MARINE RECREATIONAL FISHERIES: THE CLOSING WINDOW

 

Last Tuesday, I attended a meeting of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council.  The meeting was relatively brief, and although it touched on other matters, its main focus was on possible 2024 regulations for the recreational scup and summer flounder fisheries. 

While everyone agreed on a single set of scup regulations, three options for summer flounder had received serious consideration from stakeholders.  Two would include a 19-inch size limit and a three-fish bag, with seasons that spanned either 126 or 132 days.  The third would increase the minimum size to 19 ½ inches and, by doing so, also allow a 4-fish bag and a 213-day season that ran from April 1 through October 31.

The fact that increasing the size limit by just one-half of an inch would permit an 81-day extension of the season—perhaps, for practical purposes, closer to a 45- or 50-day extension, as just about no fluke are caught through most of April and few in late October, but still a significant increase—and add an additional fish to the bag is a pretty good indication of how few fish exceeding 19 ½ inches are being caught these days.  Going to the larger fish would undoubtedly lead to many more throwbacks, and a lot of unhappy anglers. 

Nonetheless, it was the option preferred by most of the for-hire industry, by the tackle shops, and by quite a few anglers, too, garnering about 450 first- and second-choice votes in a survey that reflected the opinions of about 850 anglers and about 50 members of the for-hire fleet.  The two primary 19-inch options each attracted about 400 first- and second-choice votes each, and a few other 19-inch options attracted far smaller shares of the angling population.

I was a little surprised by the outcome, since just a few weeks before, it seemed that a reluctant consensus was forming around one of the 19-inch options, with the general sentiment being that the summer flounder fishing didn’t really heat up until later in May, and that a 19 ½-inch fluke might be hard to find along much of the New York coast.  However, many members of the for-hire fleet did express a reluctance to sacrifice any days of the season, and asked the Department of Environmental Conservation to consider other options that might extend season length, perhaps by adopting a 2-fish bag in the earliest part of the year.

It turned out that a split-season bag limit didn’t achieve the required reduction in summer flounder landings, and perhaps because of that, the industry—and, apparently, many anglers—decided that a longer season was more important than a smaller size limit, and asked the DEC to adopt the 19 ½-inch option, saying that a shortened season would harm the state’s angling industry.

It’s not yet clear that the state will abide by their wishes.  The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission has placed New York and Connecticut in a single region for the purposes of managing summer flounder.  Both states must agree on a single set of regulations, and it is not at all certain that Connecticut will agree to the higher minimum size.  But whether or not Connecticut ultimately concurs, it is difficult not to sympathize with the angling industry, because if the boats can’t sail, and anglers can’t fish, for summer flounder during much of the year, they have little else to fish for.  That’s particularly true for boats and anglers that fish in the bays, and don’t venture into the ocean.

It wasn’t always that way.

My wife and I moved to Long Island in December 1983; I’ve kept a boat of some sort in Long Island’s waters for the past 40 years.  Back then, the fishing season never really stopped.

If the season had a beginning, it was around the first weekend in March, when a handful of party boats began fishing for winter flounder.  A few private boats, and a few anglers fishing from bulkheads and piers, also got early starts.  While they usually didn’t catch much at first, by St. Patrick’s Day, the unofficial first day of the flounder season, just about all of the party boats sailed with good loads of anglers.  The fishing hit its stride in April, continued strong through the end of May, and never really stopped altogether, with a few flounder being picked all summer in the cooler water near the inlets.  In the fall, flounder fishing began to improve late in September, and continued well into December.

In 1984, the first year that I fished Great South Bay, New York’s recreational fishermen caught and took home nearly 14.5 million winter flounder.  By 2023, that number had dropped to an estimated 535, although so few were landed, and there is so much uncertainty in the estimate, that there is just as good a chance that the actual number was anywhere between 0 and 1,680.

Whatever it was, the flounder are pretty much gone.  Party boat passengers no longer pursue them.  Nor do most shore or private-boat fishermen.  The revenues that they generate for tackle shops is somewhere very close to nil—so close that, when I tried to buy some bait last April for a quick offshore  cod trip, I couldn’t even find a pack of frozen clams; the shops said that they wouldn’t stock any bait until May.

Thus, with the loss of winter flounder, a month and a half was chopped off the start of the fishing season.  More time was chopped off at its end.

That was a big hit for the industry to absorb.  Winter flounder were once one of the most important recreational species in New York’s waters, and shops and for-hire boats took a hit when they disappeared.  If flounder were the only fish to decline, it would have been bad enough.  However, they weren’t alone.

By the winter of 1983-84, my first winter spent on Long Island, another significant fishery was just about gone.  New York’s waters had long hosted a good population of whiting (more properly called “silver hake”).  In the winter, they would come close to shore.  On the East End, around Montauk, big “baseball bat” whiting could sometimes be caught from the beach, and smaller fish could often be picked up on South Shore beaches, after they chased small bait so aggressively during the night that they found themselves on the sand, providing food for any person—or gull—that passed by.  But the real concentration of whiting occurred around New York Harbor, where anglers caught them at night from places like the Coney Island Pier.  Party boats sailed at all hours, loaded with anglers who, through the 1970s, regularly brought home buckets of fish.

Today, whiting are so scarce inshore (they are still abundant in deep offshore waters) that the National Marine Fisheries Service’s recreational landings data website doesn’t even include them in the standard list of species; to find them, a special inquiry must be made.  If you take the time to do that, you’ll learn that some whiting are still caught off New York in some years—perhaps 3,200 in 2021, but none the year after—but there are no longer enough to support a directed fishery, much less one the size of the fishery that once existed in the New York Bight.

So another few weeks were chopped off the fishing year.

But whiting were mostly a West End occurrence;  for most of Long Island, back in those days, there were cod.  By the 1980s, cod were starting to fade, but the fishery was still viable.  Some party boats regularly sailed throughout the winter from South Shore ports as well as from Montauk, and some private boats sailed as well—at least through November and early December.  I still recall fishing a tournament appropriately called the “Codfish Chiller” sometime around Thanksgiving in 1984 or ’85.  It was miserable fishing from a small boat at that time of year, but it nonetheless kept the shops open selling clams and terminal gear.  The summer fishery, which was concentrated on the East End, was more pleasant, and saw both private and for-hire boats sail to wrecks and to Rhode Island’s Cox’s Ledge, where anglers regularly caught quality cod—a very few would break 50 pounds, but 20s were common—while fishing in shirtsleeve weather.

But the summer fishery died long ago, and the winter fishery is on life support, taking away another important species from the party boats and giving them little to fish for during the season.

Tautog (“blackfish”), another species once important to the saltwater angling industry, has seen its season shrink as well.  Once caught from late April through late November along much of the coastline, and throughout the winter in some deep-water spots, it is now targeted for only a couple months in the fall; an April season exists, but produces few fish.

What that all means is that the window for successful sportfishing—and for making money in the sportfishing industry—is steadily closing.  What was once a year-round season now begins in early May and ends—for most people—at some point in November, although the striped bass fishery on western Long Island can continue into December, and the party boat fishery for black sea bass and such runs through the end of the year.

What may be more important is that, as the season shrinks, the number of species available to anglers is shrinking, too. 

Forty years ago, striped bass were in serious trouble, weakfish were beginning to wane, and the live-fish market was beginning to impact the tautog, but otherwise, there was a wide array of fish available to New York’s anglers, whether they fished from shore, from their own boats, or from for-hire vessels.  Today, that is no longer the case.

Winter flounder are gone.  Summer flounder have experienced below-average recruitment for well over a decade; although the stock is not overfished, at the end of 2022, spawning stock biomass stood at 83% of its target level, so neither are the fish abundant.  Tautog are mixed, with the New Jersey-New York Bight population still overfished, but the Long Island Sound stock recovering well, although still below the biomass target.  However, Atlantic mackerel, once a private- and party boat favorite that flooded New York’s waters during the spring, have declined below the biomass threshold, and are now overfished.

