COMMERCIAL FISHERMEN RETURNING TO MARINE NATIONAL MONUMENTS

 

When Donald Trump issued the executive order “Restoring America’s Seafood Competitiveness” on April 17, 2025, he included language that read,

“Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, shall review all existing marine national monuments and provide recommendations to the President of any that should be opened to commercial fishing.  In making these recommendations, the Secretary of Commerce will consider whether the opening of the monuments to commercial fishing would be consistent with the preservation of the historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest originally identified in the proclamations establishing the marine national monuments.”

Currently, five such marine national monuments exist.  One, the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument is located in the Atlantic Ocean, approximately 130 miles southeast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts.  The other four, which include the Mariana Trench Marine National Monument, Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument, Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument, and Rose Atoll Marine National Monument, are scattered across the central Pacific Ocean.

Until very recently, commercial fishing was banned in all five marine national monuments. As a result of the executive order, it appears that commercial fishing is now going to be allowed in all of them.

The first one to open to commercial fishing was Northeast Canyons and Seamounts. 

Commercial fishing was not allowed there when the monument was initially established, a prohibition that probably had a minimal economic impact on the commercial fishing industry.  In 2017, the Natural Resources Defense Council published a brief impact study which asserted that

“The monument’s deep and rugged canyon and seamount areas were historically some of the least fished in the U.S. Atlantic and not unusually important for any fishery.  The six to eight red crab and lobster vessels active in the monument area have been provided a seven year grace period.  Because the monument does not affect catch limits or allocations, other types of fishing effort, such as the small amount of trawling that occurred in the shallowest portion of the monument, have likely been relocated to other areas.  The canyon and inter-canyon area in the original monument proposal was also reduced by almost 60 percent to leave out the relatively more active trawling areas.”

Despite the minimal economic impact of the commercial fishing prohibition, Trump opened the monument to commercial fishing on June 5, 2020, near the end of his first term.  Then the Biden administration outlawed commercial fishing in the marine national monument again, with NOAA Fisheries issuing the final rule in early 2024.  After returning to office for his second term, Trump reopened the monument to commercial fishing, issuing a new executive order, “Unleashing American Commercial Fishing in the Atlantic,” on February 6, 2026.  The executive order alleged that

“appropriately managed commercial fishing would not put the objects of historic and scientific interest that the monument protects at risk,”

as the fish species identified in the proclamation creating the marine national monument are adequately protected under existing laws and agency actions, and that many of those species are highly migratory, “and not unique to the monument.:

Predictably, the reopening drew criticism from the marine conservation community, with Erica Fuller, speaking for the Conservation Law Foundation, an organization that is particularly focused on marine issues that arise off the New England coast, saying,

“This latest attempt to undermine the monument is not only unlawful, but demonstrates a blatant disregard for the health of our oceans,”

while Brad Sewell, Managing Director of Oceans at the Natural Resources Defense Council, stated that

“Northeast Canyons and Seamounts is a truly special place; a living scientific laboratory, a refuge for creatures as varied as cold-water corals and sperm whales.  Trump’s move to dismantle those protections is unlawful, and we’re confident that it won’t stand.”

Such comments suggest that litigation challenging the reopening might be forthcoming.

Litigation has already delayed opening of the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument to commercial fishing.  A federal district court in Hawaii ruled that NOAA Fisheries could not merely issue a letter, based on Trump’s April 2025 executive order, allowing commercial fishing in that national monument, but would instead have to go through a formal rulemaking process that included public comment on the issue.

Such rulemaking had to begin at the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council, which has jurisdiction over the waters in all four of the Pacific marine national monuments.  Historically, the Western Pacific Council has looked askance at marine sanctuaries and marine national monuments, with one Council document observing that

“The islands in the Western Pacific Region were inhabited for millennia prior to Western contact.  Today the indigenous communities comprise between 20 and 90 percent of the population, depending on the island.  With little land and terrestrial resources, the communities have in the past, and continue today, to depend on fishing for sustenance and cultural purposes.

“Ensuring continued opportunities for fishery-related livelihoods and cultural practices is challenging.  Marine protected areas and military activities have increasingly marginalized fisheries and displaced fishermen.  Today, nearly 25 percent of the region’s EEZ has been designated as either a national marine sanctuary or a national marine monument.”

A 2025 article in the Hawaiian news outlet, Honolulu Civil Beat, noted that

“[The Western Pacific Fishery Management Council] has for years opposed commercial fishing bans in the Pacific.  A brewing legal battle leaves it unclear whether [the Council] backed by the Honolulu-based longline industry and other seafood interests, will ultimately prevail [in opening the national marine monuments to commercial fishing].

“Kitty Simonds, [the Council’s] longtime executive director, told Civil Beat…that the group considers it a priority to resume bottomfishing and trolling in Papahanaumokuakea’s waters that extend 50 miles out from shore, and to restart longline fishing in the waters 50 to 200 miles out from shore.

“’We haven’t changed what we’d like to see from the time of (establishing) the monument, right?  Simonds said.  ‘We made our arguments.’”

Thus, it is hardly surprising that, last week, the Western Pacific Council voted to allow commercial fishing between 50 and 200 nautical miles around Jarvis Island, Wake Island, and Johnston Atoll within the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument.  Such vote to allow commercial fishing is the first step in the rulemaking process required by federal law and last year’s court decision.  The Council’s action will now be forwarded to NOAA Fisheries, which will issue a proposed rule for public comment and, assuming that no legal obstacles arise, will ultimately issue a final rule allowing commercial fishing.

At the same meeting, the Council also voted to allow commercial fishing in waters 12 to 50 nautical miles from Rose Atoll in the Rose Atoll Marine National Monument and from shore out to 50 nautical miles in the Marianas Trench Marine National Monument, while also allowing fishing for bottom fish and pelagic species in parts of the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument.  However, those changes will not go through normal agency rulemaking, but will instead be referred to the White House for further action pursuant to the April 2025 executive order, which could mean that they will face the same sort of legal action that delayed opening the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument to commercial fishing last year.

In her justification of the Council’s actions, Ms. Simonds said,

“This is not about removing monument protections—it’s about restoring sustainable fishing in limited areas under fishery regulations the Council has developed over decades.  Those regulations were built to balance access and conservation, and that remains the Council’s guiding principle under the Magnuson-Stevens [Fishery Conservation and Management] Act.”

