NEW PAPER ARGUES FOR REDUCED ATLANTIC MENHADEN NATURAL MORTALITY RATE

 

A recently-released paper, “Investigation of Atlantic menhaden mortality rates,” authored by Jerold S. Ault and Jiangang Luo, which appeared in the November 2026 edition of the journal Fisheries Research, has been drawing the attention of menhaden advocates.

The paper argues that the natural mortality rate for Atlantic menhaden used in the most recent benchmark stock assessment, M=1.17, was much too high, and that a rate of M=0.50 was probably a more realistic estimate, noting that

“This estimate was substantially lower than the value currently adopted in the Atlantic menhaden stock assessment and was consistent with previous assessment results, species life-history characteristics, and observed longevity.”

If the paper’s conclusions are correct, they would have very serious implications for Atlantic menhaden management, as a sharply reduced natural mortality rate would, once input to the population model, result in a significant reduction in estimates of Atlantic menhaden fecundity (the overall number of eggs produced, which the menhaden assessment uses in lieu of spawning stock biomass to gauge menhaden abundance) and a corresponding increase in the fishing mortality rate.  Stock status would almost certainly change from the current “not overfished” and “not experiencing overfishing” to “overfished” and “experiencing overfishing,” and that change would justify the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board slashing menhaden landings and placing significant new restrictions on the menhaden fishery.

Thus, it’s not at all surprising that the various menhaden advocacy groups are calling attention to the paper, which effectively supports their claims that the Atlantic menhaden population is in trouble.  We see a group that calls itself “The Forage Fish Campaign” alleging that

“Atlantic menhaden are likely collapsing after years of overharvest,”

and other advocacy groups making similar assertions.  For them, the Ault paper is pretty much a dream come true.

So what does the Ault paper actually say?

Its primary approach deals with a coastwide mark-recapture study—that is, a tagging study—undertaken by the National Marine Fisheries Service during the years 1966 through 1971, which placed magnetic tags in more than one million menhaden, and the efficiency of the magnets used to detect those tags in fish caught by the menhaden reduction industry. 

Inefficient magnets, which failed to detect many of the tags present in recaptured menhaden, would in theory lead to the false conclusion that a larger proportion of the tagged fish succumbed to natural mortality, either eaten by a predator or, perhaps, being a part of one of the mass die-offs that occur from time to time, when too many menhaden crowd into a harbor or back bay, then die when a falling tide, and perhaps elevated water temperatures, leave them with too little oxygen to survive.

Such false conclusion would then lead to an inaccurate stock assessment for, as the paper notes,

“Accurate mortality estimates are essential because stock assessment outcomes, including estimates of biomass, fishing mortality, biological reference points and sustainable harvest levels, are highly sensitive to assumptions regarding natural mortality.”

When the benchmark stock assessment adopted the natural mortality estimate of M=1.17 in 2020, a level that, the Ault paper states,

“represents a 2.3-fold increase relative to the value of M=0.50 yr^-1 used in the previous [2015] benchmark assessment and was approximately 14 standard deviations above the mean of more than a dozen previously published estimates, as well as natural mortality values used in recent U.S. and international stock assessments [citations omitted]”

that high estimate of natural mortality

“contributed to the [benchmark assessment’s] conclusion that Atlantic menhaden spawning biomass exceeded 80% of unfished levels.”

It also led to the benchmark assessment’s conclusion that Atlantic menhaden fecundity was above its target level, while fishing mortality was below its target, which is about as favorable a conclusion as a stock assessment can reach.

Unfortunately, it was almost certainly the wrong conclusion, as we learned when the 2025 Atlantic Menhaden Stock Assessment Update was released about one year ago.  In presenting its findings, it stated that

“The only new change for this update assessment is inclusion of a new vector of natural mortality based on a revised analysis of the historical tagging data that was completed by the M Working Group.”

But that change was important.  After taking another look at the magnet efficiency question, the biologists performing the assessment settled on a lower estimate of natural mortality, M=0.92.  That, in turn, was enough to substantially reduce the estimate of fecundity, and increase the estimated fishing mortality rate.  As a result, the status of the stock changed “not overfished” and “not experiencing overfishing,” with fecundity above the target level and fishing mortality below target, to the same “not overfished” and “not experiencing overfishing,” but with both fecundity and the fishing mortality rate somewhere between their target and threshold levels.  In the case of fecundity, that level was only about 5% above the threshold that defines an overfished stock.

Now, the Ault paper argues that the stock assessment update still significantly overestimated the natural mortality rate, saying

“the revised analysis continued to rely on aggregated, landings-weighted estimates of magnet efficiency derived from plant-test experiments.  Magnet efficiencies varied substantially among plants and over time, ranging from 0% to 100%, indicating highly heterogeneous, strongly non-normal distributions of tag-detection efficiency that are not adequately characterized by simple averages.  Because tag-recovery probabilities directly influence estimation of natural mortality, fishing mortality, and catchability, the use of aggregated efficiency values may obscure important spatiotemporal variation and contribute to parameter confounding.  These observations suggested that treating magnet efficiency as a fixed external input could contribute more uncertainty to mortality estimation than the movement or catchability components of the model.  Consequently, despite reducing the estimate of natural mortality from M=1.17 to M=0.92 yr^-1, the revised estimate remained higher than values suggested by Atlantic menhaden longevity, life-history characteristics, and previous stock assessments.”

With those issues in mind, the researchers Ault and Luo began recalculating the natural mortality rate, using two different approaches, one based on the menhaden’s life history, one based on a reexamination of the tagging data.

The issue of magnet efficiency was a large part of the latter reexamination.  The paper explains that

“Prior to the mark-recapture study, high-strength magnets were placed throughout the processing lines of participating reduction plants to remove metal debris from the fish meal and prevent damage to processing equipment.  The tagging study assumed that tagged and untagged fish were fully mixed within the population prior to capture.  Following harvest by commercial purse-seine vessels, fish landings were delivered to reduction plants for processing, where fish bearing implanted ferromagnetic tags could be detected and recovered by the plant magnets.  Consequently, the probability that a tag was recovered and reported depended directly on the efficiency of the plant magnet system.  Because magnet efficiencies varied among plants among plants and through time, recovery probabilities were imperfect and heterogeneous.  Accurate estimation of magnet efficiency was therefore essential because recovery probabilities directly influence estimates of survival, fishing mortality, and natural mortality in mark-recovery analyses.  [citations omitted]”

Much of the paper was dedicated to the models used to determine magnet efficiency and thus a better estimate of natural mortality; they were, as one might expect, highly reliant on statistical analysis and other elements of mathematics that probably need not be discussed in detail here.

