ASMFC DISTRIBUTES BLACK SEA BASS; SOME IN NEW JERSEY ARE NOT AMUSED

 

Last December, I reported that the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, acting in conjunction with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board, decided to authorize a 20% increase in recreational black sea bass landings.

While I questioned the wisdom of that decision, it was made, and will now govern the recreational black sea bass fishery in the mid-Atlantic and New England through at least 2027.  Last Wednesday afternoon, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board, acting pursuant to explicit language in Addendum XXXII to the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Fishery Management Plan, after substantial debate, adopted a motion to distribute the 20% increase among the three black sea bass management regions (Massachusetts-New York, New Jersey, and Delaware-North Carolina north of Cape Hatteras), which read

“Move to approve to distribute the 20% coastwide liberalization as follows:

·       Southern region 16.5%

·       Northern region not to exceed 27%

·       NJ region to receive the remaining liberalization from the Northern and Southern regions.”

The motion passed on a vote of 10 in favor, none opposed, and NOAA Fisheries abstaining.  Surprisingly, New Jersey cast a “null vote” after its two delegates, fisheries manager Joseph Cimino and Legislative Proxy Adam Nowalsky, couldn’t agree on a position, with the former supporting the motion and the latter vehemently opposed.

In fact, Nowalsky was so opposed that he threw a little hissy fit after the vote, lamenting that he had promised his constituents that they would receive at least a 20% black sea bass increase, and was now going to have to go back and tell them that they were going to get a little bit less.

He apparently wasn’t alone in his discontent, which was shared by at least some other members of New Jersey’s recreational fishing community.  Jim Hutchinson, Jr., editor of the New Jersey/Delaware edition of The Fisherman magazine, described the outcome as

“New York and Massachusetts, these states, these fisheries managers, were trying to get their grubby little hands into New Jersey’s pockets in order to grab more black sea bass for their self-serving and arrogant reasons…The anti-New Jersey sentiment once again bubbling over at the ASMFC, with other states, the northern states, believe, well, they’d like to redistribute some of that shared resource because—I don’t know—they think they deserve more, they’re better than we are, and we don’t count…The states to the north decide that it was time for a reallocation battle, because New Jersey has too much…ten other states said ‘Let’s screw New Jersey’…New York and New England, they played dirty pool.”

It was an entertaining diatribe, and undoubtedly appealed to at least some members of the New Jersey fishing community.  Unfortunately, it ignored both history and some very explicit language in the relevant fishery management plan.

A provision of Addendum XXXII clearly states,

“In the event that a region is allowed to liberalize harvest, states will develop their measures in a manner that collectively reduces interregional disparities (e.g., states with relatively restrictive measures, as determined by the [Technical Committee] based on performance, should be allowed a larger liberalization, while states with relatively liberal measures should take a smaller liberalization or remain at status quo)…  [emphasis added]”

Given that language, there was really no reason to expect that all of the regions would receive an equal percentage increase in landings.  In fact, looking at the differing management measures across the states and the regions, it was clear that some states/regions ought to be treated differently than others.

The regulations adopted by the states in the Northern region vary in their details and their complexity, but all are relatively restrictive.  Massachusetts has a 16.5-inch minimum size, 4-fish bag limit, and a season that runs from May 17 through September 1.  Rhode Island’s regulations are a bit more complicated, with a 16.5-inch minimum size for shore-based and private-boat anglers, along with a 2-fish bag limit from May 22 through August 26 and 3-fish bag for the remainder of the year, while anglers fishing from party and charter boats enjoy a 16-inch minimum size, a 2-fish bag from June 18 through August 31, and a 6-fish bag for the remainder of the year.  In Connecticut, there is a 16-inch minimum size for everyone, a 5-five fish bag limit and a season that runs from May 17 through June 23, and again from July 8 through September 25 for shore-based and private-boat anglers, while those fishing on for-hire vessels have a 5-fish bag limit from May 17 through August 31, and a 7-fish bag for the remainder of the year.  New York’s anglers are limited to a 16.5-inch minimum size, a 3-fish bag limit from June 24 through August 31, and a 6-fish bag for the remainder of the year.

In the Southern region, the regulations are much more consistent and far less restrictive, with Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina all having a 13-inch minimum size and 15-fish bag limit and seasons that are nearly, but not completely, identical, running from May 15 through the end of the year, with a 10-day (21 days in Virginia) hiatus sometime in in the middle.

New Jersey anglers, on the other hand, enjoy the smallest size limit on the coast, at 12.5 inches, and a bag limit of 10 fish from May 17 through June 19 and again throughout the month of October, 1 fish in July and August, and 15 fish in November and December.

Thus, based on the language of Addendum XXXII, the Management Board acted properly when it distributed the 20% overall increase as it did.

The history of black sea bass management, and the current physical distribution of the black sea bass resource, further confirms the Management Board’s decision as the right one.

To understand why, it’s necessary to go back to the February 2018 meeting of the Management Board, when Addendum XXX to the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Fishery Management Plan, which created the three black sea bass management regions, was adopted.

By 2018, it was very clear that black sea bass were benefitting from a warming ocean, and pushing farther and farther north in response to more favorable conditions.  Prior to 2003, about 80% of recreational black sea bass landings came from states between New Jersey and Virginia, but that soon began to shift.  In 2009, for the first time, the states between Massachusetts and New York landed more black sea bass than the states farther south, and by 2016, the landings pattern had completely reversed, with the four northern states accounting for 83% of recreational black sea bass landings.

It was simply a matter of anglers in the northeast catching more sea bass because that’s where most of the black sea bass were.

But black sea bass management didn’t reflect the changes in black sea bass abundance, inflicting disproportionately high restrictions on the Northern region states (which up until 2018, included New Jersey).  As noted in Addendum XXX,

“The northern region states have been subject to harvest reductions in all years [between 2012 and 2017] except 2012 (liberalization) and 2017 (status quo), while the southern region states have been largely status quo.  Approximately 96% of the coastwide harvest comes from the northern region states…”

Addendum XXX was, in part, intended to provide more parity between the two regions, so that the northern region wasn’t continually subject to ever more restrictive regulations.  At the February 2018 Management Board meeting, Caitlin Starks, the ASMFC’s Fishery Management Plan Coordinator for black sea bass, noted that

“the Addendum was initiated in response to several challenges in recreational black sea bass management over the past several years; related to inequities in harvest reductions and accountability for the effectiveness of regulations…”

When the debate over the final shape of Addendum XXX began, Dr. David Pierce, a Massachusetts fisheries manager, opined,

“I think the regional approach is the way to go.  Along with our having a regional approach, there is a need for us to follow through with what the organization, what the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission has decided to do; not just for black sea bass, but for the whole suite of species along the Atlantic coast, and that is to address changes in distribution, distribution and abundance of these different stocks…

“…I’m influenced by the fact that we have the latest assessment on black sea bass; indicating that about 87 percent of the black sea bass resource is found from New York to Massachusetts, and that’s a change from the way it used to be…”

Dr. Pierce then made a motion to adopt regional management and to base regional allocations on both exploitable biomass—that is, where the fish are today—and historical harvest. 

