Thursday, December 30, 2021

SALTWATER FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE PAST YEAR

2021 had its problems.  But from a fisheries management standpoint, it was not a bad year.  While some things could have gone better, and some issues, yet to be resolved, might still create some problems, progress was made on a number of fronts.

Amendment 7 won’t harm, and may benefit, the striped bass stock

As 2021 began, striped bass anglers were very concerned that the proposed Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass would weaken the conservation provisions of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s striped bass management plan.

There was good reason for such worry.  The previous summer, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board had created a work group, and charged such work group with recommending possible measures to be included in Amendment 7, which would change the way that the ASMFC managed striped bass.  When the work group’s final report was released, just ahead of the August 2020 meeting of the Management Board, it recommended that three “themes” guide the development of the new amendment:  management stability, flexibility, and regulatory consistency.

Concepts such as rebuilding the overfished striped bass stock, and maintaining it at sustainable levels in the long term, were notable only for their absence.

Thus, when the Public Information Document for Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass was released last February, it contained a number of bad suggestions which supported the three recommended themes, but would permanently reduce striped bass abundance and impair the long-term sustainability of the striped bass stock. 

The Public Information Document asked stakeholders whether they’d like to change the current management goals and objectives, which emphasize long-term sustainability and promote a well-structured spawning stock that includes a significant number of older, larger females. 

It asked whether the fishing mortality target should be increased, to allow higher harvests, while the female spawning stock biomass target was lowered to accommodate the reduced abundance that would inevitably result from removing more bass from the population.

It asked whether the “management triggers” that require the Management Board to act when certain events take place should be weakened, to provide the Management Board with further opportunity to sit on their hands and do nothing when threats to the stock arise.

It asked whether the management plan should still require an overfished stock to rebuilt within 10 years, or whether the rebuilding period ought to be drawn out to some longer time, thus

“mitigating impacts to fisheries.”

It asked whether catch-and-release striped bass fishermen, who inflict a 9% release mortality rate on the stock, should be restricted in some way, so that there would be more fish available to catch-and-kill striped bass fishermen, who inflict a 100% mortality rate on every fish tossed in their coolers. 

Although the Public Information Document clearly admitted that

“The source of mortality does not matter to the health of the stock, as long as the overall fishing mortality is below the threshold,”

some members of the Management Board’s work group, ignoring that truth,

“indicated that recreational dead discards might be the single most important issue at this time, and addressing (or reducing discards) is the most important action that can be taken going forward.”

The Public Information Document asked some other things, too, but some of the things that it never asked were whether new measures were needed in order to rebuild the spawning stock to its biomass target, or what sort of measures might be employed to reach that target within 10 years.

The need to rebuild the stock by 2029, as the management plan required, was not really mentioned at all.

Thus, conservation-minded stakeholders seemed to be facing long odds when a series of webinar/hearings were held last March.  Judging from the recommendations in the work group’s report, along with some of the language in the Public Information Document, it seemed that momentum at the Management Board was running against the striped bass, and that those representing the long-term interests of the fish, rather than the short-term interests of the fishing industry, were taking on another lost cause.

But things didn’t turn out that way.  

Stakeholders cared about the striped bass’ fate, and came out in numbers, all along the coast, to insist that the Management Board not weaken its striped bass management program, and that it instead begin a serious effort to rebuild the stock.  Over 3,000 stakeholders commented, either at the hearings or in writing, and those comments were so lopsided, in favor of conservative striped bass management, that there was reason to hope that the Management Board might take heed.

It looked like such hope would be rewarded when, at the beginning of the May Management Board meeting, Patrick Keliher, the Maine fishery manager who also chaired the ASMFC at the time, rose to say

“While we are not at the point we were in 1984, the downward trend of this stock is evident in the assessment.  For many of the Commission’s species, we are no longer in a position to hold hope that things will revert to what they have previously been if we just hold static.  The change is happening too fast and action needs to be taken…[The Management Board needs to consider] what is best for this species, and also what is best for the future of the Commission.”

And, over all, the Management Board seemed to listen, both to the comments of the stakeholders and to those of Mr. Keliher. 