Council Chair Nathan Ilaoa made similar comments, saying

“This action does not remove the monument; it supports local fishermen, the cannery and the small businesses that depend on a viable fishing economy.”

But an article in the National Fisherman notes that others

“raised concerns about impacts to protected species, ecosystems, and the cultural significance of monument areas—particularly in Papahanaumokuakea.”

So, how much real harm will be caused by allowing commercial fishing in the marine national monuments?

It’s not easy to say.  Opening up any area to longlining is always going to create some threats to marine mammals, sea turtles, seabirds, billfish, and other incidentally caught fish species.  And allowing the use of bottom-tending gear, whether lobster and/or red crab pots off New England or other gear types in the Pacific creates threats to corals and other sessile animals, while also creating the risk of entanglement for marine mammals.

And in Papahanaumokuakea, there may be additional risks to the endangered Hawaiian monk seal.

But the question that no one has satisfactorily answered is whether opening the commercial fishery in the marine national monuments is creating additional risk for a host of marine species, or whether it is merely shifting existing risk into the monuments.

That is, if lobster and red crab traps are allowed in the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument, to use one example, will that increase the likelihood that a whale might become entangled?  Or does the likelihood remain the same, because traps previously banned from the monument would still be fished somewhere, and so their exclusion from the monument would only create an entanglement risk somewhere else.

Similarly, if a longline is fished within the boundaries of the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument, would endangered turtles, or perhaps seabirds, face greater risks than they would if the same longline was fished somewhere on the high seas?

The answer might well depend on whether concentrations of protected species were higher in the marine national monuments, resulting in more interactions with fishing gear than would occur elsewhere.  But, again, it’s not clear that there is enough reliable data to provide a conclusive answer.

And in the absence of data, it is only sensible to take a precautionary approach. 

If you don’t know whether an action will cause harm, assume that it will until evidence to the contrary appears.

Unfortunately, the administration’s current efforts to open up marine national monuments to commercial fishing takes the opposite approach, and assumes, in the lack of clear evidence to the contrary, that the fishing will do no harm.  It is the more risk-prone approach.

And it is thus the wrong way to proceed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

NEWLY RELEASED PAPER LOOKS INTO JUST WHERE WESTERN ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA SPAWN

 

Throughout most of my life as an offshore angler, it seemed that scientists had a very firm grasp on where Atlantic bluefin tuna spawned.  There was a large eastern stock that spawned in the Mediterranean Sea, often at relatively young ages and smaller sizes, and a much smaller western stock that spawned in the northern Gulf of Mexico, but generally not until they were about nine years old and somewhere around 80 inches (fork length) long.

The stocks mixed on the feeding grounds, with eastern stock fish crossing over to North America and western stock fish crossing over to Europe from time to time, but when it came to spawning, the Mediterranean and Gulf were the only games in town.

That picture began to change about a decade ago, after a group of biologists published a paper, titled "Discovery of a spawning ground reveals diverse migration strategies in Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus),” which argued that western stock bluefin were also spawning, and spawning at younger ages, perhaps as young as five years old, in the Slope Sea, an area at the edge of the continental shelf off southern New England and the upper mid-Atlantic.

The paper created substantial controversy when it came out, but biologists have now generally accepted the evidence that bluefin do, in fact, also spawn in the Slope Sea.

Now, there is some evidence that the western Atlantic stock of bluefin tuna may spawn over a much broader area—perhaps even in a continuous swath of water that ranges from the Yucatan Channel, in the southern Gulf of Mexico, all the way up to the Slope Sea.  Just two weeks ago, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a release announcing that

“New Research Reveals Broad Spawning Distribution for Bluefin Tuna,”

which said that

“Working with partners, NOAA Fisheries scientists did a deep dive into bluefin tuna spawning patterns.  They compiled a large data set from fisheries surveys, archive and museum specimens, and research cruise reports going back to the 1950s.  Their analysis included more than 35,000 plankton tows, and they examined nearly 5,000 individual tuna larvae.  The results…indicate that bluefin tuna have a much broader spawning distribution than previously recognized…

“The results suggest that bluefin spawn in a continuous area during a prolonged spawning season.  Spawning starts in April in the southernmost areas—the northwest Caribbean and southern Gulf of America—and ends in early August in the Slope Sea.”

The NMFS release was referring to the paper “A re-evaluation of Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) spawning distribution in the western Atlantic Ocean,” which appeared in the February 2026 issue of the journal, Progress in Oceanography.  In that paper, the researchers stated that

“Our work documented persistent spawning by bluefin in the Yucatan Channel, southern and northern Gulf [of Mexico], Blake Plateau [located 80-200 miles off the southeastern United States], an area off the Carolinas shoreward of the Florida Current, and the western Slope Sea, despite changing temperatures in each of these regions over the past decades.  This work also revealed how uneven the allocation of sampling effort has been in space and time, leaving open the possibility of additional spawning grounds.  One hypothesis, consistent with the available data, is that bluefin have a continuous spawning distribution in the western Atlantic from the southern Gulf in early-spring to the western Slope Sea in early-summer that is only interrupted by narrow areas of the fast-moving western boundary current (i.e., Florida Current; Gulf Stream) or shallow bathymetry.  An alternate hypothesis, also consistent with the data, is that the western Slope Sea and Gulf are discrete spawning grounds of near equal magnitude with some limited spawning elsewhere.  While sampling throughout the western north Atlantic would be useful, we consider a larval survey to evaluate spawning in June in the waters south of the Gulf Stream and east of the Florida Current to be the most critical to testing these alternate hypotheses.”

The researchers came to their conclusion not by conducting extensive new surveys, but by conducting a comprehensive analysis of data that was already available, having been collected by research cruises dating back to 1956.  While most of those cruises were not directly investigating bluefin tuna, they nonetheless collected plankton samples, which were preserved for future use, as well as data on water temperature, etc.  Electronic tagging data and information generated by longline tuna fisheries was also included in the data set.

