NEWLY RELEASED PAPER LOOKS INTO JUST WHERE WESTERN ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA SPAWN

 

Throughout most of my life as an offshore angler, it seemed that scientists had a very firm grasp on where Atlantic bluefin tuna spawned.  There was a large eastern stock that spawned in the Mediterranean Sea, often at relatively young ages and smaller sizes, and a much smaller western stock that spawned in the northern Gulf of Mexico, but generally not until they were about nine years old and somewhere around 80 inches (fork length) long.

The stocks mixed on the feeding grounds, with eastern stock fish crossing over to North America and western stock fish crossing over to Europe from time to time, but when it came to spawning, the Mediterranean and Gulf were the only games in town.

That picture began to change about a decade ago, after a group of biologists published a paper, titled "Discovery of a spawning ground reveals diverse migration strategies in Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus),” which argued that western stock bluefin were also spawning, and spawning at younger ages, perhaps as young as five years old, in the Slope Sea, an area at the edge of the continental shelf off southern New England and the upper mid-Atlantic.

The paper created substantial controversy when it came out, but biologists have now generally accepted the evidence that bluefin do, in fact, also spawn in the Slope Sea.

Now, there is some evidence that the western Atlantic stock of bluefin tuna may spawn over a much broader area—perhaps even in a continuous swath of water that ranges from the Yucatan Channel, in the southern Gulf of Mexico, all the way up to the Slope Sea.  Just two weeks ago, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a release announcing that

“New Research Reveals Broad Spawning Distribution for Bluefin Tuna,”

which said that

“Working with partners, NOAA Fisheries scientists did a deep dive into bluefin tuna spawning patterns.  They compiled a large data set from fisheries surveys, archive and museum specimens, and research cruise reports going back to the 1950s.  Their analysis included more than 35,000 plankton tows, and they examined nearly 5,000 individual tuna larvae.  The results…indicate that bluefin tuna have a much broader spawning distribution than previously recognized…

“The results suggest that bluefin spawn in a continuous area during a prolonged spawning season.  Spawning starts in April in the southernmost areas—the northwest Caribbean and southern Gulf of America—and ends in early August in the Slope Sea.”

The NMFS release was referring to the paper “A re-evaluation of Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) spawning distribution in the western Atlantic Ocean,” which appeared in the February 2026 issue of the journal, Progress in Oceanography.  In that paper, the researchers stated that

“Our work documented persistent spawning by bluefin in the Yucatan Channel, southern and northern Gulf [of Mexico], Blake Plateau [located 80-200 miles off the southeastern United States], an area off the Carolinas shoreward of the Florida Current, and the western Slope Sea, despite changing temperatures in each of these regions over the past decades.  This work also revealed how uneven the allocation of sampling effort has been in space and time, leaving open the possibility of additional spawning grounds.  One hypothesis, consistent with the available data, is that bluefin have a continuous spawning distribution in the western Atlantic from the southern Gulf in early-spring to the western Slope Sea in early-summer that is only interrupted by narrow areas of the fast-moving western boundary current (i.e., Florida Current; Gulf Stream) or shallow bathymetry.  An alternate hypothesis, also consistent with the data, is that the western Slope Sea and Gulf are discrete spawning grounds of near equal magnitude with some limited spawning elsewhere.  While sampling throughout the western north Atlantic would be useful, we consider a larval survey to evaluate spawning in June in the waters south of the Gulf Stream and east of the Florida Current to be the most critical to testing these alternate hypotheses.”

The researchers came to their conclusion not by conducting extensive new surveys, but by conducting a comprehensive analysis of data that was already available, having been collected by research cruises dating back to 1956.  While most of those cruises were not directly investigating bluefin tuna, they nonetheless collected plankton samples, which were preserved for future use, as well as data on water temperature, etc.  Electronic tagging data and information generated by longline tuna fisheries was also included in the data set.

The available information, along with unprocessed plankton samples in which bluefin tuna larvae might be found, was analyzed as scientists searched for patterns that might suggest the presence of spawning bluefin tuna in areas outside of the Gulf of Mexico and the Slope Sea.  The researchers were careful to avoid assuming that the presence of larval bluefin was a definite indicator of spawning activity, as larvae could also be transported by currents from a known spawning area; instead, only larvae that were too young to have been transported from such a known area were considered likely indicators of spawning activity.

After analyzing the data, the researchers came to a conclusion that arguably resurrected, if not actual knowledge, then at least hypotheses that existed decades before.  Their paper reminded readers that research conducted as early as 1974 suggested that bluefin also spawned, not only in the Slope Sea, but also between Cuba and Haiti, in the so-called Windward Passage, as well as north and east of the Bahamas, and that another paper, published in 1995, proposed that western Atlantic bluefin spawning migrations varied, depending on the size of the fish involved.

The new paper appears to validate at least some of those old proposals.

As noted in the new paper, more work will have to be done to determine whether the spawning grounds for western Atlantic bluefin form a continuous band between the Gulf of Mexico and the Slope Sea, or whether those two areas account for most of the spawning, with only sporadic episodes in-between.

And it is still too early to tell whether the new paper will attract the same sort of negative attention the paper discussing the Slope Sea spawning ground drew ten years ago, or whether it will serve as a jumping off place for additional research that will confirm, refine, or rebut its conclusions at some point down the road.

Challenging, testing, and confirmation are all part of the scientific process, and are all valid responses to the new work.  And it’s important to get the science right, because as one of the authors, Trika Gerard, a deputy director of NMFS’ Southeast Fisheries Science Center, observed,

“These new data tell us where bluefin tuna are spawning and when, which gives us an idea of where they are migrating and how much they are contributing to future generations.  This, combined with information about genetics and population structure, helps managers decide the most appropriate way to sustainably fish for this prized species.”

The conclusions reached in the recent paper aren’t merely of academic interest.  They can have a real impact on the health and the future of the western Atlantic bluefin stock.

Then, too, there is another lesson taught by this new paper that its authors certainly did not intend, but is vitally important, nonetheless.

All of the analysis leading up to its findings were based on prior research, much of it performed by NMFS in the course of surveying aquatic life on various portions of the continental shelf, surveying protected species, or performing other ongoing studies.  The data developed in the course of that research was maintained and curated by NMFS and by other institutions, just as the processed and unprocessed ichthyoplankton samples, which contained the bluefin tuna larvae, were.

Those earlier surveys could not have been performed without an adequately funded National Marine Fisheries Service, and the data and plankton samples could not have been maintained and readily accessed unless there was enough funding to both archive the survey records and maintain people on staff who can locate and utilize the information.  In addition, eight of the sixteen authors of the paper, including the lead author, are NMFS scientists employed at one of the agency’s regional fisheries science centers.

Good fisheries science can’t exist without adequate funding.  As I noted in last Sunday’s blog post, and in some earlier essays, right now NMFS’s fisheries science is under assault, with some members of Congress, and some members of the current Administration, seeking to cut needed funding.  Already, cuts in scientific personnel are hampering NMFS’ ability to conduct surveys, perform stock assessments, and execute the other tasks necessary to its role as the steward of the nation’s marine resources.

It’s very possible that, if NMFS had been in similar financial straits over the last 50 or 75 years, the recent paper would never have been written, as the data that underlies it would never have been compiled.

