Sometime during our school years, maybe in junior high or
maybe in high school, we were probably all exposed to George Orwell’s Animal Farm,
an allegorical fantasy of a once-idealistic government gone tragically wrong. It’s safe to say that most remember the novel’s
pivotal line:
“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than
others,”
given that, since the book came out in August 1945, it has
proven applicable to far too many political situations.
Now, given some of the things that we’ve heard at the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, we have to wonder whether it
applies to fisheries management, too.
I’ve already dedicated a couple of essays to last Tuesday’s
meeting of the ASMFC’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, and though today’s
blog focuses on menhaden too, it shouldn’t be read in such a narrow
context. What it really talks
about is whether the public should have a greater say in how public resources
are managed, or whether the relative handful of people who derive private
profit from such public resources should be given greater sway.
Still, last Tuesday’s meeting is a good place to start,
because it included some troubling comments that illustrate how that question is being answered at the ASMFC.
In supporting the motion to set the annual catch limit at194,400 metric tons, a level of landings that the management board knew waslikely to exceed the fishing mortality target that the same management boardset just two months before, one state manager said that
“If we do it gradually…we will be able to bring all of our stakeholders
with us as we move forward,”
with the “it” she referred to being reducing such landings
to a level that will have at least a 50 percent probability of achieving the
target fishing mortality level.
On its face, that comment might not seem so bad, but that
changes when it’s read in the context of recent menhaden management actions,
and stakeholder input on the actions that were or were not taken.
Striped
bass were used as a proxy, or as some management board members said, an “indicator
species” for the broad array of predators that feed on menhaden, because striped
bass are more dependent on menhaden than any other fish species examined. Thus, the menhaden abundance target was set
at the level that would support the striped bass stock at its target level,
while the abundance threshold was set at the level needed to support a striped
bass stock that had declined in abundance and was teetering on the edge of
becoming overfished.
The
adoption of such ecosystem reference points was the culmination of an advocacy
effort that began more than a decade ago, and was broadly supported. In
a presentation made by ASMFC staff to the menhaden management board at last
August’s meeting, staff noted that
“Many comments were submitted on [ecological reference
points,]”
including 16 letters signed by more than 100 organizations,
more than 1,000 form letters, and over 200 individual comments. Staff also noted that, out of all of those
letters, an
“Overwhelming majority: approve [environmental reference points] to
manage Atlantic menhaden. [emphasis
added]”
While many who commented did not state just what such
ecological reference points ought to be (which is a perfectly logical position,
given that the matter is best determined by qualified biologists), others
wanted to see reference points that
“Specified [environmental reference points that allowed
striped bass to rebuild”
and/or noted that menhaden are an
“Important forage species that supports recreational
fisheries and coastal economies.”
So, based on the ASMFC’s own comments, it appears that just
about all of the stakeholders, whether anglers or not, were concerned with menhaden’s
impact on coastal ecosystems, and wanted to see ecological reference points
adopted—and presumably wanted to see the menhaden management board take those
reference points seriously, and establish harvest limits that were intended to
achieve the reference point target.
And that is what makes the comment about “bringing all of
our stakeholders with us” by not managing to the fishing mortality target, but
instead establishing annual catch limits that will knowingly exceed that mark.
Because, in the ASMFC’s own words, it seems like the “overwhelming
majority” of stakeholders were already on board with setting a harvest
level that would achieve the fishing mortality target.
Of course, not everyone agreed with that overwhelming majority. The ASMFC publishes all of the comments that it
receives on fisheries issues, and a
review of the materials for the August meeting reveals that there were two
letters in opposition to the ecological reference points. One of those letters came from the Menhaden
Fisheries Coalition, an organization that describes itself as
“a group comprised of bait and reduction fishermen, dealers,
and processors who rely on Atlantic menhaden to support themselves, their
families, and other fisheries,”
The other letter came from a group called the Science Center
for Marine Fisheries, which claims to represent
“a federal initiative to bring together academic researchers
and industry members to fund projects improving our understanding of the
scientific uncertainties around fisheries assessments and evaluating economically
important issues for fishing communities.”
