STRIPED BASS ADDENDUM II: STAKEHOLDER COMMENT (PARTICULARLY ON THE RECREATIONAL OPTIONS) AND WHAT COMES NEXT

 

At 1:15 p.m. on January 24, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board will meet to decide what the final version of Addendum II to Amendment 7 of the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass will look like.

The Management Board’s decisions will help to determine whether the ASMFC meets its obligations to rebuild the still-overfished striped bass stock by 2029, and whether the Board will put itself in a position to quickly respond to any new obstacles to rebuilding the stock.

It’s often difficult to predict what the Management Board will do although, given that even the best-case scenario only gives Addendum II a 51% chance ofrebuilding the stock by the deadline, while the worst case is a 64% probabilityof failure, it’s probably fair to say that the more the Board does at next week’s meeting, the less it will have to do between now and 2029—beginning, most likely, next October, after the release of a scheduled update to the stock assessment.

Yesterday, Emilie Franke, the ASMFC’s Fishery Management Plan Coordinator for striped bass, released a comprehensive summary of stakeholder comment received on Addendum II, along with each written comment received.  Although none of the comment was particularly surprising, some interesting patterns emerged which ought to be noted by the Management Board.

Stakeholders submitted a total of 3,525 comments, which broke down into 2,832 written comments (1,062 comments from individuals, 1,723 form letters, and 47 comments from organizations) along with 693 comments provided at the various hearings held between Maine and Virginia.

The ocean recreational fishery

Not surprisingly, 2,448 of those comments, the most addressing any individual issue, addressed the ocean recreational fishery, and as Ms. Franke noted in here memorandum to the Management Board,

“The vast majority of commenters favored ocean Option B (28-31” all modes).  Commenters noted this option is the most conservative option with the highest estimated reduction, which is needed to support stock rebuilding.  This option would best protect the 2015-year class…Most commenters noted specific, strong opposition to any mode split options.  They noted the entire recreational sector should have the same regulations and participate equally in rebuilding the stock.  They also noted that all recreational anglers should have the same fishing opportunity.,.  [emphasis added]”

Option B was supported by 93.5% of the people who commented on the issue.

Option C, which would grant special privileges to anglers fishing from for-hire vessels, was preferred by slightly less than 6.5% of the commenters.  Ms. Franke noted that

“The second most-supported ocean option was Option B (28-31” private/shore; 28-33” for-hires).  Support for this option was primarily from the for-hire industry.  Comments noted the…for-hire did not see the same level of harvest increase in 2022 as private vessels/shore anglers.  Comments highlighted that allowing the wider slot has a negligible impact (0.1%) on the estimated reduction.  Stakeholders noted the narrow 28-31” slot has had negative economic impacts on for-hire businesses with fewer bookings this year, as customers do not feel the trip is worth it with such a narrow slot.  Comments noted a wider slot would attract customers and would support anglers who value bringing fish home for food.  Comments also noted a wider slot would decrease release mortality, and that many dead fish in water have been observed this year with the narrow slot.  [emphasis added]”

While Ms. Franke provides a fair and accurate review of the comments provided, there are nuances in the comments that couldn’t be captured in a single paragraph.  The supporters of Options B and C did not neatly break down into anglers on one side and for-hires on the other; some anglers supported Option C, while a surprising number of for-hire operators and other angling-related business supported Option B.

A more accurate breakdown of the comments might be made by the commenters’ focus. 

While not everyone provided a rationale for their choices, among those who did, Option B’s supporters typically emphasized their concerns for the long-term health of the stock, along with a sentiment that all anglers, regardless of whether they fished from shore, from a boat, or from a for-hire vessel, had an equal obligation to contribute to the recovery of the striped bass stock, and that shifting some portion of that burden from for-hire anglers to the shoulders of shore-based and private boat anglers was manifestly unfair.

A perhaps surprising number of for-hire operators also supported Option B.  For the most part, they fell into two groups.  Many were concentrated in northern New England, while most—but not all—of the others had stopped trying to promote their business by selling dead fish, and instead owned successful charter operations that sold a quality angling experience, and didn’t depend on putting bass in the cooler. 

It’s probably important to note that the American Saltwater Guides Association, the only for-hire organization that represents charter operators in every state between Maine and North Carolina, supported Option B, and stated that

“ASGA strongly opposes the idea of mode-splits…and implores the Striped Bass Board to not consider these options at this time…the primary goal of Addendum II is to reduce fishing mortality to target levels; this is NOT the time to consider, let alone approve, such a fundamental shift in striped bass management exclusively designed to let one group harvest more fish than others in the same sector and further threaten the long-term sustainability of the stock.  The Striped Bass board should remain focused on rebuilding the stock and not create conflict and controversy within the recreational sector.  [emphasis added]”

Option C’s supporters, when they commented at all, often gave lip service to maintaining the health of the stock, but then focused their comments on personal economic concerns.  They made it clear that their customer base wanted to take fish home, and many of their comments seemed to reflect an attitude of entitlement.  While such entitlement was generally muffled, as it was in the comments provided by a group calling itself the “East Coast Fishing Coalition,” that seems to be composed of charter boat operators from New York and southern New England, which said that Option C

“balances the need for conservation with the socio-economic needs of the for-hire fleet,”

(as if, when managing an overfished stock experiencing recruitment failure in multiple nursery areas, such balancing should even be considered), it was fully displayed in the comments of one Long Island, New York charter boat operator, who brazenly asserted that

“I have been a charter Captain for over 40 years.  As a charter captain I pay a State fee of $250 for my charter business.  I pay for commercial insurance.  I have to maintain my captain’s license and renew it every 5 years.  I am subject to random drug testing.

“For all of these righteous requirements I get no preferential treatment to help maintain my business and no consideration of what I do for the tourist industry in my region.

“This is draconian bullying at its best based on somewhat shaky science.

“Charter catch should be 28 to 35 inch or 36 and over.”

Although it’s unlikely that most for-hire operators feel quite that entitled, none who supported Option C ever really explained why their customers ought to get special privileges that are denied to anyone else, other than it would put more money in the for-hire folks’ pockets.