The available information, along with unprocessed plankton samples in which bluefin tuna larvae might be found, was analyzed as scientists searched for patterns that might suggest the presence of spawning bluefin tuna in areas outside of the Gulf of Mexico and the Slope Sea.  The researchers were careful to avoid assuming that the presence of larval bluefin was a definite indicator of spawning activity, as larvae could also be transported by currents from a known spawning area; instead, only larvae that were too young to have been transported from such a known area were considered likely indicators of spawning activity.

After analyzing the data, the researchers came to a conclusion that arguably resurrected, if not actual knowledge, then at least hypotheses that existed decades before.  Their paper reminded readers that research conducted as early as 1974 suggested that bluefin also spawned, not only in the Slope Sea, but also between Cuba and Haiti, in the so-called Windward Passage, as well as north and east of the Bahamas, and that another paper, published in 1995, proposed that western Atlantic bluefin spawning migrations varied, depending on the size of the fish involved.

The new paper appears to validate at least some of those old proposals.

As noted in the new paper, more work will have to be done to determine whether the spawning grounds for western Atlantic bluefin form a continuous band between the Gulf of Mexico and the Slope Sea, or whether those two areas account for most of the spawning, with only sporadic episodes in-between.

And it is still too early to tell whether the new paper will attract the same sort of negative attention the paper discussing the Slope Sea spawning ground drew ten years ago, or whether it will serve as a jumping off place for additional research that will confirm, refine, or rebut its conclusions at some point down the road.

Challenging, testing, and confirmation are all part of the scientific process, and are all valid responses to the new work.  And it’s important to get the science right, because as one of the authors, Trika Gerard, a deputy director of NMFS’ Southeast Fisheries Science Center, observed,

“These new data tell us where bluefin tuna are spawning and when, which gives us an idea of where they are migrating and how much they are contributing to future generations.  This, combined with information about genetics and population structure, helps managers decide the most appropriate way to sustainably fish for this prized species.”

The conclusions reached in the recent paper aren’t merely of academic interest.  They can have a real impact on the health and the future of the western Atlantic bluefin stock.

Then, too, there is another lesson taught by this new paper that its authors certainly did not intend, but is vitally important, nonetheless.

All of the analysis leading up to its findings were based on prior research, much of it performed by NMFS in the course of surveying aquatic life on various portions of the continental shelf, surveying protected species, or performing other ongoing studies.  The data developed in the course of that research was maintained and curated by NMFS and by other institutions, just as the processed and unprocessed ichthyoplankton samples, which contained the bluefin tuna larvae, were.

Those earlier surveys could not have been performed without an adequately funded National Marine Fisheries Service, and the data and plankton samples could not have been maintained and readily accessed unless there was enough funding to both archive the survey records and maintain people on staff who can locate and utilize the information.  In addition, eight of the sixteen authors of the paper, including the lead author, are NMFS scientists employed at one of the agency’s regional fisheries science centers.

Good fisheries science can’t exist without adequate funding.  As I noted in last Sunday’s blog post, and in some earlier essays, right now NMFS’s fisheries science is under assault, with some members of Congress, and some members of the current Administration, seeking to cut needed funding.  Already, cuts in scientific personnel are hampering NMFS’ ability to conduct surveys, perform stock assessments, and execute the other tasks necessary to its role as the steward of the nation’s marine resources.

It’s very possible that, if NMFS had been in similar financial straits over the last 50 or 75 years, the recent paper would never have been written, as the data that underlies it would never have been compiled.

If the researchers are correct, and western Atlantic bluefin tuna are spawning over a greater expanse of ocean than previously believed, it is possible that the stock is larger and more resilient than biologists had thought, and might be able to withstand a modestly higher level of harvest, to the benefit of both the commercial and the recreational fishing industries of the United States.

But unless NMFS is funded at levels that will allow meaningful research to continue, and hopefully expand, and for fisheries to be monitored closely enough to ensure that higher harvest levels don’t negatively impact the health of fish stocks, there is a very good chance that such benefits to the nation, whether accruing from bluefin or from other fish stocks, will never be realized.

 

 

 

 

CUTS TO NMFS BUDGET CREATE NEW THREAT TO FISH STOCKS

 

A few weeks ago, I found myself in a familiar place doing a very familiar thing—wandering around Capitol Hill, visiting Senate and House offices during the appropriations season, trying to maintain, or hopefully increase, funding for fisheries management.

This year, it seemed a particularly urgent mission, given that the 2025 staffing reductions at the  National Marine Fisheries Service, and particularly to its regional science centers, crippled the agency’s ability to conduct the surveys and perform the stock assessments needed to maintain the health of the nation’s fish stocks. 

While the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act is arguably the most comprehensive and most successful fishery management law in the world, it has one big vulnerability:  The management system that it created is very science-dependent.  In fact, one of the findings listed near the very beginning of the statute acknowledges that

“The collection of reliable data is essential to the effective conservation, management, and scientific understanding of the fishery resources of the United States.”

Magnuson-Stevens requires that

“Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available.”

To that end, the law requires that

“Each [regional fishery management] Council shall establish, maintain, and appoint the members of a scientific and statistical committee to assist in the development, collection, evaluation, and peer review of such statistical, biological, economic, social, and other scientific information as is relevant to such Council’s development and amendment of any fishery management plan,”

and further provides that regional fishery management councils shall develop annual catch limits for the fisheries that they manage, but such catch limits

“may not exceed the fishing level recommendation of its scientific and statistical committee [or that resulting from a peer review process described elsewhere in the law].”

That all sounds nice in theory, but the truth of the matter is that scientific information can’t be snatched out of thin air.  It takes money to conduct the surveys and other research needed to develop the fisheries-related data, and it takes more money to hire and retain the qualified scientists needed to design the surveys, analyze the resulting data, perform stock assessments, and determine what must be done in order to restore stocks to health and maintain healthy stocks at sustainable levels.

That money has never been easy to obtain, but for many years, Congress has largely recognized that maintaining the long-term health of the United States’ fish stocks was in the best interests of the nation, and addressed fisheries management as a bipartisan issue.  While funding was often less than ideal, it was generally sufficient to enable NMFS to manage fish stocks.

But the current Administration, consistent with its general antipathy toward the sciences and toward agencies that advance scientific knowledge, crippled NMFS’ management capabilities last year, when it cut agency personnel, including biologists at NMFS’ regional science centers.

