“establish a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits in
the plan (including a multiyear plan), implementing regulations, or annual
specification, at a level such that overfishing does not occur in the fishery, including
measures to ensure accountability.
[emphasis added]”
Guidelines
issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service flesh out that statutory
mandate, saying
“[Accountability measures] are management controls to prevent
[annual catch limits], including sector [annual catch limits], from being
exceeded, and to correct or mitigate overages of the [annual catch limit] if
they occur. [Accountability measures] should
address and minimize both the frequency and magnitude of overages and correct
the problems that caused the overage in as short a time as possible…”
On the whole, NMFS has done a fairly good job of adopting
and enforcing accountability measures in commercial fisheries. Whether it is managing Atlantic
cod and other important northeastern groundfish, summer
flounder, scup, and black sea bass in the mid-Atlantic, or amberjack
in the southeast, the agency’s fishery management plans require that,
should the commercial sector exceed its annual catch limit, that sector must
repay the overage, on a pound-for-pound basis, in the next fishing year.
The repayment might be made on a fishery-wide, state,
seasonal, or other level, but regardless of how repayment occurs, commercial
fishermen are held very strictly accountable when they land more fish than they
are entitled to in any given year.
Recreational fishermen, on the other hand, are given far
more leeway. In many fisheries, mid-Atlantic
black sea bass being one of the clearest examples, both the Mid-Atlantic
Fishery Management Council and NMFS itself seem to be willing to find—or create—excuses
for chronic recreational overfishing, instead of holding the recreational
sector accountable for its actions.
In
recent years, anglers overfished their annual harvest limit by 84% in 2016
(admittedly, there seemed to be at least one major outlier in the data for that
year), 4% in 2018, and 56% in 2020, while falling 3% short of the recreational
harvest limit in 2017 and 5% below the limit in 2019. 2021
is not yet over, and final figures for this year will not be available for
another couple of months, but preliminary indications, based on landings
through August 31, suggest that 2021 recreational landings will again be well in
excess of the recreational harvest limit, even before dead discards are taken
into consideration.
“If biomass is above the target (B>BMSY): Adjustments to the recreational management
measures (bag, size, and seasonal limits) would be considered for the following
year, or as soon as possible once catch data are available. These adjustments would take into account the
performance of the measures and conditions that precipitated the overage.”
The average of landings for the years 2018-2020 exceeded the
average annual catch limits for those years, meaning that accountability
measures should be invoked for the 2022 season.
A
report of the most recent meeting of the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea
Bass Monitoring Committee, which suggests management measures to the
Mid-Atlantic Council, states that
“The [representative from NMFS’ Greater Atlantic Regional
Fisheries Office] on the [Monitoring Committee] said the regulations required a
change in the measures given that an Accountability Measure (AM) was triggered…”
“preferred no change in the measures given that biomass is
more than double the target and there are no concerning trends in recruitment
or other stock status indicators…the [Monitoring Committee’s] primary
recommendation was for status quo measures in 2022.”
If
NMFS insisted on a reduction in landings, the Monitoring Committee recommended
a 13% or 14% reduction, the former achieved through a ½-inch across-the-board
increase in the size limit, the latter by allowing the states to adopt
regulations that would achieve the required cut, even though such small
reduction would almost certainly assure that recreational catch would again
exceed the recreational catch limit in 2022.
Such recommendation by the Monitoring Committee marked the
third time in three years that the Committee recommended status quo monitoring
measures that it knew would lead anglers to exceed the applicable catch limits,
recommendations that have so far been followed by the Mid-Atlantic Council.
The commercial fishery has managed to stay within its quota
during those years, but it is very difficult to imagine that NMFS and the Mid-Atlantic
Council would have been similarly sanguine, and done nothing to address the
overage if the commercial fishing sector had exceeded its quota in even one
year, much less chronically exceeded its catch limit as the recreational sector
has done.
Down in the Gulf of Mexico, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council has been similarly reluctant to hold anglers accountable for
their chronic overharvest of red snapper.
