Sunday, October 30, 2016
Cleveland is leading Chicago three games to one in the World Series, and this year’s victor might well be decided before you had a chance to read this blog. Thus, if I wanted to use a timely baseball analogy as I write it, today gives me my last opportunity of this year.
Fortunately, the Center for Coastal Conservation hung a curveball right over the middle of the plate, setting things up for a perfect swing.
The curve came, as so many things do, in the Center’s report, A Vision for Marine Fisheries Management in the 21st Century; Priorities for a New Administration.
For a number of years, the Center has been attempting to weaken federal fishing laws, so that anglers may kill more fish each season, regardless of whether such harvest is sustainable or scientifically justified. While a report issued early in 2014 emphasized anglers’ role in marine conservation, the Center’s newest “vision” states that
“We look forward to collaborating with policymakers to find 21st Century solutions that ensure the right balance between recreational fishing access [i.e, harvesting more fish], economic growth and conservation of America’s coastal waters.”
That vision is in direct conflict with federal fisheries law, which makes the rebuilding and conservation of America’s fish stocks the top priority, regardless of how needed conservation measures may impact recreational landings or short-term economic goals.
Since federal fisheries laws emphasize the long term health and sustainability of fish populations, the Center needed another model to hold up as an example of the correct way to manage fisheries. Their choice defaulted to the state management of inshore species, with the latest “vision” report claiming that
“States are the experts at managing—very successfully—numerous fish species such as red drum, spotted sea trout, and striped bass.”
Of course, claiming that something is true doesn’t make it undisputed fact, and any real look at the facts quickly shows that state management of inshore species is often very far from successful.
We can look at a host of species to make that point, including tautog (a/k/a “blackfish”), weakfish, southern flounder and others. But for now, let’s just take a look at those that the Center uses as examples of good state management—striped bass, red drum and spotted sea trout.
I’ve written about how the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission mismanages striped bass many times before, providing the latest example of poor state stewardship of that resource just last Thursday. The story is so well known that I’m not going to go over it in too much detail again today.
Instead, I’ll go back more than two decades, and remind everyone how ASMFC managed to nurse a very severely overfished striped bass stock back to health by 1995, the one and only time in its 74-year history that ASMFC ever managed to rebuild a depleted fish population.
To summarize before getting into the details, ASMFC most certainly didn’t restore striped bass by finding a “balance between recreational fishing access, economic growth and conservation.”
They brought the bass back by putting the health of the stock front and center, and not worrying about what immediate impact the needed conservation measures would have on anglers’ landings or anyone’s short-term income.
That’s the kind of “fish-first” thinking that actually leads to success in rebuilding fish stocks. Amendment 3 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, which was responsible for the striped bass stock’s recovery, had two very explicit and complementary objectives.
The first objective was
“That the states prevent directed fishing mortality on at least 95% of the 1992 year class females, and females of all subsequent year classes of Chesapeake Bay stocks until 95% of the females in these year classes have an opportunity to reproduce at least once. This objective is intended to apply to the fishery until the 3-year running average of Maryland’s young-of-the-year index attains 8.0. Management measures which will accomplish this objective include combinations of the following which insure that no fishing mortality occurs on the target year classes.
a) Total closures of striped bass fisheries. Where a state whose waters border on or are tributary to those which are closed should take complimentary action.
b) Establishment of minimum size limits below which 95% of females have spawned at least once.
c) Establishment of minimum size limits in combination with seasonal closures which insure that sub-adult females are not taken in open fisheries.
d) Elimination of any allowable bycatch below minimum lengths.”
You’ll note that nowhere in that objective was there any mention of allowing certain levels of harvest activity or business activity to “balance” against the conservation effort. You’ll also note that the objective contained clear standards that could be used to measure progress toward rebuilding the stock.
The second objective of Amendment 3 was far shorter, but followed along the same lines.
“That the Striped Bass Board support restoration efforts in the Delaware River System including the Delaware Bay and that a moratorium on striped bass fishing in the Delaware Bay system be implemented upon the onset of restoration efforts.”
Again, a clear, no-nonsense objective that was all about conservation, which would completely shut off what the Center calls “access” and the rest of us think of as “dead fish,” and doesn’t give an inch to short-term economic concerns.
Because the objectives were so clear and uncompromising, Amendment 3 actually worked, and fully rebuilt the striped bass stock.
When people talk about ASMFC successfully managing striped bass, this is the success that they’re talking about, a time when ASMFC was willing to impose management measures much tougher than anything that the feds are imposing on summer flounder or black sea bass or Gulf red snapper today.
But ASMFC’s success at conserving striped bass has nosedived since then…
In late 2008, ASMFC began to hear the first concerns that the striped bass population was declining, when Matt Boutet, a Maine angler, made a statement at the November Management Board meeting, saying, in part,
“I actually flew down for the meeting today because we’ve seen a multi-year declining trend in striped bass abundance up north. We don’t really feel that we’re being well served by the current management regime. Every year the fishing gets a little bit worse. Last year the fishing was bad. This year it was abysmal. ..”
