THE ASMFC BACKS OFF ITS COMMITMENT TO MENHADEN, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

 

Just last Sunday, I asked “Will the ASMFC live up to last August’s promise” of managing menhaden in accordance with the newly-adopted environmental reference points. 

We learned on Tuesday that the answer to that question is no.

Instead of reducing the annual Atlantic menhaden catch limit from the current 216,000 metric tons down to 176,800 metric tons—the highest level of landings that would still have at least a 50 percent probability of keeping harvest at or below the target fishing mortality level—the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board opted to set the catch limit at 194,400 metric tons, a level that has only a 41.5 percent probability of keeping harvest at or below target in 2021, and a somewhat better, but still inadequate, 47.5 percent probability of keeping the fishing mortality below target in 2022.

In other words, for both years, the ASMFC chose to set annual catch limits that it knew were likely to fail to meet the fishing mortality targets that it had established just two months ago.

I have to admit that I was slightly surprised by that action. 

While I never dismiss the possibility of the ASMFC abandoning its conservation commitments to any species—it does that on a regular basis—I didn’t think that the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, which had unanimously adopted a target reference point in August would, come October, ignore that same reference point, almost before the ink of the August proceedings had enough time to dry.

But I should have known better.  We are, after all, dealing with the ASMFC, where there are no real limits to a management board’s discretion, where preventing overfishing, rebuilding stocks, basing decisions on the best available science, and even adhering to the terms of a management plan, are all viewed as mere options that, should they prove inconvenient, can be can be casually ignored without fear of any consequences at all.

That doesn’t mean that some members of the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board didn’t try to convince that board to live up to its commitments.  Dr. Justin Davis, a fisheries manager for the State of Connecticut, was the foremost among these. 

Noting that he was “proud” to have been part of the August meeting, where the ecological reference points were adopted, and declaring that such adoption was a “significant and precedent-setting decision,” Dr. Davis moved that the Management Board adopt a 176,800 metric ton catch limit for 2021 and a 187,400 metric ton catch limit for 2022.  Both would have a 50 percent probability of keeping fishing mortality at or below the ecological reference point target.

There were plenty of people on the Management Board who felt that such reference points were unduly conservative, but Dr. Davis noted that

“A 50 percent probability isn’t really risk averse,”

implicitly acknowledging that setting such a reference point also led to a 50 percent probability that such catch limits would result in the fishing mortality target being exceeded.  

He explicitly stated that the arguments for a higher catch limit weren’t very persuasive, and noted that such higher limits aren’t what the majority of stakeholders want.  He pointed out that his proposed catch limits, and their 50 percent probability of constraining landings to target, merely delivered on the ASMFC’s promise of taking action consistent with the environmental reference points.

Another speaker—I couldn’t hear her name—followed up on Dr. Davis’ thoughts, saying

“This decision is the first opportunity we have to walk the walk”

promised by the adoption of environmental reference points two months before.

But doing the right thing, and making good on the promise of the Management Board's actions in August, wasn’t all that important to many Management Board members.  All they could see is the short-term economic impacts of the harvest reductions, and at the ASMFC, short-term economic considerations will almost always be elevated above the long-term health of fish stocks, or even of entire ecosystems.

Almost as soon as the meeting began, and the suggestion of reducing landings arose, someone from New Jersey (again, because of a poor audio connection, I couldn’t quite make out who) tried to effectively negate the entire ecological reference point effort, and go back to single-species management.  He pointed out the current health of the menhaden population and said

“We should be proclaiming success,”

rather than reducing landings, because

“We would like to minimize the possibility of losing one million dollars in the menhaden fishery.”

Roy Miller, the governor’s appointee from Delaware, expressed his support for the 194,400 metric ton catch limits that the Management Board ultimately adopted, noting

“There were no economic considerations factored into”

the lower catch limits that would have had an even shot at constraining fishing mortality to the target reference point, while Eric Reid, the legislative proxy from Rhode Island, complained that

“The science that’s lacking [from the motions to reduce landings] is the socio-economic science—and it is a science.”

Capt. John McMurray, the legislative proxy from New York, tried to turn things around.  He reminded the Management Board that if it proves unwilling to adopt a harvest limit consistent with its own ecological reference point target, after unanimously adopting such target just last August, such failure will only reinforce the public perception that the ASMFC is incapable of making the hard decisions necessary to properly manage the resource, but instead caters to special interests. 

Capt. McMurray then touched on an issue that lay at the heart of the question.  He said that the Management Board

“should be [adopting the 176,800/187,400 metric ton catch limits)…for the integrity of the Commission.”

But the Commission stopped worrying about its integrity long ago—or, if it still worries about such things, it never lets such concerns get in the way of promoting short-term economic gains.  It became completely clear that the Management Board was going to make the wrong decision, and abandon its reference point target, when Stephen Bowman, the Virginia Marine Resources Commissioner, supported the higher landing limits, saying

“The environmental reference points should have an opportunity to work…but at the same time should not be punitive in nature…

“You also have to consider the people who are involved in this [fishery] as well.  [emphasis added]”

Because yes, there is always a “but” at the ASMFC, where people want healthy fish stocks, and they want successful management plans, BUT they can’t and won’t make the decisions needed to get there, because they are afraid of causing even minor economic distress. 

So long as ASMFC commissioners view science-based conservation measures as “punitive” rather than reasonable and necessary, that will never change. 

New Hampshire’s governor’s appointee, G. Ritchie White, might have been alluding to that unfortunate truth when he asked, early in the meeting, whether the ASMFC had actually succeeded in managing any species to or above its target level.  

There was a sort of awkward silence after the question, then a staff reply that the ASMFC was “trying” to do that with striped bass—although no one mentioned that it was failing miserably in such attempt, with the striped bass stock now overfished and thelatest management measures having only a 42 percent chance of reducing fishingmortality to the target level—and another staff comment that

“I know that’s the goal…”

But the only species the staff mentioned as being managed to target were spiny dogfish and a very few others, all managed not just by the ASMFC, but also by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, which is prohibited by law from adopting management measures that are more likely to fail than succeed.  If one only considers fish that are managed solely by the ASMFC, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to find even one that is at the target level of abundance.

And the debate over the menhaden catch limit illustrates why.

The ASMFC just doesn’t take the idea of biomass or fishing mortality targets seriously. 

Maybe it’s because I’ve been a hunter and a recreational rifle shooter for most of my life, going back to when I got my first BB gun at the age of 9, but I’ve always thought of a target as something that you try very hard to hit. 

You might not succeed.  Maybe you misjudged the distance to the mark, and hit high or low, the equivalent of scientific uncertainty, or you misjudged the wind, which might be more or less analogous to management uncertainty.  But when you press the trigger, you do so expecting to center the shot.

ASMFC seems to view targets differently.  It sets them up, then maybe doesn’t try to hit them at all (take a look at the ASMFC’s history of tautog management before 2017) or, as in the case of the current menhaden target, just takes sloppy shots that are likely to fly wide.  If it does hit a target, it's largely through luck.

And despite the comments about management to the target level being “the goal,” the fact that the ASMFC suffers no consequences for repeatedly failing to hit its mark doesn’t provide any incentive to improve the accuracy of its management efforts.

So the ASMFC’s recent failure to adopt a catch limit with a realistic chance of achieving the fishing mortality target shouldn’t have come as a surprise to anyone.  We should have expected the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board to break the promise it made last August.

Because that’s just what the ASMFC does.  And unless Congress steps in to make things right, that’s very unlikely to change.