NOAA APPOINTS "FISHERMAN IN RESIDENCE"

 

NOAA Fisheries reportedly appointed Maine lobsterman Dustin Delano as “Fisherman in Residence.”  What that means isn’t completely clear, as the agency isn’t providing much information about the position.  I didn’t learn about it from an agency press release, but rather heard about it while down in Washington earlier this week, speaking to Senate staff on a totally different, if still fisheries-related, manner—even though, according to Delano’s Facebook page, he has held the position since November 1, 2025.

Still, the appointment is apparently real, and both NOAA and the Department of Commerce have received a letter from the ranking member of the House Committee on Natural Resources, Jared Huffman, and the ranking member of its Subcommittee on Oversight and Regulation, Maxine Dexter, questioning whether it was the right thing to do.

It’s a reasonable question to ask.

The fisherman who was selected for the position is Dustin Delano, a lobsterman from Maine (it’s interesting to see that NOAA Fisheries chose  a lobsterman for the position, as American lobster is managed by the states through the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and not by NOAA Fisheries).

Delano also bears the titles of chairman and chief strategist for a group called the New England Fishermen’s Stewardship Association, an organization that is a frequent critic of United States fisheries management and marine policies.  In an essay that appears on the Association’s website, dated February 10, 2026—more than three months after Delano’s appointment—Delano wrote,

“…I speak for people who work these waters every day and for communities that depend on them.

“We see ocean conditions as they exist, not months later in reports.  Yet policy too often prioritizes theory over experience and paperwork over outcomes.  Commercial fishermen are not line items.  We live with the consequences of every decision made in Washington.  On the water, those decisions can make fishing less safe, manage fish poorly and drive American commercial fishermen out of business…

“We cannot credibly claim to support domestic seafood or food security while allowing the industrial takeover of our ocean.  Offshore wind destroys habitat, displaces fishing from historic grounds and embeds permanent industrial hazards into working waters.  It would be like setting our farm fields on fire and calling it progress…

“Our New England groundfish fishery is in turmoil.  Fishermen face quota swings that shift from feast to famine, often driven by incomplete surveys and outdated data.  A stock can be abundant one year and effectively unavailable the next, not because the fish disappeared, but because the survey failed to capture reality.

“When that happens, fishermen cannot simply pivot.  If the fishery they depend on is suddenly closed and they do not hold permits for others, boats tie up, crews are sent home and coastal businesses suffer despite healthy fish in the water…

“…Through President Trump’s leadership, the federal government has recognized that domestic seafood production is a matter of national interest, economic resilience and food security.

“Commercial fishermen stand ready to meet that call.  With a clear vision from the White House and policies grounded in real-world experience, we can protect and strengthen fisheries that are already sustainable, restore working waterfronts, and once again make American seafood a backbone of our national food supply.  We are a nation of fishermen ready to roll up our sleeves, do the work and get the job done with the president’s help, feeding America first and leading the world by example.”

So it’s clear that Delano, and presumably his Association, supports the White House’s fisheries policies, and it wouldn’t be particularly surprising if that support won him his new position of “fisherman in residence.”

But what isn’t particularly clear is exactly what a fisherman in residence’s duties might be, and why a lobsterman from New England is more suitable for the role than a trawler captain from New York, a bandit gear fisherman from the Gulf of Mexico, or a gillnetter from Alaska.

And then there is the question of litigation.  In the past, Delano’s Association has brought legal action against the Department of Commerce, NOAA Fisheries’ parent agency, suing to invalidate the authority of the regional fishery management councils, arguing that, because of the nature of their duties, the United States Constitution requires that all persons nominated to be council members must be confirmed by the Senate.  There was just enough truth in the Association’s argument to have the Court invalidate some very minor provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, while leaving the council system intact.

Should the Association decide to take legal action against the agency again, how could Delano reconcile his roles as chairman and chief strategist of the Association with his role as fisherman in residence at NOAA Fisheries, particularly if the latter role is a paid position?

Such concerns were raised in the March 2 letter from representatives Huffman and Dexter, which read, in part,

“We have learned that in lieu of [the Marine Fisheries Advisory Committee], NOAA appointed a single “Fisherman in Residence.”  We are concerned that this singular position cannot speak for the diverse fishing communities and fishing sectors across our country and we are concerned with NOAA’s lack of transparency regarding the appointment of this position and the role.  For the sake of the 2.1 million jobs that rely upon healthy, sustainably managed fisheries, we seek full transparency regarding the role of ‘Fisherman in Residence.’

“It is our constitutional obligation to oversee NOAA, the primary scientific agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, including whether its federal employees are complying with federal ethics laws governing conflicts of interests, impartiality, and outside activities, and whether ethics screening controls have been adequately implemented and enforced.

“It is our understanding that Mr. Dustin Delano has been appointed as ‘Fisherman in Residence’ at NOAA.  As such, we assume he is a NOAA employee, has been drawing a federal paycheck, and is advising on fisheries policy within NOAA.  However, it is clear from his Facebook posts and other public activities that he continues to serve as an industry association advocate on matters before NOAA, raising questions about his impartiality and ability to serve in the best interests of the American people and fishing interests across the country…

“Mr. Delano presents these affiliations in his advocacy and litigation-facing work in areas where NOAA is a decision-maker and, at times, a defendant.  His resume lists ‘opposition to offshore wind projects in the Gulf of Maine’ as an accomplishment under his ongoing work with NEFSA.  It also reflects his involvement with the Maine Lobstermen’s Association in association with litigation against the U.S. Department of Commerce, including Maine Lobstermen’s Association v. Raimondo, which challenged NOAA’s actions related to endangered species protection, including for the North Atlantic right whale.  In other words, Mr. Delano’s non-government roles and professional work involve representing fishermen in litigation and advocacy that directly implicate NOAA and regulated industries and stakeholders before it…

“These facts raise a straightforward question: did Mr. Delano participate personally and substantially in official matters in violation of federal law, and did [the Department of Commerce] and NOAA implement effective safeguards at the outset of his federal service to prevent disqualifying participation?..”

To help determine the answers to those questions, Rep. Huffman and Rep. Dexter instructed the Department of Commerce and NOAA to provide copies of all financial and other disclosure forms completed by Delano and relevant to the Fisherman in Residence position; any documents or other communications relating to Delano, and dating from his time as Fisherman in Residence, involving any of the agencies’ ethics personnel; any documents or other communications relating to Delano’s ethics and/or conflict of interests training; all documents and other communications relating to Delano’s employment by NOAA, including date of hire, pay grade, job description, reporting and supervisory relationships, and other similar data; any documents or communications maintained or provided by any of the agencies’ ethics personnel, concerning or related to Delano’s participation before the agencies, including participation in regulatory matters, litigation-related matters, policy development, and enforcement; and all calendars, schedules, meeting agendas, or similar matters maintained by Delano in his official capacity as an agency employee.