But, as I noted, not all for-hire operators support Option C.  Capt. Randy Siegler of Marblehead, Massachusetts commented that

“I am writing as the owner of (what I believe is) the largest/busiest guide service in the country that targets Striped Bass.  With 10 (+/-) boats running one or two trips a day, virtually every day of the season June-Sept.), [sic] we typically run 1,000-1,400 Striped Bass trips a season…

“With that as a frame of reference, I want to express how pleased we were with this past year’s size & bag limits (1 fish 28” to less than 31”).  We saw first hand the surge of fish entering the legal slot in 2022 and (previous legal slot) in 2023.  We are absolutely thrilled that these fish from the 2015 year class, critical to the long term success of the population, are being protected.

“Our business is successful if we have fish to catch…it is not dependent on sending every client home with a ‘keeper’ striped bass.  In fact, we probably average about one legal fish retained for every four of five trips.  We certainly catch ‘legal’ fish frequently, but when customers understand the science behind the population, they are more than happy to release fish that could otherwise be kept.

“I suspect that you will hear from some charter operators that they need better access to legal/keeper striped bass in order to attract customers.  I am writing to tell you that is absolutely not the case for us…”

That’s quite a difference between the comments made by two different charter boat captains.

Certainly, some of the difference is attributable to their different business models, which attract different sorts of customers.  There are certainly quite a few for-hire customers who want to take a fish home, particularly those who patronize the party boat fleet.  At the same time, one has to wonder how much customer attitudes are shaped by the attitudes of the captains themselves.  If someone emphasizes “full boat limits” in their advertising, and fills such ads with photos of dead striped bass, it’s not surprising if their customers become conditioned to believe that a full cooler is the best evidence of a good day.  On the other hand, if a boat’s business model emphasizes a quality angling experience, and allows but downplays taking fish home, angler views of a “good day on the water” might be tempered accordingly.

How a boat catches its bass also affects that perception.  There’s a big difference in the customer experience between  boats that drag umbrella rigs on wire line, never taking the boat out of gear when a fish is hooked, and those that give customers a chance to cast to structure or to breaking fish with gear that actually lets the angler feel the fish fight.  

Last June, a friend told me about what he saw while fishing from the rocks at Montauk, New York:

“I thought I’d seen it all.  Yesterday Montauk with fish pushing tiny sand eels tight to the beach in a blitz a well known charter boat insisted on running parallel to the shore trying to pull wire thru 7 feet of water.  This despite clear signs all you needed to do was lob an Ava jig and make a few cranks.”

As anyone who has done it can tell you (and in the old days, I did it a lot), pulling wire for bass can be very effective, but it’s not a lot of fun, using broomstick-stiff rods and keeping the boat moving forward as the angler cranks the hooked fish to the boat.  It’s more like work than recreation, with only the largest fish able to pull back against the heavy gear.  It’s easy to see why charter boats fishing that way have to emphasize taking fish home, because the mere act of catching those fish isn’t particularly entertaining.

It's easy to believe that if more for-hire boats emphasized just catching the fish on gear that makes fishing fun—basically, as my friend suggested, lobbing a diamond jig or other lure into blitzing bass—so that the angler can feel the fish strike and has to struggle a bit to bring the bass to hand, the thrill of the catching can become as or more important than the food from the keeping, and fewer customers would be upset if they don’t bring a fish home.  If we look at other inshore sport fisheries in other places, for bonefish, or permit, or tarpon down South, or for freshwater fish like bass and muskellunge—or, in many cases, for false albacore and bluefish right here off Long Island—anglers are more than happy to hire boats to fish for fish that they have no intention of keeping, just so long as the action is good.  There appears to be no reason why the for-hire striped bass fishery can’t evolve along similar lines.

Unfortunately, too many captains are too set in their ways to try something new.  Of course, much of that may be because, in many cases, a for-hire captain is also a commercial striped bass fisherman, and is imbued with the commercial fisherman’s desire to put bass in the boat using the quickest and most efficient means available.  As one New York angler noted,

“It would seem that the only meaningful change we are considering at this point is a possible split in the regulations (different regs for For-Hire).  As far as New York is considered, the public would require much more transparency on the overlap of those who are licensed to take recreational fishermen for-hire, but also hold permits to harvest striped bass commercially.  We appear to have a population of commercial fishermen who essentially want to be the voice of recreational fishermen.  We simply need better disclosure (data that New York has) to understand the extent to which we have conflicts of interest here.”

Anyone who might question that statement need only look to the votes of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council, which routinely sees representatives of the for-hire fleet ally with commercial representatives to defeat proposed conservation measures that might restrict either commercial or recreational landings.  More times than not, particularly when striped bass measures are being considered, the outcome of such votes can be predicted before voting even begins.

Nick Montefusco, an angler from New Jersey, added another twist to the mode split issue, saying

"any option which grants for-hire vessels less restrictive regulations as compared to shore-based private anglers is inherently incompatible with the concept of maintaining fairness in regulations across economic classes (i.e., people should not be able to pay for the privilege of retaining fish that couldn’t be retained otherwise), irrespective of the minimal impact on the projected mortality reduction.  It also opens the possibility of undermining enforcement, since it will not be immediately obvious if possession of a fish that is 31”-33” constitutes a violation…”

The ASMFC’s Law Enforcement Committee expressed similar concerns, noting that

“Consistent compliance requirements across all modes within a sector leads to enhanced voluntary compliance.  Compliance is complicated when there are varied sizes, seasons and possession limits for recreational fishers who fish in different modes.  The [Law Enforcement Committee] recognizes and respects the desires by fishers to advocate and pursue management options for their respective modes of fishing for striped bass, however when specific management options intended to safeguard the stock of a species are complicated by different regulations for different modes of fishing, voluntary compliance and enforceability decrease.”

In other words, when anglers perceive regulations to be unfair, because they grant special privileges to others and not to them, some anglers will try to rectify the situation by taking unilateral actions that may be illegal, but satisfy their sense of fairness in the fishery.

Some of the largest recreational fishing organizations in the country, including the American Sportfishing Association, Coastal Conservation Association, Center for Sportfishing Policy, Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation, and Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership recognized that truth in a joint comment letter, which stated,

“We are adamantly opposed to mode splits.  If ASMFC hands out conservation passes to the for-hire mode, what incentive does any one individual angler have with a mentality that if you’re a small percentage of the overall pie your slice doesn’t need to bear the burden of conservation?”

The Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery

Although the ocean recreational fishery drew the most comments, the Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery options generated 2,399 written comments, only a few dozen less.  Once again, stakeholders were asked to pick the most appropriate slot limit, and also asked to choose whether for-hire anglers should get special treatment not enjoyed by the rest of the angling community.  And once again, the responses broke down among similar lines.

As Ms. Franke reported,

“The majority of comments noted support for Chesapeake Bay Option B1 (19-23” fish all modes) and Option B2 (19-24” fish all modes), noting either option is estimated to meet the 14.5% reduction.  Most other comments supported Option B1 specifically, noting this is the most conservative option with the highest estimated reduction to support stock rebuilding.  Comments also noted the need to protect the 2018-year class.  Many comments noted specific opposition to mode split options, noting the entire recreational sector should have the same regulations, should contribute to rebuilding, and should have the same fishing opportunity.  Many comments also noted the need for conservative Bay regulations considering recent poor recruitment in the Bay.  [emphasis added]”

With regard to commenters supporting mode splits, Ms. Franke reported that

“Those in favor of Chesapeake Bay Option C2 (19-24” 1 fish private/shore; 2 fish for-hire) noted that charter businesses in the Bay could not survive with a 1-fish bag limit, and that for-hire trips have already decreased.  Maryland stakeholders noted that Maryland charter vessels participate in the state’s electronic reporting program and provide detailed information on trips and catch.”

Stakeholders preferences with respect to the Chesapeake fishery were even more one-sided than they were with respect to the ocean fishery, with slightly over 95% of the comments supporting Options B1 or B2, and less than 2.5% supporting Options C1 or C2, the two mode-split options.

Comments were similar to those submitted on the recreational ocean fishery.  Anglers and some for-hire operators expressed concern for the health and the future of the striped bass stock, and supported the “B” options, while supporters of the “C” options were primarily concerned with business issues.  But at least one tackle shop operator was also concerned with business issues, and he didn’t care for the “C” options at all.  He wrote,

“My business, Anglers Sportscenter, which employs between 20 to 40 people at any given time, depends to a large degree on recreational sport fishing for striped bass on the Chesapeake Bay.

“As striped bass regulations have become more restrictive it has had a negative impact on my business.

“Shifting part of the allowable catch from one sector of recreational anglers to another is a case of the government picking economic winners and losers, as tightening restrictions on my customer base hurts my business while giving more of the share to other forms of business benefits theirs.”

One of the more poignant comments came from a high school student, James Ronayne, from Annapolis, Maryland, who does his striped bass fishing from a 12-foot tin boat called the “Pork Chop.”

“…When I think about regulations, I think about the future.  I think about what a fishery will look like not only for my future, but for my kids and grandkids.

“I fully recognize that shutting down or restricting a fishery has massive implications for a lot of people and their livelihoods today.  BUT what I keep thinking about is tomorrow.  If we kill all the fish now, what does our livelihood look like next year or 5 years down the road?  What does it look like for future generations?

“While the past 5 years of a poor spawn can be partially attributed to poor weather conditions, it is also due to overharvesting.  It does not seem fair that charter boats that that possess decades of fishing knowledge, and thousands of dollars of fish-finding equipment can go out and keep upwards of 60 fish per day while I am limited to 1.  The effort per catch on their boat vs my boat is not comparable…”

If more adults felt the same way that teen does, our bass might well be in much better shape.

On the other hand, many of the Maryland charter boats commenting on the proposal insist that they will lose so many customers that they could go out of business if their bag limit is reduced to just one bass.

That may well be true, but one must then ask whether that problem is entirely due to the bag limit, or the charter boats’ usual practice of returning to the dock once a limit of bass has been caught, even if anglers only fished for a portion of their originally allotted time.  After all, there are other fish in the bay that the boats could also target for their customers to bring home, in addition to the one striper.  As John Billings, a former mate on various Maryland for-hire boats observed,

“I understand the Captain’s [sic] concerns that they may have a reduction in clientele if they can only keep one striped bass, but there are other fish in the water for harvest.  Yes, they may have to adapt to the changing times, but we all do.  Speckled sea trout, white perch, redfish, bluefish, Spanish mackerel and sea bass are all available to catch as well.  They can supplement any client’s desire for meat with most of these options, and nearly all can be caught using the same or very similar techniques and equipment they currently employ.”

Once again, as in the ocean fishery, an aversion to change may be the for-hire fleet’s biggest problem.

Other recreational measures

The draft Addendum II addressed two other issues directly related to the recreational fishery, but which attracted far fewer comments.

One asked whether, if mode splits were allowed, the captain and crew of for-hire vessels would be allowed to keep fish falling within the wider, 28- to 33-inch slot, or whether they should be restricted to the narrower 28- to 31-inch slot that applied to everyone else.  Only 303 comments were received on this question, with 247—81.5%--recommending that captain and crew be restricted to the same slot as private boat and shore-based anglers.

The other issue, which gave rise to 648 comments, asked whether, if states allowed bass to be filleted at sea or at shoreside locations, anglers/for-hire vessels should be required to 1) keep the racks from the filleted fish so that law enforcement could determine if the fish were of legal size, 2) keep the skin on the fillets to facilitate identification of the species that they came from, and 3) only possess two fillets for every rack retained.  Of the people who commented on the issue, 555, or 85.5%, favored such requirements.

Most of the opposition to this requirement came from the for-hire fleet which, as Ms. Franke reported,

“noted that fillet requirements would delay the turnaround time between charter trips.  Charter vessels need to transition as quickly as possible between trips.  Commenters noted questions and concerns about where the racks would be disposed of, and noted that state/local rules would limit where racks could be disposed of.”

Reducing the commercial quota

The draft Addendum II also proposed reducing the commercial quota by up to 14.5%.  This option drew 2,407 comments, with 2,249 of them, or just under 93.5%, supporting such reduction.  Ms. Franke reported that

“The majority of comments support Option B (up to 14.5% quota reduction), with most comments supporting the full 14.5% reduction for both the ocean and Chesapeake Bay commercial fisheries.  Comments noted that all sectors should take an equal reduction to rebuild the stock.  Some comments noted the reduction should be taken from landings, not from the quota.

“Those in favor of Option A (status quo commercial quotas), primarily the commercial industry, noted the commercial sector should not be penalized for the increase in recreational harvest…Comments noted that unlike the recreational sector, the commercial sector is heavily monitored with accountability through tagging and quota paybacks.  Comments noted there have been multiple quota reductions the past several years, and additional reductions would be detrimental to the industry with negative economic impacts.” 