Of the inshore sportfish, striped bass are overfished, and have been experiencing poor recruitment in every spawning area except the Hudson River; even there, the 2023 juvenile abundance index was the lowest since 1985.  Bluefish are no longer overfished, but remain in a rebuilding plan, with spawning stock biomass at the end of 2022 just 60% of target.  Weakfish are showing some slight signs of recovery and improved recruitment, but spawning stock biomass remains far, far below the threshold that denotes an overfished stock.

The fish that once supported the winter fishery are also in bad shape.  The newly-recognized Southern New England stock of cod is overfished, and overfishing is still occurring.  The whiting are gone from the New York Bight.  The status of mid-Atlantic red hake is unknown, but the last stock assessment update indicated that biomass was the lowest recorded in a time series going back to 2015.  Atlantic herring, that once drew a surprising number of anglers to local piers during the cold months, are now overfished and not common inshore.

The only two species that are in really good shape are scup and black sea bass.  However, recreational fishermen have exceeded their annual catch limit for both species in each of the past three years, so there is no room for any expansion of either fishery.

And so fishermen, and the recreational fishing industry, are trapped not only by a shrinking season, but by a shrinking number of available species that limits their alternatives when regulations shorten seasons or fish fail to show up in a particular location.  Things have gotten so bad in New York that some for-hire operators are now asking the state to extend the winter flounder season, despite the collapsed state of the flounder stock, in order to provide more opportunities for their customers to take a fish home.

Things aren’t much better anywhere else; I only focus on New York because it’s the fishery that I know best.  In North Carolina, the local Albemarle-Roanoke stock of striped bass is in dismal condition, the recreational southern flounder season runs for only two weeks, and big bluefish are no longer regular visitors to the late autumn beach.  In the Gulf of Mexico, overfishing is driving down cobia numbers, greater amberjack are overfished, and the season for overfished gag grouper was recently shortened by more than half.  In the Pacific, a warming ocean has pushed many salmon runs into a steep decline.

On every coast, the window of angling opportunity, both for fishermen and for the businesses they support, continues to narrow.  In many cases, such as that of New York’s summer flounder, angling businesses feel forced to choose between unpalatable management alternatives, and continuously seek the suite of rules that will minimize income loss.

Still, as bad as things seem to be, most such businesses still fail to pursue the one course of action that might offer some hope for things to get better.  Focused on minimizing their short-term pain, they fail to embrace the sort of conservative management efforts that might rebuild fish stocks in the long term, and begin to reopen the window of angling opportunity that has been slowly sliding shut for three decades and more.

IN PURSUIT OF IGNORANCE: VIRGINIA LEGISLATORS DELAY MENHADEN STUDY

 

Menhaden, particularly Atlantic menhaden, are one of my least-favorite subjects for this blog.

They’re an important forage fish.  The resource has been abused in the past.  But thanks to a lot of good people doing a lot of good work over the past quarter-century or so, menhaden management is now at least on a par with management of other important species.  The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s current menhaden management plan employs ecological, rather than single-species-based, reference points and, perhaps most important of all, current biomass remains above the biomass target, and fishing mortality remains below its target level.

Despite clear scientific advice to the contrary, many people still believe that the Atlantic menhaden stock is beset by problems.  Such stubborn and widespread belief might be attributable, at least in part, to a book written over a decade ago, The Most Important Fish in the Sea, which caught the public imagination and is still widely accepted today a gospel, despite the fact that its author, H. Bruce Franklin, was a cultural historian and professor of English, rather than a fisheries scientist.

A symptom of such persistent beliefs is the fact that, even though the last stock assessment found that there are enough menhaden swimming all along the coast to serve their ecological role, and even though that role was defined by the needs of a fully-rebuilt striped bass stock, quite a few people providing input on the ASMFC’s recently-adopted Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass made comments such as

“Mismanagement of the Chesapeake Bays striped bass harvest, along with the unsustainable commercial reduction fishery targeting menhaden, has contributed significantly to the decline of striped bass stocks in the Bay and coast-wide.”

“[O]ne thing you can do [to help conserve the striped bass] is to eliminate or reduce the number of menhaden that are netted commercially in the Chesapeake Bay.  Increasing the number of menhaden would be beneficial to stripers of all sizes in the bay.”

“Strengthen protections for Menhaden, the critically important forage fish on which Striped Bass depend for food.  As is being increasingly documented—and sadly apparent to me in simply viewing from my own home—the Menhaden population has crashed.”

And,

“Why is the ASMFC refusing to acknowledge the effect of the menhaden reduction fishery on the ability of the striped bass fishery to rebound?...Even a moratorium on recreational/commercial harvest won’t make a difference though, the fish need forage to rebound and their forage is being removed…”

Nevertheless, while the plight of the menhaden is badly overblown, and the fish is doing quite well on a coastwide basis, there are still some important questions that need to be answered.  Perhaps first among them is the question of whether menhaden can be locally depleted by the reduction fishery in the Chesapeake Bay, and whether such depletion can or does cause harm to populations of fish, piscivorous birds, and/or other animals.

A 2019 report from the University of Maryland/Maryland Sea Grant defines “localized depletion” as a

“reduction in menhaden population size or density below the level of abundance that is sufficient to maintain its basic ecological (e.g., forage base, grazer of plankton), economic, and social/cultural functions.”

It notes that such localized depletion

“can occur as a result of fishing pressure, environmental conditions, and predation pressures on a limited spatial and temporal scale,”

while recognizing that

“it is an issue of concern because it could lead to compromised predator-prey relationships, reduction in nutrient cycling, and chronic low recruitment via larval ingress of menhaden to the Chesapeake system.”

But while the report says all of those things, the one thing is doesn’t say is whether localized depletion of menhaden actually occurs in the Chesapeake Bay and, more relevant to this discussion, whether such depletion, if it occurs, is due to the activities of the reduction fishing fleet in the Virginia portion of the Bay (Maryland waters already being closed to such reduction fishing).

At the February 2005 meeting of the ASMFC’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, that Board decided to cap limit purse seine (which, for practical purposes, primarily means the reduction fleet’s) menhaden landings in the Chesapeake Bay to 110,400 metric tons per year, an amount that has been cut by more than half since then, and also

“to initiate a research program immediately to determine the status of menhaden populations in the Chesapeake Bay in order to conserve the species while more complete population information is obtained to assess whether localized depletion is occurring in Chesapeake Bay.”

Nearly two decades later, research has yet to answer the latter question.

The Virginia Institute of Marine Science states that

“It is the general position of VIMS that there is currently insufficient direct evidence to indicate that localized depletion of menhaden from Chesapeake Bay has occurred.  Hence, we do not support the implementation of drastic management regulations for the menhaden fishery.  However, sufficient ancillary information regarding the possibility that menhaden abundance in Chesapeake Bay is quite low exists and warrants serious consideration.”

For a while, it looked like VIMS might get a chance to develop the data needed to finally determine whether localized menhaden depletion occurred in the Chesapeake Bay.  The Virginia legislature passed a bill directing VIMS to develop plans for a comprehensive study of menhaden populations in Virginia waters, including the Chesapeake Bay. 

On January 10 of this year, a bill to authorize and fund what was expected to be a three-year research project headed by VIMS, but also involving Virginia fishery managers and relevant stakeholders, including Omega Protein, the sole participant in the East Coast reduction fishery.  The possibility of localized depletion was one of the topics that the researchers would have been tasked to investigate.

Unfortunately, that won’t be happening this year, and perhaps not in the foreseeable future.  Less than three weeks after the bill authorizing the study was introduced, a subcommittee of the Virginia House Rules Committee put off consideration of the bill until 2025, when it may or may not be moved forward.

