THE ASMFC PUNTS ON TAUTOG MANAGEMENT--AGAIN

 

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission has never been known for its fast responses to fisheries issues.

We saw that in 2014, when the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board ignored its own management plan, and failed to initiate a ten-year rebuilding plan even after a so-called “management trigger” requiring them to do just that was tripped in the 2013 benchmark stock assessment.\

We saw it again in 2019, after a new benchmark assessment also tripped a trigger requiring a striped bass rebuilding plan, and the Bass Board decided to initiate a full-blown Amendment 7—a process that took two full years—before addressing the rebuilding issue (although, to be fair, it did at least adopt the emergency regulations in 2023, after high recreational landings in 2022 rendered timely rebuilding, without additional management action, unlikely).

And we saw it last October, when the Bass Board took a wait-and-see approach to rebuilding the stock by the 2029 deadline, rather than impose the 12% reduction in fishing mortality that would have made rebuilding more likely.

I mention striped bass because they’ve been called the ASMFC’s “flagship species,” but the history of ASMFC delays extends well into the past, and touches on multiple species.

I was down in Alexandria, Virginia for the January 1999 meeting of the Winter Flounder Management Board, and so was a witness when that Board approved a motion to

“suspend consideration of any state’s compliance with the F40 contained in Addendum I, as amended by Addendum 2 [sic], pending development of a new amendment to the [fishery management plan], as long as a state maintains and continues to implement and enforce its current regulations,”

and in doing so perhaps dashed the last hope of preventing the collapse of the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock.

And a lot of us were listening to the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board meeting last October when, despite knowing that the fishing mortality rate was far above the fishing mortality target (although not above threshold), and that fecundity (total egg production, used in lieu of a spawning stock biomass reference point) was well below target and only 5% above the threshold that defines an overfished stock, the Board took no meaningful action to reduce menhaden landings, merely reducing the annual catch limit by 20%--when the fishery was already falling 20% short of catching its quota—setting it at 186,840 metric tons, rather than beginning the process of reducing the total allowable catch to the 108,000 metric tons needed to achieve a 50% probability of constraining the fishing mortality rate to or below its target.

So no, the ASMFC isn’t particularly quick to take action to rebuild stocks or reduce fishing mortality to levels that are sustainable in the long term.  But even within the ASMFC universe, some species seem to be singled out for greater delays and less management action. 

Of those, American lobster have probably suffered the most malign neglect, with the American Lobster Management Board presiding over the collapse of the Southern New England stock, pointedly ignoring repeated scientific advice to shut down the fishery for at least five years, and expressing far more concern for the short-term interests of lobster fishermen than the lobster resource itself.  Recently, as recruitment in the Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank stock declined, we see history repeating itself there, although in that case, the ASMFC was also plagued with a political climate that might well have frustrated the an efforts that it might have decided to make.

But right behind American lobster, we find the tautog, a fish that the ASMFC has managed since 1996 and, after 30 years, still can’t seem to get right.

The original fishery management plan, adopted in 1996, begins with the statement,

“The Plan defines overfishing as a rate of fishing mortality exceeding the natural mortality rate (M=0.15).  This overfishing definition is consistent with the slow growth and long lifespan of this species.  In addition, this conservative reference point is warranted given the uncertainty in stock structure and in the spawning biomass required to maintain at least average recruitment.”

That seemed like a pretty good start, because managers didn’t know very much about the tautog resource.

“The primary reason for the development of a tautog [fishery management plan] is the vulnerability of tautog to overfishing…Fisheries managers lack most of the biological and fisheries data necessary for effective management of the tautog resource.  Estimates of recreational and commercial catches are poor.  Information on migration and critical habitat utilization are lacking in most of the species range.  Inadequate data are available on size and age distribution, natural and fishing mortality rates, and recruitment.  Little information is available on critical habitat availability, current habitat status, or the capability of artificial habitats to expand species abundance…Because of the uncertainties associated with all aspects of the tautog resource, an interstate cooperative effort is needed to effectively manage this species.  [emphasis added]”      

Managers were effectively caught up in a fog of uncertainty, and as anyone who has ever run a boat in the fog knows all too well, when you can’t see where you’re going, you need to exercise extreme caution at all times to avoid running aground.

While biologists know more about the tautog’s life history today than they did 30 years ago, even in 1996, the ASMFC was already aware of the basic principles—conservative management based on the life history of the species, as well as the scientific (and later management) uncertainty surrounding the tautog and the tautog fishery—that should guide tautog management.

But as we soon learned, there was a big difference between the ASMFC knowing how to properly approach tautog management, and actually putting that knowledge into practice.

Management stumbled right from the start.  While the management plan defined overfishing as a fishing mortality rate that exceeded F=0.15, it also explicitly allowed overfishing to occur in 1997 and 1998, setting the target fishing mortality rate for those years at F=0.24, after which it was supposed to be lowered to the fishing mortality threshold of F=0.15.

And yes, the target fishing mortality was set to equal the overfishing threshold; the Tautog Management Board decided to skate along the razor’s edge, setting management measures that resided right at the threshold level.  It left no margin for error at all.

Thus, it set a commercial and recreational size limit of 13 inches in 1997 and 14 inches in 1998 and beyond, and left it up to the states to adopt whatever additional measures were needed to achieve the required reduction in fishing mortality.  It wasn’t quite clear what those additional management measures needed to be, but with the fishing mortality rate estimated at somewhere between F=0.58 and F=0.77, it was clear that very substantial restrictions were needed.

Facing the uncertainties inherent in the fisheries data, and the difficulties states would have in crafting management measures, it didn’t take long before the ASMFC decided to punt.

Stating that

“The implementation schedule approved in the original Tautog [Fishery Management Plan] may be problematic because (1) data are not available to evaluate scheduled regulatory obligations, and (2) the implementation schedule is not consistent for all states.  The FMP required all states to submit a commercial fishery management proposal in October 1996 for review by the Technical Committee and approval by the Board.  During this review it became apparent that the data are insufficient to satisfactorily evaluate the current fishing mortality in a number of states and to properly evaluate state fishing mortality reduction proposals.  Fortunately, many states began increased data collection efforts in 1996 that will lead to more accurate estimation of fishing mortality on both a coastwide and regional basis.  It will take time for this data to be analyzed and incorporated into the management program.  Also, some states have indicated that the differential compliance schedule is inequitable,”

the Tautog Management Board adopted Amendment 1 to the management plan in 1997.

Amendment 1 stood for the proposition that, instead of imposing some almost certainly imperfect management measures, that could later be amended, to reduce fishing mortality right away, the Board would allow overfishing to continue at a rate three, or four, or maybe even five times the overfishing threshold, allowing the stock to decline further until, in 1998, overfishing would continue at only a rate of F=0.24.  Finally, in 2000, states would have to reduce the fishing mortality rate to F=0.15, where the slightest miscalculation would subject the stock to overfishing once again.