If the researchers are correct, and western Atlantic bluefin tuna are spawning over a greater expanse of ocean than previously believed, it is possible that the stock is larger and more resilient than biologists had thought, and might be able to withstand a modestly higher level of harvest, to the benefit of both the commercial and the recreational fishing industries of the United States.

But unless NMFS is funded at levels that will allow meaningful research to continue, and hopefully expand, and for fisheries to be monitored closely enough to ensure that higher harvest levels don’t negatively impact the health of fish stocks, there is a very good chance that such benefits to the nation, whether accruing from bluefin or from other fish stocks, will never be realized.

 

 

 

 

CUTS TO NMFS BUDGET CREATE NEW THREAT TO FISH STOCKS

 

A few weeks ago, I found myself in a familiar place doing a very familiar thing—wandering around Capitol Hill, visiting Senate and House offices during the appropriations season, trying to maintain, or hopefully increase, funding for fisheries management.

This year, it seemed a particularly urgent mission, given that the 2025 staffing reductions at the  National Marine Fisheries Service, and particularly to its regional science centers, crippled the agency’s ability to conduct the surveys and perform the stock assessments needed to maintain the health of the nation’s fish stocks. 

While the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act is arguably the most comprehensive and most successful fishery management law in the world, it has one big vulnerability:  The management system that it created is very science-dependent.  In fact, one of the findings listed near the very beginning of the statute acknowledges that

“The collection of reliable data is essential to the effective conservation, management, and scientific understanding of the fishery resources of the United States.”

Magnuson-Stevens requires that

“Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available.”

To that end, the law requires that

“Each [regional fishery management] Council shall establish, maintain, and appoint the members of a scientific and statistical committee to assist in the development, collection, evaluation, and peer review of such statistical, biological, economic, social, and other scientific information as is relevant to such Council’s development and amendment of any fishery management plan,”

and further provides that regional fishery management councils shall develop annual catch limits for the fisheries that they manage, but such catch limits

“may not exceed the fishing level recommendation of its scientific and statistical committee [or that resulting from a peer review process described elsewhere in the law].”

That all sounds nice in theory, but the truth of the matter is that scientific information can’t be snatched out of thin air.  It takes money to conduct the surveys and other research needed to develop the fisheries-related data, and it takes more money to hire and retain the qualified scientists needed to design the surveys, analyze the resulting data, perform stock assessments, and determine what must be done in order to restore stocks to health and maintain healthy stocks at sustainable levels.

That money has never been easy to obtain, but for many years, Congress has largely recognized that maintaining the long-term health of the United States’ fish stocks was in the best interests of the nation, and addressed fisheries management as a bipartisan issue.  While funding was often less than ideal, it was generally sufficient to enable NMFS to manage fish stocks.

But the current Administration, consistent with its general antipathy toward the sciences and toward agencies that advance scientific knowledge, crippled NMFS’ management capabilities last year, when it cut agency personnel, including biologists at NMFS’ regional science centers.

The problem was highlighted at the May 2025 meeting of the Council Coordinating Committee, the body that represents, and expresses the concerns, of all of the regional fishery management councils.  The report from that meeting states, in part,

“Ms. Kelly Denit, NOAA Fisheries Director of the Office of Sustainable Fisheries…discussed the need to better align NOAA and Council priorities, challenges of managing over 500 stocks, and the need to prioritize fisheries management given limited resources.  Ms. Denit’s presentation touched on the National Standards Guidelines and suggested the need to evaluate narrowing the scope of management in light of current resourcing and administration priorities.

“A risk-value matrix was presented to the [Council Coordinating Committee] as a way to help evaluate which stocks require the most intensive management.  Underpinning this exercise is the reality that NOAA Fisheries cannot continue managing all current stocks and stock complexes that are currently in [fishery management plans] with existing and anticipated resources.  Ms. Denit spoke about the need to strategically choose where to take increased management risks.  The proposed matrix would categorize stocks based on ‘value’ (commercial/recreational/social importance) and ‘risk’ (ratio of catch to [annual catch limit], stock status, ecosystem role, climate vulnerability).  She suggested stocks in the high-risk, high-value quadrants might be strong candidates to receive the most detailed management, while low-risk, low-value stocks might be moved to ecosystem components or removed from management plans entirely.  Ms. Denit emphasized this report requires Council input and collaboration and stressed the need to explore more flexibility in management given current constraints…”

I have to admit that my first reaction upon reading those words was to recall a passage penned by pioneer ecologist Aldo Leopold, who wrote

“The last word in ignorance is the man who says of an animal or plant, ‘What good is it?’  If the land mechanism as a whole is good, then every part is good, whether we understand it or not.  If the biota, in the course of aeons, has built something we like but do not understand, then who but a fool would discard seemingly useless parts?  To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.”

For the very act of designating a fish stock as “high value” or “low value,” based solely on whether is supports a significant commercial or recreational fishery, or has some other societal value, seems completely contrary to Leopold’s principle, and to common sense. 

But now, nearly a year after that Council Coordinating Committee meeting was held, those designations are beginning to grow real teeth, and are threatening to bite chunks out of the federal fisheries management system, marine ecosystems, and probably state budgets as well.

Recently, the Pacific Fisheries Management Council voted to cease actively managing 47 groundfish stocks, in response to a roughly 40% reduction in NMFS scientific and regulatory staff in the Pacific region. Many of those were species of Pacific rockfish, members of Scorpaenidae, the scorpionfish family, popular food fish that tend to have longer lives than many other species, and are thus particularly vulnerable to overfishing.

Instead of actively managing such stocks, the Pacific Council downgraded some of them from “stocks that require conservation and management” to “ecosystem component species.”  Such ecosystem component species are not actively managed to prevent them from becoming overfished or experiencing overfishing; there are no annual catch limits or and no attempts to maintain optimum yield, although NMFS’ Guidelines for compliance with Magnuson-Stevens provide that

“Councils may choose to identify stocks within their [fishery management plans] as ecosystem component (EC) species…if a Council determines that the stocks do not require conservation and management…EC species may be identified at the species or stock level, and may be grouped into complexes…management measures can be adopted in order to, for example, collect data on the EC species, minimize bycatch or bycatch mortality of an EC species, protect the associated role of EC species in the ecosystem, and/or to address other ecosystem issues.”

The problem here, of course, is that the Pacific Council has already acknowledged that the 47 stocks in question were “stocks in need of conservation and management.”  It designated them as ecosystem component species not because the “Council determine[d] that the stocks do not require conservation and management,” but because funds allocated to conservation and management were cut to the point that some stocks that, in fact, were in need of conservation and management had to be sacrificed to the “ecosystem component” designation, and these particular 47 stocks were deemed “low-value” enough to draw the short straw.

Yet, despite drawing the short straw and losing most management protections, the stocks designated as “ecosystem component species” were the fortunate ones, as the great majority of the 47 stocks will be completely removed from the management plan, and have no protections at all.

And the list of species under the Pacific Council’s jurisdiction that are no longer “in need of conservation and management” may grow larger.  National Public Radio reported that Merrick Burden, the Pacific Council’s executive director, observed that

“We have coastal pelagics, which are the sardines and anchovies and mackerels—the small, silvery things that everybody eats.  We have the tunas and billfish, and we have salmon…I expect us, to some degree, to consider this type of action for each of those.”