However, the discussion of the two analytical approaches taken by the researchers is worth examining. 

“Model-based estimates of natural mortality should therefore be evaluated in the context of independent biological evidence, including observed longevity and age structure.  Liljestrand et al (2019) did not reconcile their mortality estimate with the documented age structure of Atlantic menhaden.  Even after corrections reduced the estimate to M=0.92 yr^-1, the implied maximum lifespan remained only approximately 5-6 years under natural mortality alone.  This prediction is inconsistent with historical observations of Atlantic menhaden attaining ages of 11-12 years in fishery and survey samples.  Discrepancies between model-derived mortality estimates and independently observed longevity warrant careful evaluation, as natural mortality estimates should be both biologically plausible and statistically supported.

“Our reanalysis produced a natural mortality estimate of M=0.50…, less than half the original estimate reported by Liljestrand et al (2019).  After correcting the input data, the principal source of this difference was not the fishing-effort data themselves but the methodological treatment of tag-recovery efficiency.  The resulting estimate is consistent with observed longevity, life-history characteristics, and previous stock assessment results for Atlantic menhaden, making it more biologically plausible than the substantially higher estimates adopted in recent assessments.  Given the strong influence of natural mortality on stock assessment outcomes, these findings have important implications for future stock assessments and the biological reference points, stock status determinations, and fisheries management decisions that depend on them.  [citations omitted]”

It is certainly a compelling argument, and as noted at the start of this essay, the menhaden advocacy community has been making some effort to have the Ault paper deemed the definitive analysis—what in a federal context might be considered the “best scientific information available”—with respect to the Atlantic menhaden’s natural mortality rate.

But in doing so, the advocacy community might be falling victim to a collective sort of confirmation bias, given that the Ault paper supports their long-held contentions about the health of the menhaden stock.  For while, in the Ault paper, we have a peer-reviewed study that makes an argument for a natural mortality rate of M=0.50, we also have a peer-reviewed stock assessment that rejects the essential premises and findings of the Ault paper, and sets the natural mortality rate at M=0.92.

At first glance, that might seem unlikely, given that the Ault paper was only recently published.  But if we look at the 2025 stock assessment update, we will find that those premises and general findings had already been established in 2023, although not in their final form.

Thus, the assessment update tells us,

“Ault et al (2023) submitted a working paper to the Atlantic menhaden [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] and the Ecological Reference Points Work Group (ERP WG) that re-analyzed the historical tagging data and produced an estimate of M=0.56, significantly lower than the M=1.17 reported by Liljestrand et al (2019).

“However, Ault et al (2023) had used a different subset of the data and a different approach to handling the parameters, which made direct comparisons with Liljestrand et al (2019) difficult.  The [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] formed a working group to review the datasets and methods in consultation with the primary authors to determine the best estimate of M for use in the Atlantic menhaden stock assessment.  The M [Working Group] and the [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] determined that the main cause of the difference in the M estimate was the handling of the magnet efficiency parameter, which was equivalent to the tag reporting rate in conventional tagging models.  The M WG and SAS found that Liljestrand et al (2019) had overestimated the magnet efficiency rate in their analysis, but did not agree with the stepwise estimation approach proposed by Ault et al (2023) to estimate this parameter.  In the end, the M WG and SAS recommended a revised estimate of M=0.92 from the tagging study, based on the corrected magnet efficiency rate and updated effort and landings datasets, which was lower than the value used in the 2020 benchmark, but higher than the value estimated from Ault et al’s (2023) method.  [emphasis added]”

Thus, it appears that the conclusions reached in the Ault paper do not represent a completely new approach to estimating Atlantic menhaden natural mortality, bur rather an approach that was considered and, after consultations with Dr. Ault, rejected by the Stock Assessment Subcommittee that prepared the assessment update.

That context matters, because such past consideration suggests that the Ault paper does not reflect a new revelation that necessarily resets the natural mortality estimate, but rather an approach that was considered and ultimately rejected before the 2025 assessment update was finalized.

That doesn’t mean that the ultimate conclusions in the Ault paper are wrong, but it does mean that Ault and Luo are offering an alternative estimate of M which does not automatically trump the M=0.92 estimate that was used in the 2025 assessment update; Ault and Luo must still convince the Stock Assessment Subcommittee that their estimate is the correct one.

Having said that, an argument can be made that using the Ault-Luo estimate of M=0.50 would be an appropriately precautionary action until further research either confirms or disproves its accuracy.  However, deeming the M=0.50 estimate to be the best scientific information available would be premature.

So where does that leave us?

The Ault paper was a comprehensive reanalysis of the data used to calculate natural mortality for Atlantic menhaden.  The arguments made in the paper are robust, and make a logical case for the lower natural mortality estimate. 

However, the Ault paper should not be taken as Gospel.

Its core concepts have been considered and ultimately rejected by the Stock Assessment Subcommittee, for reasons stated in the 2025 assessment update.  Unless and until its authors can successfully refute the Stock Assessment Subcommittee’s criticisms, the Ault paper should not be used as a primary driver of menhaden management measures, although its findings may well inform the discussion and debate about menhaden management issues.

It is a paper that seeks to shed light on the natural mortality question, but it does not represent the final word on the subject.  More research still needs to be done.

IS THERE HOPE FOR DEPLETED COD STOCKS?

 

The cod fishery on Newfoundland’s Grand Banks has been prosecuted for about 500 years.  In the late 1800s and early 1900s, annual landings were approximately 250,000 metric tons (551,155,655 pounds) per year, a figure that increased steadily through the late 1950s and 1960s until finally peaking at about 800,000 metric tons (1,763,698,097 pounds) in 1968.

The latter figure was completely unsustainable, and led the stock to collapse, with landings falling to 139,000 metric tons (306,442,544 pounds) just 10 years later.  A report issued by Canada in 1992, titled "The\Northern Cod Crisis,” noted that

“This has led one recent federal Commission to conclude that ‘an annual harvest of 300,000 tonnes was a sustainable figure in the years between 1902 and 1958, while harvests in excess of 600,000 could not be sustained during the later 1960s and early 1970s as was clearly evident from the notable and rapid decline in both catches and estimated stock size.”