The agencies were given two weeks to provide the requested materials, which would clearly be relevant to the question of whether Delano’s appointment as Fisherman in Residence created any ethical issues.

Delano has apparently said that, as Fisherman in Residence, he is not paid by NOAA, while a spokesman for the agency reportedly said that there were no ethical violations due to the type of agreement in place between Delano and NOAA.  In addition, Representative Jared Golden (D-ME), heralded Delano’s new position, saying

“I applaud NOAA for identifying the need for a real harvester, not another bureaucrat, to have a seat at the table and to provide input and clarity on fisheries issues…

“These accusations [in the Huffman/Dexter letter], however subtle, reflect the misguided belief that there is nothing government bureaucrats could possibly learn from those working Mainers who actually have lived and fished our coasts for generations.  They could not be more wrong.”

Yet the fact that NOAA only publicly identified Delano’s role this week, the same week that the agency began rewriting an 18-year-old rule originally intended to protect endangered right whales from collisions with vessels, stoked some people’s concerns.

The easiest way for the agencies to allay such concerns would be to promptly respond to the Huffman/Dexter letter, provide the requested materials, and allow them to speak for themselves.

Always assuming, of course, that if the documents were all produced, Reps. Huffman and Dexter wouldn’t find that their worries were justified.

 

 

MANAGERS CONSIDER ATLANTIC BONITO

 

Most people might not remember—or might not have been alive at the time—but back in the 1970s and ‘80s, Atlantic bonito were a regular part of anglers’ catches in the northeast, where they were often targeted not only by private boat anglers but, at least in the New York Bight, by the charter and party boat fleet as well.

But while they were welcome, they were never one of the region’s bigger fisheries.

From time to time, when trolling offshore, a bonito would grab a feather or other small lure meant for school bluefin.  We called them “green bonito” back then, to distinguish them from “oceanic bonito,” which were what some folks called skipjack tuna.  They were always welcome because of their tasty, light meat, but we didn’t target them specifically, because back then, there were plenty of tuna around to keep the offshore crowd busy, and few anglers wanted to be bothered catching bonito when much larger, more interesting fish were available.

It was different on the inshore grounds.  There, anglers chumming for bluefish—which was a common activity back then—often had the odd bonito grab a chunk of menhaden being drifted back in the slick.  But bonito were frequently wary of the wire leaders typically employed in the bluefish fishery, and menhaden wasn’t their favorite bait.  So anglers, both on private and party boats, might bring out some spearing for bait and, tying their hooks directly to their lines, specifically target bonito.  Such anglers would lose their share of terminal gear to the bluefish, but they caught a lot of bonito, too.

In late summer and early fall, when bonito were most abundant, they even attracted attention from the charter boat fleet, as vessels out of New Jersey and western Long Island, fishing with bait and sometimes with jigs, specifically targeted them as an alternative to the stronger-tasting bluefish.

For quite a while—perhaps from around 1990 up until 2020 or so—we saw fewer bonito in the upper mid-Atlantic, although a few were always around.  But they now seem to be coming back, to the point where, last August, one party boat fishing out of Long Island’s Captree State Park reported that their customers landed “over 1,000 Bonito” on a single trip.

With that number of fish available, bonito are again a viable target.  The National Marine Fisheries Service reports that anglers in the mid-Atlantic region took over 38,000 trips primarily targeting Atlantic bonito in 2025, compared to zero trips twenty years earlier, and about 14,000 in 1985.  While 38,000 trips is a drop in the bucket compared to the number of trips targeting other species (mid-Atlantic anglers made more than 7 million trips targeting striped bass last year), and while there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the estimates just because they are so small, it seems clear that anglers’ interest in Atlantic bonito is increasing.

Thus, before that increase gains much momentum—which can happen if bonito are available when other species, such as fluke, bluefish, or striped bass are not—and with the occasional boat already landing over 1,000 bonito in a single trip, it might make sense to put some precautionary management measures in place while the population is still completely healthy.

And some states are doing, or at least considering doing, precisely that.

Massachusetts has been a leader in that effort.

Over the past five years, Massachusetts anglers have caught between 24,000 and 588,000 Atlantic bonito per year, with an average annual catch of slightly under 220,000 fish.  To put that in context, during the same five-year period, bonito landings for the entire Atlantic seaboard ranged between about 175,000 and 1,250,000 per year, with an annual average of approximately 593,000 fish, so Massachusetts accounts for a big part of the entire recreational bonito fishery.

The growing importance of Atlantic bonito to Massachusetts anglers led that state’s Division of Marine Fisheries to adopt precautionary regulations in 2025, establishing a 5-fish bag limit (of Atlantic bonito and false albacore, combined) and a 16-inch curved fork length minimum size.  The regulations apply to both commercial and recreational fishermen, although commercial weir operators and commercial fishermen who target Atlantic mackerel with mechanical jigging gear who land bonito as bycatch are exempt from the new rule.

In explaining its decision to adopt the regulations, the Division of Marine Fisheries wrote,

“Fishing for these Atlantic bonito and false albacore is growing in popularity, particularly along Massachusetts’ southern coast.  Late summer fishing in this area now focuses on these species as they have become more seasonally available while other target species, such as bluefish and striped bass, are not as plentiful locally…The local growth of the fishery is significant and occurring without the benefit of population assessments, extensive understanding of species life history, or fishery management plans to control fishing mortality.

“With this in mind, DMF has opted to adopt precautionary management measures for these species until a time when a more robust science and management program has been implemented.  The new possession limits are designed to constrain recreational harvest approximately at current levels and discourage further expansion while curtailing the development of a directed commercial fishery.  The size limit reflects estimated size-at-maturity for both species…”

Adopting precautionary regulations in time to maintain a stock’s health, rather than waiting for a stock to decline before taking action, is a wise approach.  However, when dealing with species that migrate along the coast, one state can only do so much.  To maximize the effectiveness of management actions, all states must share in the management process.

That hasn’t yet happened with Atlantic bonito, but other states are showing interest in managing the bonito resource.

On February 20, the North Carolina Marine Fisheries Commission voted to approve a draft rule that would set a 5-fish bag limit for recreational fishermen, and give the Director of the state’s Division of Marine Fisheries the ability to adopt additional recreational and commercial bonito management measures by proclamation, provided that the Marine Fisheries Commission had given such measures their prior approval.

The Marine Fisheries Division now must perform a financial analysis of the proposed rule.  Once that is completed, the Commission will vote to approve the proposed rule’s text.  If the text is approved, the formal rulemaking process, which includes a 60-day period for public comment, will begin.  However, because of North Carolina's rules of administrative procedure, the final rule will not go into effect until 2027, and perhaps not until 2028.

