Anyone who regularly reads this
blog knows that I
am a frequent critic of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission.
I have faulted the organization
for its frequent failures to end overfishing, its chronic failure to rebuild
overfished stocks, and for its tendency to elevate short-term socioeconomic
considerations above the long-term health of fish populations.
So, given that record, it might
surprise you to learn that I firmly believe that East Coast fish populations,
as well as East Coast fishermen, are far better off having the ASMFC, even in
its current flawed form, managing regional fisheries than they would be if the
organization didn’t exist. The sort of
cooperative fishery management that ASMFC is empowered to provide probably
represents the only long-term hope of maintaining fish populations that are not
fully governed by the federal management system and the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
I say that from the perspective of
someone who has been fishing for a very long time, who fished through the last collapse
of the striped bass stock, and who witnessed the states’ flailing and
ineffective efforts to address that collapse before the passage of the
Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act in 1984, the law that finally gave the ASMFC
legal authority to compel states to adopt management measures that would
actually rebuild the striped bass population.
Prior to that law’s passage, all
was chaos. The ASMFC had been around
since 1942, but it served in a purely advisory capacity. When the striped bass
population fell into decline, the ASMFC went to work to study the problem, and
in 1981 produced its very first striped bass management plan. That plan was designated “Fisheries
Management Report No. 1,” the first management plan, for any species, ever
drafted by the Commission.
That first management plan was
extremely comprehensive. Its 200-plus
pages addressed everything from striped bass biology to the various fisheries
to the many problems that might have contributed to the stock collapse. It also suggested management measures
intended to halt the decline and hopefully rebuild the striped bass stock. Such measures included
“1. a
minimum fish size of at least 14 inches [total length] to be established for
all producing areas to reduce fishing mortality on smaller fish (age II and
III) and increase the number of recruits that enter the coastal migratory
stocks;
2. a
system of daily catch limits be implemented in the coastal areas for fish up to
24 inches [total length] to minimize exploitation of small (immature) migrant
females;
existing maximum size limits and bag limits
in producer areas be retained and a system of spawning area/regional closures
be implemented to prevent excessive exploitation of spawning concentrations.”
The management plan justified such
recommendations by noting
“On the basis of [an] analysis of Maryland
catch, it is highly probable that a 14 inch [total length] minimum size limit
in all producing areas will result in further increases in the yield by weight
in both producing areas and coastal areas, and substantially increase the
numbers of females surviving to maturity.
“Since the proposed increase in minimum
size limits in producing areas would likely result in greater exploitation of
immature fish by coastal fisheries, additional constraints in coastal areas are
also necessary. It is recommended, therefore,
that a daily bag limit of not more than 4 fish per day less than 24 inches
[total length] and greater than 14 inches [total length] for hook and line
fishermen be implemented in coastal areas.”
By today’s standards, such recommendations
seem almost laughingly modest, but in the context of their era, they appeared
almost shockingly restrictive.
The original striped bass
management plan observed that
“those deciding among these management
tools must consider much more than their potential effectiveness in a
biological sense. Equally important,
perhaps more so in sum total, are the measures’ acceptability to recreational
and commercial fishermen in all areas where the fish are found, their political
palatability, enforceability and cost effectiveness. Considering the very wide range of parochial
interests associated with this species and the fact that much remains unknown
about its population dynamics, choosing a set of management measures for the
Atlantic coast stocks of striped bass that meets all these criteria is a
formidable task. Clearly, to meet even
limited success in this venture will require a great deal of compromising among
all interested parties…”
In other words, if there was to be
any hope of rebuilding the striped bass population, everyone with an interest
in the striped bass fishery was going to have to work cooperatively to achieve
that goal.
Unfortunately, that sort of
cooperation doesn’t come naturally to people, who are usually doing their best
to one-up their neighbors in an effort to get more for themselves. Thus, the advice provided in that first
management plan was largely ignored as each state expressed concern with the
state of the striped bass stock, but weren’t willing to be the first to impose
management measures that would place a state’s fishermen at a competitive
disadvantage compared to fishermen elsewhere on the coast.
It couldn’t really be called a “race
to the bottom” because, as a practical matter, the states’ bass fisheries were
already hitting rock bottom by 1981, but it could be characterized as a
stalwart determination to remain a part of the least common denominator, and
not take the lead in doing anything that might be in the best long-term interests
of the bass, if it would cause short-term pain to local fishermen—although a
handful of states, pushed largely by recreational striped bass fishermen, did
slowly enact modest management reforms.
Changes big enough to rebuild the
bass population didn’t happen until the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act
took the management decisions out of the hands of individual states, and forced
the states to work together, through ASMFC, to create an effective and binding
solution. The Striped Bass Act
accomplished that feat by giving ASMFC the power to find uncooperative states “out
of compliance” with the terms of the striped bass management plan, a finding
that would result in federal regulators shutting down the entire striped bass
fishery in the noncompliant state.
Granted such new management
authority, ASMFC successfully rebuilt the striped bass stock. Compelled compliance was such an effective
fishery management tool that, in 1993, Congress passed
the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, which gave ASMFC
similar legal authority to compel compliance with fishery management plans for
all species subject to its jurisdiction.