There is substantial overlap between the Menhaden Fisheries
Coalition and the Science Center for Marine Fisheries; Greg DiDomenico, who chairs
the Science Center’s Industry Advisory Board, is also the Executive Director of
the Coalition member Garden State Seafood Association.
While such organizations, and particularly the Menhaden
Fisheries Coalition, claimed to support the adoption of ecological reference
points, they also clearly supported maintenance of a status quo catch limit of
216,000 metric tons for the years 2021 and 2022.
And they were the only stakeholders who took
such a position.
The same dynamic carried over into last Tuesday’s meeting.
Although there were far fewer comments
made overall, perhaps because many believed that, after adopting ecological
reference points in August, the ASMFC would act consistently, and adopt a
landings limit that was consistent with those reference points two months
later,
the only comments seeking to maintain the status quo, and not act in accord
with the reference points, came from the Menhaden Fisheries Coalition and from
the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association, which is a Coalition member.
Once again, the majority of the stakeholders who commented
were part of a broad coalition of anglers, conservation groups, and science
professionals who supported setting a landings limit with at least a 50 percent
probability of constraining harvest to or below the fishing mortality
target. The only ones who opposed such
action were either menhaden harvesters, menhaden processors, menhaden
wholesalers, or lobstermen who used menhaden as bait—in other words, were
people who, in one way or another profited from dead menhaden.
And while the memberships of such financially interested
parties isn’t small—the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association alone claims
1,800 members—the
organizations who supported managing to the fishing mortality target didn’t
have small memberships, either. They
included angling organizations such as the Coastal Conservation Association and
International Game Fish Association, trade groups such as the American
Sportfishing Association, American Saltwater Guides Association, and National
Marine Manufacturers Association, conservation organizations such as Wild
Oceans, the National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, Conservation
Law Foundation, Wildlife Conservation Society, The Nature Conservancy, and the
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership.
Thus, even when membership is taken into account, the number
of stakeholders who supported managing to the fishing mortality target far
outweighed the number who supported less effective management. Yet there was no concern about adopting a harvest limit that would "bring" that overwhelming majority of "stakeholders along."
Instead, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board opted to
support the menhaden industry’s short-term financial interests, rather than the
long-term interests of both the public and the Atlantic coast's ecosystems.
The only explanation for that is that the Atlantic Menhaden Management
Board doesn’t view all stakeholders equally, but instead favors those who profit
from a public resource, and elevates their concerns above those expressed by
everyone else.
That shouldn’t come as a surprise. ASMFC has a long history of elevating narrow,
short-term economic concerns above scientific advice, the health of fish stocks
or, as we see with menhaden, even ecosystem-wide concerns.
The failure to manage menhaden to the fishing mortality
reference point is just a new symptom of a very old problem, which manifested
itself when the ASMFC ignored
scientific advice with respect to the southern New England stock of American lobster
in 2010, permitted the now-collapsed northern shrimp
stock to be overfished through 2013, adopted a
2017 amendment to the tautog management plan that allowed overfishing to
continue in Long Island Sound until 2029 and, in
a chain of events stretching back to 2011, ignored both scientific advice and
the requirements of its own management plan to rebuild the striped bass spawning
stock, decisions that left
the stock both overfished and subject to overfishing at the end of 2017;
even now, the
weak measures adopted by its Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board a year ago
have only a 42 percent chance of returning fishing mortality to the target
level by the end of this year, partly because of concerns
to protect Maryland’s for-hire and commercial fishing fleets.
Some stakeholders truly are more equal than others in the
ASMFC’s eyes. Those who profit from harvested
fish, even when they constitute a very small minority of stakeholders, are and
have always been “more equal” than those concerned with the long-term welfare
of fish stocks.
That’s wrong.
And, one way or another, it needs to change.
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