The Rhode Island Division of Marine Fisheries is also considering management measures for Atlantic bonito, and held a hearing on its proposed measures on February 17.  There, fisheries managers presented two different options.  The first would set the recreational size limit at 16 inches, and the bag limit at 3 (bonito and false albacore combined), with no commercial harvest (an initial effort to cap commercial harvest at either a 3-year or 5-year average produced quotas so small that they would be impossible to manage).  The second proposal would establish a 16-inch minimum size for both the commercial and recreational fisheries, set a recreational bag limit at 5 fish (again, combined with false albacore), and not cap the commercial fishery at all.

It is too early to know what path Rhode Island’s fisheries managers will choose to take.

No other Atlantic coast state has yet proposed possible management measures, although New York did bring the question before it’s Marine Resources Advisory Council about a year ago for very brief preliminary discussions; it has not yet taken any further action.

Public reaction to bonito management measures have been somewhat mixed.  Anglers have been generally supportive, with the American Saltwater Guides Association asserting that

“This is a pivotal moment to maintain management momentum for two undervalued and undermanaged species [false albacore were also included in the comments].  Without clear and simple guardrails, we’re leaving the door wide open for the wrong kind of future: one where short-term exploitation replaces long-term sustainability.”

And writer Mike Wright, in a column in the Southampton [NY] Press, favorably commented on the Rhode Island proposal, saying,

“Rhode Island is the latest state to take under consideration imposing limits on the harvest of false albacore and Atlantic bonito.

“If the state listens to the pleading voices of thousands of sportfishermen who collectively pump millions of dollars into its economy, the very modest regulations on the small tuna harvests that have been proposed will be another block in the first layer in a foundation for coatwide protections of two species that have come to play an outsized role in the fishing industry of the entire Northeast.”

But angler support was not universal.  When On the Water magazine ran an article on the new Massachusetts regulations, there were some less-than-thoughtful comments that read

“Regulate everything till [sic] it’s not fun anymore…stop the regulations,”

and

“There is absolutely no reason for this regulation…same with shark fishing from shore…screw these unvoted on regulations.”

In North Carolina, there were some complaints from people who seemed averse to the idea of precautionary regulation unsupported by science, and perhaps to regulating any fish stock that wasn’t already in decline.  Dare County Commissioner Steve House opined that

“I don’t see where there’s a need for regulatory being placed on that fish because there’s no defined biological triggers for it.  There’s no conservation targets for it.”

Another negative comment came from Woody Joyner, a resident of Hatteras Island, who complained,

“over-management on something like this, without any type of population survey, without any science at all, is a reminder that over regulation does not necessarily translate into protecting public trust.”

But such comments were challenged by Commission member Alfred Hobgood, who said,

“a lot of times I feel like we’re reactive and not proactive.  Being proactive for a specific fishery [is] one of our duties…protect and preserve fish stocks and resources.”

That comment, and the context in which it was made, pretty well sums up the current state of bonito management measures.  While there is little scientific information to guide Atlantic bonito management, there is an existing fishery that seems to be increasing in popularity.  That gives management the choice of either adopting precautionary measures intended to maintain the sustainability of the bonito stock, or to do nothing and wait until the stock shows signs of distress before even considering action.

Having observed how other species, from striped bass to shortfin makos, suffered from a lack of precautionary management, the former approach seems like the right way to go.

 

ASMFC, VIRGINIA LEGISLATORS TACKLE MENHADEN ISSUES: PART II--VIRGINIA LOOKS AT THE FUTURE

 

Although the Board set the 2026 TAC at its October 2025 meeting, future TACs, and the future of the Bay cap, were not yet established. To help resolve that uncertainty, Virginia legislators have introduced four bills addressing the menhaden resource, which range from the conservative to the improvident ends of the spectrum.

The most conservative bill of the four is arguably House Bill 1048 (HB 1048), a very short bit of legislation which would outlaw all reduction fishing for menhaden in Virginia’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay unless and until “the Secretary of Natural and Historic Resources [determines] that research specific to the Chesapeake Bay has demonstrated that the menhaden reduction fishery does not negatively impact other fisheries or menhaden-dependent species…”

The bill strikes a precautionary posture, not closing the door on reduction fishing within the Chesapeake Bay, but allowing it only if research demonstrates that the reduction fishery has no negative impact on the Bay’s other fisheries or other natural resources. In doing so, it seems vulnerable to the same sort of criticism that Mr. Landry leveled against the Board, as it specifically targets the reduction fishery, and does not apply the same conditions to the menhaden bait fishery, even though that fishery, too, might negatively impact other fisheries or “menhaden-dependent species” in Virginia waters.

HR 1048 was referred to the Chesapeake Subcommittee of the Virginia House Agriculture, Chesapeake, and Natural Resources Committee, which unanimously voted to table the legislation, killing any chance that it might have had of becoming law.

A second bill, House Bill 1049 (HB 1049), would allow the reduction industry to continue to fish in the Chesapeake Bay, but would also direct Virginia’s Marine Resources Commission to “develop and maintain a quota period management system” which would “ensure that the removal of menhaden from the Chesapeake Bay is more evenly distributed throughout the harvest season…to mitigate the negative impacts of concentrated, high volume menhaden removals from the Bay.” HB 1049, if passed, would require the Marine Resources Commission to either cap monthly reduction fleet harvest at 15% of the Bay cap or to establish a “trimester system” that would see one-third of the Bay cap harvested by the reduction fishery each trimester. Should fishermen fail to harvest their full quota in any month/trimester, the unharvested quota could be rolled over into the next period.

HB 1049 would also create an observer system, and require that a “trained observer” be carried on at least 10% of all reduction fleet trips “to document the composition and weight of the actual catch and…report such documentation to the Commission.” The legislation neither defines the term “trained observer” nor establishes who would pay for the observer’s training, time, and services.

It also fails to create an exception to section 28.2-204C of the Code of Virginia, which states that “The information collected or reported shall not be disclosed in any manner which would permit identification of any person, firm, corporation or vessel, except when required by court order…” Since the entire menhaden reduction fishery in the Chesapeake Bay is conducted by Ocean Harvesters, any observer data related to the reduction fishery’s landings, bycatch, and similar issues would be deemed confidential and unavailable to the public.

HB 1049 has also reached a dead end. It, too, was referred to the Chesapeake Subcommittee, which, on a vote of 7 in favor, 3 opposed, recommended that the Agriculture, Chesapeake, and Natural Resources Committee report the bill out of Committee and refer it to the House Appropriations Committee. While the Subcommittee’s recommendation found unanimous approval, the Appropriations Committee failed to approve the legislation.