There is no clear explanation of why that occurred.  According to the website of WFXR, a local television station,

“There was no testimony or debate [at the Rules Committee meeting].  The bill’s sponsor Del. R. Lee Ware (R-VA 72^nd), who is not a member of the subcommittee, was allowed to give a brief explanation of the bill.  Immediately following that, there was a motion to move the bill to the 2025 legislative session, and that motion carried on a voice vote.”

The action was somewhat surprising, since there seemed to be wide stakeholder support for the bill.  As WFXR noted,

“Del. Ware said there was a meeting of various stakeholders including conservation groups, sport and commercial fishing groups, and Omega Protein several months ago.  Ware says all parties came to a consensus to move the research funding bill forward.  He also told the subcommittee that when he addressed the members.

“’As a result of that they came to a unanimous agreement about how to proceed with the science,’ Ware told the delegates.  They suggested a three-year longitudinal study that will really give us answers on this very important fish.’”

But for some reason, despite all the attention that menhaden have gotten in the Virginia legislature in recent years, the motion to defer action until 2025 succeeded.

Although no one seems eager to take credit for killing this year’s bill, and members of the responsible subcommittee have not tried to explain their vote, some are blaming Omega Protein for the legislation’s demise. 

Capt. Chris Dollar, who serves as “Chesapeake conservation advisor” to the Coastal Conservation Association, an anglers’ rights group, lamented that

“It’s no surprise that Omega Protein flip-flopped in their support of the study bill, but it’s extremely disheartening that that a handful of elected officials agreed with them to again derail this vital research.”

Another recreational representative, Steve Atkinson, president of the Virginia Saltwater Sportfishing Association, concurred, saying

“The fact that the industry was involved in designing this study, and then turned and lobbied against the bill, is yet another breach of public trust.”

A press release issued by the respected Chesapeake Bay Foundation sounded a similar theme, noting that

“Omega Protein previously backed the development of a scientific framework for a local menhaden population study.  But as the 2024 legislative session progressed, the company’s lobbying efforts paved the way for lawmakers to punt funding the study into next year.”

The Foundations executive director, Chris Moore, expressed his disappointment with the legislative outcome, saying

“In the Virginia Way, representatives from the conservation community, Omega Protein, and VIMS hammered out an agreement last year on how to proceed to develop more science on menhaden in both a timely and cost-effective manner.  Omega’s lack of support for funding the study is unfortunately not the Virginia Way…

“By opposing funding for these important research questions, Omega Protein once again proves that they are not acting in good faith for the Chesapeake Bay, but rather only for their own pockets.”

For its part, Omega denies any effort to torpedo the bill.  In a written statement provided to WFXR, its spokesman, Ben Landry, said

“Despite our concern that these proposed projects would not answer the primary question most people are after; i.e., ‘How many menhaden are in the Bay? and what should the Bay menhaden harvest be?’ we took no position on the bill.  I can say with certainty that no one from our team lobbied against Del [sic] Ware’s bill.”

While it seems that everyone’s statement cannot be right, and that someone must either be dishonest or mistaken, it’s also quite possible that both are telling a version of the truth; that is, it’s possible that by not actively supporting the funding bill, while also not offering formal opposition, Omega effectively damned the legislation with faint praise, making it clear to the legislators that the company would be happier if the bill was sent off to some dark corner to die.

Certainly, given all the attention that menhaden have been getting from both stakeholders and coastal legislators, there was plenty of impetus to at least move the bill out of committee, so that it could get the attention of the full legislature, attention which it seems to have deserved.  Given that, deferring the bill to the 2025 session, where it might or might not be revived, would appear a conscious decision to choose willful ignorance over promoting and developing scientific knowledge of the menhaden’s status in Virginia waters.

That makes the subcommittee’s decision all the more puzzling.

Yet there is one reason why legislators might opt for ignorance over expanded knowledge:  Someone must be afraid of what that knowledge—in this case, the menhaden study—might reveal. 

 

FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: GENERATIONS

 

It struck me as I was reading an article in nola.com, a website dedicated to news from the New Orleans region.  The article discussed proposed changes in Louisiana’s recreational fishing regulations for red drum, and included the following passage:

“While the overall tone was civil, arguments broke out between charter captains who pursue redfish in very different ways.  That often meant fly-fishing guides, who in many cases catch redfish and then release them, were urging stricter regulations, while other charter boat captains who aim to send their clients home with supper pleaded for a slower approach.

“The two groups even tended to sit on opposite sides of the room, as if members of a different tribe.

“’We’re on the water every day.  We can tell you what’s going on,’ said Venice charter captain Ron Price, 54 and a guide since 1996.”

“He argued that the proposal was too drastic, using a couple of expletives to help punctuate his point.

“’I don’t need some college kid with a seine net, throwing it in the wrong spot, to tell me we’re in dire straits,’ he said of the research.

“Ty Hibbs, 29 and a fishing guide for about a dozen years, called it a ‘decision for the future,’ as he spoke in favor of the proposal.

“’Why should my generation or the generations that follow me have to deal with a subpar fishery in Louisiana just because there’s people who don’t care about the future?’ he said.”

Change the names, and a few of the details, and the description of that Louisiana hearing could have applied described a striped bass hearing here in New York or maybe New Jersey, a weakfish hearing on the mid-Atlantic coast, a bluefish hearing in southern New England.

Because in so many of those cases, as in Louisiana, the core conflict isn’t between two different opinions about whether a specific set of regulations ought to be adopted to manage a particular species, but between two outlooks of how—and why and even whether—fish stocks ought to be managed, and whether the benefits of current exploitation outweigh the long-term benefits of a healthy and sustainable stock.

Most often, the people on each side of such debates are very different, which those pushing for larger harvests in the short term generally older folks who began to fish decades ago, when many species of fish were far more abundant, and anglers far less abundant, than is the case today.  They came to the sport when size and bag limits were liberal, if they existed at all, and seasons commonly ran from New Year’s Day to the very last day of December.  A few younger anglers, conditioned by their elders’ sensibilities, also maintain a short-term outlook, but their numbers are relatively low.

Those urging caution are usually young, who grew up in an age when size limits, bag limits, and seasons were always a part of the scene, when some fish, at least, could be hard to come by.  They may have grown up with their elders’ stories about catching fish that now, hardly anyone catches at all.  But if you look closely, you’ll not a few greybeards scattered around the younger anglers’ ranks, folks who remember the fisheries that we once had, and grieve, decades later, for what we have lost.

But the debate typically breaks down along generational lines, not only among anglers but, as in Louisiana, also among the for-hire fleet.  The old captains still focus on killing fish; full coolers are used as the gauge of a good day.  While they might not quite see themselves as selling fish to their clients, they certainly see customers’ opportunity to catch and keep fish as their business’ primary appeal; piling dead fish on the dock is nearly as important to them as it is to the captain of a longliner or trawler.  And like such commercial captains, they see themselves as part of the fishing industry.

Many young captains see things differently.  They often run smaller boats—perhaps out of preference, or perhaps out of financial necessity—and carry fewer passengers on each trip.  Their focus is less on dead fish, and more on recreation.  While catching fish still matters, they sell the overall recreational experience, often fishing with lighter tackle that emphasizes the challenge of the hookup and fight.  While that often means that their clients take fewer fish home, it also allows them to actively target fish such as false albacore that are fun to catch but aren’t valued as food, providing angling opportunities that are closed to the harvest-oriented boats.  They understand that they are mostly selling entertainment, rather than food.

And because they’re young, they also understand that if they plan to stay in the business for all of their lives, they need healthy fish stocks not only today, but for another thirty, forty, or even fifty years.