It wasn’t a strategy designed for success, and it probably wouldn’t have worked, but we’ll never know, because in 1999, the ASMFC punted again, adopting Addendum II to the management plan, which stated that

“The implementation schedule in Addendum I has been a problem given the life history of tautog and the relatively short duration that the current regulations have been implemented.  According to Addendum I the states were required to implement management measures to meet the F=0.24 requirement by April 1, 1998.  Therefore, as of September 1999, these regulations have only been implemented for about 17 months.

“Addendum I also requires that the states submit proposals to meet the F=0.15 target by October 1, 1999.  The Technical Committee is developing a stock assessment to evaluate the effects of the current regulations and determine the extent of reductions that will need to be made by the states to meet the F=0.15 target.  During the development of the assessment the Technical Committee has often noted that the effects of the current regulations may not be reflected in the assessment.

“The assessment will use the data that has been collected through 1998.  Therefore, only nine months (April-December 1998) of data reflecting the new management regime will be included in the assessment.  Given the fact that the assessment will supply limited advice on the effects of the current regulations, the Management Board approved delaying the implementation of the F=0.15 target for two years, until April 1, 2022.  [emphasis added]”

So, once again, the Management Board was willing to let overfishing continue, rather than impose some sort of precautionary management that might get it under control.

By this time, we’re starting to see a pattern emerge where, when faced with uncertainty, the Tautog Management Board is far more willing to let overfishing continue, and risk further harm to the stock, than it is to impose more restrictive management measures that might end up reducing the fishing mortality rate more than is absolutely necessary.

That bias toward risking overharvest, rather than reducing landings more than might be required, has often haunted ASMFC deliberations, but has been a particular trait of the Tautog Management Board for the past three full decades.

By 2002, when fishing mortality was supposed to have been reduced to F=0.15, biologists had finally amassed some meaningful information on the tautog’s life history, which suggested that the stock could sustain a fishing mortality rate of F=0.29.  A recent stock assessment indicated that fishing mortality had been reduced from F=0.71 to F=0.41, so additional management measures were still needed, but it appeared that abundance had increased modestly, although spawning stock biomass had declined.

In response, the Tautog Management Board adopted Addendum III to the management plan, which placed all of the conservation burden on the shoulders of the recreational fishery, requiring states to adopt regulations that would reduce the overall fishing mortality rate to F=0.29.  The commercial fishery would not be affected at all.

It turned out that Addendum III was a little too optimistic, although it didn’t appear to do any harm.  So, in 2007, the Management Board adopted Addendum IV to the management plan, which backtracked on the fishing mortality target, reducing it to F=0.20.  But Addendum III had successfully reduced the fishing mortality rate to F=0.28, just below Addendum III’s fishing mortality target, and biomass and recruitment showed what Addendum IV called a “slight increase.”

Things seemed to still be headed in the right direction, albeit very slowly.  But later in the same year, the Management Board decided to rethink its decision to make the recreational sector pay the full price of rebuilding the tautog stock, while commercial fishermen got a pass.  It adopted Addendum V to the management plan, which allowed states to achieve the required 25.6% reduction in fishing mortality by imposing new measures on both recreational and commercial fishermen.

But by 2011, all of those good feelings came crashing down, and fisheries managers realized that they had been overly optimistic all along.  Another management action, Addendum VI to the management plan, was needed.  That addendum began by admitting the failure of previous efforts:

“The 2011 tautog stock assessment update estimated that the tautog stock is overfished with overfishing occurring.  Spawning stock biomass (SSB) has remained at low levels for the last decade.  A reduction in the target F is necessary to rebuild the stock.  [emphasis added]”

It turned out that the original tautog management plan, adopted in 1996, had gotten things right all along, despite the lack of needed biological information.  To rebuild the stock, the fishing mortality rate needed to be reduced to the same F=0.15 proposed in that original plan.  Raising the target fishing mortality rate in the interim, although done in good faith, ultimately resulted in nothing more than a stalled rebuilding timeline.

Finally, in 2017, fisheries managers finally had enough information to make a comprehensive, and somewhat successful, change to the tautog management program, which came in the form of Amendment 1 to the management plan.  Amendment 1 admitted that

“Based on the 2015 Benchmark Stock Assessment and Peer Review Report, tautog is overfished and overfishing is occurring on a coastwide scale,”

so it became clear that Addendum VI, despite its reduced fishing mortality target, was nowhere near restrictive enough to turn things around. 

Up in New England, Massachusetts and Rhode Island were acting on their own, putting more restrictive regulations in place in an effort to recover their local tautog population.  Their efforts seemed to be working, with spawning stock biomass increasing and the fishing mortality rate trending down.

Amendment 1 made that sort of thing easier to do, as it recognized that the coastwide tautog stock is made up of local populations that don’t engage in extensive migrations.  The Amendment broke the stock up into four regional populations, Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Long Island Sound, New Jersey/New York Bight, and Delaware/Maryland/Virginia, each of which would have different, regionally-appropriate biological reference points for spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate, and be governed by different regulations.

Amendment 1’s new approach held a lot of promise, and was arguably the first truly meaningful effort to manage tautog in over 20 years.  Before Amendment 1, tautog management could be characterized as a light-handed approach, where half-measures were imposed in an effort to minimize disruptions to the fishery.  Amendment 1, on the other hand, seemed an earnest effort to overhaul tautog management and fully rebuild all four local populations.

At the same time, Amendment 1 didn’t go as far as it should have to reduce fishing mortality and rebuild the stock, due to substantial opposition from the for-hire fishing industry, which took an aggressive stand against any landings reductions. 

I attended the hearing on Amendment 1 that was held at the offices of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Division in June17, where the room was packed—standing room only—with party and charter boat operators who showed no respect for the forum or for the process as they loudly opposed any additional restrictions, hooted and cheered when one party boat captain told the ASMFC representative that “We don’t care about your science.  Your science is bullcrap,” regularly interrupted the proceedings with various hostile comments, threatened to sue somebody—it wasn’t completely clear who—for lost profits resulting from any new restrictions, claimed that “fraud was committed” and, in one case, yelled and screamed and cursed at the hearing officer, and somehow got away with it all.

More than got away with it, as things turned out, because they convinced New York’s ASMFC delegation to oppose any management measures with a measurable probability of success.

And New York wasn’t alone, as at the October 2017 Tautog Management Board meeting, where Amendment 1 was approved, Toni Kearns, the ASMFC’s Fisheries Policy Director, noted that

“As a reminder of the option in the document itself, for the probability of achieving the F target.  The addendum [sic] had two options; either status quo, which was no probability or Option B, which was a 50 percent probability of achieving the F target.