That motion passed.

Then Eric Reid of Rhode Island moved to base the historical harvest on landings between 2011 and 2015, which more-or-less reflected the current spatial distribution of the stock (recall that northern landings exceeded southern landings for the first time in 2009, and that the states between New York and Massachusetts landed 83% of the fish in 2016). 

Of course, basing the regional allocation on where the fish were in 2018 (and still are today), rather than on were they were a decade or more before, would have resulted in a substantial cut for New Jersey, so before Mr. Reid could even rise to speak in support of his motion, New Jersey’s Nowalsky raised an objection, making the argument that

“what has really driven this fishery in recent years is a 2011 year class; and to go ahead and essentially use this 5-year timeframe to make an allocation decision, based primarily on a single year class…

“To say this is a year class, and we’re going to use that for allocation.  I can’t even fathom that…

“To that end I believe that the 2006 to 2015 10-year option is something that is fair and reasonable; in terms of incorporating what an allocation decision should be based on, a combination of history and current conditions.”

He then moved to substitute the 10-year time period for the 5-year period suggested by Mr, Reid.

Of course, Nowalsky’s argument was completely fatuous.  Mr. Reid suggested that the allocation be based, in part, on historical landings from 2011 to 2015; the 2011 year class, which at best might have been 4 inches long in 2011, wouldn’t have impacted that year’s landings at all.  By 2015, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York all had all adopted a 14-inch minimum size for black sea bass, and since at least one length-at-age chart developed by the State of Connecticut indicated that a 4-year old fish—the age a fish spawned in 2011 would be in 2015—would only be about 13.5 inches long (with some variation, as fish grow at different rates), it wouldn’t appear that the 2011 year class would have much influence on 2015 landings, either.

But Nowalsky’s claim, however inaccurate, was still enough to divert the discussion from Mr. Reid’s motion to his own.

Mr. Reid was eventually given a chance to speak, at which point he noted that the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Advisory Panel had supported basing allocation on the 2011-2015 time period by a margin of 8 to 1; he also noted that

“Generally speaking, the biomass is trending north and east; and this timeframe will take that into account.  To me, ignoring those points would cause a bigger disconnect between management and reality, higher angler frustration and higher discards.”

New York fishery manager John Manascalco supported Mr. Reid, and opposed Nowalsky’s substitute motion.

“The 10-year timeframe doesn’t reflect the state of the fishery.  The state of Connecticut in the last two years is the second largest black sea bass harvester in the four-state northern region.  Going back to 2006 up to sometime in the early 2010s, they had no fishery.

“To adopt a time series that completely ignores the fact that the fishery has changed so drastically, that some states that used to harvest fish in the tens of thousands is now harvesting them in the many hundreds of thousands.  It is ignoring the vast impact that would have, and the equity issue that would have to the north, which has over the same time series, while the southern states remained at 12.5 inches, 200 days, a bag limit of 15 to 25 fish, has cut their seasons to no spring season and no fall season, 3-5 fish when the majority of anglers have access to the fishery, and continue to harvest the vast majority of fish on the coast, even at 15 inches.”

Dr. Pierce also opposed Nowalsky’s motion, while rebutting his claim that the 2011 year class was driving the seeming shift to the north.

“As noted already, the Advisory Panel was nearly unanimous in supporting the shorter timeframe.  They said the fishery is changing very fast.  They have said that it’s very different from beyond five years ago.

“Our focus should be on change and distribution of this resource; and the first motion that was adopted got to that particular point.  I’ll emphasize as well that biomass started shifting to the north before the 2011 year class.  We’re not talking just about the 2011 year class; it’s more than that.”

Mark Alexander, a Connecticut fisheries manager, added

“I won’t reiterate what John Manascalco said, but it’s true.  Our harvest has increased dramatically.  The abundance index in our trawl survey has increased dramatically.  But that increase has only been over the past four or five years.  Like John said, we had almost no harvest in Connecticut prior to that.

“The second thing is that in choosing [the five year base period], the Board has wanted to take this in a new direction; so that current abundance is reflected in how we approach management.  I think the shorter time period is more consistent with that approach; and for that reason I will oppose the motion to substitute.”

The southern states, which would end up with higher landings under Nowalsky’s motion, gave it their support, even after Mr. Manascalco put some more facts on the table.

“After bias correction for 2015, the regional [fishing mortality rate] for the north was well below [the fishing mortality rate that would produce maximum sustainable yield].  After bias correction for the south, the regional [fishing mortality rate] was above [the fishing morality rate that would produce maximum sustainable yield].  The north under constant catch was forced to constrain, constrain, constrain, or try to constrain harvest, 15-inch size limits, and things I’ve already spoken to; while the south was allowed to remain at 12.5 inches, 200 plus days, and large bag limits.

“Here we are again; and if I look at these tables, the outcomes of this regional allocation we’re about to make is going to what, if we accept or adopt 2006 to 2015, yet another cut for the northern states, the region that is well below the [fishing mortality rate that would produce maximum sustainable yield]; where at the same time, Delaware through North Carolina will be allowed to liberalize by as much as 36.75 percent.  That doesn’t sound like that is sound management.”

But Nowalsky’s motion wasn’t about the facts, or about fish distribution, or about changing patterns of catch.  It was not about anything resembling objective truth.  It was about landing as many fish as possible in New Jersey and the states to its south, regardless of changing conditions.  So when he saw the arguments arrayed against him, Nowalsky called for a brief recess, and when that recess was over, began blowing smoke.

“…We’ve talked a lot this week.  We’ve heard this word compromise, working together.  We’ve dealt with some recent appeals, and the challenges of those.  I just can’t help but think that if we get out of here with something that is more than a 6-4 decision or something, is better for all of us to take home.  To take something home because I convince one more person to vote for me rather than you did, I just don’t think it reflects well on this body.  I think that this approach of splitting something here down the middle is a reasonable compromise, is within the spirit that the Commission is trying to convey, and I can support this approach moving forward.”

Shortly thereafter, he withdrew his original motion, and put a new motion forward, that more or less averaged out the allocations resulting from the 5-year and 10-year base periods, and would give a 61.35% allocation to the north, and a 38.65% allocation to the south, and give New Jersey more than three-quarters of the southern allocation.

The new motion had the support of New Jersey and the southern states, leading to Mr. Manascalco resignedly admitting that the northern states were backed into a corner.

“…I do have an issue with the fact that we’re in a situation here where there are four northern states.  Essentially, given the current management structure, the way we have chosen to split up regions because of the way fisheries occur.

“Northern states will never have the votes to get fair access to the resource.  I don’t want that to be lost on anyone here.  Four states, for votes.  It’s never going to do it when there are ten people sitting around the table.  We will be talking about [annual catch limits] in a little while.  Northern states are going to take a look at the number of fish that they have to work with; and they’re going to be forced to make decisions about it.  Oh, do I need to consider going up in size again, going to 16 inches?  We’re talking about increasing discards just to maintain the fishery we currently have.