There were, of course, some dissenters, who tried to undercut stakeholders’ clear demands for conservative management.  Both Martin Gary, of the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, and Tom Fote, New Jersey’s Governor’s Appointee, tried to suggest that the webinar format skewed stakeholder response.  The former claimed that there were “folks that struggled” with the webinar format and, as a result, “there are some underrepresented sectors” in the comments, while the latter alleged that speakers on the webinars tended to be younger than those who typically spoke at in-person hearings, and suggested that some might not have been comfortable commenting on line.  Neither person could explain why such tech-unsavvy folks didn’t just pick up a pencil and send in written comments, as 3,000 pro-conservation stakeholders did.

Michael Luisi, the Maryland fishery manager who was one of the strongest proponents for beginning the new amendment, tried to frustrate the thousands of stakeholders who provided comment, and salvage his hopes for Amendment 7,  saying,

“I would prefer at this time, based on the comment, that we think more about the consequences to the commercial, recreational, and for-hire fisheries,”

and asking that none of the issues be removed from the initial draft of the amendment.

But such pro-harvest voices were in the distinct minority.  The Management Board left the plan’s goals and objectives, its biomass  and fishing mortality targets, and its 10-year rebuilding timeframe intact.  In a move that surprised most observers, Megan Ware, another Maine fishery manager, even added a proposal to protect the 2015 year class to the draft amendment.  

With Ms. Ware's action, the amendment began to change shape.  Instead of being a document that would threaten the long-term health of the striped bass stock, it was slowly morphing into an amendment that might benefit the bass, instead.

That change continued at the August Management Board meeting, when Ms. Ware rose to speak again, and successfully argued that a provision to rebuild the striped bass stock by 2029, its 10-year deadline, be included in the draft amendment, which will be presented to the Management Board for its meeting late in January 2021.

In the past year, Amendment 7 has come a long way.  It’s not yet finished, and the final version could still include weakened management triggers that insert additional years of delay into the management process.  So it’s far too early to declare a victory.

Still, at this point, it is clear that Amendment 7 will not represent a loss.  The worst provisions have already been stripped out.  

Right now, the Plan Development Team that is preparing the next draft of the amendment seems committed to the 2029 rebuilding deadline.  Other provisions could limit the use of conservation equivalency, which currently allows states to escape some of their responsibilities to conserve and rebuild the stock.  A revised management trigger that will compel the Management Board to respond to below-average spawning success is likely to be included among the options sent out for public comment.

Even if the Management Board strips out those good things, the final version of Amendment 7 shouldn’t have a net negative impact on the striped bass management program. 

Given where we started a year ago, that is, in itself, a win.

7-year rebuilding plan for bluefish

On November 12, 2019, the National Marine Fisheries Service formally notified the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council that the bluefish stock had become overfished.  The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act dictates that, after such notice was made, NMFS and the Council had no more than two years to implement a bluefish rebuilding plan.

What happened next demonstrated why Magnuson-Stevens is such an effective fishery management law.

By the December meeting of the Mid-Atlantic Council, which was held jointly with the ASMFC’s Bluefish Management Board, a draft scoping document, which updated a previous scoping document that focused solely on allocation, but would now also solicit public comment on the rebuilding process, was already prepared for review and release to the public.

Scoping hearings were held in February 2020.  The majority of those who commented at such hearings belonged to the recreational and commercial fishing industries and, as it typical of industry members, either questioned the data, questioned the need for a rebuilding program, and/or sought a rebuilding program that would have the least impact on their businesses.  For many, but not all, that translated to the longest possible rebuilding period.

But the public didn’t have the last word on the rebuilding process.  Magnuson-Stevens requires that

“For a fishery that is overfished, any fishery management plan, amendment, or proposed regulations…for such fishery shall specify a time period for rebuilding that shall be as short as possible, taking into account the status and biology of any overfished stocks of fish, the needs of fishing communities…and the interaction of the overfished stock of fish within the marine ecosystem; and not exceed 10 years…  [emphasis added, internal formatting omitted]”

Thus, not only did a plan to rebuild the overfished bluefish stock have to be put in place, but that plan must contain measures to rebuild the stock in no more than 10 years, and in a shorter time if doing so would be reasonably possible. 