HB 1048 and HB 1049 were almost certainly introduced in good faith, and if passed, might well benefit the Chesapeake Bay ecosystem. Still, the people and organizations that support those bills, and who say things like, “We look forward to working with legislators…to chart a sustainable, productive future for the Bay’s fisheries,” are engaging in a bit of hypocrisy.

For while menhaden, like all of Virginia’s other regulated marine fish species, are currently managed by the state’s Marine Resources Commission, that wasn’t always the case. Until early 2020, the Virginia legislature had retained management authority over Atlantic menhaden, while delegating the management authority for all other marine species to the Marine Resources Commission. That allowed legislators friendly to the reduction fishery to block menhaden conservation efforts, a situation that led to a confrontation between the Virginia legislature and the ASMFC, and ultimately between the legislature and the United States Secretary of Commerce, after the ASMFC reduced the Bay cap from 87,216 to 51,000 mt in 2017, and the legislature refused to make a corresponding change to Virginia law.

Conservation advocates were happy when the legislature finally handed menhaden management over to the Marine Resources Commission, with one announcing, “Great news for menhaden! Today key committees in Virginia’s Senate and House of Delegates passed bipartisan legislation to transfer management of Virginia’s menhaden fishery from the General Assembly to the Virginia Marine Resources Commission.”

But now that the Marine Resources Commission isn’t taking the actions that the menhaden advocacy community is calling for, the same people who once argued that the Commission, and not the legislature, should have the authority to manage menhaden are reversing course and, like the reduction industry in years past, are seeking to have the Virginia legislature dictate menhaden management measures.

But not all of the recently-introduced menhaden bills are seeking to restrict the reduction fishery. Senate Bill 474 (SB 474) would create an “Atlantic Menhaden Research Fund” (Fund). SB 474 also provides that the Virginia Institute of Marine Science

shall utilize moneys from the Fund to produce research relating to Atlantic menhaden necessary to inform a scientifically defensible and ecologically meaningful harvest limit for Atlantic menhaden in the Chesapeake Bay and an annual report summarizing such research…The report shall address the seasonal abundance of Atlantic menhaden in the Chesapeake Bay; the movement rates of Atlantic menhaden between the coast of the Atlantic Ocean and the Chesapeake Bay; the impacts of predator demand, such as striped bass and osprey, and predator consumption of Atlantic menhaden on the Atlantic menhaden population; the spatial and temporal patterns of the Atlantic menhaden commercial fishing efforts in the Chesapeake Bay, and the possibility of localized depletion of Atlantic menhaden in the Chesapeake Bay. [formatting omitted]

Unlike HB 1048 and HB 1049, which would immediately impose restrictions on the reduction fishery, SB 474 would effectively defer any management actions until sufficient research reveals the nature and extent of management measures that would best conserve Atlantic menhaden in the Chesapeake Bay. However, SB 474 shared a similar fate, with the Senate Finance and Appropriations Committee voting unanimously to continue the bill to its 2027 session.

The fourth menhaden bill introduced in the Virginia legislature the year is Senate Bill 414 (SB 414). Sponsored by a long-time advocate for the reduction fishery, it seeks to avoid reductions in the menhaden TAC, and possible reductions in the Bay Cap, by withdrawing Virginia from the ASMFC. There is a real likelihood that such effort would be futile, and that even if Virginia withdrew from the ASMFC, the language of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, which granted the ASMFC the authority to enforce the provisions of its fishery management plans on Atlantic Coast states, would still compel Virginia to adhere to the terms of the menhaden management plan. However, since SB 414 is more an expression of the reduction industry’s pique rather than a bill that has any realistic chance of becoming law, there is little reason to discuss it further. While it isn’t technically dead yet, the Senate Privileges and Elections Committee, on an 11 to 3 vote, chose to refer it to the Finance and Appropriations Committee, where it met the same fate as SB 474, a unanimous vote to continue the bill to the 2027 session.

Thus, none of the four menhaden bills introduced in the Virginia legislature will become law in 2026, as state legislators struggle to address the issues surrounding the menhaden reduction fishery in the Chesapeake Bay.

Despite all of the meetings that have been held, and all of the management measures that have been put in place, menhaden management in the Chesapeake Bay remains a contentious, yet poorly understood, issue. The ASMFC is seeking a way to maintain the menhaden population, in both the ocean and the Chesapeake Bay, at a level that will provide enough forage for predatory fish, birds, and marine mammals, without causing unnecessary harm to the fishing industry. The Virginia legislature, more focused on menhaden within the Chesapeake Bay, cannot agree on a clear policy, with some members favoring conservative menhaden management, and others favoring the menhaden fishing industry.

It will probably take years before all of the questions are fully resolved. One can only hope that when that resolution comes, it is based on science and good data, and not on mere emotion, and that concerns about industry’s short-term cash flows are not elevated above the health and long-term sustainability of the menhaden resource.

-----

This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/

ASMFC, VIRGINIA LEGISLATORS TACKLE MENHADEN ISSUES: PART I--ASMFC STRUGGLES WITH MENHADEN MANAGEMENT

 

Atlantic menhaden are an important forage fish all along the East Coast, feeding everything from striped bass off New England to king mackerel in the southeast. Their appeal isn’t limited to predatory fish; they are also an important part of the diets of marine mammals and piscivorous birds.

Menhaden also support a very large commercial fishing industry, which has two primary components. One is the bait fishery, which catches menhaden that both commercial and recreational fishermen use as bait for other species. The other is the so-called “reduction fishery,” which processes menhaden into fish meal, oil, and other industrial products. The reduction fishery accounts for most of the menhaden harvest, landing 131,800 metric tons of Atlantic menhaden in 2023. That is a large decrease from historical landings levels, which peaked at 715,150 metric tons 70 years ago and exceeded 400,000 metric tons as recently as 1990. The bait fishery is substantially smaller, landing 60,420 metric tons of Atlantic menhaden in 2022 and 48,550 metric tons in 2023.

While the bait fishery is largely composed of small-scale operations that exist in almost every Atlantic coast state, the Atlantic menhaden reduction fishery is prosecuted by a single company, Ocean Harvesters, which sells its entire catch to Omega Protein Corporation, a subsidiary of the Canadian seafood conglomerate, Cooke, Inc. Both Ocean Harvesters and Omega Protein are headquartered in the unincorporated community of Reedville, Virginia, which makes Virginia a key participant in the menhaden management debate.

In recent years, biologists believed that the menhaden stock was doing extremely well, as a 2020 benchmark stock assessment found that the stock was neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing; fishing mortality was well below the fishing mortality target, while fecundity, used as the measure of menhaden abundance, was well above target. A 2022 stock assessment update confirmed those findings.