“There was a range of support for status quo throughout the different hearings, as well as some support for the 50 percent probability.”

What that basically meant is that most of the stakeholders who commented wanted an amendment more likely to fail than succeed, just so long as they could keep killing tautog.  And in some places, such as Long Island Sound and New Jersey/New York Bight, they got exactly what they asked for.

That sort-of worked out for Long Island Sound, where the stock is no longer overfished nor subject to overfishing, but it didn’t do so well for the New Jersey/New York Bight population, which still experiences overfishing (as did the Delaware/Maryland/Virginia population, although there, the best estimates are that overfishing no longer occurs).

So, the Management Board set about drafting a new Addendum I that would impose a 40% reduction in fishing mortality, and have a 50% probability of getting the fishing mortality rate down to or below target by the year 2030.

I have to admit that I was happy about that, as the New Jersey/New York Bight population is the one that we catch here on the South Shore of Long Island.  I have fond memories of hooking up to one of the pilings of the Robert Moses Bridge back in the mid-1980s, and going through four dozen—sometimes six dozen—green crabs on a single tide while fishing alone, hooking up tautog almost as soon as my bait hit the bottom.  Yes, many were throwbacks, but there were enough 2- to 5-pounders in those old, no-bag limit days to put enough fish in the freezer to last well into the winter.  While I never expect to see that kind of fishing again, the ability to get out and reliably put even a couple of blackfish on ice would certainly be a good thing,.

But at the same time, given the history of tautog management, and the ASMFC’s tendency to delay action on all things tautog, I have to admit that, deep in my gut, I had doubts that Addendum I would move go anywhere.

And, unfortunately, my gut turned out to be right.

Once again, uncertainty in the data gave members of the Management Board pause.

And, once again, given the choice between doing nothing, and perhaps allowing overfishing to continue, or taking action, and perhaps adopting regulations that were overly restrictive, and might allow a few more tautog than needed to remain alive, the Management Board opted for overfishing, apparently considering it the lesser evil of the two.

The problem was that the proposed 40% reduction was based on the average landings in the years 2022 through 2024.  While 2022 and 2023 landings were fairly high, 2024 landings were lower and 2025 landings a little lower yet.  So folks began to worry that the 40% reduction might have a greater than 50% probability of reducing fishing mortality to target, and create more than the minimum acceptable probability of success, and might even achieve the target fishing mortality level ahead of the 2023 deadline.  To avoid those possible outcomes, New York’s administrative representative on the Board, Jesse Hornstein, moved

“that further action on Tautog Addendum I is postponed until projections to determine the reduction required to meet a 50% probability of achieving the F target in 2030 are updated using the most recent three-year average removals from 2024-2026 (in the current MRIP currency) after final 2026 MRIP estimates are released.  An option to allow the Board to take management action via Board action following the results of the Benchmark Assessment should be developed by the [Plan Development Team].  Board action can only be used if the upcoming Benchmark Assessment shows that Fishing Mortality needs to be reduced or that it can be liberalized by 10% or greater to have a 50% probability of achieving the F-target by 2030.  [emphasis added]”

The motion was seconded by New Jersey fisheries manager Joseph Cimino.

And so, a full 30 years after the ASMFC decided to involve itself with tautog management, much remains unchanged.  Uncertainly still plagues the management process, particularly with regard to current landings, and the Tautog Management Board is still biased against taking action to protect the stock, if there is a risk that, by doing so, they might unnecessarily limit landings.

Mr. Hornstein’s rationale for making the motion was straightforward.

“…in 2024, removals in the Bight and in the DelMarVa region as well declined and they were even lower in 2025 in the Bight.  The projection that we used to calculate the required reduction in fishing mortality use the 2022 to 2024 average to estimate removals in 2025 and 2026.  And now that we have the final 2025 removals, we know that the estimate used in the projections was an overestimate.  And given the decline in removals over the last two years, we’re potentially responding to a level of fishing mortality that may no longer be occurring to the same magnitude that it once did.  Generally speaking, there is a lot of uncertainty around tautog.  MRIP plays a big role in our assessments.  Tautog has higher [percent standard error] compared to other popular fisheries, and removals are highly variable from year to year.  In addition, New York data is split between—our MRIP data is split in a way that was never intended to be for MRIP data to be used between the Sound and the Bight, so we can manage those two stocks separately.  We’re going to be receiving calibrated MRIP data and get a new assessment in the next couple of years which will include new regional surveys and further evaluation of the large retrospective pattern that we see in the assessments. So there’s a lot changing that should improve our confidence and our understanding of the tautog population.”

And everything that he said was completely true.  But that still begs the critical question.

Uncertainty cuts both ways.  If there is a lot of room for error in the recreational landings estimates, we can’t assume that landings are, and will always be, lower than previously predicted.  It is very possible, given the higher percent standard error in the MRIP estimates, that recreational landings in 2024 and 2025 were actually higher than the point estimates, and that the uncertainty that managers are facing could be masking a greater level or removals than previously believed.

In such a highly uncertain environment, doesn’t it make sense to adopt more precautionary regulations, that hedge against unexpectedly high landings, rather than to potentially allow overfishing to continue, and erode the tautog stock, perhaps at a faster than expected rate?

Maybe so, but the Tautog Management Board, over the last three decades, has never thought that way, and has consistently avoided the more risk-averse outcomes.

Mr. Hornstein at least acknowledged the risk, although he immediately dismissed it, saying,

“While there’s risk involved in waiting another year to take action, there’s a high probability that [spawning stock biomass] is not in danger of becoming overfished during this time.  And although this will delay action likely until the annual meeting in 2027, it will still allow for the implementation of new measures by 2028 as required by the [fishery management plan].”

But one part of Mr. Hornstein’s motion did seem a little odd, and that was allowing the Management Board to liberalize tautog regulations without going through the addendum and public hearing process.  Such unilateral Board action is unusual, and generally disfavored by members of ASMFC management boards; we saw that in December 2024, when the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board decided not to take unilateral action to protect the large 2018 year class from recreational harvest in 2025, when it would be entering the slot size limit, even though the survival of the 2018s is needed if the currently overfished striped bass stock is to be rebuilt. 

Usually, such unilateral Board action is reserved for those rare times when it is needed to stem a stock decline; using Board action, rather than the addendum process, to allow fishermen to increase their landings might well be unprecedented in the history of the ASMFC.