The same National Public Radio article that quoted Merrick Burden also noted that NMFS’ decision to shed the burden of managing ecosystem component stock is going to shift at least some of that burden onto the shoulders of coastal states.

“As a result of the federal charges, the [Washington] state department [of Fish and Wildlife] may need to ask the Washington Legislature for more staff to help cover new duties…But the state’s conservation mission won’t change, and the process they use to set sustainable harvest levels with stakeholder input will continue.

“In Oregon, where there is s more active commercial and recreational fishery for some groundfish, state officials opted to take over management for at least six of the species federal regulators will drop starting in 2030.  Oregon wildlife officials want the stocks to remain in federal management.  But barring that, taking on oversight will give them more control—and enough time to develop a state management plan.”

The Pacific Fishery Management Council is only the first to address the problem of removing species from federal fishery management plan.  It is an issue that is likely to impact all of the regional fishery management councils.  Thus, on February 2, 2026, the Council Coordinating Committee sent a letter to NMFS chief Eugenio Pineiro Soler which, after a brief introductory paragraph, said,

“The [Council Coordinating Committee] has considered this issue carefully over the course of the course of several recent discussions, including presentations from NMFS Headquarters and subsequent deliberations among Council Executive Directors.  While the CCC supports constructive dialogue regarding capacity constraints and opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of fishery management and science, we have significant concerns regarding both the process used to develop the Risk/Value Matrix and the implications of the framework as currently framed.

“First, the Councils have not been adequately consulted or involved in the development of the Risk/Value Matrix or its underlying methodology.  Councils were asked to react to, and potentially apply, a framework that appears to have been substantially developed in advance, including embedded assumptions regarding objectives, priorities, and acceptable tradeoffs.  Engagement at this stage risks being perceived as endorsement of a predetermined methodology rather than meaningful collaboration.  This approach does not align with the Councils’ statutory role under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.

“Second, the CCC is concerned that the Risk/Value Matrix appears likely to function as a de facto prioritization tool for stock assessments, monitoring, and associated scientific resources, with potential implications for the allocation of funding between NMFS Regions and Science Centers…The CCC is concerned that adoption of the Risk/Value Matrix could diminish or displace meaningful Council and constituent input into decisions fundamental to fisheries science and management.

“Third, the implications of the framework remain unclear, but several Councils have identified substantive concerns when attempting to apply the Risk/Value criteria to their fisheries…raising fundamental questions about what management actions would follow and what management problems the framework is intended to address.  These outcomes suggest that the Risk/Value Matrix incorporates policy choices and management objectives that have not been discussed with, or agreed to, by the Councils.

“Fourth, the CCC notes that similar national-level stock or assessment prioritization concepts have been proposed previously and were not supported by the Councils…The current Risk/Value Matrix appears, in important respects, to revisit those concepts without addressing the concerns previously raised by the Councils.

“Finally, the CCC is concerned about the compressed timeline proposed for Council engagement, the lack of clarity concerning current and future resource levels, and uncertainty regarding how Council input would ultimately be used.  Councils are already pursuing scope-reduction, prioritization, and efficiency efforts through Magnuson-Stevens-compliant public processes.  Participating in a parallel national exercise under the current conditions creates a risk that Council input could be used to justify predetermined outcomes or become binding regardless of future budget realities…”

The letter makes it clear that the Risk/Value Matrix being forced on the regional fisheries management councils is, at best, problematic and, at worst, illegal, although the latter point is probably of little concern to the higher-ups in the Administration.

It also should provide incentive for concerned lawmakers—and my last trip to Capitol Hill made it clear that there are concerned lawmakers out there—to redouble efforts to adequately fund NMFS, and its regional science centers, so that initiatives like the Risk/Value Matrix, and its potentially arbitrary criteria, can be gracefully retired, and no longer pose a threat to an informed fishery management process.

 

  

 

THE COST OF DEPLETED FISH STOCKS

 

Any time fisheries managers suggest that a stock of fish—regardless of species—is becoming depleted, and that more restrictive regulations are needed to reverse the decline, someone will always rise in opposition, to claim that harvest reductions will cause economic harm.

A perfect example of that occurred at the October 2024 meeting of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, when John Clark, a Delaware fisheries manager, objected to further restrictions on the commercial striped bass fishery, saying

“…I mean it just seems like as a management [sic] has to weigh both sides of this, of course we want to be cautious, but there is a point where you might be foregoing fish that could be caught in the pursuit of trying to keep a stock at a level that you think is necessary.

“But in the meantime, as we’ve heard, people are going out of business and we are seeing a lot of people that are hurting.  I mean I know we hear it from our commercial guys all the time, they’ve taken since 2014 the quota has been cut almost in half.  You know that definitely comes out of their pockets…”

He then questioned the need for additional restrictions on the recreational fishery, saying

“…I mean we have been very precautionary about the size of the stock.  But we also have to be precautionary about what we’re doing to the people who depend on these fish…

“I just think that we do have to start looking at the socioeconomic side of this at this point too.”

However, he never even tried to explain what constituted “the socioeconomic side” of the striped bass fishery.

We saw similar concerns expressed in a letter, signed by six fishing tackle and boating industry-aligned groups (the American Sportfishing Association, Coastal Conservation Association, Boat Owners Association of the United States, Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, Center for Sportfishing Policy, and National Marine Manufacturers Association), which opposed the reductions in recreational striped bass landings, achieved through closed seasons, proposed in the Draft Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Public Comment, and was submitted ahead of the October 2025 striped bass management board meeting.

Even though such reductions would make it more likely that the currently overfished striped bass stock would be fully rebuilt by the 2029 deadline mandated by the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan, the six industry groups opposed them because

“The economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery cannot be overstated:

·       In 2016, striped bass trip and equipment spending across Atlantic coastal states generated approximately $13 billion in total economic output, supported over 104,000 jobs, contributed more than $7.7 billion to regional GDP.

·       On a per-pound basis, the recreational sector generates 17 times more retail sales value, 8 times more economic activity, and nearly quadruple the jobs compared to the commercial sector.

“The proposed season closures—whether prohibiting harvest or targeting—will undoubtedly erode these substantial economic benefits and disproportionately impact coastal small businesses, bait and tackle shops, marinas, boat manufacturers, charter operators, and the entire recreational boating and fishing supply chain.

“…Maintaining consistent seasons is the most equitable solution:  it preserves both regional economic stability and angler access across preference lines, without inflicting unnecessary economic hardship.  [emphasis added, references omitted]”

Similar comments, made by both stakeholders and state fisheries managers, can be found whenever harvest reductions are proposed, regardless of the species involved and regardless of how badly more restrictive management measures are needed.

But no one ever seems to consider the harm caused by the stock decline itself.

To examine that harm, let’s go back to the industry letter quoted above, and note that in the first bullet point, it references various economic statistics from 2016, nearly a decade before Addendum III was ever proposed.

And that’s a little misleading, because things change over time.

National Marine Fisheries Service data tells us that, in 2016, recreational fishermen on the northeast and mid-Atlantic coasts took about 17.4 million fishing trips primarily targeting striped bass, but by the time the industry letter was sent, in 2025, striped bass abundance had declined from an estimated 328.5 million fish in 2016 to just 177.9 million in 2023 (no abundance data is yet available for later years).  And in response to declining abundance, the number of directed striped bass trips taken by anglers declined as well, falling to 13.9 million by the time 2025 rolled around.