Response to stock assessments

Finally, the draft Addendum II asked whether the Management Board should be allowed to adopt new management measures in response to upcoming stock assessments, without the need to first put proposals out for public hearing, if the assessments suggested that, without such additional measures, the stock was unlikely to rebuild by the 2029 deadline.

The ASMFC received 2,240 comments on the issue, with the vast majority—2,150, or nearly 96%, the greatest percentage in favor of any proposal in the draft Addendum—favoring such grant of authority.  As Ms. Franke noted,

“The majority of comments support Option B (Board action process) noting the need for quick, decisive action by the Board following stock assessments to rebuild the stock and quickly implement new measures.  Some commenters noted that while they support a fast process, opportunities for public comment should be clearly communicated.

“Those in favor of Option A (Addendum/Amendment process) noted the need for a full public comment process during the development of management actions to make informed management decisions.”

A complication

Based solely on public comment, one might expect the Management Board to maintain the current 28- to 31-inch slot limit in the ocean recreational fishery, adopt a 1-fish bag limit and either an 18- to 23-inch or 18- to 24-inch slot in the Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery, require racks to be retained, etc. if fish are filleted at sea, reduce the commercial quota by 14.5%, and give the Management Board the authority to fast-track management measures if a stock assessment or assessment update suggests such measures are needed to timely rebuild the stock.

However, it is likely that one or more of those things will not happen as, for whatever reason, the ASMFC’s Striped Bass Advisory Panel seemed out of touch with the desires of its constituents, and recommended far different actions.

Only four out of 13 Advisory Panel members supported the commenters’ clear choice in the ocean recreational fishery, a 28- to 31-inch slot for all anglers.  Instead, eight Panel members supported the for-hire fleet, and recommended Option C, which would hold shore-based and private-boat anglers to such 3-inch slot, but allow anglers fishing from for-hire vessels to enjoy a broader, 28- to 33-inch slot limit.

Reasons given for such decision included claims that the larger slot would reduce discards on for-hire trips, that it would have roughly the same effect on reducing recreational landings, and that it would support the for-hire business.

The Advisory Panel reached a similar conclusion with respect to the Chesapeake Bay recreational fishery, with only five supporting any of the “B” options, which would create a 1-fish bag limit and the same slot limit for all anglers fishing within the Bay, while six supported Option C1, which would create an 18- to 23-inch slot limit, accompanied by a 2-fish bag for for-hires and a 1-fish bag for everyone else.

Again similar to the ocean recreational fishery, the majority of the Panel supported such option because it believed that the 2-fish bag was essential to the for-hire fleet’s survival, that the fleet had little to fish for besides striped bass, that the for-hire fleet was required to report its fish electronically, and because such a limit would discourage the release of small fish in the hopes of catching a larger one.

With respect to the other recreational measures, the Advisory Panel disfavored holding for-hire captain and crew to the same limits as private boat and shore-based anglers, with only one member supporting the proposal and four opposing it.  Nine members opposed rack retention requirements when fish are filleted at sea, with none supporting the proposal.

The majority of the Advisory Panel also opposed reducing the commercial quota, with seven opposing such reduction, and only four supporting it.  Reasons given for the opposition included the fact that Addendum II was initiated because recreational, and not commercial, landings spiked in 2022, because quota cuts would cause economic losses, because the commercial industry is “highly regulated” and landings are capped by quotas, because quotas are rarely caught, because most landings are now recreational, and because commercial gear has generally been adapted to avoid spawning-sized fish.

Finally, ten Panel members opposed giving the Management Board fast-track authority to adopt management measures, while only two supported the proposal.  The opposition claimed that it was concerned about losing the opportunity for public comment, that emergency actions could still be taken, that there was frustration over the last emergency action, that “faster is not always better,” that the Addendum/Amendment process is designed to address management issues, and that they wanted to avoid “knee-jerk” reactions.

Thus, the Advisory Panel was out of step with the public comment on every single issue.

Neither public comment nor Advisory Panel recommendations dictate Board action, which lies solely within the discretion of the Management Board.  However, the Advisory Panel recommendations will provide Management Board members who might be looking for an excuse not to go along with public opinion an easy way out, and a justification for supporting the views of a very small minority of stakeholders.

Thus, the future of Addendum II is very much in doubt.

On January 24, we will learn whether a majority of the Management Board will yield to the calls of the minority, and support narrow economic interests, or whether it will choose to represent the public and the needs of the bass, and support the majority view.

Right now, I can’t predict which path it will choose.

 

 

WHAT SOME STRIPED BASS FISHERMEN KNOW TO BE TRUE

 Mark Twain reportedly noted,

“The trouble with the world is not that people know too little, but that they know so many things that ain’t so.”

While the author was undoubtedly thinking of the world as a whole when he uttered that statement, it applies to the narrow world of fisheries management equally well.

Fisheries science is far from cut-and-dried.  Every new stock assessment typically brings new information; some of the data merely builds on existing knowledge, but other information, particularly that which comes from so-called “research track” assessments, can forge new ground.  We often spend too much time guessing at what an assessment might say; often, our guesses are right, but at other times, we’re surprised by something unexpected and new.

Unfortunately, fishermen tend to be a conservative bunch, who feel most comfortable when the future resembles the past.  To them, new information and ideas are often suspect, particularly when it leads to restrictions on landings and fishing effort.  When that sort of thing happens—and sometimes, even when it doesn’t—fishermen tend to believe whatever makes them comfortable, even if such beliefs are untrue.

That sort of thinking was showcased at an Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission hearing held in Kings Park, New York last December 4, to hear stakeholders’ thoughts on the Draft Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.  Addendum II is intended to put management measures in place for the 2024 season, which will reduce fishing mortality to its target level and provide the bass some interim relief until a stock assessment update, scheduled for release next October, can provide a better understanding of what managers must do to rebuild the stock by the 2029 rebuilding deadline.

However, many of those who attended the December 4 hearing represented the for-hire fleet, which typically opposes any management measure, no matter how badly needed, that might have even a short-term negative impact on their businesses.  Thus, those attending the hearing heard repeated comments to the effect that the bass stock

“is as healthy and strong as [it has] ever been,”

but that the fish are merely changing their behavior and so not showing up in the various surveys used to monitor the population.