The two outlooks aren’t easy to reconcile.  That came through loud and clear in the recent debate over the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, which saw the latter group of for-hires submit comments similar to those provided by Maryland’s Capt. Greg Shute, who noted,

“I also recommend that whatever action the board chooses in ensuring abundance that they accept dead discards while reducing harvest as a means of lowering overall mortality.  The slot options presented [for the Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery] reduce harvest significantly and only increase release mortality minimally while allowing participation.  Participation is what drives the socio-economic benefit to sport fishing.  [emphasis added]” 

On the other hand, the older, more traditional for-hires echoed the sentiments expressed in a form letter used by a group of charter boat captains, which argued that customers on for-hire boats should be governed by a wider slot size limit than that imposed on all other anglers, because

“This option is beneficial to charter boats who may be struggling to find striped bass within the small 3” slot window for their clients to bring home fish for food.  Fish for food is a very important aspect of the striped bass fishery.  [emphasis added]”

The two views seem irreconcilable, and it might seem impossible for both to be true at the same time.  Yet, I can easily argue that both positions are equally valid, as they reflect the views not only of different factions within the for-hire fleet, but also different factions within the larger angling community.

And I’ve lived long enough to understand why.

When I first started to fish in the late 1950s and early 1960s, fish of all kinds were very abundant and regulations were very few.  There was only a 16-inch (fork length) size limit for striped bass, and nothing else that a Connecticut angler need worry about.  Most adult anglers had lived through the Great Depression and many were World War II vets who approached fishing in a no-nonsense way, enjoying what they did while very much fishing for food.  Even though the economy was booming in the post-war years and employment was high, a “keeper” fish was meant to be kept, and few recreational fishermen ventured out intending to return “free” protein to the sea.

In the northeast and mid-Atlantic, things really didn’t change much until the late 1970s, when the striped bass stock collapsed, shattering many fishermen’s belief that the ocean was a limitless resource (except for “Russian” trawlers, of course, and our own commercial fishermen who they viewed as threats to the resource, a view that they never thought to extend to anglers like themselves).

Then, beginning with striped bass, the 1980s began to usher in the modern era of regulation.

Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass successfully rebuilt the striped bass stock by severely restricting landings, imposing a 1-fish bag limit and an ever-increasing size limit, intended to protect the relatively healthy 1982 year class, which eventually topped out at 36 inches. 

Later in the decade, states began to require anglers who sold all or part of their catch—back then, a not-uncommon practice among more experienced and successful “recreational” fishermen—to buy licenses, something that was never required before.  And by 1988 or so, a decline in the numbers of winter flounder, once one of the most common fish in the estuaries and bays, led to the first size and bag limits for a species that was very much taken for granted.

Throughout the 1990s, and particularly after the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act became law in 1993, regulations began constraining the landings of most other recreationally-important fish such as bluefish, summer flounder, scup, weakfish, and tautog (apologies for limiting the listing to New England/mid-Atlantic species, but that’s just the timeline that I know; other species, in other regions, were also seeing their landings limited during this period).

By the time the 21^st century dawned, a few things were true:  Many fish stocks had declined to levels that anglers fishing in the 1970s would not have believed.  The saltwater recreational fishery was regulated to an extent that such anglers could not have imagined.  And because of such regulations, some important recreational species, such as striped bass and summer flounder, were recovering—or, in the case of bass, had recovered—from being very badly overfished.

That pattern has continued to the present day.

As a result, we see different generations responding very differently to fisheries management and fisheries regulations.

A large percentage of older anglers still pine for the Wild West days of the ‘70s.  Remembering how they once brought home bushels of winter flounder, burlap bags filled with tautog or cod, and garbage cans (the old-time predecessor to today’s Yeti coolers) stuffed solid with bluefish, they rail against restrictions on landings and, contrary to common sense, try to force time to run backwards to an era when unregulated recreational fishermen could take what they wanted, any time that they wanted, without any limits or laws.

For many, the striped bass’ collapse was a watershed that forced them to confront their own attitudes toward fisheries regulation.  Some became conservation advocates, many became more mindful of how their actions impacted the bass fishery, if not necessarily other species.  Some quickly forgot the collapse and returned to their own way of thinking as soon as the bass stock began to rebuild, and retain their ‘70s mindset unto today.

On the other hand, anglers who just started saltwater fishing in the last 20 years have never experienced an unregulated fishery, nor have they ever experienced the diverse and abundant fish stocks of the 1960s and ‘70s.  They have seen the striped bass decline, and have also seen the bluefish, summer flounder, and weakfish stocks wane.  Many have never caught, or even seen, a winter flounder. 

Abundance for them is defined by scup and black sea bass, the only two species that, for the moment, still thrive.  Regulation is a normal part of the angling scene.

And thus we have generational conflict, as older anglers remember what was, and try to recreate the past, while their younger counterparts, born into a more limited fishery, think of what may yet be, and look to the future.

One cannot reverse the flow of time.

 

STRIPED BASS: WHAT COMES AFTER ADDENDUM II

 

Last week, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board approved Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.  Addendum II incorporated the emergency measure that the Management Board adopted last May—a 31-inch maximum size, which effectively created a 28- to 31-inch slot limit in the recreational ocean fishery—while also imposing a modest reduction in the recreational fishery in the Chesapeake Bay and cutting commercial quotas—but not necessarily commercial landings—by 7%.

While those measures are certainly a step in the right direction, in themselves, they will probably neither reduce fishing mortality to the target level nor fully rebuild the spawning stock biomass by the 2029 rebuilding deadline.

Additional management measures will almost certainly be needed, and now that Addendum II is behind us, it’s probably time to start thinking about what such measures should be.  An update to the striped bass stock assessment is scheduled for next fall.  Should that update suggest that there is less than a 50% probability that the stock will rebuild pursuant to Addendum II’s management measures, some sort of management action will be in order.  If that proves to be the case, the new Addendum grants the Management Board the authority to act without the need to go through the long, time-consuming process of putting out a draft addendum for public comment, holding public hearings, and finally settling on a suite of management measures to be implemented by the states.

Whether the Management Board will elect to exercise such authority remains an unanswered question, for a number of Management Board members expressed reservations about acting outside of the normal process, even though public comment might be obtained through less formal means.  The severity of the striped bass’ plight might guide their final decision; if the assessment update finds that the probability of timely rebuilding falls only a little bit short of 50%--say, better than 45%, or perhaps even better than 40%--the Management Board might well decide to embrace the formal addendum process.  On the other hand, if the probability falls in the 25% to 30% range, expedited management action is more likely to occur.

At this point, any further management measures will very probably include some sort of closed recreational season, if only because the Management Board is unlikely to further narrow the current, already narrow slot limits, either for the Bay or ocean recreational fisheries, and the 1-fish bag limit is already as low as a bag limit can go. 

That makes a season the only remaining option.

Of course, the Devil is always in the details, and figuring out what such season should look like is not an easy task.  About the only thing that we can be sure of is that the same season—that is, closing the fishery at the same time, for all states along the coast—is not a viable approach.  The fishery peaks in different places at different times; a midsummer closure would have a very different impact in Maine than it would have in Virginia.  Balancing the closures so that everyone shares the pain in a more-or-less equitable matter will be no easy task.

Even within a single state, different interests will favor different closures.  Using New York as an example, closing the season in May and November would have a real, but less significant impact on Long Island’s East End than it would have off New York City and western Long Island, where anglers enjoy some of their best fishing during those two months and see very few bass during the dog days of summer, when, anglers fishing from boats out at Montauk typically do fairly well. 

It might seem that the simple solution to that would be to set a target reduction—let’s say, solely for the purposes of argument, that the Management Board decided to reduce fishing mortality by 20%--and call on the states to each decide on their own seasons, which the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Technical Committee would then review to determine whether the proposed seasons would lower fishing mortality by the required amount.

Yet, while such an approach would relieve the Management Board of the duty to set a season acceptable to all, it creates the new issue of adjacent states adopting widely differing seasons, which lead to enforcement issues if boats from one state, where the season is open, venture into another state’s closed waters.

Setting up regional seasons could solve much of that problem, although there would still be some conflicts around the edges of such regions.  For example, placing Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts into a single region would probably make sense, even if the bass fishery in southern Massachusetts is more like that of Rhode Island.  Similarly, grouping Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York together would seem a good fit, as boats from all three states often fish together in Long Island Sound, the edges of Block Island Sound, and around Block Island Sound.