That’s a 20% decline in fishing trips, and it can probably be assumed that the economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery dropped by a similar percentage over those years.

But even that doesn’t tell the whole story, because by 2016, the striped bass stock was already in trouble, and the number of directed trips was already falling.  Directed trips peaked in 2006 at 25.8 million, at a time when female spawning stock biomass was estimated at 107,341 metric tons, compared to just 69,211 mt in 2016, and the population contained about 13.6 million fish that were at least 8 years old, compared to 2016’s 6.7 million.

So it would seem that striped bass abundance drives recreational fishing effort, and effort clearly drives the economic value of the striped bass fishery, because if people don’t fish, they don’t buy bait, fishing gear, or fuel, and they don’t spend money on charter and party boat fares.

Thus, when the recreational fishing and boating industry oppose management measures that would increase striped bass abundance in an effort to maintain short-term profits, they’re shooting themselves in the foot, because by opposing rebuilding, they’re effectively foregoing the increased long-term income that would be generated by a rebuilt stock.

To some extent, we can see the same thing happen in the commercial fishery, although there, profit doesn’t necessarily track abundance, since abundance can flood markets and drive down the price per pound paid to the fishermen.  So while commercial striped bass landings declined over time, from roughly 6,284,000 pounds in 2006 to 4,634,000 pounds in 2016 and 3,844,000 pounds in 2024, the overall ex vessel value of those landings didn’t follow the same pattern, going from about $13,745,000 in 2006 to $18,661,000 in 2016, before falling to $14,806,000 in 2024—although it’s probably worth noting that those prices are not inflation-adjusted, and so don’t perfectly reflect relative earnings over time.

Yet striped bass, as economically important as they are to the East Coast’s recreational fishery, are not the most notable example of lost economic opportunity caused by the decline of a fish stock.  That dubious honor probably belongs to the winter flounder.

In 1984, anglers in the mid-Atlantic region took about 5.625 million trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and took home about 22,925,000 of the small flatfish (winter flounder were also an important recreational species in New England, particularly in Massachusetts, but the mid-Atlantic, with its larger angling population, provides a starker example).

Winter flounder were the first fish that most anglers caught in the spring.  The fish began stirring in late February or early March, with St. Patrick’s Day the unofficial start of the season.  Because the fishery was prosecuted in sheltered inshore waters, and because flounder could be caught from shore, from docks and piers, and from both private and for-hire vessels, it drew large numbers of anglers who targeted flounder before other inshore species were readily available.

But all the fishing pressure came at a cost, and by the late 1980s, it was clear to state fisheries managers that if it wasn’t more closely regulated, the flounder would be headed for trouble.  Yet it was also clear that, because flounder could be caught at times when few other fish were biting, and because they were so popular with inshore anglers, both the local fishing tackle shops and, in particular, the party boat fleet would oppose the needed regulations, arguing that even if fish were less abundant, their customers had to have the “perception” of being able to take quite a few home if they happened to have a good day, or else they wouldn’t go fishing.

As a result, and perhaps as a result of environmental conditions as well, the winter flounder population soon went into decline.  By 2009, recreational flounder trips in the mid-Atlantic had declined to just 362,000 trips, while landings fell to a mere 160,800 fish, just 0.7%--that’s seven tenths of one percent—of what they were 25 years before.  It seemed impossible to argue against very strict management measures had to be imposed to avert a complete stock collapse—if averting a collapse was even possible by that point.

Yet, when I made a motion at the September 2009 meeting of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council, recommending that New York completely shut down its winter flounder fishery for an indefinite period, it met with immediate and intense opposition.  As reported in the Advisory Council’s bulletin,

“…Councilor Dearborn agreed [that the fishery shouldn’t be closed], further noting that the recreational fishing community is in trouble and they need to have the opportunity to fish.  She pleaded that the Council not take the more conservative approach (i.e., harvest moratorium).  They need to keep the shops open…Mr. Arnold Leo of the Town of Easthampton Fisheries Consultancy disagreed with Councilor Witek.  He said fishery management should also be guided by the considerations of the socioeconomic impact of management measures.  He realizes that the focus is on the health of the resources, however, socioeconomic impact is one of the considerations…Councilor Jordan stated that we shouldn’t inflict more pain on New York fishermen, commercial and recreational, than is already necessary.  A closure is not required in the winter flounder fishery and it should not be instituted…”

My motion failed in a lopsided vote.  Short-term economic concerns prevailed.

In 2025, anglers throughout the mid-Atlantic region supposedly made about 42,000 trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and landed approximately 600 fish, or 0.0026%--twenty-six ten thousandths of one percent—of what they landed in 1984—although the NMFS surveyors found so few flounder fishermen to interview that those numbers, and in particular the estimate of recreational trips, are so clouded in uncertainty as to be nearly meaningless.

While it’s impossible to say with certainty that early and decisive intervention would have prevented the collapse of the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock, as a warming ocean might have made a decline, if not a complete collapse, inevitable, the loss of 5.6 million fishing trips per year, many of them made at a time of year when few other alternative targets are available to recreational fishermen, undoubtedly had a significant impact on the recreational fishing industry—enough of an impact that, even if success was far from certain, one would have expected rational businessmen to at least try to prevent the predictable long-term harm to their shops and for-hire boats.

But they didn’t, and instead, focusing only on the short term, did all they could to hasten the flounder’s collapse.

Whether we’re talking about the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery (724,000 recreational trips and 102,486,000 pounds commercially landed in 1981, 56,000 recreational trips and 1,426,000 pounds commercially landed in 2024), the loss of the recreational whiting fishery in the New York bight, which was primarily prosecuted from for-hire boats and collapsed in the late 1970s, before reliable estimates of fishing effort was made, or the loss of other, popular recreational fisheries on other coasts, it is impossible to deny that the failure to put timely and effective management measures in place has had real, negative consequences for fishing-related businesses and coastal economies.

Yet even today, the focus remains on the negative short-term impacts of restricting fishing activity, and not the much greater long-term losses that too often occur when such restrictions are not put in place.

WHAT ARE THEY THINKING AT THE ASMFC?

 

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) plays a big role in East Coast fisheries management. It has the primary responsibility for drafting and updating management plans for important commercial and recreational species such as striped bass, red drum and menhaden, while also working with the regional fishery management councils to develop management measures that will complement federal regulations in state waters, where the National Marine Fisheries Service’s management authority is extremely limited.

Consequently, the ASMFC also comes in for a big share of blame when the stocks that it manages fail to thrive. It has been heavily criticized for allowing the Atlantic striped bass stock to again become overfished, after it had collapsed, and then been rebuilt, a few decades ago, as well as for its more recent decision not to reduce Atlantic menhaden landings after a stock assessment update revealed that the stock was substantially smaller, and fishing mortality significantly higher, than previously believed.

Yet, while it’s not hard to find fishermen who are willing to provide their opinions about how well the ASMFC is doing its job, it is far more difficult to learn how those who are actually making the ASMFC’s fishery management decisions feel about the organization’s actions. But at the beginning of every year, the ASMFC publishes the results of its annual survey of commissioners, giving people a look at the insiders’ views.