One of the recurring themes that appeared in the for-hire fleet’s testimony was that the recruitment failure observed in the Chesapeake Bay, which has historically produced between 70 and 90 percent of all striped bass on the East Coast, doesn’t mean that the striped bass stock is in trouble, because warming waters are causing the fish to move farther north, and to concentrate their spawning in New York’s Hudson River, as well as Connecticut’s Housatonic and Connecticut rivers.  One party boat captain said that those rivers are “where the fish are from,” and that, collectively, they “produce tons of striped bass.”  After a biologist explained that the striped bass stock assessment didn’t include bass that spawned in the Housatonic River, the captain commented that

“Not having the Housatonic River in the stock assessment is like not having the Dallas Cowboys when you’re looking at cheerleaders.”

Yet, while the for-hire operators could provide plenty of comment suggesting that the center of striped bass spawning has moved northward, they could not supply an iota of data to support that contention; it turns out that they lacked such data for a very good reason—what they were claiming is simply not true.

I honestly think that the for-hire representatives believed what they were saying.  Striped bass fishing was very good in some places, particularly in the ocean between western Long Island and northern New Jersey, during 2023, and the folks who operate party and charter boats in that vicinity were unable to square their observations of locally abundant striped bass with the stock assessment’s finding that the stock is overfished and that, because of poor recruitment, could be headed for even worse problems. 

By deciding to believe that, contrary to the assessment’s findings, the striped bass stock was actually healthy and abundant, but merely shifting north, such stakeholders could both explain their observations and create a story that justified their opposition to proposed conservation measures.

Although I do most of my striped bass fishing along the western Connecticut shore, and my experiences didn’t support what the for-hire people were saying, I didn’t want to dismiss their contentions out of hand; I wanted to make a few inquiries, and see whether what they were saying might, in fact, be the truth.  So I contacted the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, seeking a local scientist’s thoughts on whether there was any merit in the for-hires’ assertions.

The biologist confirmed my suspicions.  There was no wholesale shift of striped bass spawning into Connecticut rivers.  I was told that

“I think its pretty easy to dismiss that striped bass spawn in the Housatonic or Thames Rivers.  The head of tide extends almost to the most downstream dam in both systems—there’s very little freshwater habitat available below those dams—just not suitable spawning habitat for striped bass.”

So it would seem that leaving the Housatonic River out of the stock assessment is less like omitting the Dallas Cowboys when looking at cheerleaders, and more like omitting the Cowboys when looking for the next winner of the National Hockey League’s Stanley Cup.

And while some bass are spawned in the Connecticut River—the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection conducts regular surveys of river herring there, which have found both young-of-the-year and Age 1 striped bass, as well as ripe, egg-bearing females and males with flowing milt—the river’s contribution to the coastal migratory striped bass population is probably not very large.

“While there is enough collective evidence to suggest there is some level of striped bass spawning happening in the CT River, I don’t think the body of evidence suggests there is a large cohort of striped bass reliably produced on an annual basis.”

But the most significant point of the Connecticut biologist’s comments were not his thoughts about striped bass spawning in specific rivers, but rather the impact of any and all spawning outside of the major spawning areas.

“While I agree that there are coastal rivers where striped bass spawn where no one is doing a scientific survey to produce annual indices of [young-of-the-year] relative abundance in those rivers, and therefore trends in YOY production in those rivers are not incorporated in the assessment—but—it is not then a logical step to assume there is some body of striped bass out there on the coast that is somehow “invisible” to the assessment and therefore the management process.  The striped bass spawned in those rivers will leave those rivers and recruit to the coastal stock—and when they do—they will be caught by recreational anglers, they will be harvested by commercial harvesters, and they will be captured by the many scientific surveys operating along the coast—and all of this information feeds into the assessment to produce estimates of [spawning stock biomass], fishing mortality, relative strength of various year classes, etc.  It’s a fallacy to assume that just because we don’t have a YOY survey in a given river, that somehow the fish produced in that river are never “counted” in the stock assessment over the course of their lifetime.  [emphasis added]”

Thus, as much as some people would like to believe otherwise, there is no cryptic mass of striped bass swimming somewhere beyond fisheries managers’ ken.  If they are spawned, and survive long enough to leave their natal rivers, they are counted and considered in the stock assessment.

As far as the northernmost producer river that is subject to regular surveys—that is, the Hudson—it isn’t showing any indication of increased productivity.  Over the past five years, one year—2020—appears to have produced a very strong year class, while a slightly above-average class was produced in 2022.  The other three years were below-average, with both 2019 and 2023 falling below the 25^th percentile of all recorded spawns; 2023 produced the smallest year class of striped bass since 1985.

Even so, the belief that the center of striped bass abundance, as well as the bulk of the striped bass spawning, is shifting north remains a popular legend among some in the striped bass fishery, and particularly among those in the for-hire fleet.  I don’t expect that to change

It’s not because there are any facts supporting the notion, but because people nonetheless know that it’s true.

Even though it ain’t so.

UNLESS IT PUTS MORE DEAD FISH ON THE DOCK, NMFS DATA IS FATALLY FLAWED

Many recreational fishermen, and many members of the recreational fishing industry, are very quick to criticize catch, landings, and effort data produced by the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Marine Recreational Information Program.  The criticism always follows the same basic path:  MRIP data is wrong, anglers aren’t catching as many fish as NMFS says, and so recreational management measures are more restrictive than they really need to be.

The fact that NMFS discovered, last August, that the Fishing Effort Survey underpinning such data might be inflating effort, and so catch and landings estimates, by as much as 30 or 40 percent only added fuel to the flames.

Yet, as I have noted in the past, MRIP data isn’t always disdained by its recreational critics.  On those occasions when it finds recreational landings to have been lower than expected, and leads to more relaxed regulations, the same people and organizations that might have damned it in the past embrace MRIP findings without and qualms or concerns that the data might be underestimating the number of fish removed from the ocean.

Yet error cuts both ways, and the uncertainty surrounding recreational data makes it just as likely that an estimate understates, rather than overstates, angling’s impact on a fish stock.