But then, what do you do with New Jersey, which shares Raritan Bay with New York, and Delaware Bay with Delaware?  Grouping it with the latter state probably makes the most sense, given that all striped bass fishing must be done in state waters, and the greater expanse of shared water is to the south, but such a split wouldn’t sit well with some New York anglers, who watch their New Jersey counterparts prosecute the spring fishery in Raritan Bay, while they can only sit on the sidelines and wait for the bluefish to show.

Which brings up another big question:  If seasons are put in place, will such seasons merely prohibit anglers from keeping striped bass, or would they also prohibit targeting the fish?

From a practical standpoint, no-harvest seasons which still permit catch-and-release fishing, are the only viable option, since no-target closures are not readily enforceable.  That was made very clear when Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass was being developed in 2021.  It is just about impossible to prove to a court beyond a reasonable doubt—the standard that enforcement would have to meet to convict someone for targeting bass out of season--that that an angler who is fishing for striped bass during the closed season is not actually targeting something else.

How can one prove that the angler casting a chunk of menhaden from a Long Island beach isn’t really fishing for bluefish?  How can one demonstrate that the angler drifting eels near the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel isn’t seeking cobia, instead of striped bass?  So long as they aren’t foolish enough to put a bass in the cooler, both anglers would almost certainly escape a fine.

No-harvest closures that allow catch-and-release also make economic sense, as they allow tackle shops, marinas, charter boats, and other angling-oriented enterprises to still benefit from an active fishery.  Some businesses argue that anglers won’t fish if they can’t bring bass home, and so incomes will suffer, but as Capt. John McMurray wrote in a recent blog post for the Marine Fish Conservation Network,

“Starting that first week of October here, there were an increasing number of large striped bass targeting adult menhaden schools.  Not unusual for this time of the year, although the numbers certainly were.  What was very different is that for most of October, in my region, you really couldn’t find a ‘keeper’ (28 to 31” slot fish).  It was, for all intents and purposes, a catch-and-release fishery.

“Yet, the daily crowds were undoubtedly the largest I’ve ever seen them.  If the weather was nice, you could honestly count 200+ boats.  We’re not gonna get into the ‘no one works anymore’ stuff here, but the point is, there was a ton of traffic when it was really clear that no one was catching any keepers.

“Sure, those folks could have been out there simply to try and get a keeper, however low the chances were, but I don’t think so.  More than likely, they were out there for sport, and/or to get their hero pics (which was certainly why we were out there).”

Such commentary from a very successful, experienced Long Island charter boat captain provides solid evidence that if the Management Board imposed significant no-harvest closures, fishing-related businesses could still survive.  Some bass would certainly be lost to release mortality, but the Management Board could account for that simply by extending the length of the season when harvest would not be allowed.

The question then, of course, would be how long the closed season should be extended to account for such mortality.  That might be a more difficult question to answer than one might think.  For as Capt. McMurray also noted,

“While sure there were guys throwing plugs or dropping flutter-spoons, it was pretty clear that most of the fleet were ‘snag-and-drop’ fishing.  In other words, ripping a weighted treble hook through a menhaden school, sticking one, letting it swim and waiting for a striped bass to eat it.  What do I mean by most?  I dunno, I’d guess around 80-90%?

“If you’re up on your regs, which you should be, that’s illegal in New York, and, well, everywhere else.  In fact, fishing any live or dead bait on a treble is prohibited…Which I suppose makes sense, as it’s more likely you’re going to gut-hook a striper on a treble…A solid regulation intended to reduce dead discards.  IF…it were at all enforceable.

“The problem is, it’s efficient, and unless there are repercussions, there’s no reason for anglers NOT to do it.  If there were any boardings during the run—which I may be wrong, but there sure didn’t appear to be, and if someone were to have gotten called for snag-and-drop, well, all the angler had to say is that they were targeting bluefish (even though there weren’t really bluefish around, but enforcement officers don’t know that, nor could they prove it even if they did).

“Even before this ‘feel-good’ regulation went into place, law enforcement reps were clear, on the record, about the enforcement and compliance problems such regs cause.  Many folks, Commissioners specifically, claimed that regardless of the enforcement issues, most anglers would be compliant just because it was the right thing to do.  From what I see though, that just isn’t true.

“In case you haven’t drawn the conclusion on your own, there were a LOT of dead discards this October.  Every day we’d see several floaters, plus a LOT of fish that came over the boats’ gunnels pretty darn bloody.  [emphasis added]”

Such observations certainly cast doubt on the 9% release mortality rate generally used when calculating the impact of management measures on striped bass; there is certainly reason to suspect that, at least in the case of big bass, the mortality rate will be higher.

But such observations also lock us into a perplexing conundrum when it comes to no-harvest versus no-target season closures.

No-harvest closures make sense because they are far more enforceable, and still permit extensive recreational and economic activity.  Yet if anglers frequently engage in illegal activity to catch bass during those closed seasons, and so cause excessive release mortality, while the regulations they’re violating are not practically enforceable, no-target closures that just shut all bass fishing down may seem the best way to ensure that fishing mortality remains within acceptable bounds.

Yet if no-target closures aren’t enforceable…

That problem alone may be enough to dissuade the Management Board from taking quick action in response to bad news in the upcoming stock assessment update, in order to glean enough input from law enforcement, state regulators, and stakeholders as to which path to take.  But eventually, unless something unexpectedly happens that boosts the stock’s prospects, the seasons are going to come.

My guess is that, when it finally decides, the Management Board will opt for no-harvest closures, and leave the enforceability questions up to the states.  If that happens, some states may decide that no-target closures are manageable, as Maryland already has, and prohibit all striped bass fishing during some portion of the year.  Others will take the Board’s actions at face value and just put no-harvest closures in place.

Others might even attack the root of the problem and, along with their choice of closures, ban the use of treble hooks while fishing with bait, regardless of the target species, taking the “I’m fishing for bluefish” excuse off the table.

And, given the lack of remaining options, maybe that’s the sort of thing we ought to be thinking about:   management measures that are enforceable, but go beyond the usual size limits, bag limits, and seasons.  In that regard, two proposals that were briefly considered bother proposals that were briefly considered but quickly discarded during the development of Amendment 7 might deserve another look: requiring the in-water release of larger striped bass and requiring anglers to stop fishing once they but a striped bass in the cooler

Florida already prohibits anglers from removing tarpon more than 40 inches long from the water during the release process, and such rule is apparently being observed by most anglers.  The objections to adopting such rule for striped bass centered around the possible hazards of practicing in-water release when waves are running high.  However, whether releasing a large bass from surf or shore, such bass are often exhausted by the fight, and require the angler to spend some time reviving the fish in the water.  If the sea is too rough to allow in-water release, it is also to rough for such revival, meaning that anglers would probably be returning some number of exhausted fish to the water to die.

Thus, in-water release is a viable option, so long as anglers keep one thing in mind:  If the sea is rough enough to put either the bass or the angler at risk during the release process, no one should be fishing there and then in the first place.

Requiring anglers to stop fishing after keeping a bass is even more controversial, since it forecloses the opportunity to fish for other available species once such bass is retained.  However, such regulations work well in Alaska’s Kenai River king salmon fishery (where removing any salmon over 20 inches in length from the water prior to release is also illegal), preventing anglers from mortally wounding a fish that they will not be able to retain.

Granted, there are far more different species of fish caught all along the striper coast than there are in the Kenai, but anglers intent on a multi-species trip can always target striped bass later in the day, when their fluke or sea bass or drum or croaker are already on ice.  That might mean fishing when time and tide make landing a legal bass far less likely, but given the current state of the striped bass population, along with the threats that it faces, it might still be a viable option.

