Sunday, October 17, 2021

STRIPED BASS: HOW DID WE GET HERE (AGAIN)

 I’m not going to be very creative today.

The story of the striped bass, which went from stock collapse in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to a full recovery by 1995, to true abundance in the early 2000s, to becoming overfished again today is one that I, and many others, have told before.

Concerns unaddressed become problems; problems unaddressed grow larger and, if ignored long enough, become crises that threaten the health of the stock.

There is little point in me recounting that story once more, in my own words.

But it might be worthwhile to recount that tale, one more time, in the words of those responsible for the striped bass resource:  The scientists who are responsible for monitoring the stock, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, which is responsible for taking the scientists’ findings and using them to craft management measures that will maintain the health of the striped bass stock and ensure abundance for future generations.

Stories are best understood when told from the beginning, so this tale begins with some words from the ASMFC’s Interstate Fisheries Management Program Charter, which establishes the policies and procedures that apply to every fishery management plan, including that for striped bass.  In that regard, the Charter directs that

“Above all [a fishery management plan] must include conservation and management measures that ensure the long-term biological and productivity of fishery resources under management.  To this end, the Commission has adopted the following standards:

(1)             Conservation programs and management measures shall be designed to prevent overfishing and maintain over time, abundant, self-sustaining stocks of coastal fishery resources.  In cases where stocks have become depleted as a result of overfishing and/or other causes, such programs shall be designed to rebuild, restore, and subsequently maintain such stocks so as to assure their sustained availability in fishable abundance on a long-term basis.

(2)             Conservation programs and management measures shall be based on the best scientific information available…”

With those governing standards in mind, we can examine the public record, and see how well the Management Board discharged its duty to the striped bass and to the public in this twenty-first century.

All appeared well for the first few years.  The most recent benchmark stock assessment, released in 2019, tells us that 2001 and 2003 saw strong year classes produced in the Chesapeake Bay, and that spawning stock biomass steadily climbed steadily until 2003.  But after that, things began to head the wrong way.

The first flickers of concern about declining abundance appeared at the August 2008 Management Board meeting, when Terry Stockwell, a Maine fishery manager, voiced worries about increasing striped bass landings in response to a favorable stock assessment.

“While the stock overall appears to be doing very well, the catch in Northern New England this past year has been quite dismal.  In fact, there has been a multi-year in declining abundance altogether [sic], so I’m a little anxious about doing anything too aggressive.  You know, is this just a redistribution issue; I’m not sure.  The large fish are disappearing.  This year the schoolies have disappeared.  Before we open Pandora’s Box, at least from the northern end of the range, we would like to stay on course and see our way through this.”

If striped bass abundance was truly declining (as biologists later confirmed that it was), then Maine, at the northern extreme of the striped bass’ range, would be one of the first places to feel the effects.  But Mr. Stockwell’s concerns were casually dismissed by Management Board members such as Pat Augustine, the Governor’s Appointee from New York, who responded,

“…I’ve often asked the question as how many more striped bass do we have to have in the ocean and do the surplus, quote-quote, above the threshold—and there are some folks that are not going to like what I say, but the reality is what kind of damage are those fish doing to the sub-species below them, including the forage fish that other species are feeding on?

“…I know the Chesapeake Bay folks have spent many, many thousands of dollars and hours looking at the food chain for the striped bass and so on in the Chesapeake Bay, and they came up with some interesting results as to what they feed on, when they feed on them and so on.

“…The question that still remains open and unanswered is what are the extra fish over and beyond the threshold doing to the other sub-species?  I’m not trying to start a fight with anybody.  I’m just saying that it is a question.  Look at what happened to winter flounder.  We blame weather conditions and water conditions, lack of eelgrass, lack of phytoplankton, zooplankton, et cetera, on that end, yet what is eating them?...”

And based on that sort of logic, Mr. Stockwell’s early concerns about a decline in the stock were ignored.

At the next Management Board meeting, in October 2008, proposals were put on the table to liberalize recreational striped bass regulations in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, even if such liberalization was not necessarily in accord with the fishery management plan.  Dennis Abbott, the Legislative Appointee from New Hampshire, objected, saying

“…To me what is going on is, as I would term it, we’re dealing with striped bass management as becoming death by thousand cuts.  We keep adding little things to our management plan; we can do this in one place and we can do things in another place, and it doesn’t affect overfishing…

“Though I appreciate what Pennsylvania and Delaware are trying to do to have a better opportunity, we’re really going off the rails here.  When we adopted a coast-wide size limit of 28 inches and 18 inches for the producer areas, that is what we said but we keep weakening that.  I just think that it’s the wrong way to go because in a lot of circles people think that striped bass fishing is not as good as it was; and continuing as a management board to do these things is not going in the right direction.”