Still, some conservation advocates feared that the large fishing vessels used in the reduction fishery might be causing localized depletion, particularly in the Chesapeake Bay, and depriving predators of needed forage. A research paper that blamed osprey nest failure in a small corner of the Chesapeake Bay on such supposed depletion only increased such advocates’ concerns.

However, no one has yet demonstrated that localized depletion is actually taking place. In 2009, scientists from the Council of Independent Experts conducted a peer review of the Chesapeake Bay Menhaden Research Program, which is run by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Chesapeake Bay Office. They ad https://asmfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/aug09boardproceedings.pdf vised that, while localized depletion might possibly occur, it would probably occur only at the level of a single tributary, not across the entire Bay.

They also advised that, before trying to determine whether such depletion exists, fishery managers should define what the term “localized depletion” means, a simple first step that, more than 15 years later, has not yet been accomplished.

Nonetheless, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s (ASMFC) Atlantic Menhaden Management Board (Board) chose to take a precautionary approach toward menhaden in the Chesapeake Bay by instituting a cap on the amount of menhaden that may be removed from the Bay each year (Bay cap). The original Bay cap, which was adopted in 2006, was intended to merely prevent an increase in the reduction fleet’s landings by limiting such landings to the average tonnage of menhaden removed by the fleet each year during the period 1999-2004.

While the original Bay cap permitted the reduction fleet to remove slightly more than 100,000 metric tons (mt) of menhaden from the Chesapeake Bay each year, the Board has since gradually reduced it to the current cap of 51,000 mt.

Thus, menhaden management seemed to be on the right track, until a stock assessment update released in October 2025 (2025 update) found that earlier stock assessments had overestimated the species’ natural mortality rate. When a more accurate estimate of natural mortality was used in the latest assessment, estimates of biomass and fecundity declined, while the estimate of fishing mortality increased. Although the stock is still neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing, the fecundity estimate is now only slightly above the threshold used to define an overfished stock.

The 2025 update informed the Board that the total allowable catch (TAC) it had set for the years 2023-2025, 233,550 metric tons, raised the fishing mortality well above its target level. In order to achieve a 50% probability of keeping fishing mortality at or below the target, the TAC would have to be reduced by 54%, to no more than 108,450 mt.

So, when the Board met in October 2025, it faced a problem. Cutting landings back to 108,450 mt in a single year would have severe economic impacts on the menhaden fishing industry, while leaving the TAC unchanged might do real harm to the stock. The Board had already received multiple reports from fishermen and various conservation organizations suggesting that menhaden abundance was declining. Fishermen failed to land their full TAC in 2023 or 2024, falling about 20% short in both years, another sign that that abundance might be waning.

The Board was sharply divided on how to proceed. Matt Gates, the administrative proxy for Connecticut, moved to set the TAC at 108,450 mt for the years 2026-2028, a motion seconded by Massachusetts’ Governor’s Appointee, Ray Kane. Mr. Gates said, “This is a TAC that is informed by the best available science, and setting a TAC higher may not provide enough menhaden to fill their role in the ecosystem. This includes providing striped bass forage, the conservation of which we have set aside an entire day at this meeting to discuss.”

Dr. Allison Colden, a legislative proxy for Maryland and the Maryland executive director for the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, supported the motion, noting that

when the science shows that the Board is justified in increasing the Total Allowable Catch for this fishery we have done so. In then last four out of five times we have set specs for this fishery, the science has said that we had a reasonable risk to take in increasing the coastwide quota, and we have done that…I would encourage this Board to think just as we were confident in increasing the Total Allowable Catch when the science says we should, that we need to be as willing to take reductions when the science indicates that is warranted as well.

Not surprisingly, the Virginia delegation wasn’t happy with Mr. Gates’ motion, so Joseph Grist, the acting director of Virginia’s Marine Resources Commission, offered a substitute motion that would set the 2026-2028 TAC at 186,840 mt. While that represented a 20% reduction in the TAC, it was more show than substance; since the menhaden fishery was already falling about 20% short of catching their entire TAC. Mr. Grist’s motion effectively capped landings at their current levels, but didn’t reduce them at all.

The substitute motion was seconded by Eric Reid, the legislative proxy from Rhode Island.

Mr. Grist justified his motion by saying,

the proposed TAC is associated with a 0% probability of exceeding the [Ecological Reference Point] fishing mortality threshold in 2026 through 2028, and a low 2 to 4% probability of falling below the [Ecological Reference Point] fecundity threshold during the same period…To reduce [the TAC] any further than 20% would put at risk, directly or indirectly, hundreds, if not thousands of American jobs across several states. It will also result in the decrease of supply and increase in demand and prices of menhaden that are utilized by both the commercial and recreational fishing industries across numerous jurisdictions represented around this Board. This motion is made to balance the ecological concerns as well as the socioeconomic issues that have been provided.

And thus, the issue was joined, with proponents of conservative, science-based management squaring off with Board members who were primarily concerned with the economic disruption that might result from a significantly lower TAC.

Mr. Grist’s motion received support from some members of the Board, as well as from a reduction fleet captain, the union that represents reduction industry workers, and from commercial fishermen in other fisheries who need to purchase menhaden for bait. It eventually passed on a vote of 12 to 6.

Another motion to substitute was made, this time by Nichola Meserve, a Massachusetts fishery manager. It read “Move to substitute to set three-year specifications for Atlantic menhaden with the following TAC; 2026=186,840 MT; 2027=152,700 MT, and 2028= to 124,800 MT.” Nicole Lengyel Costa, a Rhode Island fisheries manager, provided a second.

Ms. Meserve explained that “the values in this motion represent a 20% reduction in 2026 followed by two equal reductions of 18.27% in order to reach 124,800 MT in 2028, which is the value associated with the 50% probability of exceeding the [Ecological Reference Point fishing mortality] target in 2028…However, I also recognize that the end TAC of 124,800 metric tons is a significant reduction of 46 percent overall…By phasing it in over three years it does provide for a little more stability.”

Once again, the debate was between those who supported the science and wanted to see menhaden managed with the Ecological Reference Points that were adopted in 2020 to account for the species’ role as a forage fish, and those who emphasized economic concerns. Mr. Reid opposed Ms. Meserve’s motion, saying in part,

You know we’re talking about reduction versus bait…

We’re at a point now there the economic viability, return on investment, return to owner, is so marginal that going in a stepdown approach…we’re going to take the fishery right out of it, because they can’t function at these numbers, and we’re not just talking about lobster bait in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maine.

We’re talking about bait all up and down the east coast in many, many forms. We’re also talking about fish oil, which is used in I don’t know how many products, everything from ice cream to paint, and we’re talking about supplements, vitamins, vitamin this, vitamin that, fish oil, which are sent not only throughout this country, but probably around the world.