“I’ll remind you New York has no spring, Massachusetts has no fall, 3 fish, 5 fish, and we’re going to be further restricting these fisheries.  In order to maintain just what we have, consider we’ll have to be entertaining an increase in size limit and more discards.”

That was the unvarnished truth, but neither biological nor management truths had much to do with how the issue would be decided.  As Rhode Island’s Mr. Reid observed,

“I don’t need to go to two decimal points to count 6 to 4.  That is my problem.  I do appreciate the fact that we just spent a lot of time trying to cooperate.  When you’re bargaining from a losing position to start with, it really doesn’t make you all that comfortable.  What is going to happen in the north is going to be the discard rate is going to be so high that the payback for us is going to make it more foolish than it is now.

“This is where we’re going; and that’s where we’re going to say we’re going to do.  We all know.  We all know what happens.  Those fish are going to go over the side, we’re going to have to pay them back, and we’re going to go down again…

“…this is going to create waste that is going to be insurmountable for the northern states; until we redo all this again…In our first action today the northern region already lost 100,000 fish.  That’s what we lost already.  We started out the day we’re down 100,000 fish.

“…That doesn’t work for me.  That’s not what it’s about.  Cooperation is great; and I really do appreciate that.  But we’re not going to get anything that’s close to being acceptable to us.

“I understand that it is allocation; and my partners to the south, God bless you, you’re going to get fish that you probably don’t need…

“Just be aware that if we go down even this road here, I mean okay we lose, but we don’t lose that much at 6 to 4, because that’s where we’re at…Today all we’re going to do is create waste.  I’m glad we all had a nice kumbaya moment yesterday, but we’re not having it today.”

And he was right.  Nowalsky’s motion passed 6 to 4, with 2 abstentions, as New Jersey and the southern states clung on to all the fish that they could, despite the fact that the center of black sea bass abundance had moved to the north.  And the northern states remained subject to unduly restrictive management measures for another decade, even though they had a plethora of black sea bass residing right off their shores.

Last Wednesday, the Management Board recognized the inequities that resulted from their previous action, and not only all of the southern states, but even New Jersey’s primary marine fisheries manager, voted to provide some relief for the northern states.

So no, the northern states didn’t “grab more black sea bass for their self-serving and arrogant reasons,” as The Fisherman’s Hutchinson has claimed.  They didn’t “think…they’re better than” New Jersey.  They didn’t say “Let’s screw New Jersey” or plan “dirty pool.”

They just sought a little justice in resource allocation, and finally collected on a debt that the Management Board incurred a full decade ago, although what they received won’t undo the hardships suffered by black sea bass anglers in the northeast over the past decade.

But it is still more than they had ever gotten before.

 

 

 

A BUSINESS CALLED COMMERCIAL FISHING

 

Commercial fishing is undoubtedly one of the oldest businesses still pursued by mankind.  Nonetheless, it is a business, although in some ways, it isn’t always treated as one.

I was reminded of that a few days ago, when I was wasting time perusing the Internet, and came across a post directing me to the online petition site Change.org, and a petitioner’s plea to

“Allow transfer of commercial fishing licenses beyond family in New York.”

The petitioner seeking such change argued, in part, that

“The closure of the Horseshoe crab fishery has personally impacted me and many others in New York State who rely on commercial fishing for their livelihood.  This sudden change has limited our ability to source bait, creating a significant economic strain on us and our families.  With the current regulations, commercial fishing licenses can only be transferred within a direct family lineage, which further restricts opportunities for those needing an alternative or additional income stream…

“…the restrictive nature of transferrable fishing licenses limits entry into the industry and makes it difficult for lifelong and aspiring fishermen to sustain their livelihoods…

“The amendment to allow transferability of fishing licenses beyond direct family members is a crucial step towards economic resilience.  By introducing a more flexible license transfer policy, we can ensure that those impacted by changes or closures in specific fisheries, like the Horseshoe crab, have viable alternatives to earn a living.

“…other states have successfully implemented similar policies, strengthening their fishing sectors while promoting fair access and encouraging growth.  New York can follow a similar model that respects family heritage while recognizing the practical needs of the industry to adapt to evolving environmental and economic challenges…”

I don’t know the petitioner, but from what he wrote, it sounds like he has been commercially fishing for either eels or whelks, or maybe for both, he is worried that New York’s recent ban on horseshoe crab harvest, which will be phased in over the next four years, is going to make it impossible for him to get bait for his traps, and he sees his commercial fishing business headed for economic ruin.  (Egg-bearing, female horseshoe crabs have long been the preferred bait for both whelks and eels.  Fishermen claim that no other bait is even remotely as effective, and one eel potter recently told me that, once the full ban on horseshoe crab harvest goes into effect, he might as well sell his pots, because the lack of good bait will put him out of business.)

It's not clear what license he is seeking to transfer, but he’s probably either trying to sell his license to fish for whelks while it still might be worth something to someone, or trying to purchase a license to fish for other things in order to maintain his commercial fishing lifestyle.

It doesn’t seem like an unreasonable thing to do.  The problem is that New York law doesn’t permit those sorts of transfers.  Section 13-0335 of the state’s Environmental Conservation Law explicitly states that

“Licenses…shall be non-transferable and shall expire on the last day of December of each year,”

although a license holder has the right to renew their license each year.

Yet, when one looks a little deeper, it seems that “non-transferrable” doesn’t mean that a fishermen can’t transfer a license to anyone, for section 13-0328 of the Environmental Conservation Law provides that

“the department [of Environmental Conservation] may permit reissuance of a license or permit to a member of the immediate family of the prior holder of such license or permit, provided that the individual to whom the license or permit is being issued is at least sixteen years of age.  The department may permit a license or permit holder to designate in writing a member of his or her immediate family to whom the license or permit shall be reissued in the event that the license or permit holder dies prior to surrendering his or her license to the department.”

So, even in New York, a commercial fishing license is transferrable, presumably for no charge (although that’s not necessarily true), to a member of one’s immediate family, which is broadly defined as a

“spouse, sibling, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, and, in addition, all persons who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the permit holder and domiciled in the house of the licensee or permit holder,”

but not to a member of the general public. 

Except, even that isn’t completely true, because another paragraph of 13-0328 provides that

“In the event that a designated immediate family member does not wish to engage in the commercial fishing activities authorized by such license or permit, the department may permit such person to identify an alternate person to whom the license or permit shall be reissued…”

In essence, what the state has effectively done is prevent a fisherman from selling their license or permit, and perhaps from selling their business as a going concern by packaging their boat, traps, nets, and/or other gear used to prosecute the fishery along with that license or permit, while they’re alive, and perhaps providing themselves with some retirement money by doing so, while allowing such fisherman’s heir (provided the “immediate family” qualification is met) to sell the same license to an unrelated third party, and enjoy the proceeds of that sale, once the fisherman is dead.

Somehow, that seems a little unfair.

Of course, there is also the question of who qualifies for a commercial fishing license in the first place.  Section 13-0328 also provides that

“licenses shall be issued only to persons who demonstrate in a manner acceptable to the department that they received an average of at least fifteen thousand dollars of income over three consecutive years from commercial fishing or fishing, or who successfully complete a commercial food fish apprenticeship…”

which narrows down the pool of potential commercial fishermen considerably, but doesn’t seem to make to much sense from a business perspective.