Yet, if such a precedent is being broken, it doesn’t surprise me that it is the Tautog Management Board who is doing so.  It just fits in with how they’ve managed the stock from the very start.  Mr. Hornstein ultimately laid out what seems to be the Tautog Management Board’s guiding philosophy for the last 30 years:

“Cuts to any fishery always inflict some economic pain and we owe it to the public not to cause more pain than is necessary…This is still a cautious approach as SSB is not at risk of changing status, and we’re taking a justifiable path to make sure that we’re getting it as right as we can.  And I think this is, you know, help build trust between the public and management.  And I’m concerned that if we continue to move forward without pausing to rerun these numbers, we’re in a less defensible position, especially if the next assessment completely changes our understanding of the population.”

Fair enough.

But once again, the traditional Tautog Management Board bias is all too apparent.

Yes, unnecessary harvest reductions do inflict unnecessary economic pain.  But so does the failure to impose necessary harvest reductions.  Just consider the economic losses attributable to fishery managers’ failure to avoid the collapse of the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock.  The failure to initiate a striped bass rebuilding plan in 2014, which could well have positioned the stock to better endure the its current recruitment problems.  And yes, the Tautog Management Board’s failure to buckle down and adopt precautionary measures back in 1996, which could have rendered Amendment I completely unnecessary.

A lot of potential economic benefits were lost when those three fisheries went into decline.

But the Tautog Board always worries about the economic consequences of reducing landings, and ignores the economic consequences of declining fish stocks, even though the latter consequences are just as real and can endure for a far longer time.

The same sort of bias attends the notion of “building trust,” because at this point, the only thing that I, and other folks whom I know, trust the Tautog Management Board to do is delay, and fail, and then delay again, because that’s just what it’s done for the past 30 years, demonstrating that they are more afraid of being blamed for declining landings than they are of being blamed for declining tautog abundance.  The Board might want people to trust that it won’t require unneeded landings reductions, but doesn’t seem to care if no one trusts them to return the stock to full and sustainable health.

Even with respect to the stock assessment, we see the same sort of thing; a Management Board worried that the next stock assessment will reveal that the stock is healthier than they believed.  But there seems to be no worry that the next assessment will show a stock in worse shape than managers thought, even though, if that occurred, it would seem to cast even more doubt on their credibility as competent fisheries managers.

At least a few of the Board members disagreed with that risk-prone approach.  Dr. Jason McNamee, the Rhode Island fishery manager, acknowledged that the motion didn’t affect his state’s fishery, but asked that, since none of the data appeared problematic, why would the Board want to delay the management process until new data might be obtained. 

He went on to say that

“This just feels like a really bad idea.  This is not a species that you can knock down.  It does not come back quickly.  So, I am nervous for us and the folks that may be having issues with their fishery.”

Unfortunately, Dr. McNamee held the minority view. 

Adam Nowalsky, New Jersey’s Legislative Proxy, argued that

“to go ahead and essentially penalize the fishing community in the New Jersey/New York Bight region, which does not have an overfished status, with 40% reductions that were based on at least one year of projections that we know now are not correct, I think that’s a very valid data issue.”

Nowalsky’s comments were interesting, given that he seemed willing to give full credence to the 2025 MRIP tautog data, saying that, based on that data, we have “one year of projections that we know now are not correct.”  But at the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board meeting last October, he struck a very different pose, making it a point to oppose a projection using just one year of MRIP data to support a 12% landings reduction.

It seems that he’s only willing to rely on one year of data when it can be used to justify killing more fish.

But the discussion went on from there, and in the end, a thin sort of compromise was reached. 

Mr. Hornstein’s motion was divided, and then the first half was amended by Dr. McNamee, so that instead of waiting for final 2026 data, Addendum I’s reductions would be based upon projections derived from landings in 2023, 2024, and 2025.  That motion passed on a vote of 8 in favor and 1 opposed.

So Addendum I isn’t dead, and there is a very real hope that we might see a new draft of that addendum approved for public comment in the not-too-distant future, maybe this fall, or maybe in the first half of 2027.

But given the history and the biases of the Tautog Management Board, and its 30-year trend of subordinating the long-term health of the tautog stock to the short-term interests of fishermen, you still might not want to hope too hard.

Things can always be delayed again.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ROUND TWO: SOUTH ATLANTIC RED SNAPPER EFPS

 

The National Marine Fisheries Service has just announced that it is again considering applications for exempted fishing permits that will allow anglers in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina to land red snapper over a longer period—in this case, 31 days, which might later be extended, depending upon how many fish are landed during the initial season—than is permissible under the current fishery management plan.

The first collaboration between the agency and the states of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina on recreational red snapper EFPs saw exempted fishing permits issued early last May.  However, any fishing under such permits was enjoined by a federal court before it could occur, as the initially issued permits clearly violated multiple provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act, and would have almost certainly led to gross overfishing of the South Atlantic red snapper resource.

The new permit applications attempt to address the issues raised in the court’s decision, in an effort to ensure that, if new exempted fishing permits are issued, they will survive any new court challenge.  This time around, North Carolina is not participating in the exempted fishing permit process, and has asked NMFS to set the 2026 red snapper season off the North Carolina coast.

In its request for comments on the new applications for exempted fishing permits, NMFS advises that

“The stated primary purposes for these EFPs are to improve data on recreational fishing effort, catch, and discards of red snapper in the South Atlantic, and to inform the development of a long-term state-led management strategy for the recreational harvest of red snapper.  Additional purposes for the EFPs include:  (1) evaluating mandatory electronic reporting programs for monitoring catch; (2) providing recreational fishermen on privately owned vessels (private vessels, private anglers) and the owners or operators of charter vessels or headboats (for-hire fishermen) increased fishing opportunities for red snapper; (3) quantifying angler participation and characterizing angler behavior; and (4) collecting related biological information from the fishery.  The percent standard error estimates for the recreational harvest of red snapper are high, indicating low precision and significant uncertainty that would benefit from improved data collection efforts and approaches.  Better data could reduce the uncertainty around the estimates of harvest and discards from the recreational sector.  These proposed EFPs aim to address these challenges by improving recreational catch estimation and reducing discards so fishing opportunities can increase.”

To achieve those goals, the three states submitting applications

“each requested exemptions to certain Federal regulations for the proposed projects in the South Atlantic.

“1.  50 CFR 622.181(c)(2) limits the harvest and possession of red snapper to the specified season, and applies these limitations to a federally permitted for-hire vessel in both state and Federal waters.

“2.  50 CFR 622.183(b)(5)(i) specifies when the recreational season will occur each year.

“3.  50 CFR 622.193(y)(2) specifies the annual catch limit and accountability measures applicable to the recreational harvest of red snapper."

NMFS must now decide whether those exemptions are appropriate to achieve the purposes of the requested permits.