This is what we’re talking about. We are talking about a giant economic engine for not just people in this room, or on this coast, it’s a worldwide market for a variety of products that the fishery itself produces. We can’t lose sight of that, and I don’t want to lose one drop of market share on any one of those things, because once you lose it you never get it back.

There was more debate, but it didn’t seem to change many minds. Ms. Meserve’s motion failed on a 7 to 11 vote.

But there was one more substitute motion yet to be made, and it was made by Dr. Costa, who tried to thread the needle between locking in the 186,840 mt TAC for three years and calling for greater reductions that didn’t seem to have the support of the Board. She offered a substitute motion that would set the 2026 TAC at 186,840 mt, but would have the Board set the 2027 and 2028 TACs at its October 2026 meeting. Senator Sarah Peake, New Hampshire’s Legislative Proxy, seconded her motion.

After a few brief comments, that motion passed on a vote of 16 to 2, with only Pennsylvania and, predictably, Virginia in opposition.

Lynn Fegley, the Maryland fisheries manager, then put a new motion on the table, which read, “Move to initiate Addendum II to the Atlantic menhaden fishery management plan, to address Chesapeake Bay management concerns. The addendum shall develop periods for the Chesapeake Bay Cap that distribute fishing effort more evenly throughout the season and also develop a range of options to reduce the Bay Cap from status quo to 50%.” That motion was seconded by Robert LaFrance, the proxy for Connecticut’s Governor’s Appointee.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Grist of Virginia spoke in opposition to that motion, too, arguing that the cap is not science-based, but merely “based on whatever the whims of this Board is.” He said that the Board ought to wait until a team of scientists could recommend a new level for the Bay Cap before taking action.

After some debate, and a failed attempt to amend the motion, Ben Landry of Ocean Harvesters expressed some outrage at the new proposal.

I think it is clear to everyone that this is not, you can change the name of it, it’s an Ocean Harvesters Cap and it only applies to the reduction fishery. You can mask it in any way. You know when you have dozens of [menhaden reduction] fishermen in the back [of the meeting room] and it’s just such a callous conversation about, let’s hurry and figure out how we can cut their harvest in the Bay…it’s a little hypocritical to say, my pound netters need more fish, but let’s hurry up and cut it from the reduction industry. Bait fish are fish caught in the pound netters. They are not less ecologically important than those caught in the reduction fishery. I think it’s kind of an indictment, I guess, on the entire Bay Cap, but thank you for your time.

Despite such opposition, the motion passed easily, on a 13 to 2 vote, with two abstentions and the Florida delegation, unable to agree on a position, casting a “null” vote. New Jersey and, of course, Virginia were the two states in opposition.

The meeting closed with much work to be done.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/

NEW STRIPED BASS STUDY QUESTIONS ZOOPLANKTON MISMATCH HYPOTHESIS

 

Just one week ago, I published a post that speculated on the various factors that might influence striped bass spawning success.  

Included in that post was mention of the so-called “match-mismatch hypothesis,” which predicts that colder winters result in zooplankton, and particularly copepods, blooming later and in larger numbers, and that higher water flows result in that zooplankton being where it needs to be for larval striped bass to best take advantage of its availability.  Thus, because more food is available for the larval bass, cold winters and higher water flows often result in large striped bass year classes, while warmer winters and low water flows result in fewer copepods being available when and where the larval bass need them, resulting in smaller year classes and, on occasion, recruitment failure.

However, recently-published research suggests that, at least in the years 2023 and 2024, there were more than enough zooplankton around to support a successful striped bass spawn; even so, the Maryland juvenile abundance indices for those years were 1.02 and 1.98, respectively, far below the long-term average of 11.0.

The paper “Influence of feeding on zooplankton on Striped Bass postlarval mortality, growth, and year-class success in the Choptank River, Maryland, during the 1980s and 2023-2024” was published on December 22, 2025, in the journal Marine and Coastal Fisheries.  The lead author, James H. Uphoff, Jr. is an experienced and very well-respected biologist employed by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources, who is well-known for his striped bass-related research.

The paper casts doubt on the suggestion that a mismatch between the timing of the striped bass spawn and the availability of zooplankton is responsible for the poor striped bass spawns of the past seven years, observing that

“High feeding incidence of first-feeding Striped Bass postlarvae on zooplankton and low mortality did not always translate to better year-class success during the 1980s and 2023-2024.  A prominent role of poor larval feeding success on zooplankton was not suggested for continuous poor year-class success during 2019-2024.”

In the Introduction to the paper, the authors note that

“Year-class success of Upper Bay Striped Bass is largely determined within the first 3 weeks of life in early spring and is mainly a product of environmentally influenced, highly variable survival of eggs and larvae.”

They go on to state that

“Water temperature and flow are important environmental influences on year-class success of Striped Bass.  Survival of eggs and prolarvae is negatively affected by low (<11-12^oC) and high (>21^oC) water temperatures.  A large portion of spawning may occur over a few days early in the season, starting at low—sometimes lethal—temperatures in a gamble that subsequent conditions will favor offspring survival.  Temperature may also indirectly affect survival via its effect of the timing of zooplankton blooms for first-feeding larvae (match-mismatch hypothesis), while flow has been associated with zooplankton dynamics, nursery volume, location of the nursery, advection from the nursery, water quality, and toxicity of contaminants.  [citations omitted]”

  And that

“Successful or unsuccessful initial feeding of larvae is one of the foundational hypotheses explaining variations in year-class success of fishes, but a strong connection has not been universally supported by studies.  Growth and mortality in larval fish may be linked processes connected to feeding success and expressed as variable sizes at age, stage durations, and stage-specific mortality, and as highly variable year-class success.  The concept that larval feeding and size-specific growth and mortality rates positively interact predicts that survival of a cohort is directly related to feeding and growth rates during the prerecruitment period.  [citations omitted]”

With those things in mind, the researchers set about capturing striped bass postlarvae (defined as larvae that had absorbed their yolk sacs) to determine whether poor feeding success might have led to the poor 2023 and 2024 year classes.  They then compared the feeding success of those samples with the feeding success of postlarvae during seven years during the 1980s (1981-1986 and 1989), a period that included the worst years of the last stock collapse, when spawning success was, at times, as poor as it was in 2023 and 2024 (Maryland JAIs of 1.98 in 1980, 1.22 in 1981, and 1.37 in 1983).  The researchers acknowledged such poor spawning years, saying

“The 1980s were generally a period of poor year-class success and lower postlarval survival in the Choptank River, but several years of higher postlarval survival were present, as were a moderate year class (1982 [JAI 8.45]) and a strong year-class (1989 [JAI 25.20).”