By 1992, cod abundance had fallen to about 1% of its historic level, and the Canadian minister of fisheries and oceans shut down Newfoundland’s cod fishery for two years.  In 1993, the closure was extended indefinitely.  As a result, about 37,000 fishermen and fish processors lost their jobs.

The continuing moratorium did not cause cod abundance to increase as quickly as had been hoped.  A 2010 study found that Grand Banks cod had only rebuilt to 10% of their historical abundance—although even that represented a tenfold increase since 1992. The slow recovery was attributed to various causes; in some cases, the claims were contradictory.  Some blamed the slow pace of the recovery on insufficient quantities of the forage fish needed to support the cod population, while others argued that in the absence of substantial numbers of predators, forage fish increased in numbers and began feeding on juvenile cod.  Some argued that overfishing had removed the biggest fish from the population, and so changed the genetic makeup of the stock.  Some blamed a cooling ocean, while others pointed to rapid ocean warming as a contributing factor.  Bycatch in fisheries targeting other species was often cited as a serious problem.

But, while the cause of the slow recovery was never completely established, Canada was sure that it had the right answer to rebuild the stock—keeping a moratorium on targeted commercial landings in place.  And the stock seemed to respond, slowly growing larger until, in 2024, Canadian fisheries managers decided that the stock had grown large enough to justify reopening the commercial fishery with a quota of 18,000 metric tons (39,683,207 pounds), not quite 13% of what the quota had been in 1992, when the fishery was closed.

Last June, Canadian fisheries managers went one step further, and upgraded the northern cod’s stock status from “critical” to “healthy.”  Along with that upgrade came an increased commercial quota, which is now 59,000 metric tons (130,072,735 pounds).  Although that is still less than half of what the quota was in 1992, it is another positive sign that Canada’s approach to cod rebuilding works.  And by allowing fishermen to remove only five to seven percent of the population each year, rather than a supposedly sustainable 20%, Canadian fisheries managers have settled upon a precautionary management approach that could, with time, allow the stock to recover to, or at least near, pre-collapse levels.

That doesn’t mean that Newfoundland’s cod are out of the woods.  Questions still remain, including the question of whether large trawlers, which have been blamed for the original collapse, produce substantial bycatch, and can harm bottom habitat, should be allowed to continue in the offshore fishery (they are already not fishing inshore, where 70% of the quota is caught).  But one good omen is that the fishing industry itself seems to support a precautionary approach, with the owner of one fish processing plant reportedly saying,

“This is the most hope we’ve had in Newfoundland for the cod fishery in years…[But] nobody wants to repeat what happened in 1992.”

The next question is whether the Canadian approach might be adopted by the National Marine Fisheries Service, and whether it would work on the four cod stocks caught off of New England.

There is no question that it would be a hard sell, as New England fishermen typical fight back against any harvest reduction, no matter how badly needed, and instead constantly seek to increase quotas for various groundfish, including cod.  But there is also no question that the approach that NMFS has used to manage cod over the past 50-plus years has been a dismal failure.

New England cod stocks were never as large as those off Newfounland, but their abundance showed a somewhat similar pattern, with significant but, perhaps, sustainable landings in the 34.0-57.5 million pound range in the 1950s and 1960s, which spiked during the 1970s, eventually hit a peak of 117.8 million pounds in 1980, then began a steady decline, bottoming out at a little over 1 million pounds throughout the 2020s.

However, United States fisheries managers never embraced, or even seriously considered, the sort of moratorium that was embraced by their counterparts in Canada.   Instead, even when New England cod abundance reached historical lows, NMFS allowed fishing to continue, although at a vastly reduced landings level compared to 1950.  There is no evidence that NMFS ever seriously considered imposing a moratorium on the cod fishery, despite it’s current poor condition.

Of the four acknowledged Atlantic cod stocks—Western Gulf of Maine, Eastern Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank and Southern New England—all four are overfished, and have been for some time, although only two of the four stock are currently experiencing overfishing.

Yet even in the case of the Georges Bank stock, which is in particularly poor shape, with “persistent” poor recruitment and the lowest spawning stock biomass ever recorded, only a minority of the New England Fishery Management Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee supported a more precautionary management approach.  Again, there is no suggestion that a moratorium should be imposed.  Instead, we see recommendations for

“Additional socioeconomic information on the fishery and communities associated with this newly defined stock area.”

Such request is similar to the comment made, with respect to Western Gulf of Maine cod, that the

“SSC is concerned about the socioeconomic impacts these [Acceptable Biological Catch estimates] will have on the fishery.”

While it isn’t unreasonable to be concerned about participants in a fishery and how they might be impacted by management measures, focusing on those socioeconomic impacts, in the face of an ongoing collapse of a stock, is wrong-headed, as nothing will cause greater socioeconomic harm than the complete or near-complete loss of a fishery.

Thus, the Newfoundland cod closure, even given the 37,000 lost jobs and economic disruptions that it caused, can be justified in the slow, but very real, increase in cod abundance that is allowing Canadian fisheries managers to begin increasing landings limits once again.

It is far harder to justify NMFS’ failure to take hard and meaningful action—which might very well include a moratorium—to rebuild the four New England cod stocks, and instead continuing its long-time policy of maintaining a fishery, albeit at very low levels, in a sort of death by one thousand cuts, in which fishermen are given small and steadily decreasing quotas, in the face of a small and decreasing cod population, but are not given the one thing they need most:  A reasonable hope that cod stocks might, in time, be managed back to health.

Thus, with the Newfoundland example standing bright and clear in front of them, perhaps it is time for federal fishery managers to stop torturing the domestic groundfish fleet with more timid and ineffective harvest reductions, and instead take a bold stance, shutting down the New England cod fishery in the hope of resurrecting it in a more meaningful form than anything we have seen in the last few decades.

There is no guarantee that such moratorium on all cod fishing would work.  It might jumpstart the recovery of overfished stocks, or it might just cause the quick and merciful demise of a fishery that has been languishing on life support for the past 25 or 30 years.

But, either way, it would likely lead to a better start than the ineffective management measures that are in place today.

 

TRUMP ISSUES EXECUTIVE ORDER TO "RESTORE" RECREATIONAL FISHING

 

On September 17, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order titled “Restoring American Saltwater Angling and Recreation.”

And yes, it was at least as bad as you probably expected.  It was as if the Eye of Balor had finally focused on the federal fishery management system, and began killing off its core components.