The first time around, the process was a pure political exercise, with the recreational fishing and boating industry, and the various anglers’ rights groups that carry the industry’s water, using connections within the Republican Party and the Trump Administration to get what they wanted.  Facts were basically irrelevant to the process, with at least one of the states—Florida—ranting MAGA rhetoric about the need to “rein in bureaucracy [underlined and in bold type],” returning “the power of fisheries management and conservation to the states where it belongs [also in bold type, along with some underlining, too],” complaints of “a bureaucratic blockade at the behest of status-quo defending adversarial interests [yes, more schoolgirl-like emphasis added]” and “weaponization of NOAA under President Obama,” and a reference to “God-given rights to recreate, and enjoy, our natural resources,” although no scripture was ever cited to support the suggestion that overfishing had a divine imprimatur.

Trump himself (or, at least, someone acting in his name and stead) went onto Truth Social to celebrate the issuance of the EFPs, suggesting that the industry had friends very high up in the Administration, who were pulling the right strings and doing the expected favors to get the job done.  (Perhaps it even recruited a major contributor to MAGA Inc. or to the now-enjoined East Wing ballroom, and so had made the requisite payment for administration attention.)

The states were so certain that politics would carry the day that they pointedly defied—not ignored, or neglected to follow, but pointedly defied—a regulatory requirement that the

“application package must include…[t]he species (target and incidental) expected to be harvested under the EFP, [and] the amounts of such harvest necessary to conduct the exempted fishing.  [emphasis added]”

Such defiance is clearly apparent in a letter from Roger Young, the executive director of Florida’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, to Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, in which Young dismisses the need for Florida to comply with federal regulations, writing

“[NOAA] asks for a number of fish to be harvested in the EFP.  And in conversations with NOAA leadership, it was suggested to ‘throw out a number’ for consideration.  The Florida EFP limits harvest by number of fishing days and other fishery management tools, e.g. bag and aggregate bag limits.  The results will inform future management and conservation of the fishery in the region.  The EFP is not predicated on a number of fish, and for NOAA to request a number—even an estimated number—is inappropriate and unnecessary.  The State of Florida uses similar approaches with state-managed fisheries with routine success in conservation outcomes.  NOAA’s request to guess at a number is inconsistent with scientific management standards at the FWC.  [emphasis in original]”

Florida (and the industry organizations that it was supporting) effectively told Lutnick, “F*** you.  We’re doing it our way.  We don’t need to follow your rules.  The fix is already in.”

And that apparently worked with Lutnick, because the EFPs were ultimately issued, but it didn’t do so well once the courts got involved.  In fact, Florida’s (and other states’) failure to play by the rules was one of the reasons that the EFPs issued in May were enjoined.

For while the fix might have been in at the administrative branch, the judicial branch still believed in the law, and required NMFS to comply.

So this time, Florida’s EFP application, which also sets the scene for the other two states, is a little more reserved.  And yes, they estimated the number of red snapper that will be killed if the EFPs are issued.

Although the Florida application is an extensive, multi-page document, it is largely dependent on the argument that the Florida State Reef Fish Survey, a state survey designed to complement and enhance the Federal Marine Recreational Information Program, including its Fishing Effort Survey, is a more precise survey than the Marine Recreational Information Program itself.  That argument is key, as Florida argues that

“MRIP-FES was not designed to collect data for rare-event species, like Atlantic red snapper, or for fisheries that have very short recreational fishing seasons.  Conversely, SRFS was designed to collect data at a more regional level on reef-associated species that are found in deep, offshore waters such as the Atlantic red snapper…SRFS yields more accurate catch, effort, and discard data for the South Atlantic red snapper stock as compared to MRIP-FES.  Specifically, the more precise SRFS estimates of Atlantic red snapper catch, effort, and discards are 4 times smaller, 1.2 times smaller, and 2.1 times smaller than the MRIP-FES, respectively.  [formatting omitted]”

Those lower estimates are important, because if they are accurate, they will create a pool of fish that Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina anglers might exploit, pursuant to the exempted fishing permits, without necessarily overfishing the red snapper stock.

Thus, Florida argued,

“the proportion of landings and releases were determined using MRIP data for each state from 1981 to 2024.  SRFS data (annual estimates of releases and landings) were calibrated to MRIP-FES data using previously certified methods to determine annual South Atlantic total estimates of releases and landings for the private recreational sector.  To determine a specific annual private recreational estimate of releases and landings for each individual South Atlantic state, the annual proportion estimates for each state were multiplied by the total annual South Atlantic releases (or landings) as estimated by MRIP and as estimated by calibrated-SRFS data.  Because SRFS was calibrated to MRIP, the estimates derived can be directly comparable, as they are in a ‘common currency.’

“…[C]alibrated SRFS data results in significantly fewer releases and landings throughout the year than MRIP-FES for all states.  Because SRFS higher precision than MRIP-FES for both releases and landings, SRFS data can be treated with greater confidence than MRIP-FES.  Next, a 3-year average (2021-2024) of releases and landings using MRIP-FES and SRFS data was directly compared to assess the magnitude of differences in estimates of releases and, therefore, dead discards, as well as landings between the two programs…A 25.7 percent discard mortality rate was applied to both MRIP-FES and SRFS release estimates to determine the average annual number of recreational dead discards in each state.  This discard mortality rate was recommended for use in the SEDAR 90 Data Workshop as a ‘general recreational fleet’ discard mortality rate.

“Ultimately, this comparison indicated that the average annual estimate of dead discards (2021-2024) from MRIP-FES is 586,194 fish compared to 272,623 fish estimated by SRFS.  Because MRIP-FES and SRFS are calibrated in this analysis, the 313,571-fish difference is not trivial.  The dead discard calculation determined by NMFS in the SEDAR 73 update used MRIP-FES data and not SRFS data.  This is the stock assessment that informed Secretarial Amendment 59, which established the current catch limits for Atlantic red snapper.  Presently, 93 percent (475,000 fish) of the red snapper annual catch limit (‘ACL’) (509,000 fish) are assumed to be dead discards and are removed from the catch limit before a single hook hits the water.  In Amendment 59, 97.4 percent of dead discards (463,033 fish) are attributed to the recreational sector.  However, the above analysis, which imputes other South Atlantic states to calibrated SRFS data, highlights an estimated average difference of more than 215 percent in the number of dead discards between MRIP-FES and SRFS in the South Atlantic in recent years…Viewing the SRFS data as the [best scientific information available] for Atlantic red snapper (rather than MRIP-FES), a significant portion of the 463,033 dead discards (as assumed under MRIP-FES data) could actually be accounted for as landings with no biological harm to the stock.