Because Maine is near the northern extreme of the striped bass’ normal range, a decline in the abundance of fish there is an early warning that the stock as a whole is beginning to shrink. However, after hearing Mr. Boutet’s comments, the Management Board did not further consider the issue. In fact, it voted to give Delaware and Pennsylvania the right to adopt regulations allowing the harvest of what would otherwise be considered “undersized” fish in portions of the Delaware River system, even though New Hampshire Rep. Dennis Abbott objected to the idea, arguing that it, and other measures like it, subject the striped bass stock to “death by a thousand cuts.”
The stock continued to decline, and a 2011 update to the stock assessment predicted that biomass would drop near, if not below, the threshold denoting an overfished stock by 2017. Even so, at the November 2011 Management Board meeting, state fisheries managers decided to take no action, because the stock was not yet overfished. Apparently, they felt that they had no need to avert a crisis, but rather could wait until the crisis occurred before taking any action.
Finally, after a benchmark stock assessment in 2013 showed that the stock had been repeatedly subject to overfishing, and was nearly overfished, ASMFC reluctantly took action to reduce fishing mortality to the target level. Even then, it completely ignored language in Amendment 6 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass that required them to adopt a plan to restore the biomass to the target level within ten years.
The ink wasn’t even dry on that final action when Maryland, supported by other Chesapeake Bay jurisdictions, began agitating to increase the harvest again. Although the initial effort failed, after a 2016 stock assessment update showed that fishing mortality was 0.16, slightly under the target of 0.18, Maryland convinced the Management Board to ask the Striped Bass Technical Committee how much harvest could be increased in order raise fishing mortality to the target level.
The Management Board passed that motion knowing that the female spawning stock biomass remained just 1,200 metric tons above the "overfished" threshold, and was fully 13,000 metric tons below the biomass target.
Chesapeake Bay anglers have already increased their harvest by more than 50%, when they were supposed to reduce it by 20.5%. Yet no additional action was taken to restrict their landings.
Thus, the Center clearly whiffed when it claimed that striped bass are being “very successfully” managed.
Red drum are a very important recreational species in both the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic region. Many years ago, in response to a drop in spawning stock abundance, federal fisheries managers prohibited all fishing for red drum in federal waters. However, that has recently started to change.
About eighteen months ago, the State of Mississippi asked NMFS to issue it an exempted fishing permit, which would allow Mississippi charter boats to harvest about 30,000 adult, spawning-age red drum over a two-year period.
Supposedly, the request was made as part of a scientific sampling effort, but anglers in the region saw it as the first step in opening up federal waters to red drum harvest, and placing the red drum spawning stock at risk.
The application for an exempted fishing permit put the Coastal Conservation Association, an anglers’ rights group that is one of the leading supporters of the Center, into an awkward place. They had long held out state fisheries managers as the shining knights of the fishery management system, but here were state managers from Mississippi threatening CCA’s beloved red drum.
What was the organization to do?
Being a little dishonest was the first step.
In a letter to NMFS opposing issuance of the exempted fishing permit, CCA wrote that it was
“opposed to the exempted fishing permit (EFP) application filed by the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources… [emphasis added]”
CCA went on to explain its opposition, citing the proceedings at a red drum data workshop and saying
“The workshop was requested by the [federal] Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council…The workshop determined that ‘fishery dependent’ data (such as those collected by fishermen those that would be collected by the EFP) were already more than adequately represented by each state.”
It was clear from those comments that CCA knew that it was Mississippi, and not the federal managers, who were trying to allow red drum harvest in federal waters. However, in a public press release, CCA sang an altogether different, and very misleading, tune.
The release was titled “Not Another Flawed Federal Experiment [emphasis added],” as if it was NMFS, and not CCA’s beloved state managers, who were trying to open up federal waters to red drum harvest.
It concludes by saying
“The Mississippi permit application is another unfortunate byproduct of failed federal management,”
without even trying to explain how, given that Mississippi was actually seeking an opportunity to find a new fishery for its charter boat fleet, the fish would be better off under a state management regime that would undoubtedly increase pressure on spawning-sized drum.
Because, of course, when you’re doing everything you can to smear the record of federal fisheries managers, while putting the same amount of efforts into exalting the deeds of state fisheries managers, you can’t admit that a state is at fault, even when the facts all point that way…
FOUL! STRIKE TWO!
Mississippi is again in the spotlight when it comes to spotted sea trout, although they call them “speckled trout” down there.
Apparently, the Mississippi population of speckled trout isn’t doing very well; in fact, it’s overfished. That is very possibly because, back in 2007, the size limit was reduced from 14 to 13 inches, and that size limit remained in place even after the stock showed signs of steady decline, beginning in 2009.
The Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission produced a spotted sea trout management plan in 2001; it was the last such plan ever prepared. It may be just as well that no further time and effort was spent on such a project, for some of the most important conclusions of the 2001 plan seem to be largely ignored.