MRIP estimates are also incorporated into stock assessments, where a high level of landings often imply a larger population, since a smaller stock could not support such removals without falling into decline.  Thus, here in the northeast, we have seen members of the recreational fishing community condemn MRIP data that leads to more restrictive black sea bass regulations while, in the same breath, arguing that the black sea bass stock assessment, which includes the same MRIP data, found that the spawning stock biomass stood at 240 percent of its target level, and justifies more liberal management measures.

It seems like Schrödinger’s cat, which might be both dead and alive at the same time, its state depending on when an observer makes their observation, MRIP estimates may simultaneously represent the best available data or be fatally flawed, depending on whether they provide more fish to, or take fish away from, the recreational sector.

One of the more outrageous examples of such behavior is now playing out in the Gulf of Mexico, where one anglers’ rights group, the Coastal Conservation Association, is both praising NMFS’ use of the Fishing Effort Survey to increase the recreational allocation of Gulf red grouper and condemning NMFS’ use of the very same survey to constrain anglers’ red snapper landings.

The timeline goes something like this:

On May 2, 2022, NMFS adopted Amendment 53 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico, which changed the allocation of Gulf of Mexico red grouper from 76 percent commercial/24 percent recreational to 59.3 percent commercial/40.7 percent recreational.  The basis for such reallocation was data derived from NMFS’ Fishing Effort Survey, which led managers to conclude that the original allocation resulted from an underestimate of recreational red grouper landings between 1986 and 2005, the base years used to determine the proportion of landings attributable to each sector.  When the base year data was reanalyzed using the Fishing Effort Survey methodology, it appeared that anglers had caught far more red grouper than originally thought.

The Amendment 53 reallocation, then, was less a true reallocation than it was a correction, which merely adjusted the sector allocations to what they should have been all along, if accurate data had been available when the allocation was first set.

Still, the allocation was controversial, with four members of the Gulf Council filing a minority report which argued that its adoption violated two provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, including National Standard 4, which deals with the fair allocation of fishery resources, and National Standard 9, which requires that bycatch in fisheries be prevented “to the extent practicable.”

Similar, related arguments were made by stakeholders during the comment period that preceded Amendment 53’s adoption, but they were rejected by NMFS, which argued that the Fishing Effort Survey represented the best available scientific information, and provided adequate grounds for changing the sectors’ allocations.  Most of the Gulf’s red grouper are caught off the Florida coast, and the Gulf Council had the opportunity to include catch and landings estimates from Florida’s Gulf Reef Fish Survey, which were far lower than those produced by MRIP, in its calculation of the new allocation.  However, it chose not to do so, as such data was not included in the most recent stock assessment.  Texas and Louisiana also have state recreational data programs which collect information on red grouper landings, which information was also not used to calculate the new allocation.

A group of commercial fishermen sued NMFS, seeking judicial review of Amendment 53.  They lost at the trial court level, but have since appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which has a lot of experience reviewing federal regulations. 

Although the Secretary of Commerce, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and NMFS were the only named defendants-appelees in the suit, the Coastal Conservation Association petitioned the court, successfully seeking permission to intervene as an additional appellee.  In its appellate brief, filed in May 2023, the CCA noted that

“The Fishing Effort Survey underwent ‘rigorous peer review’ and was certified as a ‘scientifically sound and suitable replacement’ for the [survey used to set the original 78 percent commercial/24 percent recreational allocation].”

 It went onto argue that

“Alternative 3 [of the draft Amendment 53, which supported the 59.3 percent commercial/40.7 percent recreational allocation] was deemed an appropriate allocation because it uses and reflects ‘the best scientific information available’ and ‘best reflects the landings from each sector from 1986-2005.’  Alternative 3 updates the historical data based on the best available evidence of what was actually caught…  [emphasis added, footnote omitted]”

It's important to note that CCA argued that the Fishing Effort Survey was “the best available evidence of what was actually caught,” even though state survey data was apparently available, at least for the states of Louisiana, Texas and, most importantly, Florida, where the lion’s share of the red grouper are caught.

It’s probably also important to note that Amendment 53 includes a table of data from both the Fishing Effort Survey and from Florida’s Gulf Reef Fish Survey for the years 2016 through 2019, and that such data indicates that, according to the former survey, the recreational catch of red grouper varied between 1,377,751 and 3,273,809 pounds during those years, while the latter survey records landings for the same years that range between 497,239 and 907,291 pounds—a far smaller amount.  Yet CCA is adamant that the Fishing Effort Survey data remains “the best available evidence.”

And that’s probably not surprising, given that using the Fishing Effort Survey data would yield a much higher recreational allocation.

But when it comes to the Fishing Effort Survey’s role in estimating Gulf red snapper landings, which results in recreational snapper landings being constrained, CCA suddenly begins singing a much different tune.

CCA’s Texas chapter posted a piece on its website that quoted Ted Venker, CCA’s so-called “conservation director,” who said

“Yet another major revision to the federal data collection system is upon us, and it should bring a realization that NOAA is just not capable of doing this job.  At best we are looking at several more years of questionable revisions, recalculations, and recalibrations based on a suspect data system that has never proven it can produce accurate information.  This is no way to manage a public resource.  It would be irresponsible to continue down this road rather than exploring and supporting state-based options to better manage the recreational sector wherever feasible.  [emphasis added]”

Thus, over the course of just a few months, we see the CCA arguing in its legal brief that the Fishing Effort Survey data represents “the best available evidence of what was actually caught,” while arguing on a chapter web page that other recreational data was generated by “a suspect data system that has never proven that it can produce accurate information.”

Those aren’t easy positions to reconcile.  It would seem that one would have to be knowingly false.

As early as September 2020, three years before NMFS discovered that the Fishing Effort Survey was  probably overstating the number of trips taken by recreational fishermen, Venker was already calling the federal landings data “flawed,” even though CCA claimed that MRIP data represented the “best available evidence” of recreational catch at the time it filed the brief in the red grouper lawsuit.

Another official CCA statement, published on the website of its Alabama chapter in February 2021, stated that

“managers and anglers alike lost faith in NOAA’s Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP),”

a statement that is completely inconsistent with CCA’s unqualified support for MRIP in the brief that it filed in the red grouper matter.  Furthering the inconsistency, in the same piece Venker argued that

“As long as NOAA insists on tying future management to a history of mistakes and bad data in [the red snapper] fishery,”

even though CCA certainly encouraged the court to support NMFS’ decision to tie the red grouper allocation—which would grant anglers a greater share of red grouper landings—to the same “history of mistakes and bad data” that it condemns when applied to red snapper.