“the instant case presents an even more striking disconnect
between the agency’s disconnect and the facts before it. The administrative record is replete with
references to a high degree of management uncertainty in the recreational sector,
as compared with the commercial sector…
“The court will not dictate precisely which accountability
measures NMFS should have required, or should require in the future. That decision is best left to the expertise
and discretion of the agency tasked with carrying out the statute…However,
Section 303(a)(15) would lose all teeth and coherence if NMFS, faced with
persistent overages and high management uncertainty, could claim compliance by
simply identifying any control that technically qualifies as an ‘accountability
measure.’ In this case, it is apparent
from the record that the existing scheme does not ‘ensure accountability’
within the meaning of section 303(a)(15).”
In
the end, the Gulf Council adopted a 20% buffer between the recreational annual
catch limit and a lower recreational catch target in an effort to prevent
recreational red snapper overharvest.
It is not difficult to understand that a similar buffer should be
adopted by the Mid-Atlantic Council as an accountability measure to address
management uncertainty in the recreational black sea bass fishery. However, to
date, the Mid-Atlantic Council has been steadfast in denying that any management
uncertainty exists in that fishery, despite its inability to constrain
recreational landings to the recreational harvest limit. Anglers have not been held in any way accountable
for their overages.
And even in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery, the
regional fishery management council has not
The
issue is particularly relevant in Mississippi and Alabama, states that,
according to the best available NMFS data, have grossly overfished their state
red snapper allocations. Overfishing has
been so severe that, after paying back their overages, neither state may have a
red snapper fishery in 2022. However,
the
Gulf Council was unwilling to acknowledge the NMFS data, and instead voted to
delay calibrating the state red snapper landings data with the federal Marine
Recreational Information Program. By
approving such delay, the Council effectively endorsed the state landings data,
which apparently underestimates recreational catch and provides the Council
with an excuse for not holding Alabama and Mississippi anglers accountable for
their overharvest.
At least in this case, unlike that
of mid-Atlantic black sea bass, NMFS
recognizes that the Gulf Council’s decision did not reflect the best available
scientific information, and there is still a chance that NMFS will
disapprove the Council’s failure to hold certain Gulf states accountable for
their recreational red snapper overages.
Still, the bias against
holding recreational fishermen accountable for exceeding their annual catch
limits remains strong.
Yet, if that remains a problem
within the regional fishery management councils, the problem is worse at the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, which has no legal obligation to
hold fishermen, including recreational fishermen, accountable when they exceed
their annual catch limits.
Thus, while commercial striped
bass fishermen who exceed their state quotas must repay overages on a
pound-for-pound basis in the next fishing year, no similar sanction effects the
recreational sector. Thus, when
2015 recreational landings in Maryland increased by more than 50%, instead of
being reduced by 20.5%, as called for in the management plan, Maryland
anglers suffered no consequences, and were allowed to keep overharvesting
striped bass until Addendum
VI to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management
Plan was adopted in the fall of 2019.
Science-based fishery
management measures are the key to rebuilding and maintaining the marine fishery
resources of the United States. Unless
fishermen are held accountable for exceeding the annual catch limits that are
an integral part of such management measures, it will be virtually impossible
to compel such fishermen to comply with the measures needed to maintain healthy
and sustainable fisheries. Yet, while
fishery managers usually seem more than willing to hold commercial fishermen
responsible for their overages, they are far more reluctant to hold recreational
fishermen equally responsible.
And that’s a mistake, particularly
when anglers often catch a larger percentage of various coastal species than
commercial fishermen do.
The only way to make fishery
regulations work is to hold all fishermen accountable for their
overages, and admit that a fish killed by a recreational fisherman is just as
dead as any fish landed by the commercial fleet.
Accountability measures work,
but only if they are imposed against everyone who exceeds their quotan of any
species of fish.
For accountability measures are
for everyone, and are not just for the commercial fleet.
No comments:
Post a Comment