Unfortunately, the most recent survey elicited a much poorer response than its immediate predecessors, with only 23 commissioners responding, compared to 28 in 2024 and 33 in 2023. The memorandum reporting on its results asserted that “The lower sample size from this year’s survey has exaggerated some of the trends in commissioner’s responses,” and that certainly could be true, although it is also possible that the respondents, although fewer in number, still provided a representative sample of all the commissioners’ views.

But even assuming that the respondents did present an exaggerated or somehow skewed view of commissioners’ opinions, it is tempting to speculate why they answered the survey when many of their colleagues did not. Were other commissioners just too busy at the end of the year to bother? Or did the respondents just feel a particularly deep obligation to try to improve the workings of the ASMFC? Do the survey results represent the views of concerned commissioners who are actively trying to change the status quo, or merely reflect the ire of commissioners who are displeased that one or more management actions didn’t turn out the way they had hoped?

There is no way to be certain, but many of the most recent responses suggest that the ASMFC might benefit if some changes were made.

The survey’s very first questions address the basic issue of how well the ASMFC is carrying out its mission: “How comfortable are you that the Commission has a clear and achievable plan to reach the Vision (Sustainably managing Atlantic Coast Fisheries)?” and “How confident are you that the Commission’s actions reflect progress toward the Vision?”

Those questions, like most of the other questions on the survey, are scored on a 10-point scale. The scores for the first two questions were disappointingly low, 7.18 and 6.90, respectively, and were, in both cases, the lowest scores ever received in a time series dating back to 2009.

The questions received their highest scores over a decade ago, with the first reaching 8.37 in 2014 and the second reaching 8.52 in 2013. Both have been declining in fits and starts ever since, with the most recent scores notably lower than they were in 2024. Whether that drop was “exaggerated” due to the low number of responses, or whether the scores accurately reflected commissioners’ evaluation of the ASMFC’s effectiveness over the past year, remains an open question, although some written comments provided toward the end of the survey suggest that, at least for some commissioners, the latter was probably the case.

Responses to other questions could explain why commissioners are pessimistic about the ASMFC achieving its goals.

ASMFC declares on its website that “As a partnership of coastal states, we work together to protect essential marine species, ensuring vibrant fisheries, thriving communities, and resilient ecosystems, all through science-driven, cooperative management, [emphasis added]” and its approach to fisheries management assumes that all states will be willing to collaborate and manage species on a coastwide basis. Yet when the survey asked, “How satisfied are you with the cooperation between Commissioners to achieve the Commission’s Vision?” the question only scored a 6.55.

While not the lowest score in the time series (the same question scored a 6.45 in 2018), it was far below the 8.20 that the same question scored in 2012, and the 8.00s it scored in the two subsequent years. Yet such score shouldn’t surprise anyone who has listened in on the various species management board meetings, such as the January 2024 Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board (Bass Board) meeting, when fisheries managers from Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia attempted to delay full implementation of an important addendum to the striped bass management plan, merely because their commercial fisheries were already open, and they didn’t want to take the bureaucratic steps needed to reduce fishermen’s quotas mid-season.

Similarly, the question “How satisfied are you with the Commission’s working relationship with our constituent partners (commercial, recreational, and environmental)?” scored a time series-low 6.15, a notable decline from the 7.92 it scored in 2013, the drop probably reflecting both how some commissioners feel about certain elements of the fishing community as well as how members of the fishing community feel about some commissioners. Either way, a poor relationship between the commissioners and the public can only make it harder for the ASMFC to do its job.

The commissioners’ views on other gauges of the ASMFC’s effectiveness were mixed.

They had a fairly positive view of the ASMFC’s progress on ending overfishing, awarding a score of 7.29, just slightly below the time series average of 7.39. However, when asked whether tracking the number of stocks where overfishing no longer occurred was “a clear metric to measure progress,” some commissioners apparently were no longer sure, as that question garnered a score of just 7.17, the second-lowest in a time series that ranged from 7.09 to 8.25. The high score was awarded only last year, and it’s not clear why the 2025 score was more than a full point lower.

Finally, there was the question, “Are you satisfied with the Commission’s ability to manage rebuilt stocks?”

It’s a key issue. It’s often easier for managers to adopt the measures needed to rebuild a stock that everyone agrees is in trouble, than it is for them to keep sustainable measures in place once successful rebuilding takes place, and fishermen yearn to increase their landings. The commissioners have never given the ASMFC high scores on the question; the long-term average is only 6.86, and the time series high is just 7.21, so the recent score of 7.06, as low at it is, suggests that the ASMFC might be having a little more success in recent years.

The scored questions provide some insight into what commissioners feel is going right and going wrong at the ASMFC, but they don’t do anything to explain why the problems are occurring, or offer any thoughts on how to overcome them.

Those questions are best answered by another set of questions, which seek more detailed written comments, such as the one which asked, “What is the single biggest obstacle to the Commission’s success in rebuilding stocks?”

Nine of the 19 people who answered that question replied with some variation on “politics,” with some of them citing the closely related issues of “Short-term stakeholder interests prioritized over resource impacts,” “balancing stakeholder desires vs taking stronger conservation measures,” and “Lack of will power to take action to restrict fishing mortality when stock status suggests action. Perfect recent examples striped bass [when the Bass Board voted against landings reductions that would make it more likely that the stock would fully rebuild by the deadline dictated by the management plan] and [Gulf of Maine] lobster [when objections by fishermen and some local politicians became so intense that the American Lobster Management Board reversed course and did not impose the measures called for in the management plan].”

Some elaborated on their views, saying that obstacles included “Not following the science due to political and/or commercial/recreational sector pressure,” and “Political impediments at both the state and Federal level are complicating efforts. Lobster, Menhaden, and Red Drum are examples.”

One commissioner provided a more detailed comment that helps to explain the drop in the survey scores described earlier, writing,

Many of my responses are lower than usual and that is because I have a few recent things on my mind, notably the menhaden/ERP action from the annual meeting [where the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board failed to reduce menhaden landings, even though such landings should have been reduced by over 50% to meet the fishing mortality target] and Striped Bass. There has always been a measure of this in what we do of course, but I think there is an element of politics that is creeping in to levels that we have not seen before, which is having negative repercussions to our making sound, consistent decisions to promote sustainability for our important stocks.”

It seems that politics has become a serious problem at the ASMFC.

The only other obstacle to ASMFC success cited by more than two commissioners was climate/environmental change, which was mentioned in six responses. But as some of the respondents noted, that is a problem that is far beyond the ASMFC’s ability to solve.

The survey also asked, “What issue(s) should the Commission focus more attention/time on?”

The answers were diverse, but most shared one common characteristic: Although the commissioners had already acknowledged that there were obstacles making it difficult for the ASMFC to reach its goals, few said that the ASMFC should focus on finding ways to overcome them. Instead, the most common suggestion, raised by four of the 13 respondents, was for some sort of outreach to constituent groups.

One commissioner suggested “Outreach to create greater understanding of what we do and cannot do.” Another expanded on that theme, writing, “Educating the public on how the commission is structured and that it is a state based compact not as federal body. Perhaps a series of PR pieces that are light hearted a [sic] speak to the realities of the job and complexity of it.” But while such outreach might help reduce the amount of criticism aimed at the ASMFC, it’s hard to see how they might remove obstacles to the ASMFC achieving its goals.