For those unfamiliar with Celtic mythology, Balor was king of the Fomorians, a race of misshapen giants, or perhaps demons, which came from beneath the sea, and were described as

“phenomenally ugly, and celebrated this ugliness, even driving out children who were normal in appearance, taking deformities as a mark of favor from their dark gods.  One Fomor might have a large arm and a small arm, while another might have two heads, and another three eyes!

“Other tales claim they were born whole enough but became strange in mind and appearance after exposure to the occult ur-light, degenerative radiances and blasphemous smokes of their eldritch rituals.”

The Eye of Balor appears to have sprung out of the latter tradition, as it gained its “immense destructive power” after Balor

“peered into a potion, [and the eye] turned venomous and caused death to anyone it gazed upon.”

Which is a pretty good analogy for what happens when Trump gets involved with fisheries management issues.

In some ways, this Executive Order came as no surprise, although there are rumors that many people within the National Marine Fisheries Service didn’t know it was going to happen.  My second blog post of 2026 warned that

“We can expect the sportfishing industry to take advantage of the current administration’s hostility to conservation measures, and its support for corporate profits, and become ever more aggressive in weakening federal fisheries management while trying harder to warp state and regional fisheries management toward greater exploitation and greater short-term economic benefits for the fishing industry, regardless of the long-term impacts on fish stocks.”

The recent Executive Order pretty well evidences that truth, and is undoubtedly the result of some major campaign contributors (and one of the things I keep wondering, ever since the EO came out, is whether Trump charges more or less for an Executive Order than he does for a pardon) talking to people high enough in the administration, and getting their priority issues included in the document. 

I don’t know whether the Executive Order was actually written by administration staff, or whether it is written by industry counsel and then just handed over to the administration for edits (the language of the document suggests that the latter might be more likely), but we can be pretty sure that Trump, who has never evidenced any interest in outdoor sports, had no idea what he was signing when he issued the EO.  Anyone who doubts that statement need only refer to his comments about another executive order, intended to facilitate sport hunting, that was issued the same day.  In that case, he said

“Lead ammunition was a problem, huh?  Is it better than other ammunition?  I assume, huh?  That’s pretty good.”

Calling him “clueless” when it comes to sportsmen’s issues would be pretty kind, although I suspect that he’s not clueless at all about who made the donations that, in his mind, justified issuing the saltwater angling-related Executive Order.

The topics included \in the EO were, for the most part, also no surprise.  Some, including the sections “Agency Implementation,” “Modernizing Data Collection Infrastructure for Recreational Catch-and-Effort Estimates,” “Restoring Integrity to Fisheries Science and Data,” and “Managing Predators” were foreshadowed in the NMFS Leadership Message issued on September 2.

And while there were some new items that the administration hadn’t seemed to focus on before, such as addressing “the decline of iconic recreational fisheries, such as the Atlantic striped bass,” “Fast-Tracking Artificial Reefs and Habitat Creation,” and “Projects for Increasing Fish Abundance,” all are presented with characteristic industry and Trumpian twists. 

New scientific efforts to conduct striped bass research (as well as research on “other depleted stocks”) will be conducted in order to

“test innovative solutions for achieving sustainable fisheries management that maximizes fishing access.  [emphasis added].”

The Executive Order talks about “Fast-Tracking Artificial Reefs and Habitat Creation,” but is primarily focused on turning played-out oil rigs (“and other-use structures with the exception of infrastructure associated with offshore wind energy [emphasis added]”) into permanent artificial reefs, a long-time goal of the red snapper-obsessed Coastal Conservation Association, and with

“the placement and management of artificial reefs within National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine National Monuments,”

which would seem an act of vandalism particularly attractive  to this administration, given its record of hostility to both National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine National Monuments.  The fact that the Executive Order would consider “habitat creation” at all is somewhat curious, given the administration’s recent actions to remove habitat damage from the list of items constituting a “take” of a listed species under the Endangered Species Act.

But then, I suspect perspective changes when donations are involved.

And the EO’s concerns with “Projects for Increasing Fish Abundance” seem to have nothing at all to do with improving spawning habitat, nursery areas, or other habitat areas of particular concern.  Instead,

“Agencies are encouraged to transition habitat restoration metrics toward production-based goals,”

which means, if you don’t speak bureaucratese, shifting away from promoting natural reproduction in recovered habitats to pumping out truckloads of hatchery-generated rubber fish of various species, with little regard for natural reproduction, native runs, or healthy ecosystems.

Which makes the whole “habitat creation “ point seem that much more hypocritical, although to be fair, it would seem that the habitat creation visualized by the Trump administration would involve toppled oil rigs, sunken vessels, and similar scrapyard-based efforts, rather than restoring anything originally created by nature, so maybe it isn’t quite as hypocritical as it first seems.

Needless to say, the recreational fishing industry is falling all over itself to praise the Executive Order.  

Jeff Angers, president and panderer-in-chief for the Center for Sportfishing Policy, gushed that

“This Executive Order is a historic recognition of what millions of American anglers and coastal communities have known for decades: marine recreational fishing deserves a management system built for the way Americans fish.  By prioritizing better data, stronger state partnerships and modern management approaches, President Trump’s order builds on our conservation gains creating a path to more reliable access and opportunity in America’s oceans.”

Glenn Hughes, president and CEO of the American Sportfishing Association, declared that

“The American Sportfishing Association thanks President Trump for his decisive action to improve management and data collection for America’s saltwater fisheries.  This Executive Order will have long-term benefits for the sportfishing industry and America’s 15.5 million saltwater recreational anglers.”

At the National Marine Manufacturers Association, President Frank Hugelmeyer said,

“Recreational boating and fishing are the foundation of America’s outdoor heritage and an important driver of our nation’s recreational economy.  Today’s actions further reaffirm the importance of ensuring Americans can access and enjoy our nation’s waters.  Access supports American manufacturing jobs and small businesses across the country.  Thank you to President Trump and his administration for recognizing the value of outdoor recreation and the American industries and communities it supports.”

And down in Houston, Texas, Pat Murray, president of the Coastal Conservation Association, also made his ritual obeisance to Trump, figuratively kissing the President’s ring while declaring,

“We’re grateful the Administration has taken this opportunity to emphasize the social and economic importance of recreational fishing.  State-based management has never been more important for our federal fisheries, and we applaud this critical need being highlighted in this Executive Order.”