For the ocean is a changeable place, and it is possible that a successful spawn this year, if it occurs, could put a very different spin on the bass’ immediate prospects.  But until some good news emerges, the Management Board would be wise to strike a precautionary stance, and to think long and hard about any action that might better ensure the future health of the striped bass stock.

 

 

 

ASMFC APPROVES STRIPED BASS ADDENDUM II: IT'S NOT PERFECT, BUT IT'S ALSO NOT BAD

 

Yesterday, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board approved the final version of Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.  While the Addendum is far from perfect, and doesn’t do enough to protect or rebuild the striped bass stock, the final version is nonetheless a better management document that I expected it to be.

And that’s probably good enough, because Addendum II was always intended to be an interim management measure, that constrains fishing mortality to a reasonably low level through 2024, and then is replaced by a new Addendum III, which will be guided by the results of the stock assessment update that will be released next fall.  Addendum II was intended to reduce overall fishing mortality by 14.5%, which would get it down close to F_target, although the final measures adopted at yesterday’s meeting probably won’t quite be enough to attain that goal.

Addendum II addressed four primary issues—constraining fishing mortality in the ocean recreational fishery, constraining fishing mortality in the Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery, constraining fishing mortality in the commercial fishery, and providing the Management Board the authority to respond quickly to the findings of upcoming stock assessments, in the event such assessments suggest that, under existing management measures, the striped bass stock is unlikely to rebuild by the 2029 deadline specified in the management plan.

However, there were ancillary issues primarily impacting the recreational fisheries that were also important to the debate; another ancillary issue—the deadline for implementing the provisions of Addendum II—also had very real implications for the commercial fishery.

With one not-too-important exception, all of the issues presented by the Addendum were resolved in a way that advanced both the public interest and the health of the striped bass resource.

The first issue addressed was the ocean recreational fishery, where there was very strong stakeholder support (2,289 comments), from individual anglers as well as some charter boat and tackle shop owners, for formally adopting the current emergency measure—a 28- to 31-inch slot limit applicable to all anglers, whether they fished from private boats, for hire boats or from the shore—into the striped bass management plan.  However, a much smaller contingent of party and charter boat owners (158 comments) supported a related option that would apply the current slot limit to private boat and shore-based anglers, but grant special privileges to anglers fishing from for-hire vessels, and allow them to take fish that fell within a wider, 28- to 33-inch slot size.

The debate between the two options pitted those who were primarily concerned with the health of the striped bass resource and providing a fair angling environment for all anglers against those who prioritized the economic well-being, and perhaps the survival, of the for-hire fleet above other concerns.

Of course, as in most debates, things were not that black and white; many folks supporting the former option were very sympathetic to the problems besetting the for-hire operators, while many of those who supported the latter option were concerned with the state of the striped bass stock.  Nevertheless, everyone was forced to pick a position based on what they believed was the most important priority at this point in time.

The ocean recreational fishery

Dr. Michael Armstrong, a Massachusetts fishery manager, started off the debate by moving that Option B, the universal 28- to 31-inch slot limit, be adopted; his motion was seconded by Dennis Abbot, New Hampshire’s Legislative Proxy.  In supporting his motion, Dr. Armstrong declared that

“There’s a whole ton of reasons why this is the right way to go.”

He noted that maintaining the current slot limit for all anglers, regardless of platform, is the best way to maintain the fishing mortality reduction achieved by this year’s emergency measure, and observed,

“Now is not the time, with a looming disaster, to start carving out exceptions for special fisheries.”

In his view, carving out special regulations for the for-hire fleet represented a “paradigm shift” in the fishery, although he wouldn’t say whether he might support such action under other, more typical circumstances.

Mr. Abbott noted that the original purpose of both the emergency action and Addendum II was to reduce fishing mortality, and that any relaxing of that size limit

“marks a setback from what we were trying to do.”

Immediately after Mr. Abbott spoke, Dr. Justin Davis, Connecticut’s fishery manager, rose to amend Dr. Armstrong’s motion by replacing “Option B” with “Option C,” which would create the special, 28- to 33-inch slot limit for for-hire anglers.  His motion to amend was quickly seconded by Emerson Hasbrouck, the Governor’s Appointee from New York.

While Dr. Davis recognized that both sides of the debate made valid arguments, he admitted that

“I’ve been swayed by the outpouring of comments that I’ve gotten from the for-hire sector in Connecticut.”

He said that the comments he heard from for-hire operators exceeded the number of comments that he’d ever received on any other issue, and expressed concern for the future of the industry, particularly because of recent restrictions on all six inshore fisheries important to the for-hire fleet, and, for charter boats that venture offshore, the closure of the mako shark fishery.  Mr. Hasbrouck noted that Option C would lead to a fishing mortality reduction only 0.1% less than that provided by Option B, and said such option would help the for-hire fleet while having a minimal impact the striped bass.

Similar sentiments were expressed by Dr. Jason McNamee, Rhode Island’s fishery manager, who admitted that he was worried about the future of his state’s for-hire fleet, and wished that mode splits had been considered earlier in the management process.

But David Sikorski, the Legislative Proxy from Maryland, spoke against the proposed amendment, arguing that

“This motion is chasing the 2015 year class as they grow,”

and is contrary to the purpose behind Addendum II.

Another member of the Maryland delegation, fishery manager Michael Luisi, disagreed, arguing that both the emergency action and Addendum II were proposed and put in place quickly, with no consideration for the needs of the for-hire businesses.

At that point, Max Appelman of NOAA Fisheries noted that he had difficulty supporting Option C not because of the mode splits per se, but because of the uncertainty inherent in the effects of the change on fishing mortality.  He observed that successful rebuilding depends on successfully limiting fishing mortality, something that managers have so far been unable to do for any extended period.

He was followed by, Mr. Abbott, who said that he opposed Option C for multiple reasons, and that

“I see a basic unfairness.  There are millions of people who fish for striped bass, and only a few in the for-hire sector.”

He felt it was wrong for an angler who fishes from a private boat to be limited to the current slot, while someone who can afford to pay for a for-hire trip can take advantage of a more permissive size limit.  Mr. Abbott said that he had been on the Management Board for 28 years, and made an impassioned comment in which he noted

“We are not paying attention to the canary in the coal mine…We continue to do the things that I called ‘death by a thousand cuts’…We always tend to take the easy path, and the easy path has taken us to where we are today.”

He said that it was time to stop making exceptions to the management measures in order to please special interests in the various states, and instead

“do what’s right for the resource,”

finally observing that

“We tend not to do what we should be doing.”

Mr. Abbott’s comments were challenged by Adam Nowalsky, Legislative Proxy from New Jersey and probably the most aggressive advocate of recreational catch-and-kill fishing on the Management Board, who claimed that the “easy path” was placing more restrictions on anglers, and that the harder route was finding a way to conserve the fish while still maximizing the economic benefits from the fishery.  He also claimed that the true inequity in the striped bass fishery was emphasizing the sport fishery over recreational harvest.

With that, it was time for a vote.

Going into the meeting, I suspected that Option C would pass on a fairly narrow vote, but in the end, the opposite happened.  While seven jurisdictions—Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and the Potomac River Fisheries Commission—supported Option C, nine—Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, NOAA Fisheries, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service—opposed it, so the motion failed.

Once that occurred, Option B was adopted on a vote of 14 to 2, with only New York and New Jersey opposing.

The Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery

The debate over recreational management measures in the Chesapeake Bay followed similar lines, but had its own unique twists.  It began when Michael Luisi made a motion to adopt Option C2, which would establish a slot size limit of 19 to 24 inches, with a 1-fish bag limit for shore and private boat anglers and a 2-fish bag for those fishing from for-hire boats.  Ingrid Braun-Ricks, executive director for the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, provided a second.