“…To ensure continued progress in rebuilding and to prevent overfishing, it is necessary to convert the current catch limits (and dead discard estimates) from their current data currency (MRIP) to an SRFS equivalent.  Based on the previous analysis, the annual estimate of dead discards from MRIP is 584,194 fish, compared to 272,623 fish estimated by SRFS.  The ratio of these two estimates represents a conversion factor of 2.15020009.  To convert the dead discard estimate from MRIP units to an SRFS equivalent, the conversion factor was applied to the MRIP estimate (i.e., 463,033 dead discards) and equated to a 215,344.1 fish dead discard equivalent in SRFS units.  Because SRFS was calibrated to MRIP in the previous analysis, the difference between these two dead discard estimates (i.e., 463,033 fish – 215,344 fish = 247,688 fish) should be available for harvest, and key reference points related to overfishing could still be maintained, albeit in SRFS currency.

“Similarly, an SRFS equivalent to the harvestable recreational ACL (i.e., 22,787 fish in MRIP units) must be determined.  Using the same approach described above for releases, from 2021-2024, the average annual estimate of landings for all South Atlantic states from MRIP is 212,017.91 fish and the SRFS annual average estimate is 26,709.93 fish.  With MRIP nearly an order of magnitude higher than SRFS the conversion factor for landings is 7.937792.  To convert the 22,787 fish ACL from MRIP units into an SRFS equivalent, the landings conversion factor was applied to the MRIP ACL to equate to a 2,870 fish ACL equivalent in SRFS units.  When combined with the dead discard savings that could be transformed into harvest by using SRFS over MRIP, (i.e., 247,688 fish), the new SRFS-equivalent harvestable ACL by the recreational sector would be 250,559 fish (i.e., 247,688 + 2,870 fish) in the South Atlantic.  [emphasis added, references omitted]”

Thus, Florida made its case that issuance of the exempted fishing permits would not lead to legally-prohibited overfishing.

Does its argument make sense?  Quite honestly, I lack the statistical knowledge, as well as the specific knowledge about the State Reef Fish Survey, needed to make that judgement.  However, there are a couple of things that stand out.

In the “Purposes and Goals” section of its application, Florida states that

“The purpose of this EFP is to allow the FWC to conduct a pilot study in 2026 to test two methods for recreational data collection and for catch, effort and discard monitoring.  These methodologies could then be potentially applied by the State of Florida for management of the private recreational and licensed for-hire components (state and federal) within the red snapper fishery off Florida’s Atlantic coast in state and federal waters:  (1) Florida SRFS and (2) a voluntary smartphone web-based application during trips where a red snapper is harvested…  [emphasis added]”

And with that, it suddenly appears that Florida has snared itself in a trap made of circular logic.

One of the primary purposes of the applied-for exempted fishing permit is to “conduct a pilot study to test” Florida SRFS as a method “for recreational data collection and for catch, effort, and discard monitoring.”

The very words “a pilot study in 2026 to test” clearly suggests that, at this point, the efficacy of Florida SRFS as a recreational data collection methodology remains unproven and unknown.

Yet, at the same time, Florida is using SRFS-derived data—or at least data calibrated in “SRFS units”—to explain why both dead discards and landings are lower than MRIP data suggests, and thus why issuing the EFPs and allowing the proposed 31-day fishing season won’t lead to legally prohibited overfishing.

Florida really can’t have it both ways. 

Either the exempted fishing permits are needed to test Florida SRFS as a valid recreational data collection methodology, in which case SRFS data hasn’t yet been established as superior to MRIP, and can’t be used to demonstrate that overfishing will not occur if the EFPs are issued, or Florida SRFS has already proven itself to be reliable, in which case the exempted fishing permits—and the 31 day season—are not needed to establish that survey’s validity.

But to use a methodology that still needs to be tested to “prove” that anglers are killing fewer fish than MRIP suggests, and thus makes a quarter-million red snapper available for fishing under the EFPs—effectively saying that SRFS data proves that testing the SRFS as a data collection methodology won’t lead to overfishing because the methodology still being tested says so—hardly seems like a winning strategy.

Even if the SRFS data is taken at face value, it’s not clear why “When combined with the dead discard savings that could be transformed into harvest by using SRFS over MRIP, (i.e., 247,688 fish), the new SRFS-equivalent harvestable ACL by the recreational sector would be 250,559 fish (i.e., 247,688 + 2,870 fish) in the South Atlantic.

After all, the commentary accompanying the final version of Amendment 59 to the snapper/grouper plan, which sets the current catch limits, states that

“While the total ACL, and ABC, is equal to 509,000 fish, separated into 34,000 fish from the total ACL that is used to apportion each sector based on the current sector allocations is the result of what remains from the total ACL after accounting for the dead discards (509,000 minus 475,000)…Using the current sector allocation ratio of 28.07 percent commercial and 71.93 percent recreational as applied to the 34,000 fish, this final rule specifies a commercial ACL of 102,951 lb (46,698 kg), and a recreational ACL of 22,797 fish.”

The allocation doesn’t take place until after all of the dead discards, generated by both sectors, are subtracted from the ACL.  Given that existing methodology, should Florida’s calculations be correct, and dead discards are really 247,688 fish lower than currently believed, not all of those fish should be allocated to the recreational sector, nor should all of them be used to hopefully prevent overfishing should the requested 31-day recreational season be put into place. 

Instead, the allocation currently in the management plan should be applied, and only 178,162 fish—71.93 percent—of the supposedly available red snapper applied to the EFP, while the remaining 28.07 percent is allocated to increase the commercial quota.

Of course, we shouldn’t let ourselves ever believe that flaws in the EFP applications, whether logical loops or incorrect allocations, are going to have any impact on whether NMFS eventually issues the EFPs.

As was the case in May, the fix is in at the administrative branch, and NMFS is going to issue the permits, regardless of the applications’ merits.  That’s just the plain, if unpleasant, truth.

The question is what happens next.

The permits issued in May were clearly illegal.  As the court noted, NMFS never even tried to address concerns that serious overfishing would occur if the permits were not enjoined; the agency didn’t even require the states submitting applications to comply with the relevant regulations.  While no lawsuit is ever a slam-dunk, NMFS actions last spring were very hard to defend.

This time, it’s a little different.  Florida, and by extension, Georgia and South Carolina, have presented an argument as to why a 31-day season won’t lead to overfishing, based on SRFS data.  The argument might be logically circular, using what Florida admits is an untested system to prove that overfishing won’t occur, but it has nonetheless been made.  Yet after the comment period ends on August 25, NMFS can—and will—find that Florida’s argument was convincing, that overfishing will not occur, and that the exempted fishing permits may be issued.

Given the legal standard for overturning agency decisions—that there only needs to be some evidence on the record that supports the agency action, even if there are far more comments that suggest that the agency action is wrong—such a finding will likely be very difficult to overturn.

In such case, the commercial sector can only hope that they might claim a somewhat larger annual catch limit as a consolation prize.