That is particularly true for the plan’s suggested benchmark for a healthy stock, a spawning potential ratio of 18%.
Mississippi has set its benchmark a little higher, at 20%, but it’s clear that, for years, that number was largely ignored. Between the years of 1981 and 2013, the SPR for Misissippi’s speckled trout never rose even a single point above that 20% number, and fell as low as 8% SPR, but the state never managed to adopt effective regulations to rebuild the stock. Today, SPR stands at a mere 10%.
The irony here is that even as the Center, supported by the leadership at CCA’s national office, are doing whatever it takes to produce a “vision” depicting the superiority of state fisheries managers, the members of CCA’s Mississippi chapter know where the problems lie, and are trying to fix things.
A press release issued by CCA Mississippi declared that
“CCA Mississippi calls for action on speckled trout. Anglers undo state managers to undo damaging regulations…
““A controversial decision to lower the minimum size limit for speckled trout to 13 inches eight years ago has resulted in exactly the kind of stock decline that recreational anglers feared at the time…the Mississippi chapter of Coastal Conservation Association is calling on the Commission on Marine Resources to reverse course and take the necessary steps to put the fishery back on solid footing.
“’Eight years ago, we were very much opposed when [state] mangers took an awfully risky position with its trout regulations and now that unfortunate decision has come home to roost,’ said F. J. Eicke, Chairman of CCA Mississippi’s Government Relations Committee. ‘We’ve taken a giant step backwards with a resource that’s treasured by anglers, but now we have an opportunity to work with the states to set things right and we shouldn’t waste any more time.’
“…’At 13 inches it is clear that too many fish are being caught and kept before they have a chance to spawn even once. If you remove fish before they can spawn, catastrophic declines are inevitable, ‘ said Eicke. ‘Fortunately, trout can rebuild relatively quickly if state managers will put the proper conservation measures back in place. They dug quite a hole for trout that we have to dig out of now… [emphasis added]’”
So would even CCA Mississippi agree with the Center that spotted sea trout are being “very successfully” managed by the state?
It doesn’t look that way from what they’re saying. And that means it’s
for the Center, and time to send it, along with the fatuous claim that state fisheries managers are, on the whole, more successful than those in the federal management system, to the showers.
When you take a look at the management of three showcase species, which the Center holds out as examples of exemplary state management, what you find is something very different—state management so bad that, in two out of three cases, even CCA, one of the Center’s foremost members, has to admit that it’s not even in the same ballpark as the sort of work federal managers are doing on a regular basis.
So let’s do the right thing, score the “vision” report as a game-ending error, and declare a win for the federal fisheries management system.
Thursday, October 27, 2016
The Center for Coastal Conservation is again trying to sell policymakers of the superior virtues of state fisheries management, and again trying to use striped bass as a good example. In its recently-issued report, A Vision for Marine Fisheries Management in the 21st Century, Priorities for a New Administration, it claims that
“States are the experts at managing—very successfully—numerous fish species such as red drum, spotted sea trout, and striped bass.”
The Center is based down in Louisiana, far from the striper coast, and maybe if you look at striped bass management through swampwater-blurred eyes, it looks pretty good. But to those of us who actually live close to the northern ocean, who remember what it used to be like, when stripers chased herring into the wash beneath a late November moon, the current state of the striped bass stock, and of striped bass management, doesn’t look that good at all.
We saw another example of how it fell short last Monday, when the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission took the first steps toward increasing the striped bass kill, even though the spawning stock biomass remains a long way below its rebuilding target.
Like most efforts to hinder striped bass conservation over the past couple of years, this week’s effort was spearheaded by Maryland, which fought hard, if unsuccessfully, to derail the harvest reductions mandated by Addendum IV to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan two years ago.
Although Maryland, and the other Chesapeake Bay jurisdictions, weren’t able to prevent ASMFC’s Striped Bass Management Board from adopting Addendum IV, they did manage to convince the Management Board to grant them one concession: Instead of reducing landings in 2015 and beyond by 25%, compared to landings in 2013, Maryland and its Chesapeake neighbors would only be required to reduce landings by 20.5%, compared to a different base year, 2012.
Instead of being happy that they were granted a break not afforded to states on the coast, Maryland began whining a year ago about the “crisis” the cuts had caused, and how their fishermen were “suffering” as a result.
Instead of staying the course until a new benchmark stock assessment could be released in 2018, less than one year into the new management regime, Maryland’s representatives on the Management Board were already fighting for a bigger kill.
Of course, when the final numbers came in, it turned out that far from “suffering” from a landings reduction, Maryland’s recreational fishermen had actually increased their harvest by more than 50%, compared to their 2012 landings.
That might have embarrassed some Management Board members into silence, but Michael Luisi of Maryland’s Department of Natural Resources seemed to feel no shame.
