Because so many different predator species depend, to a
greater or lesser degree, on Atlantic menhaden, it was practically impossible for
biologists to design a model that accounted for all predator species. Instead, because striped bass were the fish
species most dependent on menhaden, and because a menhaden population that
supported striped bass would be adequate to support the other predators, menhaden
managers used bass as a proxy, setting the target menhaden biomass at a level
that would support a striped bass population at its target abundance, and
setting the threshold menhaden biomass at the corresponding level that would
support a striped bass population that lay just at the threshold of becoming
overfished.
It seemed like a watershed in forage fish management, but as
I warned two months ago, the value of the ASMFC’s actions on menhaden can’t
really be judged by what the Management Board said it would do, managing
menhaden to the new target reference points, but must instead be evaluated
according to what the Management Board actually does when the
time comes to set new harvest limits for 2021.
On the morning of Tuesday, October 20, the ASMFC’s Atlantic
Menhaden Management Board will face that test:
Will it do what it had promised when it adopted the ecological reference
points two months ago, and manage menhaden as one of the most important forage
fish on the coast?
Or will it go back on its word to the public, ignore the
actions that it took late last August, and return to managing menhaden as if
it were just another industrial commodity, to be torn from the water, reduced
into fish meal and oils, which will be fed to chickens and used as feed in salmon
farms—themselves ecologically suspect—on the eastern Canadian coast?
Right now, I want to believe that the Management Board, which unanimously adopted ecological reference points less than ten weeks ago, is committed to that decision, and will set 2021 menhaden landings at a level that has at least a 50 percent probability of constraining such landings to the target level.
Right now, I’d bet that,
in the end, they’ll do the right thing.
But I’ll also admit that if I had to lay any real money on
the line, I wouldn’t be particularly comfortable about that wager.
Although the ecological reference points
have widespread support among anglers, academics, and the conservation community,
there are powerful industry forces that aren’t committed to their use. For example, after
ecological reference points were adopted last August, the Virginia-based Daily
Progress reported that
“The commercial fishing industry, which is dominated by
Virginia-based Omega Protein, is anxious to ensure that the catch limit for
Atlantic menhaden remains at its present level of 216,000 metric tons…
“In a letter sent to the ASMFC July 28, the Menhaden
Fisheries Coalition offered support for the ecological reference points ‘provided
they are considered and utilized flexibly.’
The members also in the same letter urged the board to consider
maintaining the status quo when it comes to catch limits.”
As readers of this blog ought to realize by now, when
people talk about “flexibility” in a fisheries management context, what they
mean is postponing, ignoring, or otherwise getting around science-based
management measures, in order to profit from larger short-term landings while
placing the long-term health of fish stock at risk.
That’s certainly true in this case.
The Menhaden Fisheries Coalition reportedly offered support
to the ecological reference points. Yet,
in
order to have at least a 50 percent probability of not exceeding the ecological
reference points’ fishing mortality target, 2021 menhaden harvest could not
exceed 176,800 metric tons, which would represent a 40,000 metric ton
reduction from the 2020 menhaden catch limit.
That’s where the flexibility comes in: The Coalition is willing to support the idea
of ecological reference points, so long as no one actually takes such reference points seriously
and applies them in a way that might meaningfully constrain landings.
That’s reflected in the
Coalition’s recent comments on the 2021 harvest limit where, in an impressive
bit of doubletalk, it says
“The Menhaden Fisheries Coalition has supported and continues
to support management of menhaden to maintain both the fishery itself (and
those who depend upon it) and the stock’s role in the ecosystem. More specifically, the Coalition supports the
use of current [ecological reference points] fishing mortality rate (F) target,
which the Board adopted at the August 2020 meeting.
