herding, with the politics shifting from issue to issue, inter-state rivalries playing a role, and intra-state frictions sometimes influencing outcomes.

The Center’s input on the striped bass issue wasn’t notable because it made a discernable difference, but merely because, for the first time, it occurred at all.

Things are different at the federal level, where the Center and its member organizations have been interfering for a long time, generally trying to impeach the science and the recreational catch and landings data in order to increase recreational landings and, not coincidentally, to increase the sale of fishing equipment, boats, and boating-related gear.  In the federal arena, its political connections can be far more focused, and used to better effect.

The recreational fishing industry’s first big success arguably occurred in 2017, when it convinced the incoming Trump administration to ignore the conservation requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and reopen the recreational red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico, even though doing so would, without question, lead to overfishing.  In issuing the rule reopening the fishery, NMFS admitted that

“The stock is still overfished.  While the stock is ahead of its rebuilding target, if employed for a short period of time, this approach may delay the ultimate rebuilding of the stock by as many as 6 years.  This approach likely could not be continued through time without significantly delaying the rebuilding timeline.  Similarly, the approach will necessarily mean that the private recreational sector will substantially exceed its annual catch limit, which was designed to prevent overfishing the stock…”

An email sent by Earl Comstock, Director of the Department of Commerce’s Office of Policy and Strategic Planning, to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross noted that the extended recreational red snapper season

“would result in overfishing of the stock by six million pounds (40%),”

but still recommended going through with the proposed extension.

The Center for Sportfishing Policy, which had no small role in convincing NMFS to reopen the season, hailed the action, with Jeff Angers, its president, declaring that

“Today’s announcement [of the extended season] is a fix—albeit a short-term fix—that will allow millions to enjoy one of America’s greatest pastimes and boost economies far beyond the Gulf of Mexico—including in the manufacturing and retail sectors in non-coastal states.

”The federal fishery management system is failing recreational anglers on many levels, and the red snapper is the ‘poster fish’ of the quagmire.  The temporary rule directly addresses this problem, giving millions of recreational anglers in the Gulf of Mexico an opportunity to enjoy America’s natural resources and giving the Gulf economy a much needed shot in the arm.

“Today would not be possible without the tireless work of Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.  Industry leaders met with Secretary Ross in March, and he listened.  We also thank Majority Whip Steve Scalese (R-La), Congressmen Garret Graves (R-La) and Austin Scott (R-Ga) for beginning the conversation with the Trump Administration in March regarding the mistreatment of private recreational anglers.  The status quo in federal fisheries management driven by radical environmentalists is a man-made fishery management disaster…”

By exerting pure political force, the industry had caused NMFS to ignore Magnuson-Stevens’ clear prohibitions on overfishing, thus showcasing two other hallmarks of the recreational fishing and boating industry’s efforts to influence fisheries policy: concerted efforts to get around Magnuson-Stevens’ conservation provisions, and attacks on the federal fisheries management system.

But, while recreational fishermen were able to overfish the Gulf red snapper stock in 2017, litigation brought by conservation groups managed to bring NMFS to heel; it ultimately entered into a settlement agreement in which it stated that the 2017 season extension, and its resultant overfishing, would not be repeated in the future.  The industry victory, though real, was also short-lived.

The recreational fishing and boating industry won a longer-lived victory early in 2020, when the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council adopted Amendment 50 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico.

Once again, the industry had attempted to evade the conservation provisions of Magnuson-Stevens, convincing then-Louisiana Congressman Garret Graves to sponsor something called the Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act, which would have taken responsibility for recreational red snapper management in the Gulf away from NMFS and hand it over to the states, which wouldn’t be bound by federal fisheries low, so that anglers could kill more fish (while they lasted) and, theoretically, the fishing and boating industry could sell more stuff.

That legislative effort also failed, eventually leaving the industry with Amendment 50 as its last, best option.  Amendment 50 allowed the states to set their own red snapper regulations, within certain prescribed limits, and use their own data collection systems to measure recreational landings.  Once Amendment 50 was fully implemented, recreational fishermen enjoyed longer red snapper seasons, thanks to state data collection programs that frequently reported lower catch rates than were reported by the federal system.