One of the interesting artifacts of CCA’s anti-MRIP ravings, and its recent harping on NMFS’ announcement that the Fishing Effort Survey might have overestimated angler effort by 30 to 40 percent is that, if you assume that recreational landings really have been overstated by 30 to 40 percent and reduce the estimates of recreational landings underlying the new red grouper allocation accordingly, the current 40.7 percent recreational allocation, that resulted from the use of “flawed” estimates produced by a “suspect data system,” is reduced to somewhere between 24.4 and 28.5 percent of overall landings, a figure not all that different from the pre-Amendment 53 allocation.

In all honesty, I have no idea what recreational red grouper landings really were in the years between 1986 and 2005.  I don’t know whether the commercial/recreational split, based upon those landings, ought to be 76/24, 59.3/40.7, something in-between, or something completely outside of that range.

I don’t know how many red snapper were recreationally landed in the Gulf of Mexico, whether we’re talking about last year or in any year since the recreational fishery began.

And while I believe that NMFS’ Fishing Effort Survey overstated the number of trips taken by anglers, and caused MRIP to overstate catch and landings, neither I, NMFS, nor anyone else knows with any sort of certainty whether the initial indications that landings were overstated by 30 to 40 percent extend across all species, all states, and all fisheries, or whether the actual extent of the error varies from place to place and from species to species.

But what I do know is that there are far too many members of the angling community who speak from both sides of their mouths, eager to condemn federal fisheries data and the management program that it informs when management measures grow more restrictive, while willing and eager to endorse the same management program when it lets them pile more dead fish on the dock.

In the end, even in this cynical age, things like credibility and integrity still matter.  Sadly, as the fight over fisheries data shows time and again, those are the two things that many engaged in that fight lost a long time ago.

 

 

 

  

MID-ATLANTIC "HARVEST CONTROL RULE": ONE YEAR LATER

 

At its June 2022 meeting, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC) adopted the so-called “Percent Change Approach” (PCA) for managing the recreational summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass fisheries; the PCA will also be used to manage the recreational bluefish fishery, once the bluefish stock is no longer subject to its current rebuilding plan.

 

Unlike previous management approaches, the PCA does not constrain recreational landings to a recreational harvest limit (RHL) or even to an annual catch limit (ACL); instead, it employs a table that dictates whether recreational landings should be increased, decreased, or left unchanged, depending on the most recent estimate of spawning stock biomass (SSB) and whether future landings are calculated to be above, below, or approximately equal to a theoretical RHL.

 

When the PCA was proposed, some individuals and organizations argued that it didn’t comply with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act‘s (Magnuson-Stevens) statutory requirements and so made overfishing more likely; MAFMC staff also argued against its approval. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) nonetheless approved final regulations adopting the PCA on March 9, 2023.

 

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is seeking judicial review of such regulations, but until that lawsuit is decided, the PCA will determine how recreational fisheries are managed in the mid-Atlantic.

 

In December 2022, the PCA was employed for the first time. Now, managers and stakeholders have their first opportunity to evaluate whether the PCA is living up to its supposed promise of providing “greater stability and predictability in recreational measures from year-to-year while accounting for uncertainty in recreational catch estimates.”

 

It may be too soon to draw any conclusions. For the 2024 fishing year, the PCA is calling for recreational summer flounder landings to be reduced by 28% and scup landings to be reduced by 10%. It is also calling for black sea bass landings to be reduced by 10%, but the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Monitoring Committee (Monitoring Committee) advised the MAFMC to leave those landings unchanged, although though nothing in the PCA permits such an outcome.

Summer Flounder

The 28% reduction in recreational summer flounder landings was a response to an unexpected finding that the summer flounder stock experienced overfishing in 2022, after the 2023 management track stock assessment determined that fishing mortality had slightly exceeded the threshold.

 

While such overfishing was unrelated to the PCA, the MAFMC did fail to follow the PCA’s direction with respect to 2023 summer flounder management measures. Because it was faced with two different calculations of 2023 RHL, one based on a single year’s data, which called for a 10% increase in landings and another, more accurate estimate based on multiple years’ data, which called for a 10% decrease, the MAFMC decided to leave landings unchanged, although such status quo outcome was not authorized by the PCA.

 

Had the MAFMC imposed a 10% reduction in 2023 landings, effectively phasing in the 28% over two years, it might have blunted the impact of the unanticipated landings cut. Now, the entire reduction must be taken in a single year, angering stakeholders. The summary of the December 4, 2023 Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Advisory Panel meeting (Advisory Panel Summary) reported that

 

Multiple advisors expressed frustration with the 28% reduction in harvest needed for summer flounder under the Percent Change Approach. One advisor noted that this reduction will be devastating…Another advisor noted that this is particularly going to hurt the for hire industry that is already severely suffering, and it will also hurt tackle shops and shoreside suppliers of fuel…

One advisor stated that fishery management should come with a warning label that “harvesting and releasing fish may result in severe management decisions…” He stated that the 28% reduction was going to put party boats out of business…Summer flounder has gone from a 16% liberalization a few years ago to a 28% reduction this year, which is “feast or famine” management…

Their only solace is that, since the PCA sets management measures for two-year periods, the landings target should remain unchanged in 2025; to that extent, at least, the PCA is providing some level of stability and predictability.

Scup

Although scup landings need only be reduced by 10% in 2024, the Advisory Panel Summary reported that “Multiple advisors expressed frustration with the 10% reduction in harvest required for scup under the Percent Change Approach. Several advisors said reductions are not necessary given biomass is so high. Instead, measures should be liberalized.”

 

Because recreational scup landings for 2019-2022 exceeded the recreational sector’s ACL by an average of 126%, the fishery management plan required the MAFMC to consider imposing additional restrictions on the fishery, to comply with Magnuson-Stevens’s requirement that management measures “ensure accountability” for excessive harvest. However, NMFS’ Greater Atlantic Region Fisheries Office (GARFO) informed the MAFMC that no such measures were needed, as the combination of the 10 percent reduction in 2023 landings and improvements made to the Recreational Demand Model (RDM) used to predict future landings adequately addressed the “conditions that precipitated the overage.”