In many such situations, regional fishery management councils have defaulted to the 10-year maximum rebuilding period without giving thought to a shorter rebuilding timeline, but when the Mid-Atlantic Council contemplated that possibility in the case of bluefish, Michael Pentony, the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Regional Director for the Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office, took that option off the table.  He noted that bluefish weren’t badly overfished, that recovery should be possible in less than 10 years, and that dragging out the rebuilding process over a 10-year period would thus violate Magnuson-Stevens’ requirement that the rebuilding period be as short as possible,

Eventually, the Council and Management Board considered options to rebuild the stock in either 5 or 7 years, and while the 7-year plan wasn’t perfect, in that it violated the Council’s risk policy in the early years of rebuilding by allowing too great a probability of overfishing, it still kept that probability low enough to comply with all legal standards, and was ultimately the one adopted by both management bodies.

As with striped bass, we see bluefish management measures that fall short of perfection.  But, to an even greater degree than is the case, so far, with bass, we also  see bluefish management measures that will provide clear benefits to the stock, which were quickly put in place once bluefish became overfished, and which will hopefully rebuild the stock in less than the 10 years permitted by Magnuson-Stevens.

Thus, thanks to actions taken in 2021, bluefish management is headed in the right direction.

 

ICCAT bans shortfin mako landings

The period from late 2017, when shortfin mako sharks were first found to be badly overfished, and the first months of 2021, was embarrassing to United States fishermen and marine conservation advocates, as the U.S,, which has long been a leader in the conservation of highly migratory fish stocks, reversed its traditional stand and became one of the primary obstacles to mako conservation.

That occurred after scientists at the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas determined that shortfin makos were badly overfished, and that fishing mortality would have to be slashed to nearly nothing in order to stop the decline in abundance and give the North Atlantic mako stock a reasonable chance to rebuild by 2070.  Such scientists advised that ICCAT adopt a no-retention policy for the stock, but such recommendation was rejected by both the United States and the European Union, which together represented the nations with the first-, second-, and fourth-highest mako landings.

A number of excuses were made to justify the U.S. opposition:  The United States had already imposed measures to reduce dead discards of makos in its pelagic longline fishery, while other nations did not.  The United States reported its mako bycatch, while other nations did not.  The United States accurately reports where its makos are caught, but (if the South Atlantic remained open to harvest), other nations might not.  Such excuses were presented as a need to “level the playing field,” but were largely an exercise in finger-pointing.  If the end result is a ban on mako landings, it didn’t really matter if the U.S. had started its trip down the conservation road a little earlier than others; once a ban was adopted, everyone, including the United States, would end up in the same place.

Given that the United States had earlier opposed listing the shortfin mako on Appendix II to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, a listing that would only require that the U.S. document international commerce in the species, and certify that such commerce involved legally-captured fish and did not threaten the makos’ survival, its resistance to a retention ban seemed to be less rooted in any considerations of fairness and level playing fields than in a desire to monetize the mako shark resource to the greatest degree possible, regardless of how that impacted the shark.

However, when the presidential administration changed in 2021, bringing leadership changes to the Department of Commerce, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and to the National Marine Fisheries Service, it appears that the United States position on makos changed as well.

At the November 2021 ICCAT meeting, the United States agreed to a resoltion that would limit total mako fishing mortality to 250 metric tons.  Such proposal would completely ban mako retention in 2022 and 2023, although if the level of dead discards falls below 250 mt after that, could allow for very limited harvest.

It was a big step forward.

Speaking personally, although I will never, under any possible circumstances, live long enough to see makos recover in 2070, I can rest a little easier knowing that the fish that I have admired, pursued, and enjoyed for so long now has a decent shot at survival.

NMFS stands up to Mid-Atlantic Council

Over the past couple of years, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council has not done itself proud when it comes to scup and black sea bass management.  Instead, it has allowed anglers to repeatedly exceed their annual limits, failing to take any action to rein in such resource abuses even when, in the case of black sea bass, Council inaction was likely to result in not only the recreational harvest limit, but the allowable biological catch, being exceeded.