Instead, he pointed out that Amendment IV apparently did its work slightly too well, and that fishing mortality for 2015 was estimated to be 0.16, a bit lower than the 0.18 mortality target.
Apparently believing that it was his duty to increase his state’s kill as much as possible, and minimize the number of immature bass that might survive and possibly help to rebuild the spawning stock, Mr. Luisi made a motion
“to task the Striped Bass Technical Committee to 1) determine the percent liberalization of harvest that would increase fishing mortality (F) from the 2015 terminal year estimate of 0.16 to the [Fishery Management Plan] target of 0.18…”
That motion was remarkable on a number of levels.
The first was the thin justification for making the motion at all. The difference between the 2015 fishing mortality rate of 0.16 and the target rate of 0.18 is surpassingly small—so small that the two rates aren’t really significantly different; there is always some error inherent in such estimates, and that inherent error could easily be large enough that the actual, rather than the estimated, 2015 fishing mortality was 0.18, if not a bit more (although it could also have been somewhat lower).
Then there is the question of whether regulations ought to be changed every time actual landings diverge from the target. Try as they might, managers aren’t perfect. It is almost certain that, despite all of their efforts, the actual fishing mortality rate in any given year will be a little higher or a little lower than the target figure.
But, of course, it’s safe to say that Maryland wouldn’t have made a motion to determine how much to reduce harvest if the 2015 mortality estimate had been 0.20, a bit higher than the target level. In fact, if we can go back a few years, we can find instances where some members of the Management Board had wanted to reduce harvest due to a clear drop in striped bass abundance, but never got very far.
For example, a 2011 stock assessment update noted that abundance had fallen from 67.5 million fish in 2004 to 42.3 million fish in 2010, and stated that
“Forecasts of age 8+ abundance from 2010 to 2017 and spawning stock biomass from 2011 to 2013 at status quo F (0.23) and selectivity show an increase in abundance through 2011, but a subsequent decline in abundance through 2017. Spawning stock biomass will increase slightly in 2011, but decline through 2013.”
After that information, which accurately predicted the state of today’s stock, was presented at the November 2011 Striped Bass Management Board meeting, Paul Diodati, representing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, asked
“…even if you add in future young-of-the-year indices that might be better than the past ten years, is that projection of [spawning stock biomass] going to change dramatically or not until after 2017? In other words, you have a trajectory that the projections are suggesting that we’re approaching that threshold [which defines an overfished stock] in 2017 under current conditions or average conditions…
“It seems to me that given that the past seven years of poor or below average recruitment, it is inevitable that is going to translate into lower [spawning stock biomass] over the next several years regardless of what happens over the next three or four years relative to recruitment.”
Gary Nelson, who presented the stock assessment update and contributed to its preparation, answered simply,
“Yes, that’s true.”
So there was little question that, regardless of the strong 2011 year class and regardless of what recruitment looked like in the near future, there was a likelihood that the stock would be overfished, or nearly so, by 2017. Yet when the time came to consider a draft addendum that would have reduced harvest to prevent that from occurring, a motion was made, which passed 9 to 6, to postpone further action on such addendum until after a stock assessment was completed, something that would not occur for another two years.
Because that’s how things work at ASMFC.
The concept of conserving a declining stock is viewed with suspicion, and efforts to do so are seldom made until the population falls to a point near, or below, the threshold for an overfished stock. On the other hand, any chance to increase the kill is quickly exploited, and action to do so is quickly taken, even if the population is far below the target that denotes a healthy and fully restored stock.
And that perennial truth about ASMFC seems to be playing out here once again.
To be fair, it’s far from certain that the Management Board will increase striped bass harvest. The Technical Committee was only asked to determine the percentage increase in harvest that would, in theory, be needed to reach the target level.
Once the Technical Committee comes back with that number, the Management Board may decide that the change is too small to be worth worrying about.
It may recognize the folly inherent in changing regulations based only on 2015 data, when there may have been higher landings in 2016.
It may consider the poor 2016 spawn in Maryland, and decide that it makes sense to be cautious.
Or, it may move forward with measures that would increase the kill.
But the very fact that the Management Board would entertain Maryland’s motion, and open the door to even the possibility of increasing the striped bass harvest at this time, reveals the biggest flaw in striped bass management.
ASMFC isn’t subject to any enforceable standards. There are no legal requirements that ASMFC’s management plans rebuild and adequately conserve striped bass or any other stock. ASMFC’s management boards may, at any time, exercise their discretion free of legal restraints, and arbitrarily abandon management measures adopted just a year or two before.
Despite what the Center for Coastal Conservation might say, that sort of haphazard management just doesn’t work.
That’s why ASMFC hasn’t managed to rebuild a single depleted stock in the past 20 years, although it has seen the health of a number of stocks decline during that time.
Right now, striped bass are badly in need of rebuilding. The Maryland motion raises the question of whether ASMFC has the dedication and the discipline needed to get that job done.