After all, as noted at the very beginning of this post, commercial fishing is a business.  And it is a very technically and physically demanding business, particularly when prosecuted at a small scale, where fishermen typically need to have a working knowledge of navigation, mechanics, vessel maintenance, weather, oceanographic conditions, fish movements and behavior, how do deploy and maintain fishing gear, first aid, and at least the rudiments of fiscal planning and marketing, to even have a prayer of running an economically successful operation, while at the same time putting up with the physical discomforts, injuries, and dangers inherent in running a boat at sea under often hostile conditions.

So why limit the transferability of licenses/permits—effectively, the transfer of a fisherman’s business—to a fishermen’s immediate family during a fisherman’s life, but allow the transfer to anyone—or, at least, to anyone who meets the qualifications to hold a commercial license—after that fisherman’s death?

If a fisherman’s heir can benefit by selling the deceased fisherman’s permit, why shouldn’t the fisherman be able to enjoy the same benefit while he/she is still alive? 

Some might argue that, while the permits are generally non-transferrable, the state has carved out a special exemption that allows a fishing-related business to stay in the family if a fisherman retires or dies.  But if that is the case, why allow a fisherman’s heir to sell the permit, if the fisherman couldn’t do the same? 

Wouldn’t it make more sense to allow the fisherman to transfer the license/permit to a family member if he/she chose to do so, but to sell it to an unrelated person if the fisherman thought that was the better thing to do?  Whether a permit was sold by a fisherman before his/her death, or by the fisherman’s heir after death, it will go to an unrelated third party either way, so it’s hard to see what state policy is better served by prohibiting fishermen from making such transfers.

The requirement that a commercial fishing license can only be issued to someone with previous fishing experience also seems difficult to defend.

Certainly, commercial fishing requires certain knowledge, skills, and abilities, and a person would be foolish to invest capital in a license and equipment unless they knew that they had the requisite abilities to be successful.  But the same can be said of many businesses.  It’s certainly true of restaurants, but no law in the State of New York requires someone to spend three years as a line cook before opening up a café.  Landscaping requires certain knowledge and skills, but anyone with a truck, some tools and the requisite insurance (and a pesticide certification if that service is offered) can get into the business without any prior experience trimming shrubs or cutting lawns. 

Why should commercial fishing be any different?

Is it merely because fishing communities want to take care of their own, and provide a pathway for deck crew to move into the wheelhouse?  While that sort of sentiment is understandable at some level, it shouldn’t be memorialized in state law, which serves best when it provides the greatest economic opportunities for everyone, regardless of their background.

A fisherman—or, as the law currently stands, a fisherman’s heir—should be able to sell a commercial license to whoever offers the best price, regardless of previous experience or the likelihood of commercial success.  Selling for the highest price that the market will bear is, after all, the goal of free enterprise.  Limiting potential buyers by requiring prior fishing experience virtually guarantees that the highest possible price for the license will not be realized.

It would seem that if someone may buy a gas station, delicatessen, dairy farm, or meat packing plant—all of which come with their own environmental, licensing, and/or food safety considerations—without having to demonstrate previous experience in the field, it’s difficult to make a business or policy argument for placing the current restrictions on buying a commercial fishing business, restrictions that can prevent the seller from maximizing the proceeds of the sale.

Yet those restrictions are there, largely because the commercial fishing business, like ranching, logging, and the family farm, have been romanticized in popular culture, which leads to them being viewed differently in the law.

But that is all an illusion.

A commercial fishing business is no less a business than a tire shop, hardware store, or the local gym.  It should be regulated only as much as necessary to conserve fish stocks and keep them  sustainable in the long term, protect the lives and the health of fishermen, and protect the health of those who purchase the fishermen’s products.

Economic issues are something that only the fishermen and the marketplace should decide.

 

 

 

UPDATING MRIP IN 2026: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECTOR ALLOCATIONS

 

A few days ago, I happened upon an article in The Outdoor Wire which noted that the Gulf Fishery Management Council delayed fishery management actions for scamp and yellowmouth grouper

“based on uncertainty associated with private recreational landings estimates generated by the federal recreational data collection program, the Marine Resource [sic] Information Program’s Fishing Effort Survey (MRIP-FES).  The Council is hesitant to base sector allocation for the Scamp Complex (scamp and yellowmouth grouper) on MRIP-FES estimates before its Scientific and Statistical Committee can review the results of a pilot study being conducted to address MRIP-FES overestimation issues.”

For those not familiar with the “overestimation issues,” in 2023, the National Marine Fisheries Service discovered that it’s Marine Recreational Information Program was overestimating recreational fishing effort, which in turn inflated recreational catch and landings estimates.  Apparently, due to the order of questions presented in the Fishing Effort Survey, anglers were reporting that they took more fishing trips than they actually did, skewing the survey results.

In response, NMFS engaged in a multi-year process to revise the Fishing Effort Survey.  That process is now at, or very close to, completion, and revised recreational effort, catch, and landings data should be available this spring, although the rollout might be delayed by last year’s government shutdown.  The revised effort—and so catch and landings—estimates are expected to be lower than those developed prior to the survey revisions.  It appears that private-boat data will be impacted more than the data for shore-based anglers, and that data for the periods when fewer anglers fished (expressed in two-month “waves”) will face greater revisions than data from periods with higher angling activity.  The extent of the revisions will also vary from state to state.

Assuming that everything is rolled out on, or at least somewhat close to, schedule, the next question is how the new data will impact fishery management measures, possibly including the allocation of the allowable catch between the commercial and recreational sectors.

When the Marine Recreational Information Program was initially adopted, it indicated that recreational fishing effort was higher than previously believed.  NMFS stated that

“For stocks assessed to date, this increase in effort from the [Fishing Effort Survey] in historical catch estimates has generally resulted in a retrospective increase in estimates of fish stock abundance, especially for those fisheries with large recreational components.”

It almost certainly follows that, when stock assessments are conducted after the downward-revised effort data becomes available—the 2027 benchmark stock assessment for striped bass comes to mind—the estimate of stock abundance will be revised downward in response to that data.

In most fisheries, that might not have a direct effect on recreational management measures; while the spawning stock biomass of a given fish stock might be lower than previously believed, the recreational removals of fish from that stock will also be lower than previously estimated.  As long as both the estimate of biomass and the estimate of recreational removals decline by about the same percentage, the current management measures might well remain unchanged.

However, that won’t be the case in commercial fisheries, which fish on a hard-poundage quota that is based on fish abundance.  (To oversimplify the quota-setting process, managers go through a series of steps to determine how many fish, measured in pounds/metric tons, can be safely removed from a population each year.  That becomes the annual catch limit, which is divided between the commercial and recreational sectors based on predetermined allocation percentages.  The commercial allocation, as modified for management uncertainty, becomes the commercial quota.)