The National Marine Fisheries Service had, for a while, gone along with the Council, deeming its status quo measures a temporary accommodation to recent changes to the Marine Recreational Information Program, which estimates recreational catch, effort, and landings, and to a dearth of 2020 recreational fishing data due to the COVID pandemic. 

As 2021 drew to a close, it appeared that the Council might again ignore recreational overages, in whole or in part.  In the case of scup, projections indicated that recreational landings for 2021 would probably be close to double the recreational catch limit; Council staff, deciding that the best course would be to average landings over a period of years to account for inevitable error in the annual estimates, recommended the adoption of management measures that would reduce anglers' landings by 56% in 2022.  But the Council was reluctant to force such a large reduction, and favored a 33% cut instead.

In the case of black sea bass, anglers were projected to exceed the recreational harvest limit by a substantial amount, resulting in Council staff recommending a 28% cutback to prevent more excess harvest in 2022.  Overharvest in the three previous years, 2018-2020, was high enough to require that accountability measures be imposed.  Yet many Council members only wanted to adopt a 14% cut.

While that was better than status quo, it was not good enough.  NMFS had decided that temporary measures, designed to address unexpected and transient events, would not be allowed to continue.

Regional Administrator Michael Pentony made that position clear.  He noted that with respect to the inadequate scup cutback

“To paint this as a compromise, that may be so, but the regulations don’t allow us to make a compromise.”

If the Council ignored his advice, as it ultimately did, and approved the 33% reduction, he made it clear that he would be legally obligated to impose additional restrictions, including a possible closure of federal waters, to better ensure that the recreational harvest limit would not be exceeded again.

A similar discussion occurred with respect to black sea bass, although in that case, enough states feared a federal waters closure that they approved the full 28% cut.

It was nice to see NMFS finally take a stand against chronic recreational overharvest, and in favor of regulations designed to keep the affected fisheries healthy in the long term.

On balance, it was a good year

When dealing with fisheries issues, the big, spectacular wins, such as passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 or adoption of Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, don’t happen often.  The fact that I had to go back to the previous century to find those two examples certainly demonstrates that.

In the day-to-day fight to protect the nation’s fisheries, victories are usually very small, incremental gains that make it a little more likely that a stock will be sustainably managed, or that an overfished stock will begin to rebuild.

Sometimes, merely not losing a fight can feel like a major win, as was the case a few years ago when the  so-called “Modern Fish Act,” which could have seriously undercut federal fishery management, was reduced to something resembling an inconsequential red snapper bill.

Viewed in that context, 2021 was a pretty good year.

ICCAT’s decision to ban the retention of shortfin makos was a major step toward reversing that species’ decline and hopefully rebuilding the stock in the next 50 years.  While the mako’s future is still cloudy, and may depend upon the 250 metric ton fishing mortality limit being achieved, that future looks far brighter than it did just two months ago.

The future of the striped bass, although still quite uncertain, is looking much brighter, too.  The fact that thousands of stakeholders turned out to comment on the pending amendment, and convinced the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board to strip most of the bad ideas out of the current draft of Amendment 7, holds out hope that a similar turnout in 2022, when the final draft is released for public comment, will convince the Management Board to strip the rest of the bad proposals out of Amendment 7, and instead produce a document that will improve the management plan and better assure a sustainable striped bass fishery in upcoming decades.

Bluefish rebuilding was mandated by law, so the mere fact of a rebuilding plan provides little cause to rejoice.  However, the fact that the rebuilding period was compressed into 7 years, rather than the 10 arguably allowed by law, was a welcome development, and hopefully an example that can be followed in other plans impacting other fisheries.

NMFS standing up to the Mid-Atlantic Council was another example of NMFS only doing what the law required.  However, in an environment where not doing what the law required was tolerated before, the mere fact that NMFS has finally lost its patience with recreational overharvest becomes a good sign.

That doesn’t mean that all is well in the fisheries world.  There will be plenty of challenges to keep advocates busy in  the new year (and we’ll look at some of them on Sunday).  But in an arena where wins can often feel frustratingly few and far between, it is good to look back on a year, to find that nothing went terribly wrong, while a few things turned out pretty well.

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