Sunday, October 23, 2016
Almost always, when we think about coastal fisheries issues, we concentrate on the fish themselves. Is recruitment adequate? Are too many fish being killed? Has the population become too small?
Those are all important questions, but sometimes we seem to forget that fish live in water, and that coastal waters need to kept in a condition conducive to life. We also tend to forget that fish that need not only good water, but an intact habitat that provides adequate places to spawn, to grow, to feed and to shelter.
We’ve recently been reminded of that here on Long Island, in both positive and negative ways.
On the down side,
Long Island waters are becoming
increasingly threatened by nitrogen and phosphorus runoff from both fertilizers
and septic systems. Such runoff is
leading to algae
blooms that suck oxygen out of the bays they occur, creating hypoxic conditions
that have led to massive fish kills.
The runoff, perhaps paired with warming waters, has also caused the emergence of a new threat, blooms of a phytoplankton capable of producing saxitoxin. While such blooms have not led to fish kills, they have the potential to kill people, as the saxitoxin concentrates in shellfish, and can cause anyone who eats such contaminated shellfish to contract potentially fatal paralytic shellfish poisoning.
Even when such extreme events do not occur, blooms of the so called “brown tide” and “mahogany tide” can reduce oxygen in the bay enough to force fish out into the inlets and oceans for most of the summer. They also disrupt the bay ecosystem by cutting off the sunlight that submerged aquatic vegetation such as eelgrass needs to survive and, by the sheer numbers of minute phytoplankton involved, make it difficult for mollusks such as clams and scallops to feed effectively.
There’s an old saying that “the solution to pollution is dilution.” While that was probably never true, at least once people started congregating together in large villages, much less in huge urban/suburban complexes such as Long Island, once pollution of any sort enters the waterway, the only two options are to try to contain it, or to dilute it as quickly and as completely as possible.
The nitrates and phosphates that run into our waterways will hopefully, in time, be curtailed, but once in the groundwater or in the creeks and rivers feeding into the bays, they can’t be effectively contained, leaving dilution as the only option.
In the fall of 2012, we learned how well that worked, as “Superstorm”, nee Hurricane, Sandy swept across Long Island and cut three new inlets through the barrier beach.
Two of those inlets were quickly filled in and closed by the Army Corps of Engineers, pursuant to New York’s Breach Contingency Plan. The Corps wanted to close the third inlet, too, but that one carved its way through the Otis Pike Fire Island High Dunes Wilderness Area, where the provisions of the Breach Contingency Plan do not automatically apply.
The third breach allowed ocean water to feed into Bellport Bay, the easternmost section of Great South Bay, for the first time in almost 200 years, when another inlet in about the same place was closed by natural forces.
Historically, Bellport Bay had the highest dissolved oxygen levels in Great South Bay. There was little exchange of water between Bellport Bay and the ocean, resulting in phytoplankton blooms and low dissolved oxygen levels. From an angler’s perspective, Bellport Bay was effectively a dead sea for most of the fishing season.
However, once the ocean broke through at Old Inlet, all of that changed. Tom Schlicter, the outdoor columnist for the Long Island newspaper Newsday, described what happened next.
“…the past several summers have seen a nice influx of fluke and summer school weakfish inside bay waters adjacent to this stretch. For the past few springs, big blues and striped bass have followed schools of bunker into the area, and returned again each fall in numbers on one remembers ever being present this far back in the bay.
“It’s hard to say if the bait and predator species came rushing through the new gap in the barrier island or if the flushing action of the breach has attracted some fish while also making the waters more inviting to predators entering from Moriches and Fire Island inlets. Either way, it’s pumped a lot of life into the estuary here—much of it along the mainland shore where anglers can cast from local docks and bay beaches.”
That shouldn’t be surprising, because the life in the bay evolved as part of the dynamic barrier system, composed of barrier islands, inlets and lagoons, where new inlets were regularly opening while old inlets closed, as the barrier islands reshaped themselves to fit the demands of wind and tide.
When people try to interfere with that dynamic system, in order to protect their investments in island marinas and summer homes, you end up with dead seas such as Bellport Bay before it was rescued by Sandy.
Thus, it was a relief to hear that the National Parks Service has recently decided that it would be best to leave the new inlet alone.
Even so, there are continuing rumors that the Corps of Engineers is still trying to convince people to close it.
Such effort flies in the face of other information that the Corps has had on hand for some time.
In conjunction with its multi-billion-dollar Fire Island to Montauk Storm Damage Reduction Reformulation Study, the Corps interviewed Long Island baymen in 2000, on issues that included the impact of new inlets cut by storms. The baymen’s comments were consistent.