If the spawning stock biomass was overestimated, the commercial quota based on that overestimate was probably too large.  Some fish stocks might have been harmed as a result.  Should that prove to be the case, and a stock is found to be significantly below its biomass target, and perhaps even overfished, recreational management measures might be indirectly affected, as both commercial and recreational landings are reduced in order to rebuild that stock to its biomass target.

But it’s not only management measures—size limits, bag limits, and seasons—that might be affected by the revised estimates of recreational effort, catch, and landings.  Allocations between the commercial and recreational sectors might be revised as well.

In 2022, after the Marine Recreational Information Program showed that historical recreational landings for summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass were higher than previously believed, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board adopted the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Commercial/Recreational Allocation Amendment.

One of the stated reasons for the amendment was that

“The commercial and recreational allocations for all three species are currently based on historical proportions of landings (for summer flounder and black sea bass) or catch (for scup) from each sector.  These allocations were set in the mid-1990s and have not been revised since that time.  Recent changes in how catch is estimated has resulted in a discrepancy between the current levels of estimated sector-specific catch and harvest and these allocations.”

In response to that discrepancy,

“For all three species, the preferred alternatives would revise the allocations using the same base years as the current allocations, updated with recent data on catch and landings in those years.  For all three species, the revised allocations would be catch-based and there would be no phase-in period.”

Thus, the amendment shifted the summer flounder allocation from 60% (of landings) commercial/40% recreational to 55% (of catch) commercial/45% recreational, shifted the black sea bass allocation from 49% (of landings) commercial/51% recreational to 45% (of catch) commercial/55% recreational, and shifted the scup allocation from 78% (of catch) commercial/22% recreational to 65% commercial/35% recreational, all based on the then-new Marine Recreational Information Program data.

Summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass were not the only species affected.  For example, also in 2022, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council revised the red grouper allocation from 76% commercial/24% recreational to 59.3% commercial/40.7% recreational, doing so

“Because the recreational landings estimates are greater using the new survey than the previous estimates of recreational landings, the commercial-recreational allocation would shift from 76 percent and 24 percent, respectively, to 59.3% and 40.7% respectively.”

One year later, in 2023, the same council shifted the commercial/recreational allocation for greater amberjack from 27% commercial/73% recreational to 20% commercial/80% recreational, again because the new Marine Recreational Information Program Fishing Effort Survey data indicated that anglers made more trips, and caught and landed more amberjack, in the years used to determine the allocation than managers previously believed.

That leads to the obvious question:  If the revised Fishing Effort Survey data leads to estimates of anglers’ catch being reduced in the base years used to calculate allocations, will the regional fishery management councils, consistent with their actions when recreational landings were revised upward, now revisit allocations to reflect the new understanding of recreational removals during the designated base years?

While going through such an exercise might not seem worthwhile for some species, where the shift might only be a percentage point or two, in other cases, a reallocation based on lower recreational catch and harvest might bring a real benefit to the commercial sector, particularly if the estimate of spawning stock biomass, and so commercial quota under current allocations, is reduced in response to the new recreational estimates.  Under such circumstances, a reallocation based on the revised numbers might keep some commercial quotas closer to the status quo.

That doesn’t mean that reallocation will necessarily happen; regional fishery management councils aren’t required to tie allocation to historical landings, and are free to leave things as they are.

Thus, when I look at the article that gave rise to this post, I have to admit that I’m a little surprised that the Gulf Council delayed its decision on scamp and yellowmouth grouper allocation.  While waiting for the Science and Statistical Committee’s analysis was the right thing to do—fisheries decisions should always be based on the best scientific information available—the Gulf Council, at least in recent years, has demonstrated a definite slant toward the recreational sector, and it’s pretty likely that delaying action on allocation won’t benefit the recreational side at all.

So, it will be interesting to see whether the other regional fishery management councils will revisit allocations, once the revised recreational catch and landings data is released.

 

 

 

 

 

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE STRIPED BASS "WORK GROUP"

 

When the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board met last October, they failed to adopt additional conservation measures that would make it more likely that the spawning stock biomass would be rebuilt by 2029, the deadline set by the fishery management plan.  But one thing that the Board did do was agree to set up a “Work Group

“to develop a white paper that could inform a future management document.  The Work Group should include representation from all sectors in addition to scientists and managers.  The goal of this Work Group is to consider how to update the [fishery management plan’s] goals, objectives, and management of striped bass beyond 2029, in consideration of severely reduced reproductive success in the Chesapeake Bay.  The Work Group should utilize public comment, including that received during the Addendum III process to inform its research and management recommendations and work with the Benchmark [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] to incorporate ideas and deliver necessary data products.  Work group discussions should include the following topics:

·       Review [biological reference points] and consider recruitment-sensitive, model-based approaches.

·       Formally review hatchery stocking as both a research tool and a management tool for striped bass w/cost analysis.

·       Evaluate the potential for other river systems to contribute to the coastal stock.

·       Explore drivers of recruitment success/failure in Chesapeake Bay, Delaware, and the Hudson in light of changing climatic and environmental conditions, including potential impacts from invasive species.

·       Explore the reproductive contribution of large and small female fish and the implications of various size-based management tools.

·       Methods to address the discard mortality in the catch-and-release fishery.”

That gives the Work Group a very broad mandate to investigate, and provide recommendations on, striped bass management issues, and creates the potential for the Work Group to have a very positive or a very negative impact on striped bass management, and the long-term health, sustainability, and structure of the striped bass stock.  As is so often the case, it will all depend on how the Management Board decides to structure and constitute the Work Group, an issue that it will discuss when it meets at 8:30 next Wednesday morning (February 5).

One of the most important questions is who will be included among the Work Group’s members.  The ASMFC has adopted guidelines, titled the “Work Group Meeting Standard Operating Practices and Procedures,” which sets the outer limits for membership, saying

“Membership should be a limited subset of Board members approved by the Chair of the Board or the Board itself.  Ideally, members will represent diverse perspectives on the issue at hand.  WGs can request non-Board members to provide information to the WG but will not be members of the WG itself.”

That last sentence could create some problems.  As a recreational striped bass fisherman, I’m particularly sensitive to that possibility, for while the motion creating the Work Group stated that “The Work Group should include representation from all sectors in addition to scientists and managers,” the unfortunate truth is that, apart from a few people from New England and perhaps one more from Pennsylvania, I don’t believe that there are any independent recreational fishermen on the Management Board. 

There are plenty of commercial fishermen, and representatives of the for-hire fishing industry, as well as representatives of recreational industry-affiliated organizations such as the Coastal Conservation Association sitting on the Board, but finding even one recreational fisherman who isn’t beholden to the for-hire or tackle or boating industries in one way or another, and is willing to represent the shore-based and private-boat anglers’ point of view, might not be an easy job. 

Some of the state fisheries managers do a pretty good job of representing such anglers’ concerns, but while it’s nice that others might be willing to speak on your behalf, it’s always better to be able to speak for yourself.  But given the composition of the Management Board, that might be hard for anglers to do.

