Everyone seems to want healthy fisheries—at least in
theory. The problems arise when managers
propose concrete ways to rebuild depleted stocks, proposals that inevitably
must involve reduced landings, and so reduced incomes for people who work on
the water.
At that point, the need for healthy stocks, and the
rebuilding required to get there, becomes subject to intense debate, as folks
wishing to maintain healthy cash flows begin to begin to publicly question
whether healthy fish populations should be managers' top priority.
I was reminded of that once again when I read a few pieces
on proposed restrictions on fishing for southern flounder down in North
Carolina.
There’s no question that the southern flounder stock is in
bad shape. A draft amendment to North Carolina’s southern
flounder management plan notes that a recent stock assessment
“estimated overall declining trends in recruitment and female
spawning stock biomass (SSB).
Recruitment has decreased throughout the time-series from approximately
13 million recruits in 1989 to approximately 4 million recruits in 2017. The model also predicted a decline in SSB
beginning in 1989, which corresponds to an increase in [fishing mortality]
beginning in 2007 with a time-series high in 2013.
“The model estimated F35% (fishing mortality target) as 0.35
and F25% (fishing mortality threshold) as 0.53.
Estimated fishing mortality in 2017 was 0.91, which is higher than the F
threshold of 0.53 and indicates overfishing is occurring…
“[S]ustainability benchmarks were calculated using projected
SSB values modeled using estimates of fishing mortality associated with a [spawning
potential ratio of] 25% (threshold) and [a spawning potential ratio of] 35% (target)…The
ASAP model estimated a value of 5,452 metric tons (approximately 12.0 million
pounds) for SSB35% (SSB target) and a value of 3,900 metric tons (approximately
8.6 million pounds) for SSB25% (SSB threshold).
The estimate of SSB in 2017 is 1,031 metric tons (approximately 2.3 million
pounds), which is lower than the SSB threshold of 3,900 metric tons and
indicates that the stock is overfished…”
So there’s no question at all that the southern flounder is
having real problems, and can use some help from fishery managers. And given that
the southern flounder supports both
“one of the largest and most valuable commercial fisheries in
North Carolina, accounting for landings of 1.39 million pounds with a dockside
value of $5.66 million in 207,”
and a recreational fishery in which
“flounder species have been the most often reported target
species in 20 of the last 37 years,”
one would think that fishermen would be very eager to see
the stock restored to health.
Certainly, North Carolina fishery managers seem intent on
rebuilding the stock. The proposed
amendment to the management plan would end overfishing within two years and,
assuming that other states with a southern flounder fishery also do their part,
should rebuild the stock by 2028.
The
necessary reductions in fishing mortality will have to be substantial if there
is to be a good chance of success. Thus,
according to a
June 10 press release,
“The [North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries] proposes a
62% reduction in southern flounder harvest (compared to 2017) in North Carolina
this year and a 72% reduction in harvest beginning in 2020 to be achieved
through commercial and recreational season closures. The division also proposes yardage and time
restrictions for gill nets and prohibiting the use of puncturing devices, such
as gaffs, in the pound net fishery.”
Given the state of the southern flounder stock, such measures
seem appropriate, and should be adopted quickly, as the proposed amendment to
the management plan warns that
“delayed implementation will further increase the magnitude
of necessary reductions.”
Unfortunately, the reaction to the proposed, and badly
needed, management measures have been entirely predictable. The
JDNews of Jacksonville, North Carolina reported that one commercial
representative on North Carolina’s Marine Fisheries Commission argued that
“in addition to managing the fishery and natural resources,
there is also a ‘human resource’ impact if fishermen see a reduction in their
livelihood. He said he understands the need
to preserve the stock but questioned the emergency action of the proposed
recommendations, which are following after impacts already felt after Hurricane
Florence.”
“These proposed restrictions will have devastating impacts to
the fishing economies of Carteret County.
The Division of Marine Fisheries…[has] decided to pursue an accelerated
timeline…to adopt substantial reductions in commercial and recreational harvest
and have chosen fishing reduction goals that are not practicable or reasonable
when considering the economic impacts, biology of southern flounder, management
history and possibly environmental considerations…
“The proposed measures are problematic in that the estimated
reductions in fishing mortality must be obtained from all the southeastern
Atlantic states where southern flounder occur.