But Mr. Abbott’s early concerns were ignored, too.  Yet at the May 2009 Management Board meeting, there were indications that some of the concerns expressed were justified, and that the bass might just be facing a problem.

The exhibits presented at that meeting are not readily available.  However, some of the comments made make it clear what such exhibits revealed.  Douglas Grout, a New Hampshire fishery managers, observed such exhibits and noted

“…There was only one thing that surprised me here…I notice under the fishing mortality rates the only fishing mortality rates that result in either a level [spawning stock biomass] or age 8-plus or an increase is 0.25 or lower.

“I kind of expected the leveling, given that is pretty close to our target, that there would be [a fishing mortality rate of] 0.32, that we would see a leveling of the [spawning stock biomass] or age 8-plus, but clearly the analysis shows that at that level of fishing mortality there would be a rather significant decline in both of those…”

The fishing mortality target at the time, which would remain in place until the 2015 season, was 0.30. 

Dr. Desmond Kahn, speaking for the Atlantic Striped Bass Technical Committee, did not seem overly concerned by the issue raised by Mr. Grout.  He responded that

“…I share your surprise.  This was done by Gary Shepherd [of the Northeast Fisheries Science Center]…The thing that is kind of striking about the graph is that if you look the peak on this appears—it looks like about 2003.  Then we have seen a decline already through 2006, according to this.

“…I think it is something we’re going to explore further this summer.  I’d like to learn more about why this gives this appearance.  I can’t make a judgment as to whether it is totally accurate or not at this point…”

Of course, recent stock assessments have confirmed that the spawning stock biomass did, in fact, hit its peak in 2003, and then began a decline that lead to the stock being overfished today.  But despite the early warning of a possible problem, and some Management Board members expressing concerns over falling recreational catch, the Management Board was not particularly worried about the apparent decline, and so did nothing to intervene as the population began to wane.

Some were even loudly calling for an increase in commercial landings, with New York’s Mr. Augustine saying

“…We’re talking about there is a possible impact on the stock.  We think that there might be a lack or loss of big fish in certain waters, baits have changed, water temperatures have changed.  The bottom line is it seems like every time we put off making a hard decision and in this particular case a commercial sector happened on the short end of the stick, their bag limit of quota has increased once in the last five or seven years…

“So, the question is what are we protecting?  Are we protecting the fish so that recreational fishermen can continue to grow in terms of numbers and harvest their fair share of two fish per person or are we being fair and equitable allowing the commercial sector, which is a valid sector just as the recreational sector is in terms of what it brings to the economy—those people who don’t fish who like to eat striped bass want to be able to eat a fish off the marketplace.

“…Are we doing single-species management and by having an overabundance of striped bass in my mind are surplus, what is the negative effect those striped bass are having on fish down the food chain?

“We can’t blame all the demise of the winter flounder strictly on striped bass.  We say there are the birds, we say there’re the seals, but the bottom line is they are eating down the food chain.  Whether they’re porgies, black sea bass, it doesn’t matter what they are.  So, if in fact we’re going to try to keep our spawning stock biomass above that threshold, the question we have to answer is how far above that threshold?...”

While the commercial increase never occurred, the striped bass’ decline continued.

Finally, in 2011, biologists formally confirmed that the striped bass stock was facing future problems, when a stock assessment update informed the Management Board that

“Female [spawning stock biomass] will fall slightly below the threshold by 2017 under both [the average and the low] recruitment scenarios.”

 Knowing that the stock would become overfished within the next six years, the Management Board began to rouse itself, and initiated work on a addendum to the management plan that could have significantly reduced fishing mortality, and might have halted the stock’s decline.  However, at the November 2011 Management Board meeting, progress was halted.

Once again, New York’s Mr. Augustine took the offensive, saying, despite the conclusions of the 2011 assessment update,

“We’ve heard a lot of gnashing of teeth concerned about the actual status of the stock, and we, the board, have to take some serious action to prevent a variety of things happening, particularly mortality on the larger fish.  I know we’ve gone off on a venture here in the last couple of meetings saying that we’ve got to protect, got to protect, got to protect, and at the same time the reality of what you’ve presented is so starkingly black and white that the status of the stock is not in harm’s way.”