Four other commissioners suggested that commissioners should be provided with more and/or better information; while that wasn’t a direct counter to the obstacles faced by the ASMFC, better informed commissioners probably would lead to better management decisions.

There were also three commissioners (one responding to a different question) who complained about the problems caused by a lack of cooperation between the commissioners, and between the ASMFC and other management bodies. To that point, one comment noted, “We have lost the ability to work together and compromise in best interest of the resource that we manage. We need to figure out a different/better way to work together with the [Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council]. Joint meetings are generally a waste of time and money as most of the recommendations are for status quo and it is impossible to get 60 individuals to do something different when one body or the other has veto power over the result.”

A more detailed, and more troubling, response, which reflects the realities of the current, conservation-averse approach to federal fisheries management, read,

I was shocked and alarmed by some of the votes and comments made by our federal partners at the annual meeting. Very inconsistent with previous positions and counter to achieving sustainability goals. I don’t envy these partners right now, so I think that it will be very important for us to guard against putting them into positions where they will have to make comments/votes like this again to the extent this is possible. This will require some strategic thinking on how best to bring things forward into the process for the foreseeable future. We are also going to have to bolster ourselves against the loss of resources from the federal government (assessment support, objective advice, data collection) so that we can continue to serve our states as well as we can. The states can step up, we have the expertise, so we should look for the opportunities to do this.

But commissioners don’t blame federal managers and federal management bodies for all of the cooperation problems. As another noted, “Commission Employees are amazing. However, the decorum of the states representatives have [sic] eroded over the past 10 years and the ability to work with states to protect everyone’s interests has declined as a result.”

Commissioners also addressed the need for better socioeconomic data. “Socioeconomics” is a term often heard in ASMFC debates, but there is little agreement on what it means, or how it ought to be measured. Far too often, it seems to mean little more than “If the ASMFC does X, then I, my company, my friends, or my sector might end up making less money.”

That sort of discussion probably hit its low point at the Bass Board meeting held on December 16, 2024, when New Jersey’s Legislative Proxy, Adam Nowalsky, made a motion to initiate a new addendum to the striped bass management plan, “in consideration of 2024 recreational and commercial mortality while balancing socioeconomic impacts…” After another commissioner asked, “What is it that we’re going to be balancing those socioeconomic impacts against?” Nowalsky declined to provide an answer, responding only that “I would defer to the Board specifically for that…I think every one of the options that we are potentially contemplating today, or we would contemplate in this Addendum, has a socioeconomic impact,” and undoubtedly causing some Bass Board members to wonder why he raised the “socioeconomic” point in the first place.

In hopes of someday obtaining more meaningful socioeconomic information, one commissioner wrote,

I’d like to see more emphasis on economic concerns. We’ve seen economic issues take on prominence for several species, for example, striped bass management hurting the for-hire sector in the Chesapeake and lowering the menhaden [total allowable catch] affecting the reduction fishery workers, but we don’t have analyses of these issues. Continuing on those issues, what are the factors affecting an angler’s decision to go out on a for-hire boat—is the regulations, the cost per trip or a combination of those factors (e.g. I’ll pay $80 for a trip if I can keep X number of fish)? How much menhaden quota does the reduction industry need to maintain employment—was the situation as dire as they claimed?

Those are all good questions, but they only scratch the surface of what might be asked.

As part of the recent debate over Addendum III to the striped bass management plan, there were proposals to award anglers fishing from for-hire vessels with regulations that were more favorable than those governing anglers fishing from shore or from private boats. A proposed new amendment to the summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass and bluefish management plans would similarly favor for-hire anglers over other recreational fishermen. Yet the for-hire fleet is responsible for less than 2% of all striped bass trips, and for-hire anglers also generate only a small proportion of the trips targeting other species. So, would management measures that discriminate against most anglers, who take the great majority of fishing trips, be a net economic positive because it might shore up the for-hire fleet, or a net economic negative because it comes at the cost of, and perhaps discourages, most members of the angling community?

And what is the cost of the ASMFC’s failure to maintain robust fish populations?

Commissioners often argue against more restrictive management measures because of the immediate harm such measures might cause to the fishing industry. Yet no one has ever asked how much harm is caused by not adopting management measures that maintain stocks at higher levels.

In 2006, when the striped bass biomass was near its peak, recreational fishermen took approximately 25.8 million trips primarily targeting them; by 2025, with the stock overfished and abundance declining, that figure had dropped to just under 14 million trips. How much greater would the economic benefits from the fishery have been if the Bass Board had made the hard decisions needed to keep striped bass abundance high enough to support nearly 26 million directed striped bass trips per year, as was the case in 2006, instead of just the 14 million trips that were taken in 2025?

If the ASMFC developed the capability to conduct real socioeconomic analysis, questions like those could be answered, to the benefit of both fish and fishermen.

The ASMFC’s annual survey of commissioners provides an important insight into the organization. It provides a look at the problems that make it harder for the ASMFC to achieve its goals, at why those problems occur, and at how they might be addressed.

And it provides at least a partial roadmap to making the ASMFC a better and more effective organization than it is today.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/.

THE TYRRANY OF THE MINORITY

 

In last Sunday’s edition of One Angler’s Voyage, I wrote about a pair of Maryland legislators who, at the apparent request of the charter boat industry, are holding up new regulations that would potentially benefit both the striped bass and the state’s striped bass fishermen.  (NOTE:  As I was preparing to publish this post, I learned that the hold had ended, the relevant legislative committee approved the new regulations yesterday, and that such regulations will be printed in the Maryland Register on March 20, allowing them to go into effect on March 30, in time for the spring catch-and-release season to extend through the full month of April.)

About a month before, I focused on a piece of Maryland legislation, introduced to appease the charter boat industry, that would allow the charters’ clients to retain two striped bass per trip instead of one, dictate the length of the season, and outlaw catch-and-release seasons in the striped bass fishery.

And in 2024, a group of waterman, including the Maryland Charter Boat Association, Inc., brought a legal action against the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, challenging the validity of Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, claiming that its harvest reductions, and in particular, its reduction of the Maryland striped bass bag limit for charter boat customers to one fish from two, hurt the for-hire business.  Shortly after the courts dismissed that action, the original plaintiffs initiated another in a different court, but this time they were also joined by three other charter boat groups, the Cape Cod Charter Boat Association, the Connecticut Charter and Party Boat Association, and the Montauk Boatmen and Captains Association.

Once again, the goal of the suit was to invalidate Addendum II, and reverse its mandated landings reductions so that the charter boat groups’ customers could kill more striped bass, regardless of how that action impacted the currently overfished striped bass stock.

Robert Newberry, a spokesman for the Delmarva Fisheries Association, another plaintiff in the lawsuits mentioned above, expressed his support for the Maryland legislation that would increase the bag limit for charter boat customers and take away the Maryland Department of Natural Resources ability to set striped bass seasons in the Chesapeake Bay, saying

“We have said this adversely affects our industry, but there’s been no economic study done.  You know, all we get from DNR.  Well, you know, some of the guys are going to get hurt, not some—everybody’s hurt.”

