We all know that, right now, striped bass aren’t in good shape. A recent stock assessment found them to be overfished, and the recruitment of new fish into the population isn’tgoing all that well.
There were big year classes in 2001 and 2003, but that was
two decades ago, and the survivors are dwindling fast, although if
you catch a high-40s or 50-plus fish, those two year classes are probably responsible.
Spawning was generally below average from 2004 to 2010. After that, there was a
big year class in 2011 that Amendment IV to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped
Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan was supposed to protect, but
for whatever reason, failed to do; the 2011s never recruited into the spawning
stock in the expected numbers, although there still seems to be fair numbers of
them around.
2012 saw the lowest Maryland juvenile abundance
index ever recorded. 2013 was better,
but far from good, 2014 just below average; 2015 produced a solid year class
that, while not as big as the 2011s, recruited into the stock in greater
numbers and arguably forms the current last, best hope for rebuilding the
spawning stock biomass.
Very slightly above-average year classes in 2017 and 2018—I tend to think of them as “strong average” given the statistical uncertainty and the fact that they’re only a couple of points above the average level—could provide the 2015s with an assist in rebuilding the stock if we don’t kill them off before they mature (both year classes can already be legally killed in the Chesapeake Bay).
On the other hand, 2016,2019, and 2020 produced dismally below-average abundance indices of 2.20, 3.37,and 2.48, respectively (the long-term average is around 11.6); the whispers I’m
hearing out of Maryland are suggesting that the 2021 numbers won’t be much, if
any better—we should know that for certain in a few days, when the numbers
ought to be released.
All of which means that, given the current age structure of
the population, if we lose the 2015s, the striped bass is probably screwed.
There are a lot of folks out there who realize that.
In supporting her motion, Ms. Ware stated
“While I don’t think we are at the place where the stock was
in the 1980s, at this point we have had five years of average or below average
recruitment.
“It is this repeated poor recruitment that got us in trouble
last time, so I think how we deal with this 2015-year class could be kind of
make or break on where this stock goes, and how successful we are in rebuilding…”
David Sikorski, Maryland’s Legislative Proxy, seconded Ms.
Ware’s motion. In doing so, he observed
“recent Addendum VI measures probably failed to meet reducing
fishing mortality on this 2015 stock, as implemented by all three [Chesapeake]
Bay jurisdictions.
“I really have the utmost concerns of the impact we’re
already having on these fish. I think
the best way to address this is to be laser focused on limiting fishing
mortality on these fish that are left in the system, recognizing that they hold
a lot of the hope for the future, as we all cross our fingers and hope that
2021 brings us brighter recruitment projections.”
It’s difficult to disagree with either Ms. Ware’s or Mr.
Sikorski’s comments. As Michael Armstrong,
the Massachusetts fishery manager, noted,
“we’ve got five-year classes locked and loaded, with nothing
behind 2014 [sic]. We have the 2015-year
class, and 2014 was not bad out of the Hudson.
That is all we’ve got to rebuild with.
You know we targeted that for [a fishing mortality rate of] 0.2, and we
never achieved it, so I’ve got to assume we didn’t hit it this time. We have to start doing draconian things to
get this stock back. That is the bottom
line, and so I support that.”
Of course, protecting the 2015s is easier said than
done.
The simple expedient of a 35-inch minimum size, originally one
of the options included in Addendum VI, would have accomplished that goal for a
few years, until the 2015s reached that size, at which point the current 28- to
35-inch slot limit might have been adopted to protect what would then have been
the older, larger females. By
adopting the slot limit for the 2020 season, just as the 2015s were approaching
28 inches in length, the Management Board placed a huge bullseye on the very
year class they must depend upon to rebuild the stock.
It’s unclear whether they will be able to change management
measures quickly enough to prevent severe damage to those fish.
Now, it’s up to the Management Board to decide which, if
any, of the PDT’s proposals to include in the draft Amendment 7 that will be
released for public comment, and which to include when the final version of the
Amendment is adopted, probably at next February’s Management Board meeting.
It’s possible that the Management Board will decide to abandon
any special protections for the 2015s, and just leave the current slot limit in
place, but I don’t expect that to happen.
I don’t think the real question is whether the Management Board will
adopt measures to protect the 2015s, but rather whether, if it adopts such
measures, they will be put in place soon enough to make any real difference.
The current thought is that Amendment 7 won’t be implemented
until 2023; that means that at least some portion of the 2015 year class will
have been bracketed by the 28- to 35-inch slot limit for three full fishing years,
2020-2022—and that doesn’t include earlier attrition that occurred in the Chesapeake
Bay, where immature females may be legally harvested, beginning when they’re
about two years old.