As to what will happen to the red snapper itself, who can know?

While the stock is no longer overfished or—at least right now—subject to overfishing, the age structure remains slanted toward smaller fish, skewing its spawning potential toward the low side.  It’s not inconceivable that removing larger numbers of those small fish will depress spawning potential in the long term, and impact the sustainability of the red snapper fishery.  Maybe the stock will just muddle along, neither overfished nor fully restored, for years into the future.  Or maybe it will produce a few more strong year classes, and be fully rebuilt, despite the issuance of the EFPs.

Right now, it’s hard to tell.

But one thing is certain:  In moving forward with the applications for exempted fishing permits, NMFS, the states, and the industry organizations behind the effort are emphasizing short-term exploitation over the long-term health of the red snapper stock.

And that’s always the wrong thing to do.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SOUTH ATLANTIC RED SNAPPER: ARE ANGLERS TRULY SEEKING "FAIR ACCESS"?

 

On July 24, 2026, the recreational fishing tackle industry’s largest trade organization, the American Sportfishing Association (ASA), issued a press release which declared that “Sportfishing Groups Support Rep. Austin Scott’s South Atlantic Red Snapper Fair Access Act.”

The press release went on to note,

In recent years, recreational anglers in the South Atlantic have been limited to extremely short red snapper seasons, including one- and two-day openings, while commercial harvest has been open for substantially longer periods lasting weeks or months. The South Atlantic Red Snapper Fair Access Act establishes a straightforward principle: if federal management prohibits the public from recreational harvest of South Atlantic red snapper in federal waters, then commercial harvest and sale of red snapper from federal waters should also be prohibited during that same closure.

On the surface, that might seem reasonable, but anyone aware of the facts underlying South Atlantic red snapper management, and of recent events surrounding that fishery, will quickly realize that the legislation in question has nothing at all to do with fairness, nor with any rational approach to managing the red snapper fishery.

South Atlantic red snapper pose one of the most difficult management problems on the East Coast. A comprehensive stock assessment, released in 2008, found that overfishing had been occurring, and that the stock had been overfished, since the 1960s; at the time of that assessment, spawning stock biomass was believed to be at just 3% of its target level, while the fishing mortality rate exceeded its target by nearly 700%. A second assessment, released two years later and using a different statistical model, came to somewhat less dire conclusions, finding that spawning stock biomass was at about 9% of its target level, and that the fishing mortality rate exceeded its target by a little over 300%.

Those findings resulted in very restrictive regulations being imposed on commercial and recreational fishermen. The fishery was completely shut down in 2011; while some harvest was allowed in subsequent years, the recreational season remained extremely short, ranging anywhere between one and nine days.

The South Atlantic red snapper stock responded to the management measures, and is no longer overfished, nor is it experiencing overfishing. However, anglers continue to fish for other species during the closed red snapper season, in waters where red snapper are present, resulting in very high red snapper bycatch in the recreational snapper-grouper fishery. While that bycatch is, for the most part, returned to the water alive, many of the fish later succumb to barotrauma-related injuries, caused by the sharp change in water pressure that a fish experiences after it is hooked in deep water and then cranked to the surface.

A study published in the May 2026 edition of the journal Fisheries Research, which studied red snapper release mortality off northeastern Florida, found that 46.8% of hooked red snapper that were released at the surface of the ocean died within six hours of release; even when a descending device was used to help released snapper get back to the bottom, 29% of the red snapper died within 48 hours of release.

Such high rates of discard mortality in recreationally released South Atlantic red snapper, which occur throughout the entire year, lead to a massive waste of the red snapper resource, with anglers returning hundreds of thousands of fish to the water to die.

On June 11, 2025, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued a final rule implementing Amendment 59 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Snapper-Grouper Fishery in the South Atlantic (Amendment 59). Comments accompanying the rule noted that

Most of the red snapper fishing mortality is attributed to dead discards in the recreational sector. The recreational sector consists of both private recreational anglers and charter vessels and headboats (for-hire). Recreational fishermen discard red snapper during both the directed red snapper recreational open fishing season and during the closed recreational season while fishers are targeting snapper-grouper species that co-occur with red snapper…approximately 98 percent of all red snapper discard mortalities during 2021-2023 were from the recreational sector. [emphasis added]

As a result of that extremely high level of dead recreational discards, far more red snapper are killed and wasted by anglers than are harvested by either commercial or recreational fishermen. Of the total annual catch limit (ACL) of 509,000 red snapper, 475,000, a startling 93.3% of the entire ACL, are set aside for dead discards. Of the remaining 34,000 fish, 22,797 are allocated to the recreational sector, with the remainder allocated to the commercial fishery.

Of all the red snapper caught each year, by both commercial and recreational fishermen, fewer than 7% ultimately go to feed people; the remainder are dumped back into the water to die, and end up feeding the sharks and the crabs.

Because the great majority of that waste occurs when the recreational red snapper season is closed, the only way to meaningfully reduce dead discards while increasing landings is to institute a seasonal closure on all fishing for snapper-grouper species. NMFS attempted to do that, issuing proposed regulations on January 14, 2025, which would have shut down a section of ocean off northeast Florida to all snapper-grouper fishing during the months of December, January, and February.

However, the ASA, along with other members of the recreational fishing industry and various “anglers’ rights” groups such as the Coastal Conservation Association, immediately opposed the closure, apparently believing that 475,000 wasted red snapper was a reasonably price to pay for keeping the season for other snapper-grouper species open. After the new presidential administration entered the White House, it proved sympathetic to industry concerns, and removed the proposed closure from the final version of Amendment 59.

As an alternative, the recreational industry and allied organizations urged NMFS and state fisheries managers in Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas to collaborate on so-called exempted fishing permits which, under the guise of improving recreational catch and landings data, would have extended the recreational red snapper season from two days to 39 days off Florida and 62 days off the other three states.

The exempted fishing permits, which NMFS issued on May 1, 2026, would do little or nothing to reduce anglers’ dead discards; instead, by setting aside certain provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens), including those prohibiting overfishing and requiring fishermen to adhere to annual catch limits, they would have allowed recreational fishermen to overfish the South Atlantic red snapper stock with impunity, while the commercial sector would still be constrained to its scant share of the fishery.

That doesn’t seem particularly fair.

One marine conservation group, the Ocean Conservancy, observed that the longer season could result in anglers landing as many as 485,000 South Atlantic red snapper, about 20 times what would be allowed if the ACL remained in place.

Members of the commercial fishing industry, afraid that such gross overfishing would threaten their ability to harvest their allocated share of the red snapper stock, challenged the exempted fishing permits in federal court, arguing that their issuance violated key provisions of Magnuson-Stevens, including its requirement that “Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing.” A federal judge agreed, and issued a temporary injunction preventing anglers from fishing pursuant to the exempted fishing permits.