The fact that the motion directed the Work Group to update the fishery management plan’s goals and objectives is also something of a red flag.  Right now, Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass states that

“The goal of Amendment 7 to the FMP is to perpetuate, through cooperative interstate fishery management, migratory stocks of striped bass; to allow commercial and recreational fisheries consistent with the long-term maintenance of a broad age structure, a self-sustaining spawning stock; and also to provide for the restoration and maintenance of their essential habitat.”

It's not particularly clear what in that goal would need to change, even in view of the recent poor recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay and elsewhere on the coast.  Goals, after all, are aspirational, representing an end that one hopes to achieve, despite whatever obstacles lie in the way.  Continued poor recruitment might, for example, make it more difficult to maintain a “broad age structure” in the population.  Yet managing for some other goal—say, sacrificing the larger, older females in order to maintain a higher fishing mortality rate—would only make the stock more vulnerable to unexpected changes in fishing mortality or environmental conditions, something that would be patently unwise at low recruitment levels.

Similar arguments could be made for keeping the objectives unchanged.  According to Amendment 7

“In support of [the] goal, the following objectives are specified:

1.  Manage striped bass fisheries under a control rule designed to maintain stock size at or above the target female spawning stock biomass level and a level of fishing mortality at or below the target exploitation rate.

2.  Manage fishing mortality to maintain an age structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long-term abundance of striped bass populations.

3.  Provide a management plan that strives, to the extent practical, to maintain coastwide consistency of implemented measures, while allowing the states defined flexibility to implement alternative strategies that accomplish the objectives of the FMP.

4.  Foster quality and economically-viable recreational, for-hire, and commercial fisheries.

5.  Maximize cost-effectiveness of current information gathering and prioritize state obligations in order to minimize costs of monitoring and management.

6.  Adopt a long-term management regime that minimizes or eliminates the need to make annual changes or modifications to management measures.

7.  Establish a fishing mortality target that will result in a net increase in abundance (pounds) of age 15 and older striped bass in the population, relative to the 2000 estimate.”

While it might be difficult, and even practically impossible, to maintain female spawning stock biomass at the target level in the face of continued poor recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay, such poor recruitment would make it even more important that fishing mortality remain at or below the target, to keep spawning stock biomass from falling even further.  And striving to maintain an age structure adequate to support the greatest possible abundance becomes an even more important objective under such circumstances, for with a dearth of young bass entering the population, the remaining older fish might be needed to jump-start a recovery when favorable spawning conditions finally occur, as they were needed to initiate the recovery of the late 1980s.

The Board also addressed the “goals and objectives” issue when Amendment 7 was being drafted five years ago.  At that time, public comment was solicited on the question, and 1,719 of those comments (98.4%) supported the goals and objectives that are currently in the plan, while only 28 supported change.  Given such lopsided opinion, it seems unreasonable to open up that discussion again.

Those issues aside, the bullet points included in the motion raise some interesting issues which, when answered, could well assist future management efforts.

The issue of biological reference points might be the most interesting of all.

Right now, the reference points used to manage the striped bass stock aren’t truly “biological,” in the sense that they weren’t developed from the model used to assess the stock.  Instead, they have been termed “empirical” reference points, based on the estimated spawning stock biomass in 1995, the year that the once-collapsed striped bass stock was deemed to be fully recovered.  Such reference points are based on observation, as the reference points calculated by the model during the last benchmark stock assessment were deemed to be “unrealistic.”

It is possible that, when the 2027 benchmark stock assessment is conducted, the model used—which might or might not be the same model used the last time—will produce calculated biological reference points.  If that occurs, such calculated reference points should certainly be adopted to manage the stock.  However, if the model again returns “unrealistic” reference points, then reference points based on 1995 spawning stock biomass ought, again, to be used.

Regardless of how the reference points are calculated, we should all understand that they are going to change from those now in effect.  It is virtually certain that the spawning stock biomass reference points will be lowered, and that the fishing mortality reference points will be amended to match that change.  That’s because the Marine Recreational Information Program’s estimates of recreational effort, catch, and landings are going to be revised ahead of the 2027 benchmark assessment, to correct for a previous overestimation of recreational effort, which inflated catch and landings data.  Since the estimate of spawning stock biomass is, in part, dependent on the estimate of recreational catch and landings, once the MRIP estimates are reduced, the estimate of biomass is going to go down, too.

That’s not a bad thing, but rather a natural step in biologists’ quest for the most accurate data.

But what we do need to look out for is one or more members of the Work Group trying to influence that group to lower the biomass target and threshold in an effort to increase commercial and/or recreational landings.  In the past, we’ve seen some Management Board members, in particular Michael Luisi of Maryland and John Clark of Delaware, try to do so, arguing that the current reference points are too high because the biomass target has only been reached for a few brief years in all the past few decades.

The flaw in their argument is that, during much of the time since 1995, and in 11 of the 14 years between 2004 and 2017, the striped bass stock was experiencing overfishing; there were few if any years since the stock was first declared to be recovered when fishing mortality was at or below the target level.  With fishing mortality at such high and unsustainable levels, it was near-miraculous that the biomass ever rose to a level even close to the target, even for just a few years.  But with fishing mortality kept to or below the target level, and assuming that recruitment also returns to historical patterns, a biomass target of 125% of 1995 levels isn’t unrealistic at all.

Of course, there is also a real chance that recruitment might remain at lower levels, due to changing environmental conditions in the Chesapeake Bay.  But should that prove to be the case, raising the fishing mortality target would be an even riskier, and even more foolish, thing to do.

Even before the Work Group is organized, the Board will have the opportunity to suggest “alternative” reference points that could be be included in the upcoming benchmark stock assessment, probably as soon as the February 5 meeting.  So the issue of reference points may be one of the most urgent items that the Worg Group will consider.

The remainder of the bullet points in the motion raise equally legitimate questions, which have either emerged in the public discussions—such as the popular, if patently incorrect argument that the decline in recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay isn’t too important, because the Chesapeake bass are just moving north and spawning in some yet-unidentified northern rivers—or are going to be key issues of striped bass management discussions going forward.

In the end, the output of the Work Group may depend largely upon the input given by its members, and those members are yet to be chosen.  Despite the clear language of the “Work  Group Meeting Standard Practices and Procedures” document, there is at least a suggestion that non-Board members may be included in the Group, as a Work Group related document provided ahead of the February 5 meeting asks the questions

“1.  What is the maximum size of the WG to ensure the group will function effectively?

2.  Will each WG seat be allocated by category type to ensure representation of the full management range and diversity of stakeholder interests?

3.  Will there be a specific nomination process, e.g. each state can nominate x number of participants?

4.  How will individuals be chosen?”

Such language neither limits Work Group participation to Board members nor clearly includes non-Board as Work Group members, but seems to at least suggest that non-Board members might be considered.

If that proves to be the case, we can only hope that independent anglers will be adequately represented.  After all, in 2024, the recreational sector accounted for about 85% of all striped bass fishing mortality, and within the sector, shore-based and private boat anglers accounted for about 98.5% of all recreational trips.  Such anglers are, by far, the largest group of stakeholders, both in numbers and in impact, in the overall striped bass fishery.  They have their own views and concerns, which are not the same of the industry organizations who might seek—and even claim—to represent them. 