North Carolina is planning on implementing substantial reductions this
fall, while it will be some time before (other) states can implement similar
measures or if they even choose to do so.”
Those are the sorts of arguments one hears at just about any
fishery meeting when additional restrictions are being discussed: sure,
conservation is needed, but not at the expense of anyone’s income. There is always a hurricane, or a nor’easter,
or some other natural event that can be used to justify delay, and there are always
the voices that urge taking no action until someone else—another state, or
perhaps the federal government—takes action first, because no one ever wants to
be the first to act to protect a fish stock, and perhaps thus miss out on the
last, big, profitable kill.
And too often, the states listen. Louis
Daniel, the former director of the Division of Marine Fisheries, recently
stated that the law governing fisheries management in North Carolina
“has been a monumental failure to replenish our fish stocks,
and the reason for that is politics.”
He added that instead of taking the actions needed to
restore fish stocks, managers merely
“nibble around the edges,”
adopting half-measures because of political pressure to do
so. To illustrate the problem, he noted
that southern flounder that were 5, 6 and 7 years old were once a part of the
catch in North Carolina, but that today, because of ineffective fishery
management, it’s rare to see a flounder that’s more than 2 years old.
Unfortunately, such problems aren’t restricted to southern
flounder, and they’re also not restricted to North Carolina. They seem to be endemic in fisheries outside
of federal jurisdiction, which aren’t governed by the provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, that prohibit overfishing and
require the prompt rebuilding of overfished stocks.
It’s a particular problem at the Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission, which isn’t bound by Magnuson-Stevens. It has raised its head thereon many occasions,
including in
1999, when the southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock was
beginning to crash, and ASMFC’s Winter Flounder Management Board decided to back
off on its efforts to rebuild the stock, because the New England Fishery Management
Council had not yet adopted similar measures (the stock has since collapsed),
and more recently in
2017, when political pressure brought by the recreational fishing industry led ASMFC’s
Tautog Management Board to override the Technical Committee’s recommendations
and allow overfishing to continue in Long Island Sound until 2029 (with only a
50% chance that it will cease at that point).
Most recently, and most importantly, it has cropped up at ASMFC’s
Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, which has a long and unenviable history
of avoiding the most difficult management decisions, particularly with regard
to rebuilding the stock.
In 2011, even after receiving a stock
assessment update warning that the striped bass would become overfished by 2017,
the Management
Board decided to suspend work on an addendum to the management plan that would
have reduced commercial and recreational landings, deferring action largely
because the stock wasn’t overfished yet.
In
2014, the Management Board took action to reduce landings to the target level
(although it
later completely ignored Maryland’s failure to adequately constrain recreational
landings, which increased substantially at a time when they were supposed to be
reduced by 20.5%), but it failed to comply with clear language in Amendment 6 to the
Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass which
called for rebuilding female spawning stock biomass to the biomass target
within 10 years, apparently
based on advice that there would be significant uncertainty associated with
projecting the effects of management measures out that far (although
federal fishery managers, required to do so by Magnuson-Stevens, frequently and
successfully adopt 10-year rebuilding plans on a regular basis).
There is little reason to believe that such failures and
delay accomplishes anything of lasting good.
As Mr. Daniels noted in North Carolina, with respect to such
actions,
“Does anybody think that they’re seeing more fish than they
did 22 years ago [when North Carolina’s fishery management law was adopted]?”
“Anybody even close to seeing the same amount of fish that
you saw 22 years ago?”
“…We haven’t rebuilt—restored—one fish. Not one.”
“We’ve got a problem, and it’s just going downhill. We’re not seeing any improvement in these
resources.”
Because that’s what delay does, it just makes things worse.
While some folks may make a little more money for a short
while, in the end, delay hurts us all.
That’s an important thing to remember, not only in the case
of North Carolina’s southern flounder, but in the case of other species, too.
Right now, it’s something to remember as ASMFC looks at
striped bass.
No comments:
Post a Comment