The problem was highlighted at the May 2025 meeting of the Council Coordinating Committee, the body that represents, and expresses the concerns, of all of the regional fishery management councils.  The report from that meeting states, in part,

“Ms. Kelly Denit, NOAA Fisheries Director of the Office of Sustainable Fisheries…discussed the need to better align NOAA and Council priorities, challenges of managing over 500 stocks, and the need to prioritize fisheries management given limited resources.  Ms. Denit’s presentation touched on the National Standards Guidelines and suggested the need to evaluate narrowing the scope of management in light of current resourcing and administration priorities.

“A risk-value matrix was presented to the [Council Coordinating Committee] as a way to help evaluate which stocks require the most intensive management.  Underpinning this exercise is the reality that NOAA Fisheries cannot continue managing all current stocks and stock complexes that are currently in [fishery management plans] with existing and anticipated resources.  Ms. Denit spoke about the need to strategically choose where to take increased management risks.  The proposed matrix would categorize stocks based on ‘value’ (commercial/recreational/social importance) and ‘risk’ (ratio of catch to [annual catch limit], stock status, ecosystem role, climate vulnerability).  She suggested stocks in the high-risk, high-value quadrants might be strong candidates to receive the most detailed management, while low-risk, low-value stocks might be moved to ecosystem components or removed from management plans entirely.  Ms. Denit emphasized this report requires Council input and collaboration and stressed the need to explore more flexibility in management given current constraints…”

I have to admit that my first reaction upon reading those words was to recall a passage penned by pioneer ecologist Aldo Leopold, who wrote

“The last word in ignorance is the man who says of an animal or plant, ‘What good is it?’  If the land mechanism as a whole is good, then every part is good, whether we understand it or not.  If the biota, in the course of aeons, has built something we like but do not understand, then who but a fool would discard seemingly useless parts?  To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.”

For the very act of designating a fish stock as “high value” or “low value,” based solely on whether is supports a significant commercial or recreational fishery, or has some other societal value, seems completely contrary to Leopold’s principle, and to common sense. 

But now, nearly a year after that Council Coordinating Committee meeting was held, those designations are beginning to grow real teeth, and are threatening to bite chunks out of the federal fisheries management system, marine ecosystems, and probably state budgets as well.

Recently, the Pacific Fisheries Management Council voted to cease actively managing 47 groundfish stocks, in response to a roughly 40% reduction in NMFS scientific and regulatory staff in the Pacific region. Many of those were species of Pacific rockfish, members of Scorpaenidae, the scorpionfish family, popular food fish that tend to have longer lives than many other species, and are thus particularly vulnerable to overfishing.

Instead of actively managing such stocks, the Pacific Council downgraded some of them from “stocks that require conservation and management” to “ecosystem component species.”  Such ecosystem component species are not actively managed to prevent them from becoming overfished or experiencing overfishing; there are no annual catch limits or and no attempts to maintain optimum yield, although NMFS’ Guidelines for compliance with Magnuson-Stevens provide that

“Councils may choose to identify stocks within their [fishery management plans] as ecosystem component (EC) species…if a Council determines that the stocks do not require conservation and management…EC species may be identified at the species or stock level, and may be grouped into complexes…management measures can be adopted in order to, for example, collect data on the EC species, minimize bycatch or bycatch mortality of an EC species, protect the associated role of EC species in the ecosystem, and/or to address other ecosystem issues.”

The problem here, of course, is that the Pacific Council has already acknowledged that the 47 stocks in question were “stocks in need of conservation and management.”  It designated them as ecosystem component species not because the “Council determine[d] that the stocks do not require conservation and management,” but because funds allocated to conservation and management were cut to the point that some stocks that, in fact, were in need of conservation and management had to be sacrificed to the “ecosystem component” designation, and these particular 47 stocks were deemed “low-value” enough to draw the short straw.

Yet, despite drawing the short straw and losing most management protections, the stocks designated as “ecosystem component species” were the fortunate ones, as the great majority of the 47 stocks will be completely removed from the management plan, and have no protections at all.

And the list of species under the Pacific Council’s jurisdiction that are no longer “in need of conservation and management” may grow larger.  National Public Radio reported that Merrick Burden, the Pacific Council’s executive director, observed that

“We have coastal pelagics, which are the sardines and anchovies and mackerels—the small, silvery things that everybody eats.  We have the tunas and billfish, and we have salmon…I expect us, to some degree, to consider this type of action for each of those.”

The same National Public Radio article that quoted Merrick Burden also noted that NMFS’ decision to shed the burden of managing ecosystem component stock is going to shift at least some of that burden onto the shoulders of coastal states.

“As a result of the federal charges, the [Washington] state department [of Fish and Wildlife] may need to ask the Washington Legislature for more staff to help cover new duties…But the state’s conservation mission won’t change, and the process they use to set sustainable harvest levels with stakeholder input will continue.

“In Oregon, where there is s more active commercial and recreational fishery for some groundfish, state officials opted to take over management for at least six of the species federal regulators will drop starting in 2030.  Oregon wildlife officials want the stocks to remain in federal management.  But barring that, taking on oversight will give them more control—and enough time to develop a state management plan.”

The Pacific Fishery Management Council is only the first to address the problem of removing species from federal fishery management plan.  It is an issue that is likely to impact all of the regional fishery management councils.  Thus, on February 2, 2026, the Council Coordinating Committee sent a letter to NMFS chief Eugenio Pineiro Soler which, after a brief introductory paragraph, said,

“The [Council Coordinating Committee] has considered this issue carefully over the course of the course of several recent discussions, including presentations from NMFS Headquarters and subsequent deliberations among Council Executive Directors.  While the CCC supports constructive dialogue regarding capacity constraints and opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of fishery management and science, we have significant concerns regarding both the process used to develop the Risk/Value Matrix and the implications of the framework as currently framed.

“First, the Councils have not been adequately consulted or involved in the development of the Risk/Value Matrix or its underlying methodology.  Councils were asked to react to, and potentially apply, a framework that appears to have been substantially developed in advance, including embedded assumptions regarding objectives, priorities, and acceptable tradeoffs.  Engagement at this stage risks being perceived as endorsement of a predetermined methodology rather than meaningful collaboration.  This approach does not align with the Councils’ statutory role under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.