In any equitable process, independent shore-based and private-boat anglers must be allowed to speak with their own voice.   

They do not seek to dominate the conversation, or to have every issue decided in their favor.  But as the largest of all of the stakeholder groups in the striped bass fishery, they have the right to a seat at the table, and to have their voice carry at least as much weight as those of the for-hire, tackle, and boating industries, who in the end depend on individual anglers for their very survival.

It is up to the Board to ensure that the right things are done.

POLITICAL FISH

 

Not too many years ago, there was a group called the Recreational Fishing Alliance that tried to influence saltwater fisheries management policy.  The group was never particularly influential or effective, at least outside of New Jersey.  It was, for all practical purposes, a vanity project conceived of and in large part financed by the wealthy owner of a well-known boatbuilding company, and was better known for getting in the way of worthwhile conservation efforts than in getting anything meaningful done.

It very deservedly ceased doing business a little over two years ago, but while it was on the wrong side of just about every fisheries management debate, there was one thing that it got completely right, and that was a bumper sticker that it sold which simply said,

“Fish are political animals.”

That’s not something that we generally like to admit.

We like to believe that the fisheries management process is a science-based endeavor, in which dedicated fisheries managers consistently apply the best scientific information available to management issues and so obtain optimum results.  But while that’s how the system is supposed to work, and while there really are a lot of very capable scientists and very dedicated professional fisheries managers out there trying their best to properly manage fish stocks, the unfortunate truth is that politics drives much of the process, a fact that frustrates the scientists and professional managers as much as it does the commercial and recreational fishermen who depend on healthy and sustainable fish stocks for the livelihoods and/or recreation.

Start by considering just who the fisheries managers are.

Here in New York, which is more-or-less similar to the management structure of most Atlantic Coast states, our marine fish are subject to three levels of management:  1) by the National Marine Fisheries Service, usually acting on the advice of the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council, 2) by the states, acting cooperatively through the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and 3) by the State of New York, with the advice of its Marine Resources Advisory Council.

In each of those cases, the Director of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Resources Division, or their representative, has a seat at the table, where they are joined by others, who are selected in accord with the laws governing the particular management body.

In the case of the Mid-Atlantic Council, the Marine Resources Director is currently joined by three other persons (each state is guaranteed only one seat for a state manager and one other, “obligatory” seat, and must compete with other states for the “at-large” seats that become available) nominated by the governor and appointed by the United States Secretary of Commerce. 

While individuals seeking nomination can and do submit their names to the DEC, who will forward them to the executive chamber for consideration, who the governor nominates, and the order in which the nominees are listed, is a highly political process; there is no guarantee that the person most favored by the DEC will be listed as then governor’s top choice, and there have been multiple occasions when New York delayed submitting its list of nominees to the Secretary of Commerce after a politically-connected person, representing themselves or speaking for one special interest group or another, engaged in back-room politics to contest the originally-proposed list of nominees and have it altered to suit their purposes. 

Once the list of nominees is submitted to the Secretary of Commerce, the appointment process again relies on political clout, as national recreational fishing, commercial fishing, and conservation groups each try to convince the Secretary, or others farther down the chain of command, to appoint the nominee that will best represent their interests.  During the mid-2000s, the debate over who would hold a New York seat on the Mid-Atlantic Council even reached the White House and its Council on Environmental Quality; it was decided, at least in part, after a long-time fishing buddy of the president’s father—who lived in Texas, and had nothing to do with New York at all—urged the appointment of his favored candidate.

At the ASMFC, the process is simpler, but no less political.  There, each state is represented by three designated individuals, an Administrative Appointee, who is typically the state’s top marine fisheries manager, a Governor’s Appointee, and a Legislative Appointee, who often assigns their vote to a proxy.  Once again, becoming a Governor’s Appointee or a Legislative Proxy is a purely political process, with multiple interest groups vying to see that their representative is named.

Finally, there are the state management panels, which in New York takes the form of the Marine Resources Advisory Council, which is chaired by the head of the School of Marine of Marine and Atmospheric Science at Stony Brook University or their designee, and consists of seven members of the recreational fishery and seven members of the commercial fishery.  Of the seven representatives from each sector, three are appointed by the DEC, and typically represent fishermen already active in the management process, with two more appointed by the state Senate and two appointed by the state Assembly.  The political connections needed for the latter appointments are obvious, although perhaps not as egregious as the connections needed to get a seat on one southern state’s fisheries commission, which are usually awarded to the interested parties who donated the most to the governor’s last reelection campaign.

In most of the instances described above, it’s pretty clear that the ordinary citizen, unaffiliated with a politically-connected group, has about as much chance to be appointed to a management seat as a snowball has of enjoying—and surviving—a month-long stay in Hell.

So, when it comes to many management decisions, the deck is already stacked in someone’s favor—just who depends on the forum—before the debate even begins.

And, of course, the fishery being debated matters as well, because some fish just have more charisma than others, garner more public support, and so get more management attention.

Consider the winter flounder.

Averaging maybe a foot long, dull brown on one side and white on the other, with a small mouth and a twisted face that has both eyes on the same side of its head, the flounder was no one’s idea of “charismatic megafauna.”  Yet it was once the backbone of recreational fishing in states between Massachusetts and New Jersey, and supported important commercial fisheries as well.

Recreational flounder landings peaked around 1984, and then quickly began to decline along with the flounder biomass, particularly in the southern New England/mid-Atlantic region.  At about the same time, populations of Atlantic bluefin tuna and of North Atlantic swordfish were in steep decline.  While the decline of the flounder was probably at least as severe as that of the two pelagic species, when conservation organizations had a choice between depicting majestic bluefin tuna and swordfish, sleek and silver as they sped through blue water, in their fundraising materials, or depicting the humble brown flounder humping across a submerged mud flat, hunting for worms and such, charisma dictated the choice.  Public relations campaigns educated the public about the declining fortunes of the charismatic species, and put political pressure on fisheries managers to take meaningful action to end their decline.  The winter flounder enjoyed no such attention.

All of that attention certainly benefitted the big, charismatic fish.  Today, the bluefin tuna population appears to be reasonably healthy (although some disagree), while broadbill swordfish in the North Atlantic are completely recovered.  On the other hand, the spawning stock biomass of southern New England/mid-Atlantic winter flounder fell from about 50 million pounds in the early 1980s to somewhere around 7 million pounds today, and shows no signs of improvement.

Because for fish as for people, once they enter the political sphere, charisma matters.

We recently saw the same sort of thing play out here in New York.

In 2024, a bill to shut down the commercial horseshoe crab fishery was introduced in both houses of the state legislature.  The sponsors were both politicians from the west side of Manhattan, and probably didn’t spend a lot of time on the water, but instead sponsored the bill at the request of some national conservation groups that weren’t interested in the horseshoe crabs themselves, but on a bird called the red knot, which depended on horseshoe crab eggs for food, and were being seriously threatened by the decline in horseshoe crab abundance.