It’s probably important to note that while the industry spokesmen all praised the benefits that the EO will bring to the fishing industry and to recreational fishermen, none even tried to suggest that it would improve the health of sustainability of the nation’s saltwater fish stocks. 

We should probably be grateful for that tiny sliver of honesty.

But otherwise, the Executive Order is about what one would expect. 

“To effectuate the policy described in section 1 of this order, all relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall partner with States and the private sector to vigorously rebuild, expand, permit, and modernize data collection.  All such agencies shall eliminate unnecessary restrictions that harm our coastal economies, burden charter fishing businesses, and limit public access to our marine resources.  Furthermore, it is the policy of my administration to demand accurate cutting-edge data collection and empower State-Federal partnerships to produce the information needed for responsible management…

“…the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works shall, consistent with applicable law, take steps to initiate action to suspend, revise, or rescind regulations that overly burden boaters, anglers, and outdoor businesses.”

To achieve those goals, the EO directs the Secretary of Commerce to

“review targeted National Standards Guidelines issued under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act…for consistency with the purpose of this order.  Specifically, the Secretary shall, at a minimum, consider revising the Guidelines for National Standard 1 (Optimum Yield) and National Standard 2 (Best Scientific Information Available) to ensure they appropriately account for the unique biological, economic, and social characteristics of the recreational fishery, and to facilitate the rapid integration of State-level data into Federal management decisions, where appropriate.”

The Secretary of Commerce would also be expected to overhaul and/or replace the current Marine Recreational Information Program used to estimate recreational effort, catch, and landings with a new approach to data collection that would rely much more heavily on state-supplied data, while also generating

“a list of key species to use in partnership with the recreational angling community, charter captains, and State agencies to gather real-time data, deploy advanced tagging technologies, and improve catch-and-release mortality estimates,”

and developing

“a comprehensive 5-year strategic plan with clear implementation milestones to improve the collection, analysis, and application of recreational fisheries economic data to support fisheries management.  This plan shall ensure that the economic impact and value of recreational fishing, including for-hire fisheries and shoreside support industries, is fully accounted for in Federal fishery management decisions and harvest opportunities,”

thus moving the emphasis in management decisions away from good science, conservation, and sustainability and toward the economic aspects of fisheries management.

At the same time that was going on, the Executive Order would have NMFS and other relevant agencies working to relieve the regulatory and administrative burden on recreational fishermen and the recreational fishing industry, creating more artificial fish habitat (while making it easier to destroy natural structures and waterways that constitute critical habitat for various marine species), killing off more of the sharks and seals that steal anglers’ catch, while increasing fish abundance through projects that deemphasize habitat restoration in favor of “production-based goals.”

In other words, the Executive Order is just about what one would express when an angling industry focused on short-term profits buys the ear of an administration that seeks to monetize the nation’s natural resources, with neither side of the transaction having much, if any, regard for those resources’ long-term health or sustainability. 

You end up with fisheries, and a fishery management system, that look like they’ve suffered the gaze of Balor.

Speaking for myself, and I suspect for a lot of saltwater sport fishermen, we’d be far happier with an administration that ignored all of this fancy Executive Order stuff, and just managed to get the cost of diesel back under $5.00 per gallon.  Under $4.00 would be even better.

That would do more toward “restoring American saltwater angling and recreation” than all of the executive orders ever issued, the most recent order included.

 

 

 

MENHADEN: CERTAINTY WITHOUT MUCH SCIENCE

 

The menhaden silly season has gotten underway.

By “silly season,” I mean that time of the year when well-intentioned people come out of the woodwork to make all sorts of claims relating to menhaden management and the species’ role in coastal ecosystems, but have little or no factual support for anything that they choose to say.

What do we actually know about Atlantic menhaden?

We know that it is an important forage species, that helps to support finfish, bird, and marine mammal populations along the entire Atlantic coast of the United States.  We know that all of the menhaden on the East Coast belong to a single stock, that the stock spawns over the continental shelf, and that the older fish engage in long coastwide migrations, although many of them don’t commute between the extremes of the fish’s range, but rather engage in shorter travels—say, Maine to Virginia, or perhaps North Carolina. 

There are a lot more things that we simply suspect.

We suspect that menhaden might be susceptible to localized depletion, although that has never been proven through any sort of objective scientific research.  We also suspect that such localized depletion, particularly in the Chesapeake Bay, might be leading to osprey experiencing nesting failure.  And we suspect that the absence of menhaden in places where they were once abundant may be affecting the presence or absence of sharks, striped bass, bluefish, and other predatory fish species.

But due to a lack of sound data, for many aspects of menhaden biology, suspecting is the best that we can do.

Unfortunately, too many menhaden advocates don’t wait for the necessary data to be developed before drawing firm conclusions about menhaden biology and the role that the fish plays in coastal ecosystems.  Thanks to a recent vote in the Virginia state legislature, that information is being gathered right now, although from a practical perspective, it probably won’t be completely collated, analyzed, peer reviewed and, finally, presented to the scientific community for another five years or so.  But the menhaden advocates don’t want to wait, so they’re making some very iffy claims that are based on very little hard science.

Thus, down in the Chesapeake Bay, we’re seeing a group that calls itself the Southern Maryland Recreational Fishing Organization planning to sue Virginia—again—over what the Organization alleges is poor menhaden management.  

It had sued once before, using the Chesapeake Legal Alliance, a non-profit legal group, as counsel, but the Court failed to hand down a decision soon enough to make a difference in that season’s harvest, although the Court seemed interested in the arguments that the Organization was making.

The planned lawsuit will make arguments similar to those made the last time around—that Virginia’s approach to menhaden management violates section 28.2-203 of the Virgina Code, which requires, among other things, that, in state fishery management plans,

“Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving the optimum yield from each fishery...”

while also being

“based upon the best scientific, economic, biological and sociological information available.”

The Organization is apparently claiming that the large-scale menhaden reduction fishery, which is responsible for most of the commercial menhaden landings, should not be permitted to fish in state waters, but rather should be pushed at least three miles offshore, into federal waters, because the state waters fishery

“threatens both the ecological health of the Bay and the livelihoods of commercial and recreational fishermen who depend on menhaden predators like striped bass.”