“Second, the CCC is concerned that the Risk/Value Matrix appears likely to function as a de facto prioritization tool for stock assessments, monitoring, and associated scientific resources, with potential implications for the allocation of funding between NMFS Regions and Science Centers…The CCC is concerned that adoption of the Risk/Value Matrix could diminish or displace meaningful Council and constituent input into decisions fundamental to fisheries science and management.

“Third, the implications of the framework remain unclear, but several Councils have identified substantive concerns when attempting to apply the Risk/Value criteria to their fisheries…raising fundamental questions about what management actions would follow and what management problems the framework is intended to address.  These outcomes suggest that the Risk/Value Matrix incorporates policy choices and management objectives that have not been discussed with, or agreed to, by the Councils.

“Fourth, the CCC notes that similar national-level stock or assessment prioritization concepts have been proposed previously and were not supported by the Councils…The current Risk/Value Matrix appears, in important respects, to revisit those concepts without addressing the concerns previously raised by the Councils.

“Finally, the CCC is concerned about the compressed timeline proposed for Council engagement, the lack of clarity concerning current and future resource levels, and uncertainty regarding how Council input would ultimately be used.  Councils are already pursuing scope-reduction, prioritization, and efficiency efforts through Magnuson-Stevens-compliant public processes.  Participating in a parallel national exercise under the current conditions creates a risk that Council input could be used to justify predetermined outcomes or become binding regardless of future budget realities…”

The letter makes it clear that the Risk/Value Matrix being forced on the regional fisheries management councils is, at best, problematic and, at worst, illegal, although the latter point is probably of little concern to the higher-ups in the Administration.

It also should provide incentive for concerned lawmakers—and my last trip to Capitol Hill made it clear that there are concerned lawmakers out there—to redouble efforts to adequately fund NMFS, and its regional science centers, so that initiatives like the Risk/Value Matrix, and its potentially arbitrary criteria, can be gracefully retired, and no longer pose a threat to an informed fishery management process.

 

  

 

THE COST OF DEPLETED FISH STOCKS

 

Any time fisheries managers suggest that a stock of fish—regardless of species—is becoming depleted, and that more restrictive regulations are needed to reverse the decline, someone will always rise in opposition, to claim that harvest reductions will cause economic harm.

A perfect example of that occurred at the October 2024 meeting of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, when John Clark, a Delaware fisheries manager, objected to further restrictions on the commercial striped bass fishery, saying

“…I mean it just seems like as a management [sic] has to weigh both sides of this, of course we want to be cautious, but there is a point where you might be foregoing fish that could be caught in the pursuit of trying to keep a stock at a level that you think is necessary.

“But in the meantime, as we’ve heard, people are going out of business and we are seeing a lot of people that are hurting.  I mean I know we hear it from our commercial guys all the time, they’ve taken since 2014 the quota has been cut almost in half.  You know that definitely comes out of their pockets…”

He then questioned the need for additional restrictions on the recreational fishery, saying

“…I mean we have been very precautionary about the size of the stock.  But we also have to be precautionary about what we’re doing to the people who depend on these fish…

“I just think that we do have to start looking at the socioeconomic side of this at this point too.”

However, he never even tried to explain what constituted “the socioeconomic side” of the striped bass fishery.

We saw similar concerns expressed in a letter, signed by six fishing tackle and boating industry-aligned groups (the American Sportfishing Association, Coastal Conservation Association, Boat Owners Association of the United States, Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, Center for Sportfishing Policy, and National Marine Manufacturers Association), which opposed the reductions in recreational striped bass landings, achieved through closed seasons, proposed in the Draft Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Public Comment, and was submitted ahead of the October 2025 striped bass management board meeting.

Even though such reductions would make it more likely that the currently overfished striped bass stock would be fully rebuilt by the 2029 deadline mandated by the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan, the six industry groups opposed them because

“The economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery cannot be overstated:

·       In 2016, striped bass trip and equipment spending across Atlantic coastal states generated approximately $13 billion in total economic output, supported over 104,000 jobs, contributed more than $7.7 billion to regional GDP.

·       On a per-pound basis, the recreational sector generates 17 times more retail sales value, 8 times more economic activity, and nearly quadruple the jobs compared to the commercial sector.

“The proposed season closures—whether prohibiting harvest or targeting—will undoubtedly erode these substantial economic benefits and disproportionately impact coastal small businesses, bait and tackle shops, marinas, boat manufacturers, charter operators, and the entire recreational boating and fishing supply chain.

“…Maintaining consistent seasons is the most equitable solution:  it preserves both regional economic stability and angler access across preference lines, without inflicting unnecessary economic hardship.  [emphasis added, references omitted]”

Similar comments, made by both stakeholders and state fisheries managers, can be found whenever harvest reductions are proposed, regardless of the species involved and regardless of how badly more restrictive management measures are needed.

But no one ever seems to consider the harm caused by the stock decline itself.

To examine that harm, let’s go back to the industry letter quoted above, and note that in the first bullet point, it references various economic statistics from 2016, nearly a decade before Addendum III was ever proposed.

And that’s a little misleading, because things change over time.

National Marine Fisheries Service data tells us that, in 2016, recreational fishermen on the northeast and mid-Atlantic coasts took about 17.4 million fishing trips primarily targeting striped bass, but by the time the industry letter was sent, in 2025, striped bass abundance had declined from an estimated 328.5 million fish in 2016 to just 177.9 million in 2023 (no abundance data is yet available for later years).  And in response to declining abundance, the number of directed striped bass trips taken by anglers declined as well, falling to 13.9 million by the time 2025 rolled around.

That’s a 20% decline in fishing trips, and it can probably be assumed that the economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery dropped by a similar percentage over those years.

But even that doesn’t tell the whole story, because by 2016, the striped bass stock was already in trouble, and the number of directed trips was already falling.  Directed trips peaked in 2006 at 25.8 million, at a time when female spawning stock biomass was estimated at 107,341 metric tons, compared to just 69,211 mt in 2016, and the population contained about 13.6 million fish that were at least 8 years old, compared to 2016’s 6.7 million.

So it would seem that striped bass abundance drives recreational fishing effort, and effort clearly drives the economic value of the striped bass fishery, because if people don’t fish, they don’t buy bait, fishing gear, or fuel, and they don’t spend money on charter and party boat fares.