The problem was that the biggest red knot feeding ground, where horseshoe crab eggs were most important to the red knots, was the Delaware Bay.  While some red knots did stop along New York’s beaches during the horseshoe crab spawn, it was not the sort of feeding ground that Delaware Bay was; in fact, the next major red knot stopover were the extensive tidal flats off Massachusetts.

That didn’t mean that New York’s horseshoe crabs were doing OK.  The horseshoe crab population is broken down into local stocks, and the New York stock (which is defined to include both New York and Connecticut) is considered to be in “poor” condition relative to its historical abundance.  But New York’s fisheries managers were already trying to get on top of the problem by implementing appropriate management measures.  While the ASMFC allocated 366,272 horseshoe crabs to the state each year, the Department of Environmental Conservation limited annual harvest to just 150,000—less than half of the state allocation—and implemented closures around the full and new moons in May and June, when the animals crowded onto shallow beaches to spawn.

The measures worked so well that, by early October 2025, only 67,000 horseshoe crabs—about 45% of New York’s already-reduced 150,000 crab quota—had been landed, and the likelihood of many more being landed was slight.

But that wasn’t good enough for the political folks who, along with their various organizations, were pushing for the bill.  For them, the issue wasn’t good horseshoe crab management, but scoring a “win” by shutting down the fishery.  So they kept up the pressure, at one point even enlisting the help of the late primatologist Jane Goodall who, with all respect to her work and her memory, might not ever have seen a live horseshoe crab in her life, but was nevertheless willing to contribute her name and her cachet as a famed scientist to the cause.

Because that’s the way it goes when a fish (or other marine resource) goes political; expertise and facts carry far less weight than public relations and personal clout.

Even so, New York’s governor heeded the advice she received from the DEC and vetoed the 2024 bill.  But political pressure can be inexorable.  A new bill to close the horseshoe crab fishery was introduced early in 2025, and the various political forces redoubled their efforts to make that bill law.  Eventually, with some compromise language that would phase in the closure over four years, it was signed into law, against the advice of the DEC and the Marine Resources Advisory Council, in the waning days of the year.

In that case, political pressure by well-meaning people and organizations resulted in the passage of legislation that was probably unnecessary but, on balance, might well end up doing more good than harm.

But politics can go the other way, too.

In 2023, the ASMFC adopted Addendum XXVII to Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Lobster, which was initially viewed as a precautionary measure that would permit a rapid response should recruitment of Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank lobster enter a substantial decline.  At the time it was passed, no one realized that such a decline was already on the horizon, and that just months after Addendum XXVII was adopted, its new management measures, which included an increase in the minimum size, would be triggered due to a 39% crash in lobster recruitment.

Affected lobster fishermen were, for the most part, adamantly opposed to the regulatory change, and implementation was repeatedly delayed.  Eventually, the opportunities for delay began to wane, and final implementation of the new management measures was scheduled for July 1, 2025.  But the lobster fishermen weren’t having any of that.  Having failed to further delay implementation at the ASMFC, they turned to political remedies.

The debate probably hit its nadir after New Hampshire’s Republican governor, Kelly Ayotte, wrote a letter to the ASMFC which read, in part,

“I have heard loud and clear from our lobstermen, commercial fishermen, and concerned legislators and citizens from our Seacoast that this minimum size increase will have a negative impact on an industry already strained by existing regulations.  To ensure the survival of an iconic and historical industry in our state and our region, and to ensure our nation remains competitive in global trade, I ask you today to rescind these new guidelines.  In the meantime, New Hampshire will comply with the previous minimum size for lobster in an effort to preserve this proud industry.”

Just in case anyone failed to understand that her letter represented a gentle way of telling the ASMFC to kiss off, she also put up a post on X.com (formerly “Twitter”) which read

“New Hampshire will not comply with burdensome regulations that harm our lobstermen.

“We will protect this iconic and historic industry nin our state.”

The text was accompanied by an image featuring a star, a lobster, and the words

“COME AND TAKE IT.”

Normally, the ASMFC’s response to such defiance would be to find the state out of compliance with its fishery management plan and, in accordance with the terms of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, forward its finding to the Secretary of Commerce who, after finding that New Hampshire was, in fact, out of compliance with a management provision necessary for the conservation of the lobster fishery, would impose a moratorium on that fishery until the state chose to comply.

However, faced with defiance by a governor who belonged to the same political party as the President of the United States, and given that, during his first term, that President had already issued an Executive Order seeking to deregulate the nation’s commercial fisheries, which suggested that his Commerce Secretary would not find New Hampshire out of compliance (and also facing resistance from fishermen in other states), the American Lobster Management Board backed down and eventually adopted a new addendum that revoked then challenged management measures.

Politics had defeated science once again.

Which brings us to Atlantic menhaden, which may be the most political fish of all.

No one with any credibility will deny that menhaden are a very important forage fish all along the East Coast.  But for many years, and particularly after the publication of a book titled The Most Important Fish in the Sea, which was written by a non-scientist and cultural historian who exaggerated  the species’ role in coastal ecosystems, menhaden management has been badly politicized.  Much of that politicization revolved around the fact that most menhaden are landed by what is known as the “reduction fishery,” a fishery involving very large, very visible boats which deploy very large purse seines capable of capturing an entire school of fish in one set.  The fact that such vessels are owned and operated by a single company, Ocean Harvesters, and sell to a single buyer, Omega Protein Corporation, which is owned by a very large Canadian fisheries products company, Cooke Inc., only inflames the debate.

The notion of a single corporation conducting an industrial-scale fishery for menhaden just seems to rub folks the wrong way, perhaps because it offends their notion of commercial fishermen as strong, independent operators who risk their lives taking small boats out into a big ocean in order to bring home seafood that will feed the public.  The actual number of menhaden being caught, and scientists’ stock assessments declaring that the menhaden stock is neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing, seem to take up little room in their arguments, which mostly revolve around claims that the reduction fleet’s activities lead to “localized depletion” of menhaden, even though localized depletion has never yet been established—or even adequately defined.

In that sort of environment, it’s probably not surprising to see that the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership has announced that it’s hiring a public relations agency to assist it with its menhaden management campaign, to

“highlight the far-reaching impacts of menhaden management decisions, engage anglers, conservationists, and policymakers through strategic media outreach and storytelling.”

Storytelling, not science, because they’re engaging at the political level, where telling the right story is all that matters. 

It’s not an effort to educate the public, which would be based on stock assessments and hard data, but rather an effort to propagandize the public, by telling stories that tug at the emotions rather than providing facts that tug at the intellect.

It’s probably an effort at greenwashing, too, prosecuted by an organization that tried to undercut federal red snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico and more recently opposed proposed measures to conserve Atlantic striped bass and make it more likely that the spawning stock biomass would be fully rebuilt by the 2029 deadline established in the fishery management plan.

It’s unfortunate, but in the political side of fisheries management, perceptions always trump facts, and the organizations with the money and political clout to propagandize the public and impact the management process nearly always come out ahead.

Which means that until conservation-minded anglers figure out how to come together and invest their time and financial assets in the political process, they will always be left behind.