 

Black Sea Bass

Black sea bass landings will not be reduced in 2024, despite the PCA’s direction to do so, because of the Monitoring Committee’s creative interpretation of the PCA. The Monitoring Committee advised the MAFMC that the PCA assumes stocks will be assessed every two years, and that the theoretical RHL, as well as the recreational landings limit for each stock, will only change in response to an assessment. Since the black sea bass stock assessment was delayed until 2024, and since the PCA is meant to promote management stability, the Monitoring Committee suggested that leaving the landings target unchanged was consistent with the intent of the PCA.

Such argument was not illogical, yet it remains flawed, for nothing in the explicit language of the PCA supports such status quo outcome. Under the conditions prevailing for black sea bass—an SSB more than twice the target level, and anglers predicted to exceed the RHL in 2024—a 10% reduction was the only action permitted by the PCA. The Monitoring Committee’s advice, and the MAFMC’s ultimate decision, to leave landings unchanged relied on an interpretation of fishery regulations that elevated the expressed purpose of the PCA—providing stable and predictable management measures—above the clear language of such regulations.

 

As was the case with scup, the average of recreational black sea bass landings for the past three years exceeded the recreational ACL, requiring the MAFMC to consider accountability measures. And, as was the case with scup, GARFO cited a 10 percent reduction imposed on 2023 landings, combined with the improvements in the RDM, as reasons why no additional measures need be imposed.

 

Given the unambiguous language of the regulations, the decision to not reduce black sea bass landings was, at best, legally questionable. It also failed to mollify stakeholders. The Advisory Panel Summary noted that

One advisor said the black sea bass fishery is poorly managed and there is little support among the recreational fishing community for management. He said the measures for both scup and black sea bass should be liberalized because biomass is so high. It feels as if the recreational fishery is penalized each year, even for rebuilt stocks…

Another advisor from Connecticut agreed with the previous comments…He said the Monitoring Committee’s justification for status quo measures in 2024 should instead be used to justify a liberalization…

A third advisor expressed agreement with the previous two speakers and questioned why management is considering cuts for very abundant species like scup and black sea bass…

One advisor from New York said he would have previously thought status quo was a good outcome. However, the current black sea bass measures are problematic, including the 16.5 inch minimum size limit in New York. Discard mortality is very high. Regulations should be liberalized to reduce discards…

Lessons Learned?

What, then, are the lessons of the PCA’s first year?

It’s probably too early to consider how the PCA impacts fish stocks, since final recreational landings data for 2023, the first year affected by the PCA, will not be available until April 2024. But we did get some insight into how the PCA influences people.

The PCA has relieved fisheries managers, including members of the MAFMC, of the discipline imposed by earlier management approaches. Prior to the PCA, past fishery performance was used to predict future landings. Management measures for the upcoming year were adjusted, becoming more or less restrictive, depending on whether past landings were above or below the next year’s RHL.

It was an imperfect system. Uncertainty in recreational landings estimates often led to management measures that were either more restrictive than they needed to be or not restrictive enough to keep landings at or below the RHL. The seeming impossibility of accurately predicting anglers’ response to new management measures, and to other factors affecting the fishery, also made it difficult to predict management outcomes. Yet because the former approach was focused on the RHL, it presented a disciplined, systematic methodology that almost always prevented overfishing and led to the recovery of overfished fish stocks.

In theory, the PCA brought even more discipline to the process by establishing a series of predetermined management actions that the MAFMC would be required to take, depending on the whether the SSB was above or below the biomass target and whether future landings were predicted to be above or below the RHL. The PCA made allowances for the uncertainty inherent in recreational fishing data, while the RDM provided a more accurate prediction of how anglers would respond to management measures.

 

Unfortunately, nothing in the PCA prevents anglers from exceeding not only the RHL, but also the ACL. Nothing in the PCA prevents combined recreational and commercial landings from leading to overfishing. Changes to recreational landings are made mechanically, with no consideration of the impact from commercial landings and no provision to cap recreational landings at a level that would prevent either the ACL or the overfishing limit (OFL) from being exceeded. NMFS has admitted that the PCA “would allow for some level of RHL overages in some circumstances. RHL overages carry a risk of ACL overages, which in turn risk [acceptable biological catch] and OFL overages and therefore risk resulting in overfishing.”

 

Although Magnuson-Stevens requires that fishermen be held accountable for exceeding the ACL, the accountability measures adopted by NMFS pursuant to the PCA can be toothless. It is difficult to successfully argue that a one-time 10% reduction in landings truly holds the recreational scup fishery accountable for overages that exceeded the ACL by an average of 126 percent for three consecutive years.

While the MAFMC has demonstrated a willingness to apply the PCA’s provisions mechanically to increase landings, even if such increase would cause landings to exceed the ACL, it has also demonstrated a willingness to ignore the PCA’s requirements to decrease landings in the case of both the 2023 summer flounder management measures and the 2024 black sea bass measures, although nothing in the PCA or related regulations justified such action.

The PCA is also notable for its impact or, more accurately, its lack of impact on stakeholder attitudes toward fisheries management. While the MAFMC states that its so-called “Recreational Reform Initiative,” including the PCA, “aims to address a range of challenges,” which include “widespread angler dissatisfaction with some recreational management measures, stakeholder perceptions that measures are not reflective of stock status, and concerns about how Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) data are used to manage these fisheries,” nothing in the Advisory Panel Summary suggests that stakeholders are any less dissatisfied with recreational management measures today than they were before the PCA was adopted.

 

If the comments expressed in the Advisory Panel Summary make anything clear, it is that most panel members are only interested in harvesting more fish, and not in the fisheries management process; any management measure that leads to reduced or, in the case of black sea bass, even status quo landings, is simply unacceptable to them.

Such attitude ought to cause both MAFMC members and GARFO to ask whether they gave too much weight to stakeholder comments when considering the PCA, and whether stakeholder support of the PCA was motivated by nothing more than a hope that it would provide a means to evade the strictures of Magnuson-Stevens and put more dead fish on the dock.

Unfortunately, both MAFMC and GARFO now have so much institutional prestige invested in the PCA that neither is likely to admit it is flawed. Instead, unless NRDC’s lawsuit succeeds, and a court invalidates the PCA, it is likely to survive in its present form until 2025 when, absent further action by the MAFMC, it may no longer be used.

When that time comes, we can only hope that it is replaced by something better designed to prevent overfishing and sustain the long-term health of fish stocks.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/