Thus, when the recreational fishing and boating industry oppose management measures that would increase striped bass abundance in an effort to maintain short-term profits, they’re shooting themselves in the foot, because by opposing rebuilding, they’re effectively foregoing the increased long-term income that would be generated by a rebuilt stock.

To some extent, we can see the same thing happen in the commercial fishery, although there, profit doesn’t necessarily track abundance, since abundance can flood markets and drive down the price per pound paid to the fishermen.  So while commercial striped bass landings declined over time, from roughly 6,284,000 pounds in 2006 to 4,634,000 pounds in 2016 and 3,844,000 pounds in 2024, the overall ex vessel value of those landings didn’t follow the same pattern, going from about $13,745,000 in 2006 to $18,661,000 in 2016, before falling to $14,806,000 in 2024—although it’s probably worth noting that those prices are not inflation-adjusted, and so don’t perfectly reflect relative earnings over time.

Yet striped bass, as economically important as they are to the East Coast’s recreational fishery, are not the most notable example of lost economic opportunity caused by the decline of a fish stock.  That dubious honor probably belongs to the winter flounder.

In 1984, anglers in the mid-Atlantic region took about 5.625 million trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and took home about 22,925,000 of the small flatfish (winter flounder were also an important recreational species in New England, particularly in Massachusetts, but the mid-Atlantic, with its larger angling population, provides a starker example).

Winter flounder were the first fish that most anglers caught in the spring.  The fish began stirring in late February or early March, with St. Patrick’s Day the unofficial start of the season.  Because the fishery was prosecuted in sheltered inshore waters, and because flounder could be caught from shore, from docks and piers, and from both private and for-hire vessels, it drew large numbers of anglers who targeted flounder before other inshore species were readily available.

But all the fishing pressure came at a cost, and by the late 1980s, it was clear to state fisheries managers that if it wasn’t more closely regulated, the flounder would be headed for trouble.  Yet it was also clear that, because flounder could be caught at times when few other fish were biting, and because they were so popular with inshore anglers, both the local fishing tackle shops and, in particular, the party boat fleet would oppose the needed regulations, arguing that even if fish were less abundant, their customers had to have the “perception” of being able to take quite a few home if they happened to have a good day, or else they wouldn’t go fishing.

As a result, and perhaps as a result of environmental conditions as well, the winter flounder population soon went into decline.  By 2009, recreational flounder trips in the mid-Atlantic had declined to just 362,000 trips, while landings fell to a mere 160,800 fish, just 0.7%--that’s seven tenths of one percent—of what they were 25 years before.  It seemed impossible to argue against very strict management measures had to be imposed to avert a complete stock collapse—if averting a collapse was even possible by that point.

Yet, when I made a motion at the September 2009 meeting of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council, recommending that New York completely shut down its winter flounder fishery for an indefinite period, it met with immediate and intense opposition.  As reported in the Advisory Council’s bulletin,

“…Councilor Dearborn agreed [that the fishery shouldn’t be closed], further noting that the recreational fishing community is in trouble and they need to have the opportunity to fish.  She pleaded that the Council not take the more conservative approach (i.e., harvest moratorium).  They need to keep the shops open…Mr. Arnold Leo of the Town of Easthampton Fisheries Consultancy disagreed with Councilor Witek.  He said fishery management should also be guided by the considerations of the socioeconomic impact of management measures.  He realizes that the focus is on the health of the resources, however, socioeconomic impact is one of the considerations…Councilor Jordan stated that we shouldn’t inflict more pain on New York fishermen, commercial and recreational, than is already necessary.  A closure is not required in the winter flounder fishery and it should not be instituted…”

My motion failed in a lopsided vote.  Short-term economic concerns prevailed.

In 2025, anglers throughout the mid-Atlantic region supposedly made about 42,000 trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and landed approximately 600 fish, or 0.0026%--twenty-six ten thousandths of one percent—of what they landed in 1984—although the NMFS surveyors found so few flounder fishermen to interview that those numbers, and in particular the estimate of recreational trips, are so clouded in uncertainty as to be nearly meaningless.

While it’s impossible to say with certainty that early and decisive intervention would have prevented the collapse of the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock, as a warming ocean might have made a decline, if not a complete collapse, inevitable, the loss of 5.6 million fishing trips per year, many of them made at a time of year when few other alternative targets are available to recreational fishermen, undoubtedly had a significant impact on the recreational fishing industry—enough of an impact that, even if success was far from certain, one would have expected rational businessmen to at least try to prevent the predictable long-term harm to their shops and for-hire boats.

But they didn’t, and instead, focusing only on the short term, did all they could to hasten the flounder’s collapse.

Whether we’re talking about the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery (724,000 recreational trips and 102,486,000 pounds commercially landed in 1981, 56,000 recreational trips and 1,426,000 pounds commercially landed in 2024), the loss of the recreational whiting fishery in the New York bight, which was primarily prosecuted from for-hire boats and collapsed in the late 1970s, before reliable estimates of fishing effort was made, or the loss of other, popular recreational fisheries on other coasts, it is impossible to deny that the failure to put timely and effective management measures in place has had real, negative consequences for fishing-related businesses and coastal economies.

Yet even today, the focus remains on the negative short-term impacts of restricting fishing activity, and not the much greater long-term losses that too often occur when such restrictions are not put in place.

WHAT ARE THEY THINKING AT THE ASMFC?

 

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) plays a big role in East Coast fisheries management. It has the primary responsibility for drafting and updating management plans for important commercial and recreational species such as striped bass, red drum and menhaden, while also working with the regional fishery management councils to develop management measures that will complement federal regulations in state waters, where the National Marine Fisheries Service’s management authority is extremely limited.

Consequently, the ASMFC also comes in for a big share of blame when the stocks that it manages fail to thrive. It has been heavily criticized for allowing the Atlantic striped bass stock to again become overfished, after it had collapsed, and then been rebuilt, a few decades ago, as well as for its more recent decision not to reduce Atlantic menhaden landings after a stock assessment update revealed that the stock was substantially smaller, and fishing mortality significantly higher, than previously believed.

Yet, while it’s not hard to find fishermen who are willing to provide their opinions about how well the ASMFC is doing its job, it is far more difficult to learn how those who are actually making the ASMFC’s fishery management decisions feel about the organization’s actions. But at the beginning of every year, the ASMFC publishes the results of its annual survey of commissioners, giving people a look at the insiders’ views.