“The primary issue facing the Board next week is the
trade-off in term of foregone allowable catch to marginally increase the
certainty with which the target will be achieved. For example, to get to a 50 percent
certainty, it would require nearly a 20 percent cut in menhaden [total annual catch]…we
do not believe the benefits of increased certainty outweigh the negative
impacts that would result…”
In other words, the Menhaden Fisheries Coalition supports
the ecological reference points, so long as no one actually uses them to manage the fishery.
That sort of comment could be expected from a trade association trying to protect its profits, and looking through the comments sent to the Management Board, represents what is clearly a minority view.
Unfortunately, the notion that managers
should ignore the target reference points was the majority view
of the ASMFC’s Atlantic Menhaden Advisory Panel, where seven out of the twelve
panel members commenting on the issue thought that the Management Board shouldn’t
try to constrain 2021 harvest to a level that would have at least a 50 percent chance of keeping
fishing mortality within the target.
Such
advisors made comments like
“Given the precautionary nature of previous [total annual
catch] decisions, which resulted in F below the ERP F target in recent years, a
risk of 66% of exceeding the ERP F target will not adversely impact the role
menhaden play in the environment.”
That is certainly an odd bit of logic, as the 2021 harvest
limit would be based on the current menhaden biomass, which already reflects any
benefits bestowed by “previous TAC decisions.”
And
“It is overly precautionary to set the TAC for menhaden
based on the risk of exceeding the ERP F target. For example, the federal risk policy for
setting an acceptable biological catch (ABC) is based on the risk of exceeding
the overfishing limit (OFL), a value akin to the ERP F threshold; status quo
has a 0% chance of exceeding the F threshold in both years,”
which is remarkable for throwing around a lot of loosely related fisheries management concepts in an attempt to prove a very dubious point.
If one wants to bring federal fisheries
management concepts into the debate, the most obvious candidate for mention—which
that commenter clearly ignored—was the concept of “optimum
yield,” which is defined in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act as
“the amount of fish which—will provide the greatest overall
benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and
recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of
marine ecosystems; is prescribed by such on the basis of maximum
sustained yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic,
social, or ecological factor; and in the case of an overfished
fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the
maximum sustainable yield from such fishery.
[emphasis added; internal formatting omitted]”
In light of that definition, it would seem clear that the ecological
reference point fishing mortality target for menhaden, which is intended to
protect marine ecosystems, and reduces landings from something closer to
maximum sustainable yield to landings optimized to address ecological factors, is
very probably equivalent to what “optimum yield” for menhaden would be under
the federal management system.
References to ABC and OFL, which are primarily concerned with
overfishing in a single-species, rather than ecosystem-based, management model,
are irrelevant to the discussion.
Even so, there is a high likelihood that at least some
members of the Management Board will prove sympathetic to such arguments,
particularly the argument that
“The TAC should remain status quo particularly during this
time of economic crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, harvest in 2020 will be well below
the TAC due to lost fishing opportunity thus providing another buffer to the
fishery.”
Various ASMFC management boards have, in the past, been
prone to elevate short-term economic concerns above the long-term health of
fish stocks, and it isn’t hard to envision some members of the Atlantic
Menhaden Management Board swayed by an argument rooted in the real economic
hardships caused by COVID-19. If the
majority of the Management Board feels that way, it’s easy to picture them supporting
the long-term health of the various Atlantic coastal ecosystems at greater risk
in order to increase economic returns to the handful of fishermen involved in
the large-scale menhaden harvest.
Hopefully, that won’t occur this time.
Hopefully, the majority of Management Board members, who
gave broad support to ecosystem reference points two months ago, will do so
again, and set a 2021 harvest limit no higher than the 176,800 metric tons that
will provide a 50 percent chance of achieving the management target.
For if they fail to do that, and instead ignore their own
recent management actions in order to please the industrial menhaden fleet,
they will not only throw away the most promising forage fish management action
seen in the United States to date. They
will have broken faith with a public who believed that the ASMFC had taken an
important and meaningful action, only to see it ignore the clear provisions of
a management plan once again.
No comments:
Post a Comment