Unfortunately, they can’t support that allegation with any sort of hard data; the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, in its recently released Draft Addendum II to Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Menhaden for Public Comment, admitted that

“Sufficient scientific data are not available to satisfactorily address the potential for localized depletion in the Bay or to identify specific reasons for predator finfish deficiencies or low larval menhaden recruitment…”

So it is hard to understand how the Organization can claim that Virginia isn’t using “the best scientific…information available” when it established its menhaden regulations, since the best scientific information available doesn’t establish the existence of localized menhaden depletion within the Chesapeake Bay.

The case for menhaden reductions within the Bay causing osprey nest failures is nearly as hard to make, although that hasn’t stopped various organizations involved with menhaden advocacy from trying to make it, in arguments that go well beyond what can be proven today. That debate really started when a team of scientists published a paper titled “Widespread reproductive deficits in Chesapeake Bay ospreys” in the journal Frontiers in Marine Science last May.

The paper concluded that

“Although several factors may influence osprey productivity within the Chesapeake Bay, we suggest that reduced availability of Atlantic menhaden (Brevoortia tyrannus) is a primary driver of poor reproductive performance within high-salinity waters.”

However, the researchers also noted that

“Several documented and suspected factors other than food stress could be contributing to nest failures within the Chesapeake Bay including stressors that influence clutch/brood survival (nest predators, weather, contaminants) and those that may disrupt breeding (nest competitors, disease),”

although they later argued against many of those factors contributing to current nest failures, and observed that

“Nesting ospreys within the higher salinity reaches of the Chesapeake Bay are believed to be menhaden dependent.  Menhaden are a schooling fish with a very high energy density making them efficient to capture and ideal for brood-rearing.  Broad patterns in food-stress metrics and reproductive deficits in 2024 suggest that menhaden abundance was inadequate to support a stable population.”

 Still, the paper’s authors, like the ASMFC, admitted that

“The impact of harvest on the abundance of adult menhaden within the Chesapeake Bay remains controversial primarily because we do not have the abundance data required to evaluate the relationship between harvest and menhaden abundance.”

Despite such caveats, the menhaden advocates and those opposed to the reduction fishery—there is substantial overlap between those two groups—latched onto the paper and used it as “evidence” that maintaining a reduction fishery withing the bay was bad not only for menhaden, but for osprey and the many other species that regularly feed on menhaden.

That has led to some criticism of the paper itself.

One such criticism recently appeared in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, in which the author said,

“As a commercial fisherman from Maine, I was troubled by the Washington Post’s article about menhaden and starving osprey chicks in Chesapeake Bay.  It presents a simple story: commercial fishermen catch menhaden, osprey lose their food, and chicks starve.  It is compelling.  It just is not what the science proves.”

Just what the science proves—rather than merely suggests—isn’t quite clear.  What is clear is that we shouldn’t be blaming osprey nesting failure on menhaden harvest within the Chesapeake Bay until we have enough data to justify the claim.

The third and most recent example of blaming the menhaden fishery for problems popping up along the coast comes from right here in New York, where a member of New York City’s City Council has written to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, asking him to push the reduction fishery 12 miles offshore along the entire East Coast.

According to the website qns.com,

“[City Council member Joann] Ariola warned Lutnick that the overharvesting of menhaden populations—commonly known as bunker—in waters off Jamaica Bay and the Rockaway Peninsula may be contributing to increased shark sightings near New York City beaches, which she claimed was having a detrimental impact on local economies…

“’My constituents can watch menhaden being removed from the ocean just beyond New York’s jurisdiction, but neither they nor the state can reach across that line and stop it,’ Ariola said in a statement.  ‘Only the federal government can close this dangerous loophole.’

“In her letter to Lutnick, Ariola wrote that there was a ‘growing body of evidence’ that sharks are coming closer to shore as a result of decreased menhaden populations beyond the three-mile buffer.  Increased shark sightings, she said, had led to numerous beach closings in the Rockaways over the summer.”

Because this one deals with events more-or-less in my home waters, I can pick out the false statements pretty easily.  To begin, the big reduction boats rarely fish off New York.  It’s a matter of simple economics, for the farther they travel from their Virginia processing facility, the more they have to pay in fuel and other costs; as a rule, the reduction fleets rarely travel north of New Jersey, although they might appear off western Long Island every now and then.  But to say that her “constituents…watch menhaden being removed from the ocean just beyond New York’s jurisdiction” certainly overstates the situation.

So does then claim that “sharks are coming closer to shore as a result of decreased menhaden populations beyond the three-mile buffer.” 

Sharks have always been a part of New York’s coastal ecosystems, and the fish that people are now seeing close to shore—sand tigers, sandbars, duskies, spinners, blacktips, and the occasional small white—are the same species that people have been seeing close to shore for the last few centuries.  I’ve been shark fishing off New York for the last few decades, and understand how sharks move along the coast.  They’re not coming in closer because of an absence of schooling baitfish, but rather because there have been enough menhaden inshore that the sharks can shadow the bait schools that swim just beyond then surfline and still be assured of catching a meal without having to work very hard to do it.  Videos from drones flown from the beach frequently show sandbars, sand tigers, spinners and occasionally blacktips and whites keeping pace with the schools that provide feeding opportunities. 

Far from what Councilwoman Ariola seems to be claiming—that a dearth of menhaden offshore has forced sharks to come closer to New York beaches—the truth is that there have always been a lot of sharks, and a lot of menhaden, swimming very close to shore.  Although there have been days when I ran into big schools of menhaden a dozen miles off the beach, those days have been far less common than the days when I saw far the ocean dark with menhaden in less than 75 feet of water.  So in reality, I expect to find more blacktips, spinners, and small whites in those shallow depths than I would in my more usual 100 to 240-foot fishing  depths.

So, Councilwoman Ariola is also creating a false narrative based on inadequate, inaccurate information gleaned off the Internet rather than by spending time on the water and perusing scientific journals.  In doing so, she contributes to the misunderstandings that people have about menhaden, and helps to perpetuate the current lay view that menhaden are facing some kind of crisis.

She’s certain enough of her views to urge a federal cabinet secretary to accept her point of view as gospel, without first reaching out to the scientists who might be in a better place to judge whether that point of view is valid.

But it is just that sort of unjustified certainty that has shape the menhaden debate for the past decade or so, a debate driven by emotion rather than by data, which is unlikely to serve either the menhaden or the menhaden fisheries very well.

SANDBAR SHARKS: THE STOCK ASSESSMENT, AND BEYOND

 

Last week, I spent a few days down in Silver Spring, Maryland, attending the fall meeting of the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Highly Migratory Species Advisory Panel.  Sharks, and sandbar sharks in particular, were a major focus on the meeting’s last day.