So by 2023, the 2015 year class will have been heavily
targeted for no less than five years. It’s
hard to say how many will remain when any Amendment 7 protections finally go
into effect.
The Management Board might make an exception for the 2015-specific management measures, and implement them a year earlier than the
rest of Amendment 7. However, the Board
is usually reluctant to implement measures mid-season, and any measures adopted
in February 2022 probably couldn’t be implemented by the states until April or
May, when the bass season along most of the coast is already well underway.
In addition, implementing new size limits, bag limits, or
seasons a year before any new restrictions on the use of conservation
equivalency go into effect would allow states like New Jersey and Maryland,
which typically seek advantage through the conservation equivalency process, to
undercut the 2015-specific measures with proposals designed to evade their full share of
the conservation burden.
Thus, the question of what happens if we get Amendment 7 wrong,
and we lose a large portion of the 2015 year class, looms large and real.
As Mr. Armstrong recognized in his statement quoted above, “We
have the 2015-year class, and 2014 was not bad out of the Hudson. That is all we’ve got to rebuild with.” If we lose the 2015s, rebuilding will become very, very difficult to achieve, unless some unexpectedly good year
classes emerge from the Chesapeake Bay.
That could happen.
But a continuing string of low recruitment years could happen, too, and
in fact has happened before.
From 1975 through 1988, the Maryland striped bass juvenileabundance index never rose above 8.45, well below the current long-termaverage, and bottomed out at 1.22. In an
exchange of thoughts with one of my management-savvy striped bass fishing friends, I commented that the years that teed up the stock collapse of the late
1970s and 1980s—that is, the recruitment decline between 1970 and 1975—bore an
uncomfortable resemblance to the last few years of recruitment, between 2015
and 2020.
From what I could remember at the time that I made the
comment, both periods saw a strong year class followed by a few near-average
year classes, before below-average recruitment.
But I said that based on memory. When I actually looked at the numbers, I
found that the last 6 years of recruitment in Maryland—which tends to be the bellwether
for striped bass abundance along the coast—was significantly worse
than it was in the early 1970s.
Although we have seen larger year classes since, the 1970
year class was, when it was produced, the largest ever seen on the striper coast,
with a value of 30.52. The next five years
saw the Maryland juvenile abundance index produce values of 11.77, 11.01, 8.92,
10.13, and 6.69, for a 6-year average of about 13.17. That’s actually above the current long-term
average of 11.6.
Of course, the ten years after that produced an average
juvenile abundance index of 4.26 and a stock collapse.
Comparing the early 1970s to the past six years, we begin
with another big year class in 2015, although with a juvenile index of 24.20,
the 2015 year class was about 20% smaller than 1970. The next five years saw juvenile abundance
indices of 2.20, 13.19, 14.78, 3.37, and 2.48, for a 6-year average of 10.04,
below both the long-term average and the average for the first six years of the
1970s.
That is an unsettling comparison.
At the same time, the management environment is very
different today than it was in 1975.
For one thing, there is now a formal, coastwide management
structure. The Management Board may not
be perfect, but it is far better than the management vacuum that existed forty-five
years ago, when state managers’ greatest concern was maintaining a level
playing field for their fishermen, an attitude that severely hampered the
adoption of needed regulation.
Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, there were no
commercial striped bass quotas, no limitations on who could sell fish (many so-called
“recreational” fishermen routinely did so, even in what were supposed to be “gamefish”
states), and no meaningful recreational regulations. The 1970 year class, which held out such
promise, was largely wiped out by the middle of the decade.
Current management measures should prevent the sort of wholesale
slaughter that went on back then.
At the same time, striped bass were under far less recreational fishing pressure than they are today. During the 1970s, there were plenty of winter flounder, tautog, weakfish, bluefish, and other inshore species to absorb fishing pressure, particularly pressure brought by those who wanted to take fish home to eat. Striped bass were not yet a panfish.
Charter boats had more
plentiful targets offshore, with cod still relatively abundant, pollock teeming
as far south as Block Island, and pelagic species such as mako sharks, white
and blue marlin, and the various tunas more available in more places than they currently
are.
So the two periods are not directly comparable.
Still, it’s clear that bass could be in serious trouble if
we lose the 2015s. There have been no
big year classes since, and even if we get a good one in 2022, such year class
won’t be fully recruited into the spawning stock until after the end of this
decade.
Thus, we must get Amendment 7 right.
The bass are running out of options.
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