“The breach agreement allows the government to fill in any breach, but breaches are the best thing for the bay, and hopefully they will continue. Pike’s and Little Pike’s Inlets were the two breaches. After the breach in the fall of 1992, water quality improved tremendously in Moriches Bay, and the scallop population soared. Without a doubt the breach made the water cleaner and clearer, breaches also make a very productive bottom. The Brookhaven Baymen’s Association fought to keep the breach open because of the excellent water quality in the west end of Moriches Bay…”
“’No flushing makes a dead sea.’ Quantuck Bay, between Moriches and Shinnecock Bays, is always brown. There is no flushing in Quantuck Bay, and in the summer the brown tide percolates and turns the water brown. There is seasonal shellfishing in the winter months, but you can’t make a day’s pay, and the clams don’t look healthy. There is not enough oxygen for the clams on the bottom. Clams need to have a frequent flushing over them, and a soft and clean bottom without silt build-up…”
“…there is no water flow in Great South Bay. After the breach there was good clamming and fishing. There is no flushing now. There was flushing and growth during that time, but there’s no flushing now. Well-flushed areas support life, but stagnant areas do not…”
“The change in water quality occurred after Pike’s Breach. Fishing improved at that time, and the fish were plentiful…more inlets are needed increase flushing and diffuse and dilute pollution levels.”
“One bayman said that he never saw the bottom of Bellport Bay until the breach occurred. The last good year for water quality and harvesting shellfish was 1994. You could find quahogs, scallops, and razor and soft-shell clams. There were massive amounts of clams. One bayman got approximately 20 bags of shellfish in 45 minutes. He couldn’t scoop them up fast enough. Fishing was also good for approximately 1 year after the breach.”
The breaches referred to in the comments were cut through Pike’s Beach in Westhampton after two severe nor’easters raked Long Island in late 1992. Despite the breaches’ obvious benefits to the water quality and life in the bays, and the baymen’s effots to keep such breaches open, they were closed by the Army Corps of Engineers nearly a year after they were opened.
Such breaches, and their eventual closing, gave birth to the aforementioned Breach Contingency Plan, which mandates the closure of new breaches as soon as they occur.
No one knows for certain why the closures originally took place, or why the Breach Contingency plan “had to” be drafted, but one bayman interviewed by the Corps put the blame on local real estate interests, saying
“…consultants for West Hampton Dunes [a community cut off from the rest of Long Island by the Pike’s Beach breaches] threatened [the West End Baymen’s Association’s] president by saying if you support the baymen we’re going to publicize that Moriches Bay is loaded with transformers that fell off the telephone poles and put PCB’s [sic] (polychlorinated biphenlyls) in the water. The pressure to fill in the breach and build houses back on the beach was so great that anything was said to make that happen, and not to make the area part of the National Seashore…”
The bottom line is that the Army Corps of Engineers were clearly told that storm-cut breaches in the barrier beach benefited life in the bay, and that closing such breaches did significant harm to shellfish, fish and the industries that depend on them.
Thus, today, the Corps of Engineers is planning to spend over a billion taxpayer dollars to better assure that such lifegiving breaches don’t occur again, so that Long Island’s bays might enjoy a fishless stagnation for much of the year.
To that end, it’s worthwhile to look at one old-time baymen’s comments with respect to Shinnecock Bay and Shinnecock Inlet, which inlet began its existence as a “breach” cut by the great hurricane of 1938.
“Before the 1938 hurricane created Shinnecock Inlet, Shinnecock Bay’s only source of salt water was Moriches Bay. It was like Mecox Bay. There wasn’t much flush here. It used to stink from the lack of flushing. There were also crabs because of the brackish water before the 1938 hurricane. The trouble is getting the crab spawn to survive. After the breach you could get 30-40 bushels of blue crab/day…”
When reading those words, it’s worth remembering that if the Breach Contingency Plan had b een in place back then, and if the Army Corps of Engineers had the same attitude in 1938 that it has today, Shinnecock Inlet would have been closed as soon as humanly possible once the hurricane had passed.
Instead of the clear, vital Shinnecock Bay that we have today, which supports many commercial and recreational fisheries, we would have a still, stinking, fetid pool that, given the nearby housing activity, and accompanying septic tank construction, that has occurred in the last eighty years, would have all of the attraction of an open sewer.
So it’s not hard to argue that the whole premise of the Contingency Plan, that breaches be closed as quickly as possible, might run contrary to both experience and common sense, and is in need of substantial review…
Yet the Corps’ sand-pumping (I had originally mistyped that “sand-pimping,” and still wonder whether that might be a better description) efforts don’t only cause harm to fish habitat inside the bay. They damage oceanfront habitat as well.
That has been a big issue down in New Jersey, where the Corps’ sand-pumping efforts have turned into a sort of double-whammy that plagues both fish and fishermen.
First, the Corps is pumping sand from offshore ridges that have long been considered essential fish habitat and important fishing grounds. Tom Dillingham, director of the American Littoral Society, a venerable marine conservation group, notes that
“They’re sacrificing the health of fish habitat for the protection of housing developments along the beaches.”
“The best sand is often in areas with the most fish, or at least the healthiest benthic communities—those with shellfish, worms, invertebrates and other marine organisms that live on the ocean floor and attract fish.”