It all worked pretty well for 25 years. While ASMFC didn’t have much success
rebuilding fisheries after bass were restored in 1995, it still did a pretty
good job of keeping everyone moving in the same general direction. States went out of compliance a few times,
but on the first 19 occasions, the threat of a fishery shutdown pushed them
back into line pretty quickly.
In 2017, all of that changed.
That year, the State of New Jersey
decided that it wouldn’t comply with ASMFC’s management plan for summer
flounder. It claimed that a smaller
minimum size could be coupled with a slightly shorter season (in September,
when fishing effort is tapering off from the summer vacation period) and some
other, less-measurable factors into a set of management measures and education
efforts that would be “conservationally equivalent” to the management plan.
ASMFC
just didn’t buy New Jersey’s arguments.
Its Summer Flounder, Scup and Black Sea Bass Technical Committee did not
find conservation equivalency, and when New Jersey moved to have its
management proposals approved, not a single non-New Jersey member of the Summer
Flounder, Scup and Black Sea Bass Management Board believed the proposal to
have enough merit to justify seconding the state’s motion.
It was pretty clear that the New
Jersey proposal didn’t meet the standards created by ASMFC’s management plan,
but New Jersey went ahead with it anyway. It was a gamble on New Jersey’s part, but
perhaps not a very big one. A new
presidential administration had recently moved into Washington, and the new Commerce
Secretary, Wilbur Ross, had already made it clear that he favored high harvest
levels over good fisheries conservation.
In addition, the then-New Jersey
governor had ties to the new administration.
So instead of making a management decision based on science and good
stewardship, New Jersey decided to spin the wheel and see whether it could gain
a political win, which would see Secretary Ross overturn ASMFC’s noncompliance
finding.
For New Jersey, if not for the
flounder, things turned out pretty well.
As it hoped, the
Secretary of Commerce took the political route.
His office never even bothered to consult the regional administrator of
the Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office about the merits of New Jersey’s
position, even though the regional office would have the most knowledge about how
New Jersey’s proposed regulations could impact the fishery.
ASMFC’s noncompliance finding was
overturned. New Jersey could keep on killing smaller fish.
“This is the first time that no one asked
me for a formal recommendation. The
secretary’s decision goes against long-standing protocol, and there is a cost
to that.
“There’s a reason we have regional
administrators, because their experience and knowledge is valuable in making
decisions like this one. This is an
unfortunate precedent…
“This is a system that keeps all states
accountable to each other. We’re now
going to have to figure out how to repair that system.”
“We are very much concerned about the short
and long-term implications of the Secretary’s decision on interstate fisheries
management. Our focus moving forward
will be to preserve the integrity of the Commission’s process, as established
by the Atlantic Coastal Act, whereby, the states comply with the management
measures we collectively agree upon.”
For when the Secretary of Commerce
condoned New Jersey’s noncompliant actions, he opened the door on a past that at
least the responsible East Coast fishery managers had thought they had forever
left behind, the days when states managed coastal fish stocks without regard
for their neighbors, and everyone tried to scoop up the biggest share, regardless
of its impact on the long-term health of the stock.
Once a door like that opens, it is
very, very difficult to close.
Already, we have seen the ASMFC’s
Atlantic Menhaden Management Board decide not to find Virginia out of
compliance for its failure to adhere to every provision of the menhaden
management plan, knowing full well that the Secretary of Commerce would
overturn that finding as well, and so further weaken the management authority
of the ASMFC.
Given the attitudes of the current
Secretary of Commerce, New York could very possibly get away with it, too.
But fisheries management, and
particularly East Coast inshore fisheries management, isn’t about seeing how much you
might be able to get away with.
It is
about an interstate compact, backed by federal law, which has held together a
fragile coalition of states, and allowed them to manage shared fish stocks in a
rational and uniform manner. If a few
more states choose to put their own parochial interests ahead of the shared
interest in healthy fish stocks, and go out of compliance with rules they see as unfair, that coalition could easily fall apart, and
take us back dangerously close to the days when each state did what was best
for them, and not for the overall health of our fisheries.
As the first striped bass
management plan noted, “to meet even limited success in [managing a fishery]
will require a great deal of compromising among all interested parties.” States that threaten to go out of compliance
every time a management decision doesn’t go their way aren’t acting in the
spirit of compromise at all.
ASMFC, for all of its flaws, has used
compromise and a cooperative fishery management approach to benefit our East
Coast fisheries. States repeatedly going
out of compliance would threaten whatever progress has been made.
I will continue to argue that
ASMFC’s management process needs an overhaul.
I believe that ASMFC’s overall
management record has been, at best, a “limited success.”
Even so, I will forever maintain
that “limited success” is better than no success at all, and insist that whatever
course ASMFC eventually takes, cooperation—and full compliance—must always be a
part of its future.
Well said. As long as fishermen think only of themselves and to hell with the fish. we will be in trouble. There are enough problems with incorrigible lawbreakers, it shouldn't mean if you can't beat them join them.
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