Sandbars have been getting a lot of attention lately, because they have been one of the species most closely linked to shark depredation—that is, sharks stealing a recreational or commercial fisherman’s catch—not only in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, but all the way up into southern New England as well.

As a result, sandbar sharks have been one of the priority species for a stock assessment.  An assessment, dubbed SEDAR 101, as it is the 101^st assessment performed under the SouthEast Data, Assessment and Review process, began back in 2025, has been delayed a bit because of staff cuts at the Southeast Fisheries Science Center, and is expected to be completed and released sometime around the middle of next year.

It’s not clear what that assessment will say, and part of that uncertainty comes from the fact that determining what might be considered “normal” or, perhaps, “historical” sandbar shark abundance is proving to be a very difficult thing to do.

There is only one index, the Virginia Institute of Marine Science Longline Survey, that goes all the way back to the early 1970s, when the sandbar shark population had not yet been depleted by the commercial shark fishery.  It suggests that sandbar sharks were far more abundant in the 1970s and early 1980s than they are today, shows the population falling to near-time series lows in the late 1980s, then vacillating between such lows and somewhat higher levels ever since, without ever approaching the abundance levels of 45 years ago.

Other indices tell a somewhat different story. 

The Northeast Fisheries Science Center and Southeast Fisheries Science Center longline surveys didn’t begin until the latter half of the 1990s.  Both recorded their lowest abundance levels during their first few years of existence—from 1995 or 1996 through 2008 or so—then saw a steady and significant increase in abundance that peaked in the late 2010s or perhaps 2020, before going into a modest but noticeable decline ever since.  The Shark Research Fishery survey, which is tied into a special commercial permit that allows a limited number of fishermen—right now, only three boats opted to obtain the permit—to target and harvest a limited number of sandbar sharks each year, recorded its lowest value in its initial year of 2008, then increased steadily through 2012, at which point it declined a bit, held steady through 2020, increased to its highest level in 2024, and then registered a marked decline in 2025.

So the survey with the longest time series suggests that current sandbar shark abundance isn’t much higher today than it was 40 years ago, although it reached somewhat higher levels in intervening years and might be trending very modestly upwards today, while the other three surveys seem to suggest that sandbar shark abundance reached a nadir in the late 1990s and 2000s before increasing substantially through the early 2020s, at which point it suffered a modest decline.

The latter three surveys seem more in accord with lay observations, but the results of the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences study can’t be ignored, and add some uncertainty to the assessment.  Because sandbar sharks probably haven’t been near their historical level of abundance for close to 50 years, people often forget how abundant they once were; one member of the Advisory Panel brought up the fact that anglers were now seeing sandbar sharks in western Long Island Sound, somewhere that, according to him, they were never seen before, a statement that forced me to say that we used to see sandbars off Greenwich, Connecticut—about as far west as you can go in the Sound without leaving New England—during the 1960s, and that they only disappeared some time after that.

The record of commercial shark landings, which extends back to 1950, might have cast some light on the question of past sandbar shark abundance, but it has uncertainty problems of its own.  Such landings were low into the 1980s, then spiked sharply in 1985, hit their peak a few years later, then fell sharply again in the early 1990s.  The problem was, until 1987, those landing weren’t identified as to species, and even though sandbar shark landings began to be separated out in ’87, some landings remained “unclassified” for about another 15 years, making it difficult, if not practically impossible, for biologists to tease out how much of the commercial landings consisted of sandbar sharks, and how much was composed of other shark species.

There is also some real uncertainty about the sandbar shark’s life history, which can impact the outcome of the assessment.  For example, we know that sandbar sharks don’t pup every year, but we don’t know whether a female produces pups every two years, or every three.  The answer to that question will make a meaningful difference in how many pups a female can produce over her lifetime which, in turn, will play a role in determining how much fishing pressure the stock will be able to bear.

We also don’t know how old sandbar sharks might get, another data point relevant to both lifetime pup production and the level of fishing mortality the species might be able to support.  Because sharks are difficult to age, the maximum age is often stated as a range; the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences states that

“The species grows slowly and does not mature until it is about 25 years old.  Maximum age is unknown, but may exceed 50 years.”

However, that estimate appears to be an outlier on the high side, with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission’s description saying

“A slow-growing species, both sexes reach maturity around 12-13 years (about 6 feet) and are estimated to live 20+ years,”

while a paper produced for SEDAR in 2017 suggested that the maximum age for a sandbar shark is probably at least 31 years, and perhaps somewhat more.

Another problem with establishing maximum ages is that removing fish from a population can impact its age structure, by preventing fish from reaching the same age that they would in an unfished population.

So age, as well as pupping frequency, must be added to the uncertainties plaguing the sandbar shark stock assessment.

Faced with such substantial uncertainties, the stock assessment team is likely to conduct what’s called a “management strategy evaluation,” which can result in management procedures being established for the sandbar shark stock.  At the Advisory Panel meeting, the NMFS scientist heading the assessment team explained that a “robust management procedure” is effectively

“a weatherproof rulebook…

“A set of management rules that won’t lead to negative outcomes even if our data are highly uncertain, the climate shifts, or the fish (or fishermen) behave unexpectedly.

“Instead of trying to find the ‘perfect’ rule for a predictable world, a robust procedure is about finding a ‘safe’ rule for an unpredictable one.

“An empirical [management procedure] is based on data like an index of abundance that provides real time information about the stock.”

One of the possibilities is that, should the assessment recommend that sandbar sharks be removed from the prohibited list and a fishery reestablished, is that landings will be tied to some sort of index of abundance, with annual quotas rising, falling, or remaining the same based on the trends in that index.

Because many sharks share the same sort of uncertainties that plague the sandbar shark stock assessment, it is anticipated that future assessments of other shark species will follow the pattern—management strategy evaluation, management procedures, etc.—that are employed in the sandbar shark assessment.

Of course, what everyone wants to know is what NMFS will do once the sandbar shark assessment is completed.  NMFS probably wants to know the same thing.

One thing that a lot of people need to understand is that a stock assessment is just what its name suggests—it is an assessment of the health of the sandbar shark stock, which might include some projections of future abundance and recommend some possible management measures (e.g., reference points such as an overfishing limit and target fishing mortality rate or landings limit).  But the assessment is not, in and of itself, a fishery management plan; instead, it is a tool that NMFS can and will use when putting a fishery management plan in place.