In comparison, the highest Maryland JAI for the period 2019-2025 was last year’s 4.04.

Once the postlarval striped bass were obtained, the contents of their guts were sampled, to determine if they contained food and, if they did, what the nature of that food was.  Food was broken down into three categories, 1) cladocerans (tiny crustaceans popularly known as “water fleas”), 2) copepods (another group of tiny crustaceans), and 3) miscellaneous.

The researchers then scored the presence or absence of food using a “feeding incidence” value, calculated by dividing the number of postlarval striped bass with guts containing food items by the total number of postlarval bass sampled.  The resultant feeding incidence, or “FI” could be  limited to a specific category of food items, or could be broadened to include cladocerans, copepods, and miscellaneous food and non-food items.

During the 1980s, three years (1981, 1982, and 1989) had high FIs for cladocerans, exceeding .50 in all cases, while the remaining years had cladoceran FIs of less than 0.35.  Copepod FIs were high (over 0.35) in 1985 and 1990, moderate (0.22-0.26) in 1982, 1984, and 1989, and below 0.11in the remaining years.  While the cladoceran FI seemed to have little correlation with postlarval survival, years when the copepod FI was less than 0.11 saw relatively high levels of postlarval mortality; relatively low mortality rates occurred in years when the copepod FI exceeded 0.38, which years also saw higher growth rates in the postlarval bass.

When those 1980s results were applied to the survey findings from 2023 and 2024, the researchers found that for “first-feeding” larvae—those between 5 and 7 millimeters in length—the copepod FI in 2023 was “well above” the 0.38 level that resulted in favorable growth and mortality rates during the 1980s, and was slightly above that level in 2024 as well; both the 2023 and 2024 copepod FIs were higher than all but one copepod FI measured previously.  The 2023-2024 copepod FIs for postlarval bass between 8 and 10 millimeters in length were significantly higher than the FIs for the 5 to 7 millimeter category.

The researchers noted that the strongest year class of the 1980s, 1989, resulted from a high initial abundance of first-feeding larvae, a moderate copepod FI, and a high cladoceran FI; in the next-highest year class, 1982, the copepod and cladoceran FIs were similar to those of 1989, but the initial abundance of first-feeding larvae was lower.  Yet the 2024 year class, which also had similar, if not higher, FI values for both cladocerans and copepods, was poor.

That was a surprising result, for based solely on FI values, the 2023 and 2024 year classes should have been at least moderately successful, if not markedly strong.

But that was not the case.

So, the researchers went on to comment on water temperatures, observing that

“The period when postlarvae predominated in the Choptank River occurred earlier in 2023-2024 than during the 1980s.  Postlarval collections began on April 13 in 2023 and on April 18 in 2024.  Postlarval periods in the years 1980-1988 were estimated to begin as early April 22 [sic] and as late as May 18…Postlarval periods for 1989 and 1990 were estimated to have started on May 3 and May 1, respectively…

“Temperatures rose very quickly in 2023-2024 during the 1-week interval from what we interpreted as peak spawn to when the sampling of feeding larvae started…

“Analyses of temperatures in long-term spawning surveys of eggs or adult spawners have indicated a shortening of the spawning season since around 2000.  In general, spawning temperature milestones for the beginning and end of spawning in the Choptank River, Nanticoke River, Potomac River, and Head of Bay indicated that spawning was not starting much earlier, but it peaked and ended earlier.  Shortening of the spawning season would be reflected by earlier postlarval periods.  [citations omitted]”

The researchers concluded by writing,

“Our investigation of Striped Bass postlarval feeding success in 2023-2024 did not indicate that FIs on major zooplankton prey were too low, and our proxy indicator of [the mortality rate] did not indicate high postlarval mortality.  Our feeding investigation did not encompass the entire recent 6-year drought in year-class success, but the findings for 2023-2024 did not indicate a consistent, prominent role for feeding success…”

Most other factors that limited spawning success in the past do not seem to be playing that role today, so

“This leaves changes in temperature during spawning and early larval development as a hypothesis warranting investigative emphasis.”

The new paper is creating something of a stir among those who follow and try to predict striped bass spawning success, as the match-mismatch hypothesis had many proponents and seemed to explain the year-to-year variability of striped bass spawning success.  To that point, the paper does not directly challenge the match-mismatch hypothesis; it may well have impacted striped bass spawning success in the past, even though it doesn’t seem to be responsible for the poor spawns of 2023 and 2024.

Could it have been responsible for other poor spawns over the past seven years?

Right now, we don’t have the data to know, but we do have the data to show that water temperatures in the Chesapeake tributaries where striped bass spawn is rising, and the rising water temperatures are shortening the period when conditions are right for a successful spawn.

So those rising temperatures may very well be a prime contributor to the current spawning drought.

But maybe we are trying too hard to find a single culprit.  Maybe the bass are falling victim to multiple adverse conditions, not all of which need to occur in a single year.

Again, I will reference my post of a week ago, and its mention of a research team that has described what it calls “the poor recruitment paradigm,” which

“hypothesizes that it is easier to predict poor recruitment rather than good recruitment because an environmental variable effects recruitment only when its value is extreme (fatal); otherwise, the value maythe be benign and not influence recruitment.  Thus, good recruitment necessitates all environmental conditions not be harmful and for some to be especially favorable; poor recruitment, however, requires only one environmental variable to be extreme.”

Looking at the past seven years in that perspective, it is possible, but not necessarily true, that a match-mismatch situation contributed to some of the bad spawns over the past seven years, while high water temperatures and/or a shortened spawning season contributed to others.  And maybe some yet-unidentified factor also played some role.

The only thing that seems likely right now is that the poor 2023 and 2024 year classes did not result from a zooplankton/larval striped bass mismatch, and that something else—perhaps higher water temperatures—caused the dismal spawns in those years.

Whether that “something else” caused all of the poor spawns that have occurred since 2019, and might also cause further poor spawns in the immediate future, is something that the scientists still need to figure out.

Until they do, managing striped bass with the assumption that the current very low recruitment will continue well into the future seems to be the right thing to do.

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARYLAND LEGISLATION CHALLENGES THE ASMFC ON STRIPED BASS

 

On February 6, 2026, two Maryland state senators, C. Anthony Muse and Stephen S. Hershey, Jr., introduced SB 755, designated an “emergency bill” and described as

“AN ACT concerning Natural Resources—Striped Bass Recreational Seasons and Fisheries Regulations for the purpose of prohibiting the Department of Natural Resources from establishing a recreational catch and release season for striped bass; requiring the Department to establish certain recreational and charter boat summer and fall striped bass seasons and a trophy season for striped bass; requiring the Department to complete and submit to certain State entities for review an economic impact statement for any proposed fisheries regulations identified by the Department as having a major impact on interested stakeholders; and generally relating to recreational fishing seasons for striped bass and fisheries regulations.  [formatting omitted]”

Both legislators come from Maryland’s Eastern Shore and, given the content of the bill, it appears that they were acting on behalf of Eastern Shore waterman and, in particular, Maryland charter boat operators, who are seeking a two-striped-bass bag for their customers.