Mr. Luisi attempted to justify his motion by noting that the 2-fish bag for for-hire vessels had already been adopted for Maryland through the conservation equivalency process, and that for-hire vessels participated in an electronic data program that provided much information which he deemed to be “incredibly valuable.”  He also argued that the “sport fishery” (i.e., shore and private boat anglers) and the for-hire fishery were “not one in the same,” and so shouldn’t be governed by the same rules.

Virginia fishery manager Pat Geer disagreed with the motion, saying that while he was happy to support consistent recreational rules throughout the Bay, Virginia’s Finfish Advisory Panel strongly opposes any sort of mode split, and has for many years.  He also noted that Virginia’s for-hire fleet, many of which fish in the Chesapeake Bay, were already subject to a 1-fish bag limit and had no problem with it.

Dr. Armstrong noted that stock assessments benefit from uniform regulations, and that when biologists try to analyze data where different modes have different rules,

“We’re slicing the [Marine Recreational Information Program] baloney awful thin.”

At that point, Mr. Sikorski again split with his state’s fishery manager, moving to substitute Option B2 for Option C2.  The two options were the same except for one very big difference:  Option B2 established a 1-fish bag limit for everyone, including for-hire anglers.  Mr. Geer seconded the motion.

In support of his motion, Mr. Sikorski explained that most of the 2018 year class will be larger than 24 inches in the upcoming season, and that Option B2 would thus help protect the last strong year class produced in the Bay.  He noted the problems besetting the Bay’s bass fishery, emphasized the need for consistent regulations, and then argued that

“Chesapeake Bay regulations have done a disservice to this resource…One fish for all could have been how we prosecuted our fishery for the past four years”

instead of

“chasing a snowball downhill.”

He acknowledged his concern for the impact a 1-fish bag limit might have on the for-hire fishery, but also noted that because Maryland had closed its traditional April striped bass fishery so that it might have a 2-fish for-hire bag, other businesses have suffered, including an Annapolis tackle shop that saw revenues decline by 23%.  Instead of breaking the recreational sector into pieces, Sikorsky said that

“I prefer to define us as the general public,”

while warning that if current trends persist,

“the dark days are coming.”

When a vote was finally taken on the motion to amend, it passed 13 to 3, with New Jersey, Maryland, and the Potomac River fisheries commission dissenting.

The lopsided vote didn’t stop Michael Luisi from trying again, this time proposing that the Management Board approve Option C2 only for 2024, and adopting Option B2 for 2025 and beyond; once more, his motion was seconded by Ms. Braun-Ricks. 

This time, he argued that retaining the 2-fish for-hire bag limit in 2024 would give the for-hire fleet time to adjust their business plans to account for a smaller bag, while also giving Maryland a chance to figure out how to maintain the data being accrued through electronic for-hire reporting, before such data was lost to “retribution” from an upset for-hire fleet.

New Jersey’s Nowalsky supported the motion, noting that for-hire boats often book trips well ahead of the season, when customers believe that fishing rules will not change, and so already have commitments to customers; more restrictive rules, he claimed, would lead to cancelled trips, while Doug Grout, proxy for New Hampshire’s Governor’s Appointee, opposed it, arguing that Addendum II was intended to reduce fishing mortality in 2024, not in 2025.

Other comments were made, but when the vote was taken, Michael Luisi’s motion was defeated, this time by a vote of 4 to 14, with New Jersey, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, and Virginia its only supporters.

Still, Luisi tried one more time, making a motion to substitute Option C1, which would reduce the slot size to 19 to 23 inches, achieving a greater fishing mortality reduction while still giving the for-hires a second fish.  This time, Dr. Davis seconded the motion, calling it “a reasonable compromise.”

Nowalsky challenged the Management Board to choose between Option C1, which achieved an even greater fishing mortality than Option B2 did, and their opposition to mode splits, which would allow more fish to be killed.  In response, Mr. Sikorsky noted that the narrower slot would increase release mortality, disagreed with those who sought special privileges for a “small group,” and plead,

“Let’s stop trying to divide people by how they participate in the fishery.”

With that said, a vote was taken, and Mr. Luisi lost again, this time on a vote of 6 in favor, 9 opposed, and a single abstention.  Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland were among the supporters.

With no new motions put on the table, Option B2 was adopted by a vote of 14-2, with only New Jersey and Maryland voting against.

Recreational law enforcement

Before moving away from the recreational fishery, the Management Board also needed to consider a measure intended to assist law enforcement, which would require anyone who filleted a bass at sea or at a shoreside location to retain the rack—that is, the carcass—so that law enforcement agents could determine whether the filleted bass complied with the relevant slot limit.  The same provision would require skin to remain on the fillet to facilitate species identification, and would set a possession limit of two fillets for every rack retained.

A motion to remove the requirement to leave the fillet unskinned passed with little opposition.  The amended motion found wide support, with 14 in favor, no opposition, and the two federal agencies abstaining.

The commercial fishery

The next agenda item called for the Management Board to decide whether the commercial quota should be reduced and, if so, by what amount.  Addendum II contemplated quota reductions that might range from 0 to 14.5%.

Dr. Armstrong put a motion on the table for a 14% reduction, saying that Addendum II should include commercial reductions

“Because we need to be moving in that direction,”

and that the commercial reduction ought to approximate that taken in the recreational fishery.  Cheri Patterson, New Hampshire’s Legislative Appointee, seconded the motion.  Delaware fisheries manager John Clark quickly responded by making a motion to substitute Option A, which called for status quo commercial landings.  Mr. Hasbrouck seconded his motion.

Mr. Clark argued that excessive recreational landings made Addendum II necessary, and that recreationally-related fishing mortality comprised the largest part of overall fishing mortality.  He said that a quota reduction would “make life very difficult” for Delaware’s commercial fishermen, who had experienced an aggregate 40% quota cut since 2014, and claimed that at some point, such reductions would no longer allow them to make a living as commercial fishermen.  He also opined that cutting the commercial harvest did a disservice to seafood consumers.

Other Management Board members supported Mr. Clark’s statement, but Mr. Appelman disagreed, saying that NOAA Fisheries supported some level of reduction, although not necessarily 14%.

On the other hand, Rhode Island’s Legislative Proxy, Eric Reid, expressed concerns that any cut could destroy the commercial striped bass fishery.  He called striped bass “a seasonal specialty,” produced by a “boutique fishery” for a “boutique market,” and believed that if the fish was not available to restaurants when they wanted it, they would substitute another species and, having moved on, would not buy the bass when it came on the market again.

Mr. Sikorski addressed the question from a Chesapeake Bay perspective, noting that the Bay produced about 80% of all commercial landings, when measured in numbers of fish, that fishing mortality is not only currently too high, but also focused on fish needed to rebuild, and that Addendum II was all about rebuilding the stock.  He thus opposed the motion for status quo quota.  Mr. Luisi, his colleague from the Maryland delegation, said that he wouldn’t support the substitute motion or a 14% cut, but would support a reduction that fell between the two.

In the last comment before the vote on the substitute motion, Joseph Cimino, New Jersey’s fisheries manager, noted that the Management Board was making “huge assumptions” about the effectiveness of the recreational measures, and that imposing recreational restrictions while leaving the commercial quota at status quo would be inequitable.

The final vote found only New York, Delaware, and Virginia supporting the motion, which failed 3-13.

At that point, Mr. Luisi moved to substitute a 7% reduction for the 14% in Dr. Armstrong’s original motion.  Jeff Kaelin, Governor’s Appointee from New Jersey, seconded the motion, which only received comment from Chris Batsavage, a North Carolina fisheries manager, who argued that 7% was too small of a reduction to promote rebuilding, and noted that when different levels of reduction are mandated for different sectors, the fish that aren’t caught by the more restricted sector often end up being caught by the sector with less stringent restrictions.

Despite that comment, the motion to substitute a 7% commercial quota reduction passed on a vote of 8 jurisdictions—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission and Virginia—in favor, 6 opposed, and the federal agencies abstaining.  When the final motion came up for a vote, it passed 13 to 1, again with two abstentions, and only North Carolina voting against.