Unfortunately, the most recent survey elicited a much poorer response than its immediate predecessors, with only 23 commissioners responding, compared to 28 in 2024 and 33 in 2023. The memorandum reporting on its results asserted that “The lower sample size from this year’s survey has exaggerated some of the trends in commissioner’s responses,” and that certainly could be true, although it is also possible that the respondents, although fewer in number, still provided a representative sample of all the commissioners’ views.

But even assuming that the respondents did present an exaggerated or somehow skewed view of commissioners’ opinions, it is tempting to speculate why they answered the survey when many of their colleagues did not. Were other commissioners just too busy at the end of the year to bother? Or did the respondents just feel a particularly deep obligation to try to improve the workings of the ASMFC? Do the survey results represent the views of concerned commissioners who are actively trying to change the status quo, or merely reflect the ire of commissioners who are displeased that one or more management actions didn’t turn out the way they had hoped?

There is no way to be certain, but many of the most recent responses suggest that the ASMFC might benefit if some changes were made.

The survey’s very first questions address the basic issue of how well the ASMFC is carrying out its mission: “How comfortable are you that the Commission has a clear and achievable plan to reach the Vision (Sustainably managing Atlantic Coast Fisheries)?” and “How confident are you that the Commission’s actions reflect progress toward the Vision?”

Those questions, like most of the other questions on the survey, are scored on a 10-point scale. The scores for the first two questions were disappointingly low, 7.18 and 6.90, respectively, and were, in both cases, the lowest scores ever received in a time series dating back to 2009.

The questions received their highest scores over a decade ago, with the first reaching 8.37 in 2014 and the second reaching 8.52 in 2013. Both have been declining in fits and starts ever since, with the most recent scores notably lower than they were in 2024. Whether that drop was “exaggerated” due to the low number of responses, or whether the scores accurately reflected commissioners’ evaluation of the ASMFC’s effectiveness over the past year, remains an open question, although some written comments provided toward the end of the survey suggest that, at least for some commissioners, the latter was probably the case.

Responses to other questions could explain why commissioners are pessimistic about the ASMFC achieving its goals.

ASMFC declares on its website that “As a partnership of coastal states, we work together to protect essential marine species, ensuring vibrant fisheries, thriving communities, and resilient ecosystems, all through science-driven, cooperative management, [emphasis added]” and its approach to fisheries management assumes that all states will be willing to collaborate and manage species on a coastwide basis. Yet when the survey asked, “How satisfied are you with the cooperation between Commissioners to achieve the Commission’s Vision?” the question only scored a 6.55.

While not the lowest score in the time series (the same question scored a 6.45 in 2018), it was far below the 8.20 that the same question scored in 2012, and the 8.00s it scored in the two subsequent years. Yet such score shouldn’t surprise anyone who has listened in on the various species management board meetings, such as the January 2024 Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board (Bass Board) meeting, when fisheries managers from Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia attempted to delay full implementation of an important addendum to the striped bass management plan, merely because their commercial fisheries were already open, and they didn’t want to take the bureaucratic steps needed to reduce fishermen’s quotas mid-season.

Similarly, the question “How satisfied are you with the Commission’s working relationship with our constituent partners (commercial, recreational, and environmental)?” scored a time series-low 6.15, a notable decline from the 7.92 it scored in 2013, the drop probably reflecting both how some commissioners feel about certain elements of the fishing community as well as how members of the fishing community feel about some commissioners. Either way, a poor relationship between the commissioners and the public can only make it harder for the ASMFC to do its job.

The commissioners’ views on other gauges of the ASMFC’s effectiveness were mixed.

They had a fairly positive view of the ASMFC’s progress on ending overfishing, awarding a score of 7.29, just slightly below the time series average of 7.39. However, when asked whether tracking the number of stocks where overfishing no longer occurred was “a clear metric to measure progress,” some commissioners apparently were no longer sure, as that question garnered a score of just 7.17, the second-lowest in a time series that ranged from 7.09 to 8.25. The high score was awarded only last year, and it’s not clear why the 2025 score was more than a full point lower.

Finally, there was the question, “Are you satisfied with the Commission’s ability to manage rebuilt stocks?”

It’s a key issue. It’s often easier for managers to adopt the measures needed to rebuild a stock that everyone agrees is in trouble, than it is for them to keep sustainable measures in place once successful rebuilding takes place, and fishermen yearn to increase their landings. The commissioners have never given the ASMFC high scores on the question; the long-term average is only 6.86, and the time series high is just 7.21, so the recent score of 7.06, as low at it is, suggests that the ASMFC might be having a little more success in recent years.

The scored questions provide some insight into what commissioners feel is going right and going wrong at the ASMFC, but they don’t do anything to explain why the problems are occurring, or offer any thoughts on how to overcome them.

Those questions are best answered by another set of questions, which seek more detailed written comments, such as the one which asked, “What is the single biggest obstacle to the Commission’s success in rebuilding stocks?”

Nine of the 19 people who answered that question replied with some variation on “politics,” with some of them citing the closely related issues of “Short-term stakeholder interests prioritized over resource impacts,” “balancing stakeholder desires vs taking stronger conservation measures,” and “Lack of will power to take action to restrict fishing mortality when stock status suggests action. Perfect recent examples striped bass [when the Bass Board voted against landings reductions that would make it more likely that the stock would fully rebuild by the deadline dictated by the management plan] and [Gulf of Maine] lobster [when objections by fishermen and some local politicians became so intense that the American Lobster Management Board reversed course and did not impose the measures called for in the management plan].”

Some elaborated on their views, saying that obstacles included “Not following the science due to political and/or commercial/recreational sector pressure,” and “Political impediments at both the state and Federal level are complicating efforts. Lobster, Menhaden, and Red Drum are examples.”

One commissioner provided a more detailed comment that helps to explain the drop in the survey scores described earlier, writing,

Many of my responses are lower than usual and that is because I have a few recent things on my mind, notably the menhaden/ERP action from the annual meeting [where the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board failed to reduce menhaden landings, even though such landings should have been reduced by over 50% to meet the fishing mortality target] and Striped Bass. There has always been a measure of this in what we do of course, but I think there is an element of politics that is creeping in to levels that we have not seen before, which is having negative repercussions to our making sound, consistent decisions to promote sustainability for our important stocks.”