In his decision, the judge stated that

Traditional tools of statutory analysis show that any [exempted fishing permits] the NMFS issues must comply with the [Magnuson-Stevens Act]…

Therefore, at a minimum, each EFP the agency issues—including data collection projects—must ‘address’ (i.e., ‘to give attention to or deal with a matter or problem’) the ‘needs’ (i.e., necessary dut[ies] or obligation[s]’) Congress identified within Chapter 38 [of Magnuson-Stevens] several of which emphasize the need to prevent overfishing…

while the Court agrees with the Government that Congress, through section 1867(d) [of Magnuson-Stevens], authorized the NMFS to ‘create an expedited, uniform, and regionally-based process to promote issuance, when practicable, of experimental fishing permits,’ the Court does not find that Congress gave the Government unbridled discretion to circumvent MSA and the fishery management plan framework through the EFP process…As Amicus Curiae aptly observes, ‘nothing in [Section 1867(b)]…gives the [NMFS] general authority to exempt fishing activities from any legal requirements…let alone indicate[s] that Congress meant for [EFPs] to become a vehicle to deregulate fisheries’…As explained above, EFPs must ‘address’ the ‘needs’ identified under the MSA—not provide an escape hatch from them. Such needs include the overarching requirement that fisheries be managed to prevent and end overfishing.

The various recreational fishing organizations that championed the exempted fishing permits in the hopes of gaining longer recreational red snapper seasons waxed indignant when the court’s decision was released, but have since showed little interest in continuing litigation.

When viewed in that historical context, the true nature of the South Atlantic Red Snapper Fair Access Act (Act) becomes clear. Far from being an effort to strike some sort of equitable balance between the recreational and commercial red snapper fisheries, the bill is really a petty, almost childish, effort to gain some sort of revenge against the commercial red snapper fishermen for prevailing in their effort to invalidate the exempted fishing permits.

And what makes it worse is that the proponents of the Act aren’t even trying to hide their motivations. The ASA press release clearly says,

This summer, recreational anglers in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina were set to receive expanded red snapper access through NOAA-approved, state-led Exempted Fishing Permit pilot programs that would have expanded fishing opportunity through advanced recreational data collection and improved management, but those seasons were halted by a preliminary injunction resulting from a lawsuit filed by commercial fishermen…

“South Atlantic red snapper is an important public resource, and access to that resource should be managed fairly,” said Rep. Scott. “If commercial fishing interests are concerned enough about the current condition of the red snapper fishery to support shutting down recreational access, then commercial sale and harvest of the same stock, from federal waters, should be limited during the same closure. This is not about attacking commercial fishing. It is about making sure that conservation burdens are being shared fairly.”

And the Act itself includes findings that

(1) South Atlantic red snapper is a healthy public fishery resource that supports recreational anglers, for-hire operators, coastal communities, fishing tackle retailers, marinas, lodging providers, and other businesses throughout the South Atlantic region.

(2) In recent years, recreational harvest of South Atlantic red snapper in Federal waters has been limited to extremely short seasons, including one- and two-day seasons, despite historic abundance and strong public demand for access to the fishery.

(3) Conversely, commercial harvest of South Atlantic red snapper in Federal waters has remained longer for substantially longer periods, including commercial seasons that have lasted for weeks or months in recent years.

(4) Leading up to the 2026 recreational fishing season, the States of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, working with the National Marine Fisheries Service, developed and received approval for State-led exempted fishing permit pilot programs designed to improve recreational fisheries data collection, test State management strategies, reduce uncertainty, and provide more reasonable recreational access to South Atlantic red snapper.

(5) Those State-led pilot programs were halted by a preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, blocking the approved 2026 pilot seasons for the States of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, including Florida’s season just hours before it was scheduled to begin.

(6) While anglers continue to sit at the dock awaiting a management system that allows reasonable access to a healthy public fishery resource, conservation burdens and access restrictions should be shared fairly across sectors.

It’s a remarkable set of findings, not only for what it says, but also for what it doesn’t say. For example, it notes that the “State-led pilot programs” were “halted by a preliminary injunction,” but failed to explain that the exempted fishery permits were enjoined because issuance of those permits was patently illegal and in clear violation of the provisions of Magnuson-Stevens. Instead, the findings almost suggest that the fishermen were victims of a court’s arbitrary and capricious whim.

The Act also exhibits a very warped concept of “fairness.”

The Act, as well as the ASA and other recreational fisheries interests, tie “fairness” solely to the comparative lengths of the recreational and commercial fishing seasons, when in reality, it is not the length of the season, but how many fish are removed from the population, which is the primary management concern.

From that standpoint, the deck is stacked against the commercial fishery, and in favor of anglers, from the start, as NMFS regulations allocate 71.93% of what remains of the ACL, after dead discards are subtracted, to the recreational fishery, and the remainder to commercial fishermen.

In 2025, recreational landings were limited to 22,797 fish, which were expected to weigh about 263,815 pounds, compared to the 102,951 pounds allocated to the commercial sector, and anglers caught those 22,797 fish very quickly. Over the course of just two days, recreational fishermen didn’t just land 22,797 red snapper, they landed 36,482, an overage that probably exceeded all of the South Atlantic red snapper landed by the commercial fleet over the course of the year.

Yet, despite significantly exceeding their ACL, anglers are calling their two-day season “unfair.”

Even that doesn’t tell the whole story, because along with the fish that they landed were the fish that they returned to the water to die. About 98% of the 475,000 dead discards are attributable to the recreational sector, and if those 465,500 dead discards are added to the 36,482 red snapper that anglers actually harvested in 2025, one ends up with nearly 502,000 red snapper killed by recreational fishermen, compared to the approximately 20,703 red snapper (consisting of a harvest of roughly 11,203 fish, assuming an average weight of 9.19 pounds, plus 9,500 dead discards).

Still, the recreational fishery is complaining that that is “unfair”—to them.

In 2025, recreational fishermen were responsible for about 96% of all of the fishing mortality of South Atlantic red snapper. Yet they are still claiming that they are being denied reasonable access to the red snapper resource, and are thus seeking “fair access” by outlawing commercial fishing when the recreational season is closed.

It is an incredible claim, that has nothing to do with fairness, and everything to do with a group of sore losers, who unfortunately presume to speak for the entire recreational sector, trying to wreak some sort of vengeance against the commercial red snapper fleet, simply because the commercial fishermen chose not to allow NMFS to illegally issue exempted fishing permits that could have easily resulted in harm to both the red snapper stock and to the fishermen’s livelihoods.

The Act supports the recreational spokesmen’s malignant claim, and in doing so, promotes the worst sort of inequity.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/