Management response to stock assessments

Because the formal addendum process typically takes at least a year between the time a new addendum is proposed and the time when its management measures become effective, the draft Addendum II contained a provision that would allow the Management Board to fast-track management action, without going through the formal process, should a stock assessment indicate that there was less than a 50% probability that the stock would rebuild by the 2029 deadline if management measures were left unchanged.  Absent such power, the Management Board would be unable to quickly respond to any new threats to the rebuilding process.

Dr. Davis moved to grant such authority, a motion that was seconded by David Borden, Rhode Island’s Governor’s Appointee.  Little opposition was voiced, although Maryland’s Luisi was an exception, saying that

“This Board shouldn’t be acting fast, in my opinion,”

and expressing support for the addendum process.

However, multiple Management Board members expressed concern that the fast-track process didn’t provide sufficient opportunity for stakeholder input, and made it clear that they hoped that such input be provided by alternate means, if the Board chose to fast-track an addendum—something that it was not compelled to do, even if it had the authority to do so.

Despite such misgivings, the motion passed on a vote of 11-5, with New Jersey, Maryland, the District of Columbia, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, and Virginia taking the minority view.

Implementation dates

One of the critical aspects of any Addendum, and particularly of Addendum II, is when such Addendum’s measures will have to be implemented by the states.  Addendum II, after all, was intended to govern the 2024 fishery, so there would be little use implementing its measures when the year was nearly over.

Thus, Dr. Armstrong moved that the states would have to present their implementation plans to the Management Board by sometime in March, and make such measures effective no later than May 1, 2024.  Mr. Borden seconded the motion.  

Dr. Armstrong noted that the Management Board decided to reduce the commercial quota by only 7%, rather than the 14% originally suggested, and advised compounding the problem by delaying the implementation of even that small reduction.  He recognized that fisheries had already begun in such states, but noted that such states had the ability to hold back a portion of their quota from fishermen, knowing that their quotas might be reduced, and that if they chose not to do so, and exceeded the reduced quota in 2024, they could always pay back the excess with a smaller quota in 2025.

Mr. Sikorski supported the motion, agreeing that the smaller reduction in commercial quota justified a quick implementation.  He noted that, although the Maryland and PRFC fishing seasons had already begun, they would close on January 31 and February 29, respectively, and wouldn’t restart until June, providing an opportunity to call back excess commercial striped bass tags. 

That drew an immediate response from Luisi, who said that recalling tags would be like giving someone $1,000, and then asking for $70 back.  He maintained that Maryland was unable to recalculate the number of tags to be issued under the reduced quota, and observed that some fishermen might have already used their entire tag allocation.  With respect to calling back 7% of the already issued tags, he said that

“It can’t and will not happen…We’re not able to do that administratively.”

Mr. Geer made similar comments, saying that

“We’re in the same situation.  Our season started on the 16^th,”

while reminding the Management Board that it had been warned by the Bay states that such issues would arise if Addendum II wasn’t adopted at the October 2023 Board meeting.  He then moved to amend the motion, to require all recreational management measures to be adopted by the states no later than May 1, 2024, but giving the states until January 1, 2025 to adopt commercial measures.  The motion was seconded by Mr. Clark.

Mr. Nowalsky made the only comment on the motion to amend, saying that while he was sympathetic to the administrative concerns, the originally proposed commercial reduction was nonetheless cut in half, and if implementation of that reduction was delayed until 2025, it had the effect of cutting the reduction in half again.  He warned that if Mr. Geer’s motion passed, he would seek to reopen the vote on the commercial quota, and seek an increased reduction.

With that, Mr. Geer’s motion was put to a vote, in which seven jurisdictions—Maine, New Hampshire, Delaware, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, Virginia, and North Carolina—voted in favor, seven voted against, the federal agencies abstained, and the motion narrowly failed, because it did not win a simple majority.

With that, Dr. Armstrong’s motion was back on the table, and passed ten in favor, four against, and the federal agencies abstaining, with Delaware, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission and Virginia casting the dissenting votes.

Final approval of the entire Amendment II came on a 12-4 vote, with the same four jurisdictions voting against adoption.

Thoughts and observations

Addendum II, standing on its own, will probably not be enough to rebuild the striped bass spawning stock biomass by the 2029 deadline.  However, it marks an important step on the way to rebuilding, particularly since it gave the Management Board authority to fast-track some future management measures.

Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts remain steadfast supporters of striped bass conservation, while Pennsylvania and North Carolina--and to a surprising degree, the District of Columbia--are also proving themselves to be good and responsible stewards of the striped bass resource.

New Jersey and Delaware, on the other hand, consistently elevate short-term exploitation over long-term stock health.  Unfortunately, that duo has now been joined by New York, which had previously been a champion of striped bass conservation; while New York’s state fisheries management agency continues to care for the resource and tries to consider all stakeholders when making decisions, both New York’s Governor’s Appointee and its new Legislative Appointee have strong biases in favor of the commercial and for-hire sectors, and give short shrift to private recreational fisherman.  That bias was made extremely clear by Mr. Hasbrouck’s efforts to discount recreational comments early in the meeting, when he asked whether most public comments were made by recreational fishermen, and asked whether the Advisory Panel, which presented contrary recommendations far more favorable to the commercial and for-hire sectors, had “more balanced” representation between the three sectors.  

I suppose “balance” is in the eye of the beholder.  Given that the recreational sector accounts for at least 85% of striped bass fishing mortality, with the precise percentage varying from year to year, and given that surf and private boat anglers are responsible for about 98.5% of all recreational striped bass trips, and thus the lion’s share of the economic contributions from the fishery, it’s not hard to argue that true “balance” would weigh the responses according to each sector’s participation in the fishery. 

But that wouldn’t fit Mr. Hasbrouck’s aims.

With respect to the tension between the for-hire fleet and the rest of the recreational fishery, it’s becoming clear that both New Jersey’s Nowalsky and Maryland’s Luisi have a particular disdain for anglers who tend to emphasize recreation, and release most of their catch, and favor the catch-and-kill segment of the recreational fishery championed by the for-hire fleet.  While that disdain doesn’t appear to be shared by any other state managers, nor any of the other recreational representatives, it is something to monitor as time goes on.

Also with respect to such tensions, it seems that the idea of “mode splits,” or “sector separation,” is gaining some support among Management Board members.  While, speaking personally, I don’t believe that fisheries managers should create an aristocracy within the recreational sector, members of which are granted privileges not available to the general public, I am also not entirely opposed to true “sector separation,” if it is done correctly.  That is, if the for-hire fleet is given special consideration because it represents businesses, then managers should focus on the for-hire businesses themselves, and not on their customers, by giving the sector a separate quota reflecting its recent historical share of recreational landings, issuing tags to be attached to all for-hire fish, and then shutting down the fishery when the quota is reached, with paybacks required if the quota is exceeded.  Such a management approach would be similar to the commercial management system, and would take advantage of the electronic reporting systems already in use by for-hire boats along much of the coast, which make real-time management and, if needed, in-season closures a realistic possibility not available to the rest of the recreational sector.

My final observation may, in the end, be the most sobering. 

While Addendum II may help make it possible to rebuild the striped bass stock by 2029, it cannot maintain the stock at its target level.  Only nature, assisted by fisheries managers, can achieve that goal.  In recent years, we have seen unusually low striped bass recruitment, presumably due to unfavorable spawning conditions.  Unless such conditions improve—we can only hope that this winter’s cool and wet conditions extend through the spring, and possibly lead to higher juvenile abundance in the coming year—the health of the bass stock will inevitably decline. 

Should that occur, the best that managers can do is try to preserve the spawning stock through the hard times—what Dr. Armstrong called a “looming disaster” and Mr. Sikorski “dark days”—until favorable conditions recur.

While we can hope for the best for the bass, but until such conditions return, such hope is mere wishful thinking.