While passage of the bill would undoubtedly please the charter boat community, it would also take Maryland out of compliance with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s fishery management plan for Atlantic striped bass.  As a result, depending on the whims of the Secretary of Commerce and others within the Trump administration, it could thereby result in a complete closure of Maryland’s striped bass fishery.

While the striped bass fishery in Maryland’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay is legally regulated by the State of Maryland, Maryland’s regulatory actions are constrained by the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, which provides in pertinent part,

“The [Atlantic States Marine Fisheries] Commission shall prepare and adopt coastal fishery management plans to provide for the conservation of coastal fisheries resources…The coastal fishery management plan shall specify the requirements necessary for the States to be in compliance with the plan.  Upon adoption of a coastal fishery management plan, the Commission shall identify each State that is required to implement and enforce that plan…

“Each State identified…with respect to a coastal fishery management plan shall implement and enforce the measures of such plan within the timeframe established in the plan…

“The Commission shall determine that a State in not in compliance with the provision of a coastal fishery management plan if it finds that a State has not implemented and enforced such plan within the timeframes established under the plan…

“Upon making a determination [that a State is out of compliance], the Commission shall within 10 working days notify the Secretaries [of Commerce and the Interior] of such determination.  Such notification shall include the reasons for making the determination and an explicit list of actions that the affected State must take to comply with the coastal fishery management plan…

“Within 30 days after receiving a notification from the Commission [that a state is out of compliance] and after review of the Commission’s determination of noncompliance, the Secretary shall make a finding on whether the State in question has failed to carry out its responsibility [to comply with a coastal fishery management plan]; and, if so, whether the measures that the State has failed to implement and enforce are necessary for the conservation of the fishery in question…

“Upon making a finding…that a State has failed to carry out its responsibility [to comply with the provisions of a coastal fishery management plan] and that the measures it failed to implement and enforce are necessary for conservation, the Secretary [of Commerce] shall declare a moratorium on fishing in the fishery in question within the waters of the noncomplying State…  [formatting and numbering omitted]”

Currently, striped bass are managed pursuant to the ASMFC’s Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, as well as Addendum II and Addendum III to such Amendment.

Relative to Maryland’s recreational striped bass fishery in the Chesapeake Bay, Addendum II provides that

“Chesapeake Bay recreational fisheries are constrained by a 1-fish bag limit and a slot limit of 19 inches to 24 inches…States are required to maintain the same seasons that were in place in 2022.

“The Chesapeake Bay recreational spring trophy fisheries are managed by the same size and bag limits as the ocean fishery (1 fish at 28 inches to 31 inches) with the 2022 trophy season dates.  [internal reference omitted]”

Addendum III granted Maryland some flexibility in setting its seasons, allowing it to either maintain its 2022 seasons or implement a different set of seasons that the state had previously presented to the board and to the Striped Bass Technical Committee; such alternative regulations were not found to increase Maryland recreational striped bass landings.  However, Maryland was not permitted to adopt any other combination of seasons—only the 2022 seasons or the alternative presented to the board were permissible.

A reading of SB 755, makes it clear that the bill, if passed and signed into law, would take Maryland out of compliance with the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan in multiple respects.

The first section of the bill, which simply states,

“The Department may not establish a catch and release season for striped bass, commonly known as rockfish,”

is fine on its face.  If Maryland chose to replace the current catch-and-release seasons with outright prohibitions on striped bass fishing, it would be free to do so without running afoul of the ASMFC’s management plan.  Problems would only arise should the state replace a current catch-and-release season with one allowing harvest.

But the second section creates all sorts of trouble, and not only with respect to compliance issues.

It begins,

“The Department annually shall establish a recreational and charter boat summer and fall striped bass season beginning May 16 each year and ending December 10 each year.”

The reason for that is pretty clear: The charter boats don’t like the current season, which allows no striped bass fishing at all (including catch-and-release) during the last half of July, and dislike the proposed alternative seasons, which would allow harvest throughout July but outlaw all striped bass fishing for the entire month of August, even more, because the for-hire boats do a lot of business during the summer and summer closures limit their profits. 

The problem is that neither the 2022 seasons, which include no striped bass fishing for half of July, nor the alternative set of seasons approved in Addendum III, contemplate the continuous open season specified in SB 755.  That season, if adopted, would take Maryland out of compliance with the current management plan.

A later subparagraph in the same section establishes a bag limit of two fish per person for anglers fishing from charter boats, which clearly contradicts Addendum II’s one-fish bag limit, and would also take Maryland out of compliance.

So would the bill’s section (C), which would require Maryland to establish a spring trophy fishery.

Such fishery existed in 2022, so if Maryland chose to reestablish it, the state would be free to do so if it kept its current season structure; language in Addendum III suggests that, if the alternative season structure was adopted, a trophy fishery would be prohibited.  However, the 2022 trophy fishery ran from May 1 – May 15, while SB 755 would break the new trophy fishery into three 3-consecutive-day periods in late April and/or early May, a clear violation of Addendum II’s requirement that “States are required to maintain the same seasons that were in place in 2022.”

SB 755 is also flawed in that it specifies that anglers “may not catch or possess [emphasis added]” more than two striped bass per day if fishing from a charter boat, or one fish per day if fishing from any other platform.  The plain meaning of the words “catch or” preceding “possess” suggest that if an angler released a bass, whether voluntarily or because the fish was over- or undersized, the released fish would be counted toward the daily bag limit, and that the angler would be required to stop fishing once the one (or, if fishing from a charter boat, two) fish bag limit was caught, even if the angler hadn’t retained any bass up to that point.

But that is a technical issue.  The primary problem with SB 755 is that, if passed, it would take Maryland out of compliance with the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan, and could result in a federally imposed moratorium shutting down the state’s striped bass fishery until the bill was repealed.

If that happened, the charter boats who are presumably behind SB 755 wouldn’t be able to fish at all, at least for a while.

It seems to be one of those cases where the charter boat folks ought to be careful of what they ask for, because they might get it.

And maybe it’s also one of those cases where legislators ought to be careful to understand all of the implications of a bill before they introduce it, because if SB 755 becomes law, and a moratorium is imposed in response, there are going to be a lot of unhappy people, both in the recreational and in the commercial fishery.

And a lot of those commercial and recreational fishermen live—and vote—on the Eastern Shore.