However, by 2025, for-hire vessel operators in the eastern Gulf were reporting a decline in both the size and abundance of red snapper, and it is very possible that the same state-generated regulations that allowed anglers to enjoy longer red snapper seasons and allowed the recreational fishing industry a longer season to sell tackle to red snapper anglers are also allowing recreational fishermen to remove too many red snapper from the population, causing a decline in both the number of larger fish and the number of fish overall.

Still, so long as sales are up, the industry is likely to continue to call Amendment 50 a win.

2023 saw the industry leave its familiar waters of the southeastern United States, and venture into the fisheries of the Mid-Atlantic region.  It wasn’t the sort of wholesale industry effort that we saw with Gulf of Mexico red snapper, but rather an effort spearheaded by the American Sportfishing Association, which worked with other interested parties to circumvent the clear mandates of Magnuson-Stevens in order to allow recreational fishermen to exceed their sector annual catch limits for bluefish, black sea bass, scup, and summer flounder.

The vehicle to do so was so-called Framework 17 to the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Fishery Management Plan and Framework 6 to the Bluefish Fishery Management Plan, which were collectively known as the Recreational Harvest Control Rule Framework.

Like earlier industry efforts, the Harvest Control Rule Framework attacked the strict conservation provisions of Magnuson-Stevens, and the federal recreational data collection program, in creating a framework where, when fish abundance exceeds the spawning stock biomass target, recreational landings might exceed the recreational harvest limit, recreational annual catch limit, and even the acceptable biological catch and overfishing limit, so long as spawning stock biomass remained high enough to produce maximum sustainable yield.

And like other industry efforts, the Harvest Control Rule Framework allowed anglers to kill more fish than they might have killed under a strict application of federal fisheries law, which is a hallmark of industry advocacy.  What impact that higher kill will have on the stocks is yet to be determined.

Finally, we have the current effort to extend recreational red snapper seasons in the South Atlantic by means of NMFS issuing exempted fishing permits.  Once again, the recreational industry tried to do an end-run around Magnuson-Stevens, using its political clout with state governors—most particularly Florida’s Governor Ron DeSantis—and with the Trump Administration to overrule the scientists and subject matter experts at NMFS, and have top leadership issue exempted fishing permits that would have allowed anglers to ignore the annual catch limit for South Atlantic red snapper, and enjoy a recreational season 20 to 30 times as long as it was in 2025, with the resultant, unavoidable overfishing.

After President Trump himself announced, on social media, that the exempted fishing permits would be issued, the Center for Sportfishing Policy’s Angers gushed,

“The Administration’s visionary embrace of cooperative federalism wins the day—and the summer.  Their willing partnership with willing South Atlantic states brings the region hope for calm waters and exciting catches of a plentiful fisheries resource.  The state agencies are willing and anxious to do the hard work.  It’s a win-win for the fish, the anglers and coastal communities.  We thank President Trump for his leadership in advancing a path forward for South Atlantic anglers.”

The only problem was that the industry goal—having NMFS issue exempted fishing permits that would allow anglers to grossly overfish the South Atlantic red snapper resource—was apparently illegal, and any fishing pursuant to the permits was temporarily enjoined by a federal judge.

To hear some anglers tell it, the court’s action was all the commercial fishermen’s fault.  The “greedy” commercial fishermen’s fault, because they filed suit to protect the 11,200 or so red snapper that they may harvest each year, when anglers already—without the aid of exempted fishing permits—kill nearly 500,000 red snapper in the same one-year period, including about 475,000 fish that aren’t taken home or eaten, but merely returned to the water to die.

So, all things considered, are the commercial fishermen really greedy for trying to hang on to the few fish the law allows them to take?

Or is the real greed—and the real political influence—to be found in the recreational fishing and boatbuilding industry, which repeatedly tries to frustrate federal fisheries laws, and the conservation efforts of professional fisheries managers, in order to sell more merchandise to an expanding angling public?

Has that sort of greed blinded the industry to the simple fact that, without healthy fish stocks, their businesses cannot endure?

When we get to the point where killing half a million red snapper—475,000 of which go to waste—isn’t enough, and they want to kill more, even if it means overfishing the stock, the answer to those questions becomes dismayingly clear.