It seems that politics has become a serious problem at the ASMFC.

The only other obstacle to ASMFC success cited by more than two commissioners was climate/environmental change, which was mentioned in six responses. But as some of the respondents noted, that is a problem that is far beyond the ASMFC’s ability to solve.

The survey also asked, “What issue(s) should the Commission focus more attention/time on?”

The answers were diverse, but most shared one common characteristic: Although the commissioners had already acknowledged that there were obstacles making it difficult for the ASMFC to reach its goals, few said that the ASMFC should focus on finding ways to overcome them. Instead, the most common suggestion, raised by four of the 13 respondents, was for some sort of outreach to constituent groups.

One commissioner suggested “Outreach to create greater understanding of what we do and cannot do.” Another expanded on that theme, writing, “Educating the public on how the commission is structured and that it is a state based compact not as federal body. Perhaps a series of PR pieces that are light hearted a [sic] speak to the realities of the job and complexity of it.” But while such outreach might help reduce the amount of criticism aimed at the ASMFC, it’s hard to see how they might remove obstacles to the ASMFC achieving its goals.

Four other commissioners suggested that commissioners should be provided with more and/or better information; while that wasn’t a direct counter to the obstacles faced by the ASMFC, better informed commissioners probably would lead to better management decisions.

There were also three commissioners (one responding to a different question) who complained about the problems caused by a lack of cooperation between the commissioners, and between the ASMFC and other management bodies. To that point, one comment noted, “We have lost the ability to work together and compromise in best interest of the resource that we manage. We need to figure out a different/better way to work together with the [Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council]. Joint meetings are generally a waste of time and money as most of the recommendations are for status quo and it is impossible to get 60 individuals to do something different when one body or the other has veto power over the result.”

A more detailed, and more troubling, response, which reflects the realities of the current, conservation-averse approach to federal fisheries management, read,

I was shocked and alarmed by some of the votes and comments made by our federal partners at the annual meeting. Very inconsistent with previous positions and counter to achieving sustainability goals. I don’t envy these partners right now, so I think that it will be very important for us to guard against putting them into positions where they will have to make comments/votes like this again to the extent this is possible. This will require some strategic thinking on how best to bring things forward into the process for the foreseeable future. We are also going to have to bolster ourselves against the loss of resources from the federal government (assessment support, objective advice, data collection) so that we can continue to serve our states as well as we can. The states can step up, we have the expertise, so we should look for the opportunities to do this.

But commissioners don’t blame federal managers and federal management bodies for all of the cooperation problems. As another noted, “Commission Employees are amazing. However, the decorum of the states representatives have [sic] eroded over the past 10 years and the ability to work with states to protect everyone’s interests has declined as a result.”

Commissioners also addressed the need for better socioeconomic data. “Socioeconomics” is a term often heard in ASMFC debates, but there is little agreement on what it means, or how it ought to be measured. Far too often, it seems to mean little more than “If the ASMFC does X, then I, my company, my friends, or my sector might end up making less money.”

That sort of discussion probably hit its low point at the Bass Board meeting held on December 16, 2024, when New Jersey’s Legislative Proxy, Adam Nowalsky, made a motion to initiate a new addendum to the striped bass management plan, “in consideration of 2024 recreational and commercial mortality while balancing socioeconomic impacts…” After another commissioner asked, “What is it that we’re going to be balancing those socioeconomic impacts against?” Nowalsky declined to provide an answer, responding only that “I would defer to the Board specifically for that…I think every one of the options that we are potentially contemplating today, or we would contemplate in this Addendum, has a socioeconomic impact,” and undoubtedly causing some Bass Board members to wonder why he raised the “socioeconomic” point in the first place.

In hopes of someday obtaining more meaningful socioeconomic information, one commissioner wrote,

I’d like to see more emphasis on economic concerns. We’ve seen economic issues take on prominence for several species, for example, striped bass management hurting the for-hire sector in the Chesapeake and lowering the menhaden [total allowable catch] affecting the reduction fishery workers, but we don’t have analyses of these issues. Continuing on those issues, what are the factors affecting an angler’s decision to go out on a for-hire boat—is the regulations, the cost per trip or a combination of those factors (e.g. I’ll pay $80 for a trip if I can keep X number of fish)? How much menhaden quota does the reduction industry need to maintain employment—was the situation as dire as they claimed?

Those are all good questions, but they only scratch the surface of what might be asked.

As part of the recent debate over Addendum III to the striped bass management plan, there were proposals to award anglers fishing from for-hire vessels with regulations that were more favorable than those governing anglers fishing from shore or from private boats. A proposed new amendment to the summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass and bluefish management plans would similarly favor for-hire anglers over other recreational fishermen. Yet the for-hire fleet is responsible for less than 2% of all striped bass trips, and for-hire anglers also generate only a small proportion of the trips targeting other species. So, would management measures that discriminate against most anglers, who take the great majority of fishing trips, be a net economic positive because it might shore up the for-hire fleet, or a net economic negative because it comes at the cost of, and perhaps discourages, most members of the angling community?

And what is the cost of the ASMFC’s failure to maintain robust fish populations?

Commissioners often argue against more restrictive management measures because of the immediate harm such measures might cause to the fishing industry. Yet no one has ever asked how much harm is caused by not adopting management measures that maintain stocks at higher levels.

In 2006, when the striped bass biomass was near its peak, recreational fishermen took approximately 25.8 million trips primarily targeting them; by 2025, with the stock overfished and abundance declining, that figure had dropped to just under 14 million trips. How much greater would the economic benefits from the fishery have been if the Bass Board had made the hard decisions needed to keep striped bass abundance high enough to support nearly 26 million directed striped bass trips per year, as was the case in 2006, instead of just the 14 million trips that were taken in 2025?

If the ASMFC developed the capability to conduct real socioeconomic analysis, questions like those could be answered, to the benefit of both fish and fishermen.

The ASMFC’s annual survey of commissioners provides an important insight into the organization. It provides a look at the problems that make it harder for the ASMFC to achieve its goals, at why those problems occur, and at how they might be addressed.

And it provides at least a partial roadmap to making the ASMFC a better and more effective organization than it is today.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/.