Ken Warchal, a vice-president of the Jersey Coast Anglers Association, observed that
“The Army Corps of Engineers’ own environmental assessment shows that Manasquan Ridge prime, essential fish habitat.”
However, the thought of severely damaging essential fish habitat doesn’t deter the Army Corps from their sand-pumping mission. In the words of the Corps’ Keith Watson,
“When we were approved to use those areas, they were not essential fish habitat. It’s the approved borrow area for the hardest-hit reach from Sandy. Everything else is not compatible for [sand] grain size or has other issues.”
In the true manner of bureaucrats everywhere, the Corps seems resistant to changing a course that has already been decided, regardless of whether the latest scientific information now suggests that moving forward is not a good idea.
And once the sand gets to the beach, it does more harm, burying inshore structures and the ecosystems that they support.
To be fair, much of that structure comes in the form of jetties created in earlier beach stabilization efforts. However, much like the Hudson River piers in Manhattan, which frustrated the Westway project years ago, New Jersey’s jetties have now become the focus of a host of marine organisms, and so have integrated themselves into the marine environment. Burying them would do environmental harm.
New Jersey anglers are quick to point out the problem. An article in the Asbury Park Press explained their concerns.
“What’s even worse, said [Joe] Pailotto, [Chairman of the Asbury Park Fishing Club,] is that the project will effectively turn a thriving ecosystem into a desert.
“One area that will receive tons of sand is known as ‘jetty country,’ a stretch of rockpiles and groins that act as a nursery for a wide variety of fish and marine life, and offers some of the best recreational fishing along the Atlantic coast.
“’Would you bury a coral reef?’ asked Greg Hueth, president of the Shark River Surf Anglers. ‘All that habitat will be filled in and destroyed and won’t come back. It’s like burying someone alive.’”
Yet burying ecosystems alive is what the Army Corps does, and has been doing for a very long time.
Although I’ve tried to limit this essay to the areas that I know best—Long Island’s South Shore Bays and the coast along the New York Bight—it’s impossible to ignore the damage that the Corps has done to coral reefs off southern Florida, smothering them with silt from channel dredging operations.
And it was typical of the Corps that, instead of admitting its culpability, it argued that the coral damage was caused by disease, and not by its dredging efforts, perhaps to better assure that its future dredging plans, near other reefs, will not be reexamined.
Such claim was easily dismissed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration which, unlike the Corps, is legally responsible for keeping corals, and other marine organisms, healthy and alive.
One could, in fact, easily argue that, rather than being responsible for keeping marine organisms that are affected by its operations alive, the Army Corps of Engineers far exceeds any other federal agency when it comes to the damage done to a wide array of marine life, and the damage wrought to marine ecosystems.
Thus, I was somewhat perplexed not long ago, when I was reading a new report issued by the Center for Coastal Conservation, entitled A Vision for Marine Fisheries Management in the 21st Century, and subtitled, Priorities for a New Administration.
I’ll undoubtedly discuss that report, in excess detail, in future blog posts. It provides a lot of grist for the mill. But the statement relevant here is that
“the recreational fishing community supports a strongly funded US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) with a robust recreational fishing and boating program. The Corps’ protection and restoration programs seek to re-establish the natural functions of America’s rivers, lakes, wetlands and coasts. In addition, the Corps’ navigation and development projects mitigate important aquatic habitats and provide access for recreational boaters and anglers.”
While the Corps does play a significant role in dam removal, and in that way arguably contributes to “re-establish[ing] that natural functions of America’s rivers, (although it probably also played a role in damming them up in the first place) ” its history of channelizing rivers and destroying much of their ability to support anadromous fish runs and other forms of aquatic life, alone, more than offsets any good done elsewhere.
As far as the rest of it goes, well, Long Island’s baymen, quoted above, tell us all we need to know about what happens when the Corps engages in projects to “mitigate important aquatic habitats.” “
“Mitigate,” as used here, is just another word for “degrade,” if not for “destroy.”
Thus, it seems very curious that an organization that tries to convince the public that it stands for “conservation,” and even has that word in its name, would want to provide more funding to the Corps of Engineers.
Of course, these are the same folks who want to weaken the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, so that anglers can continue to overfish and not worry about rebuilding once-overfished stocks.
Maybe when you take that sort of thing into account, supporting the Corps makes some sort of sense.
Or at least, has a certain consistency…
Thursday, October 20, 2016
Maryland released its annual Juvenile Abundance Index for striped bass a few days ago, and the news isn’t good.
To put that in context, the long-term average is 11.7. When the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission began recovering the collapsed striped bass stock in the 1980s, it determined that a three-year rolling average of 8.0 would signal that the stock had begun to recover.
So 2.2 is pretty bad.
Still, the Maryland Department of Natural Resources correctly notes that a single year’s index provides no reason to worry. It issued a reassuring statement which said
“While this year’s striped bass index is disappointing, it is not a concern unless we observe poor spawning in multiple, consecutive years. Very successful spawning years, as recently as 2011 and 2015, should more than compensate for this below-average year class. Nonetheless, the department and our partners will continue to work to maintain a sustainable fishery for our commercial watermen and recreational anglers.”