The general public’s failure to understand the distinction between a stock assessment and a management plan came over loud and clear in the comments sent to SEDAR, where disgruntled fishermen, seeking to stem shark depredation, said things like

“There is an overpopulation of sandbar sharks in our waters from Ponce Inlet to Fort Pierce and I’m sure elsewhere and that’s where I normally go fishing from.  If it’s not myself it’s the person on either side of me reeling in a fish that gets eaten it’s about time to allow these fish to be harvested and thin down the numbers,”

and

“Too many sharks.  Need to cull them,”

while shark conservation advocates take the opposite tack, seemingly believe that the assessment is a proposal of some sort to resume sandbar shark harvest, and make comments such as

“This proposal is extremely devastating for the ocean and for people.  Sharks are vital for healthy marine ecosystems, so we must protect them not kill them and I am firmly opposed to any plan that increases shark fishing quotas,”

and

“Commercial shark long lining needs to remain banned as Atlantic sandbar sharks still had a 70% depletion in their populations in 2017.  They are still considered an endangered species and this will have dire consequences for the ecosystem.  An ecosystem without sharks will die and there will be no more fish to be able to fish up.”

It’s somewhat astounding how much the public gets wrong.  Not only is the stock assessment not a management plan, but without a completed assessment, it’s impossible to say whether sandbar sharks are rebuilding to historical levels of abundance, much less that they are “overpopulated,” “endangered,” in need of culling, or of being thinned down.

However, it is clear that NMFS intends to use the stock assessment, once it is finished, as part of its strategy to reduce shark depredation on the recreational and commercial fisheries.  At the Advisory Panel meeting, the agency made a presentation in which it noted that

“Public perception suggests the stock of sandbar shark has recovered from the overfished status determined in 2018.  Sandbar shark are one of the primary species associated with depredation events.”

Of course, public perception isn’t always right (recall how many comments sent in to SEDAR were from people who perceived the stock assessment to be a fishery management plan), and even if the sandbar shark is no longer deemed to be overfished, it’s population may still be—and probably is—a long way from fully rebuilt.

Despite all of the comments suggesting that the sandbar shark population has “exploded,”—24 such comments having been sent in to SEDAR alone—the sandbar shark’s life history renders explosive population growth impossible.  Think about it:  if it takes at least 12 years for a shark to mature and start producing pups of its own, then increasing sandbar shark abundance can only be a very slow process, because the spawning stock biomass can’t even start to grow until a dozen years after management measures are first adopted; until then, all the management measures are doing is preventing the spawning stock from declining as quickly as it had been before. 

Thus, NMFS is focusing much of its anti-depredation efforts on measures that focus on reducing depredation, rather than reducing shark abundance.  It is trying to determine where and when depredation is increasing, trying to determine why depredation may be increasing and, if it can get a handle on those factors, is also trying to determine whether the likelihood of shark depredation at certain times, in certain places, and perhaps in certain fisheries can be predicted, and whether, by predicting the likelihood of depredation, fishermen will be able to avoid its worst effects.

NMFS is also looking into the possibility of developing effective and practical technologies that will discourage depredation events.

And if the sandbar shark stock assessment (and future stock assessments for other species that engage in depredation, particularly bull sharks) indicate that it can be done without leading to overfishing and/or an overfished stock, NMFS will look into the possible solution that so many in the angling community suggest—increasing shark landings and so reducing shark abundance.

But that isn’t as easy an answer as some would like to believe.  Even if SEDAR 101 finds that sandbar sharks are no longer overfished and well on their way toward recovery (the current target recovery date is 2070, still 44 years away), that they can safely be removed from the prohibited species list, and that the stock can support some level of commercial and/or recreational fishing, relaxed regulations are not likely to lead to a substantial reduction in the sandbar shark population, nor are they, in and of themselves, likely to lead to a significant reduction in shark depredation.

That’s because relaxed regulations aren’t likely to lead to a significantly larger number of sandbar shark removals.  One thing that became very clear at the Advisory Panel meeting was that commercial shark fishermen are already having trouble finding markets for the sharks that they catch; they aren’t coming close to catching the entire commercial quota.  Thus, unless fishermen can find a way to open new markets, they will have little interest in an increased sandbar shark quota that only provides them with access to fish that they will be unable to sell.

As far as the recreational side goes, I noted at the meeting that even back in the 1970s and ‘80s, when there were neither size nor bag limits for sandbar sharks, it was very unusual for an angler to retain and eat them; their flesh was edible, but not prized, and the sandbar shark’s tough, knife-dulling skin made gutting and cutting one up almost more trouble than the meat was worth.  So allowing anglers to take sandbar sharks home probably won’t lead to significantly increased landings.  And the other source of recreational removals, tournament entries, are also unlikely to come into play, for if the sharks entered aren’t kept for food, and instead end up carted off to the town dump, public backlash is likely to be substantial.  We saw that in Florida a few years ago, when a kill tournament largely targeting bull sharks resulted in significant public outrage, and even threats of physical violence aimed at its organizers (after that session of the meeting ended, another Advisory Panel member walked over to me, told me that he was one of the people who organized the Florida tournament, and acknowledged the public outrage), while this summer, there were also much more measured expressions of discontent when the Alabama Deep Sea Fishing Rodeo decided to again award prizes for the largest sharks entered.

So, where does that put the sandbar shark, and where is NMFS likely to go with its efforts to reduce shark depredation?

The sandbar shark stock assessment should be completed sometime next summer, and assuming that it passes peer review—not a given for an assessment containing a lot of unknowns and perhaps an untested and potentially controversial management strategy evaluation—it will guide NMFS’ management efforts.  The stock assessment MIGHT find that the sandbar shark stock is no longer overfished, and that it might be safely removed from the prohibited species list, but that is not guaranteed. 

Depending on what level of abundance is eventually used as a baseline for a healthy biomass, the assessment might find that the stock is still overfished, no longer overfished but with a lot of rebuilding left to do, well on its way toward rebuilding or—perhaps the least likely—fully rebuilt.

And depending on that finding, NMFS might change commercial and/or recreational regulations regarding sandbar shark landings, perhaps partly in the hopes that higher landings might reduce depredation.

But right now, all of those things lie ahead of us.

Right now, we can only wait and watch as SEDAR develops its approach to assessing the sandbar shark stock, an approach that might be used to assess other shark stocks in the future.