With all of the pending legislation, the lawsuits, and the comments about “everybody” being hurt, one might get the impression that the charter boat fishery for striped bass in the Maryland portion of the Chesapeake Bay is a huge industry or, at least, a huge part of the region’s striped bass fishery.

But nothing could be farther from the truth.

For the truth is that, in all of 2025, anglers fishing from Maryland charter boats took an estimated 66,278 fishing trips targeting striped bass, a figure that shrinks into near-obscurity when compared to the estimated 1,135,664 striped bass trips taken by Maryland’s private boat anglers, or even the estimated 317,507 bass trips taken by anglers fishing from shore.

Yes, that’s right.  Despite all the noise that they make, based on the number trips taken that primarily target striped bass, the Maryland charter boat fleet only accounted for 4.4% of the state’s striped bass fishery last year.  And even that number is deceptive, because not all of the Maryland charter boat fleet seeks to kill more fish while eliminating the catch-and-release seasons.  While the Maryland Charter Boat Association still relies on a century-old business model that emphasizes putting dead bass on the dock, and unsuccessfully sued to block Addendum II’s landings reductions, the Maryland Light Tackle Fishing Guides Association embraced Maryland’s proposed spring catch-and-release season, with members’ businesses built around the overall angling experience, and not just around harvest.

Thus, the Maryland charter boat operators who are trying to increase striped bass harvest while eliminating the catch-and-release season undoubtedly accounted for far less than 66,000 trips last year.

Still, they act as if they were the dominant sector in the Maryland striped bass fishery.

We see the same thing on a coastwide basis.  

In the runup to the adoption of Addendum II in early 2024, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board solicited public comments on issues such as landings reductions and the question of whether passengers on for-hire vessels should be singled out for special regulations that would allow them a wider slot size limit than that governing shore-based and private boat anglers.  In supporting the special regulations for charter and party boat anglers, a group calling itself the East Coast Fishing Coalition wrote

“The East Coast Fishing Coalition (ECFC) membership consists of many of the charter boat associations along the east coast from Maryland to Massachusetts.  We are unified in our representation of hundreds of Charter and Party-Boat operators engaged in the for-hire industry along the Eastern seaboard.  Our mission is simply to preserve the recreational harvest of marine fish through responsible and sustainable management.  It is our belief that most recreational fishermen have the distinct goal to ‘fish4dinner’ as a primary objective when they embark on a recreational fishing trip.  The for-hire fleet has the expertise and infrastructure in place to offer that opportunity to those recreational fishermen.”

Once again, we see the for-hire fleet posturing as if they have the right to speak for “most recreational fishermen,” even though for-hire striped bass trips only accounted for 1.45% of all directed striped bass trips taken between Maine and North Carolina in 2025, and claiming that most anglers want to bring home striped bass for dinner, even though the ASMFC recognizes that

“The recreational fishery is predominantly prosecuted as catch and release, meaning the majority of striped bass caught are released alive either due to angler preference or regulation…Since 1990, roughly 90% of total annual striped bass catch is released alive…”

Once again, we see the very small for-hire sector try to dictate fishery policies that will impact the much larger universe of anglers.

And such efforts aren’t limited to striped bass.

Right now, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council is working with the ASMFC to develop a “Recreational Sector Separation Amendment” that

“may consider options for managing the for-hire recreational fisheries separately from other recreational fishing modes,”

which would be fine if the for-hires were given their own quota, based on current landings, and allowed to harvest that quota while governed by bag limits or seasons different from those governing private boat and shore-based anglers. 

Unfortunately, the momentum seems to be swinging toward a scenario where anglers fishing from for-hire boats will be granted special privileges, in the form of smaller size limits, larger bag limits, and/or longer seasons than those governing the great majority of anglers who fish from shore or from private boats, but will be fishing on the same pool of fish. 

Fisheries management is effectively a zero-sum game, in which any extra fish given to one sector must be taken away from another.  Although for-hire anglers only accounted for about 2.74% of the summer flounder trips, 5.15% of the scup trips, 10.60% of the black sea bass trips, and 1.23% of all bluefish trips taken in the Mid-Atlantic region last year, managers seem to be leaning toward granting them extra fish at the expense of the great majority of anglers, who generate the majority of the social benefits, and likely also the majority of the economic benefits, generated by the fisheries in question.

It seems that, at both the state and regional levels, the for-hire fleet has a significant influence on the management process, which is all out of proportion to its small contribution to overall fishing effort. 

Perhaps, before adopting management measures that provide more special privileges to for-hire anglers at the expense of the greater angling community, fisheries regulators ought to step back, examine the relative economic benefits provided by the for-hire and shore-based/private boat sectors, and begin to craft measures that provide the greatest overall benefit to the community and to the nation, rather than just to a single sector that seems to believe it is entitled to special treatment, regardless of the species involved.

 

 

 

 

MARYLAND LEGISLATORS STALL STRIPED BASS SEASON RESET

 

When the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board adopted Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fisheries Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass last October, it included a provision that allowed Maryland to either retain the recreational striped bass seasons that it already had in place, or to replace them with a new set of seasons, described in Addendum III, which would supposedly have the same conservation impact.

Amendment III justified taking such action by saying,

“Since 2015, Maryland has modified regulations for Chesapeake Bay recreational striped bass fishery seven times, with changes including size, bag limit, and season modifications as well as gear and targeting restrictions.  These changes have built off regulations that were previously in place for each action, resulting in newer regulations becoming increasingly complicated through time, including a complex suite of season closures throughout the year.  In addition, the current understanding of release mortality rates and environmental stressors within Chesapeake Bay has resulted in some Maryland stakeholders’ desire to adjust seasons to better take advantage of fishing opportunities when conditions are favorable to lower striped bass release mortality (i.e. cooler water with less hypoxia).”

After Amendment III was approved, Maryland initiated a state rulemaking on the proposed new seasons.  If the rule is finally adopted, the end of the spring catch-and-release season, which begins on January 1, would be pushed back a month, from March 31 to April 30.  The current April 1-May 15 and July 16-July 31 no-target seasons would be eliminated and replaced with an open season that ran from May 1-through July 31, to be followed by a new no-target closure that ran for the full month of August.  Harvest would then resume on September 1 and run through December 5, with only catch-and-release allowed through the rest of the year.

The new seasons would provide anglers with 187 fishing days when they were allowed to retain a striped bass, along with another 146 fishing days when only catch-and-release was permitted.  The state’s hopes to increase the amount of time when anglers could participate in the striped bass fishery, while also minimizing release mortality by imposing a no-targeting closure during August, when the warmest, most hypoxic waters increased the likelihood that a released bass would not survive.

Maryland calculated that the new seasons would not impact fishing mortality, based on the assumption that the number of fishing trips made each day would be the same as it was in 2024.  However, as noted in Addendum III,

“The [ASMFC’s Striped Bass Technical Committee] noted that an increase in effort would be expected with a season opening from no-targeting to allowing catch and release; however, the [Technical Committee] agreed that it is very difficult to predict how much effort would increase, especially with out an applicable historical reference period.  In the past when April was open to fishing, there was no harvest allowed for part of the month, not just catch-and-release fishing as proposed here.  Additionally, effort has varied from year-to-year even under the same regulations.  The [Technical Committee] could not develop a quantitative assumption about how effort would change when the season is opened from no-targeting to catch-and-release that was any more defensible then the assumption of constant effort, and so accepted the use of that assumption in this case.”