That sounds fine. But if we remove the word “consecutive” from the Maryland Department of Natural Resources’ statement, and take a broader look at striped bass abundance, does the poor 2016 figure give cause for concern?
While there were dominant year classes in 2011 and 2015, the worst spawn ever recorded in the 62-year history of the Maryland young-of-the-year survey, 0.89, occurred just four years ago. Other than that record-low year, you have to go back to 1990, when the collapsed striped bass stock was still struggling to rebuild, to find a spawn that was worse.
Still, it’s true that some good year classes can make up for the bad ones, so it’s worthwhile to take a look at some recent averages to see where we might stand today.
The 3-year average is now 12.47, a bit above the long-term figure.
One the other hand, the 5-year average, which captures the terrible 2012 spawn but not the dominant 2011 year class, is a mere 8.81.
An average of the last 10 years captures both the two worst and two best recent year classess, and returns a figure of 10.87, which remains below the long-term average, but not by very much.
Thus, if we look at the averages alone, it would appear that the Maryland DNR is right. The poor 2016 spawn is largely offset by more successful spawns in other years.
On the other hand, to determine the trajectory of the stock, and figure out whether abundance is increasing or decreasing over time, you need to look at trends.
They tell a somewhat different tale.
The long-term average reaches back six decades. During most of those years, striped bass were hardly regulated at all, and overfishing was tolerated whenever and wherever it occurred. The long-term average also includes the spawning stock collapse of the 1970s and early 1980s, when rebuilding had not yet begun.
A medium-term average that includes only the modern era of striped bass management, the years after the stock had been declared rebuilt in 1995, would yield a figure of 16.41, significantly higher than the long-term average, and well above the averages for the most recent 3, 5 and 10-year periods.
Even if the starting point for such medium-term average was moved back to 1986, when the ASMFC’s Striped Bass Management Board adopted Amendment 3 to the management plan and began the stock’s rebuilding, such average, at 15.31, would still remain notably higher than the long-term average and the most recent 3-year, 5-year and 10-year averages.
Thus, despite having the large 2011 and 2015 year classes included in the mix, the last 10 years of striped bass reproduction, when viewed through the lens of the past three decades, have not been particularly good.
In fact, the average for the past 10 years, 10.87, is the third-lowest average for any 10-year period beginning on or after 1986. The only two 10-year intervals that returned lower averages were 2004-2013, when the juvenile abundance index averaged 10.47, and 2005-2014, when the index averaged 10.55.
It’s probably significant that all three of the worst 10-year intervals in the past thirty years ended within the past four years.
In contrast, the best 10-year intervals since 1986 included 1992-2001, when the juvenile abundance index averaged 23.69, and 1996-2005, when it averaged 22.24, more than twice the current 10-year average and ten times the 2016 level.
Even the average for the rebuilding period following the collapse, 1986-1995, was 11.76, about equal to the long-term average and somewhat higher than the average for 2007-2016.
Viewed against that background, the current state of striped bass reproduction doesn’t look all that good.
Another factor also comes into play.
Biologists have linked successful striped bass spawns with particular environmental conditions, more specifically cool, wet springs.
Unfortunately, springs seem to be getting warmer.
Unless there is a drastic, and completely unlikely, change in global weather patterns during the last two months of the year, 2016 will be the warmest year ever recorded. Even taking 2016 out of the equation, the five warmest years on record occurred in 2015, 2014, 2010, 2013 and 2005.
That’s a trend that doesn’t bode well for striped bass spawning success in the long term.
In the short term, things look somewhat better.
The 2011 year class will begin recruiting into the coastal fishery next season, so anglers that have already been catching a lot of undersized 2011s will now be able to take a bass or two home. In the Chesapeake, the 2015s will also start appearing in fishermen’s catches, although virtually all of them will probably have to be returned to the water.
So long as harvest remains at 2015 levels, it is unlikely that the stock will become overfished in the next few years.
The danger is that the abundance of smaller fish will lead to further calls to relax the regulations imposed last year, pursuant to Addendum IV to Amendment 6 of the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan.
Hopefully, no such calls will be heard, for the 2016 update to the most recent benchmark stock assessment has already stated that, at current harvest levels, there is only the slimmest possibility of the female spawning stock biomass returning to target abundance by 2018. The small 2016 year class is certain to further slow the recovery of the stock, even if landings remain unchanged.
Increased landings would make recovery even less likely, and increase the possibility that the female spawning stock, already just slightly above the overfishing threshold, would decline enough to fall below that critical reference point.
Thus, all eyes should be on ASMFC’s Striped Bass Management Board when it meets next week, and all anglers concerned with the health of the striped bass stock should stand ready to challenge any rash effort, however unlikely, to increase the kill.