Anglers are generally supportive of the new seasons, although a few are concerned that the extended spring catch-and-release season might have an adverse impact on the striped bass spawn.  On that point, Addendum III could only note that

“There is also uncertainty around the effect of catch-and-release fishing on spawning success (from the proposed opening to catch-and-release in April) given the very limited information on this topic.”

So there remains a possibility that the new April release season could have an impact on the spawn, although there is no strong evidence that it would.

The possibility was apparently unlikely enough that the Chesapeake Bay Foundation urged the public to support Maryland’s proposal.  The Foundation advised,

“mature striped bass are experiencing high rates of catch-and-release mortality in the hot summer months.  Low oxygen levels and heat-induced stress make striped bass most vulnerable during this time.

“DNR’s proposed August closure could help reduce that stress.  The proposed change would also add a few more days for catch-and-release fishing in April when air and water temperatures are cooler and fish are much less likely to die.

“Lastly, the proposed season adjustment would simplify Maryland’s fishing schedule.  The current calendar is a complex patchwork of some harvest days, some catch-and-release, and some closed entirely for a few weeks at a time.  Simplifying to a sngle month-long closure would leave less margin for error and help angler compliance with fishing regulations.”

Nevertheless, there was also some strong opposition to the proposed new seasons when they appeared in a draft of Addendum III.  That opposition primarily came from the owners, operators, and organizations representing the “traditional” Maryland charter boats, which typically take customers out with the intention of killing a limit of bass and then immediately returning to the dock.

Thus, the Delmarva Fisheries Association, which had already brought unsuccessful litigation against Addendum II to Amendment 7, opposed any change in the Maryland seasons, arguing that

“The proposed closure from July to August [sic] will be detrimental financially, not only to the Charter industry and the recreational industry but will also devastate tourism throughout the state of Maryland…Another issue is bringing in catch and release of the spawning stock in Maryland from January 1^st to May 15^th.  Part of addendum 6 [sic].  And the most important part is to protect the spawning stock biomass.  This Catch and release will not only harm the biomass, but studies have shown that handling and catching these fish in the spawning cycle is detrimental to their egg production and breeding capability…”

The Solomons [MD] Charter Captains Association also feared that the extended spring catch-and-release season would cause harm to the stock, saying

“We are opposed to Maryland’s Comment Atlantic Striped Bass Draft Addendum III porposals [sic]. 

“Catch-and-release in April goes against the very statements Maryland’s DNR (M. Luisi) publicly supported last year…The Maryland Y.O.Y survey has not shown successful spawns.  A single female can carry millions eggs [sic] each year.  Catch and release during the Spring migratory season will impact tens of thousands of juvenile fish each season forward.  Maryland DNR doesn’t address any impact their new proposal may have on failed spawns.

“For every one SSB fish that is killed during the Spring catch and release season, millions of eggs are lost!”

And a Captain Mike Smolek, apparently representing another charter boat group, stated that

“The Upper Bay Charter Captains Association is against Addendum III and does not support the Maryland Chesapeake Bay Recreational Baseline Season that has been proposed by Mike Luisi DNR.”

Local politicians also tried to intervene on behalf of the charter boats.  The Calvert County Board of County Commissioners opined, after objecting to any reductions in commercial landings, that

“Equally concerning is the proposal to reopen catch-and-release fishing from January through May, directly targeting spawning fish in the Chesapeake Bay at their most vulnerable stage.  This period has been closed for the past six years to protect the spawning stock, and reversing that protection contradicts the Maryland Department of Natural Resources’ own recommendations.  In addition, the proposed non-targeting closure for recreational and charter boats from July 15 through August 31 would compound the damage, undermining the charter industry during its peak season and further destabilizing Maryland’s fishing economy.”

The County Commissioners of Kent County made similar objections, writing

“on the recreational and charter boat side of the issue, it is proposed to open up catch and release from January through May, specifically, targeting spawning fish pre-staged and spawning in the Chesapeake Bay Region.  Historically, this time has been closed for the past 6 years specifically to protect the spawning fish, which completely goes against what the Maryland Department of Natural Resources proposed last year, and to protect the spawning stock biomass of striped bass to accomplish their [stock rebuilding] goal for 2029.  The recreational and charter boats will have a non-targeting closure next summer from July 15^th to August 31^st.  As proposed, these reductions are unnecessary and will cause significant financial hardships for the industry, economic tourism in the County, and income generated by people who fish in Maryland.”

Those sentiments were echoed by the Commissioners For Somerset County and the Commissioners of St. Mary’s County, who also argued against the proposed seasons.

And that seems to be where the Maryland proposal stands now—with the politicians, and not with the Department of Natural Resources, nor with the people of the State of Maryland. 

For the Department has done what the law required it to do.  It took the question of new recreational striped bass seasons out to the public for scoping.  It printed the proposed rule in the Maryland register on January 23 of this year, opening the 30-day public comment period.  That comment period has now closed, and the state was in the process of reviewing the comments and, if it ultimately decided to adopt the proposed seasons, have them in place by April 1.

But now politicians, working to protect special interests invested in the status quo, have intervened.  Jay A. Jacobs (R-36^th District), a member of Maryland’s House of Delegates representing four counties on the state’s Eastern Shore, is doing his best to block the proposed rule.  He has prevailed upon Delegate Samuel Rosenberg (D-41^st District), the House Chair of the Joint Committee on Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review, to delay the final adoption of the new seasons by imposing a “hold” on the rule.

Delegate Rosenberg can do that because, under Maryland law,

“Proposed state agency rules are reviewed by the [Administative, Executive, and Legislative Review] Committee with regard to the legislative prerogative and procedural due process…

“Copies of all regulations of each State agency are received by the Committee.  Unless submitted to the Committee, certain regulations or standards may be invalid…  [citations omitted]”

While submission of regulations to the Committee is usually a routine matter—little more than checking off a box—in this case, because of Delegate Jacobs’ pandering to the Eastern Shore charter boat community, the rulemaking process has been stalled for as much as 60 days, far longer than needed to ensure that there will not be an extended spring catch-and-release season this year.  But beyond that, it will accomplish nothing. 

If the Maryland Department of Natural Resources decides to implement the new seasons, it will—just 60 days later than it would have had the Committee not invoked a hold.  In that case, August 2026 will still be closed to all striped bass fishing in Maryland’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay; the catch-and-kill charter fleet will not have gained a reprieve.  The hold just allows them to spite the new fleet of light-tackle charters who encourage catch-and-release and haven’t made dead striped bass an essential part of their business model, by taking away their spring season this year—but only this year, if the new seasons are ultimately put in place. 

That’s no way to manage striped bass—or any other fishery. 

It’s not impossible that those who believe that the spring fishery will harm spawning striped bass are right, at least in part.  And if that’s what Delegate Jacobs is worried about, then instead of placing a temporary and ultimately purposeless hold on the proposed regulations, he ought to be doing his job as a legislator, and fighting to fund a study that might provide the proof.

Otherwise, he ought to get out of the way and let Maryland regulators do their jobs.

Folks who agree might want to send a message to Delegate Rosenberg, at samuel.rosenberg@house.maryland.gov, asking him to release the hold on the proposed season change.  If enough emails are sent, he might even agree.