Dr. Jaime Geiger of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service effectively agreed, saying

“if I had to put it in a simplistic way, red light, yellow light, green light, we have a green light fishery with getting ready to enter possibly a yellow light phase.”

For him, the prediction of an overfished stock six years down the road didn’t merit more than that.

Tom Fote, Governor’s Appointee from New Jersey, clearly opposed reducing striped bass landings, saying

“how can I be a hypocrite and go out to my public in New Jersey and basically say, oh, by the way, we’ve been doing so great with striped bass and there really is no—we haven’t hit any of the triggers [for management action contained in Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass] and now I’m going to reduce your catch by 40 percent.”

Jim Gilmore, New York’s fishery manager, agreed that striped bass constituted a “green light fishery” and noted

“If we take action now of the magnitude that was recommended in this addendum, we are overmanaging this fishery and that’s one of the things we’ve got to start getting away from.  From anything that I’ve seen and read in all the reports, I think the fishery is in good shape and we really need to do nothing at this point.”

While Mr. Gilmore was concerned about “overmanaging” striped bass, it’s worth pointing out that, after going through many years of Management Board transcripts, no one has ever expressed concern that the Board might be “undermanaging” the resource, and not taking action when action was needed.

Still, there were voices at the November 2011 meeting that expressed concern for the striped bass.

Mr. Stockwell of Maine supported the possible landings reductions, saying

“I’ve been hearing a lot of good news today, but frankly I don’t hear any good news from the northern Gulf of Maine.  A number of our charterboat businesses have gone out of business.  Our recreational fishermen are not finding the fish.”

G. Ritchie White, New Hampshire’s Governor’s Appointee, concurred.

“…If there is a reasonable possibility that we will be overfishing in 2017 and 2018, I would much rather take a baby step now [and move forward with harvest reductions] than take some drastic action then.  Whether we need the 40 percent [reduction] or not, I’m not sure, but doing something at this point to slow down the mortality on a spawning stock biomass I think is important…”

Mr. Grout of New Hampshire also supported some sort of action.

“…Clearly we’re seeing a decline in the [spawning stock biomass]…what we’re looking at is under a low recruitment scenario there is a projection that by 2017 we’re going to be in that overfished condition.

“That is the line in the sand.  It’s not going below the target; it’s going below our established threshold here.  Even under average recruitment, which includes the good years, we’re going to be right at that threshold by that time.  The question to me here is do we want to get out ahead of this and prevent this from occurring and help us achieve our vision of healthy and sustainable stocks by 2015 or do we want to wait and react?”

The Management Board’s choice, by a vote of nine to six, was to wait and react to an impending crisis.

Their chance to do just that came only two years later, after the 2013 benchmark stock assessment reported conditions that tripped two of the management triggers in Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.  Those triggers, approved in 2003 by the Management Board, stated that

“If the Management Board determines that the fishing mortality target is exceeded in two consecutive years and the female spawning stock biomass falls below the target in either of those years, the Management Board must adjust the striped bass management program to reduce the fishing mortality rate to a level that is at or below the target within one year,”

and

“If the Management Board determines that the female spawning stock biomass falls below the target for two consecutive years and the fishing mortality rate exceeds the target in either of those years, the Management Board must adjust the striped bass management program to rebuild the biomass to a level that is at or above the target within [no more than ten years].”

The Management Board’s duty was clear, and to its credit, it began work on an addendum to the management plan that would, at least partially, address the management triggers.  But that doesn’t mean that everyone agreed.  Tom Fote of New Jersey opposed any additional conservation measures, saying

“It seems I’ve been here over the years doing the same thing.  We have been looking at some figures for a period of time and then decided we’re going to do a drastic cut.  Two years later they’re finding out that we didn’t need the drastic cuts and had to change the regulations in New Jersey again…

“I’m really concerned to do this in such a fast-track method when it has such an impact on the people involved that basically harvest these fish and the industry is there.  We’re not doing any social and economic impact of what will happen going from two fish to one fish.  As I said, I look at these figures and I don’t see the sky falling.

“I see that we’re coming to where we have decided where a threshold will be and then we’re getting close to that line, but we’re not under that line.  It is not overfished and overfishing is not taking place.  People have been pushing for closing this or doing something.  The people that basically send the emails are the people who want to do that.  The people that are out fishing a lot times, which are a majority of the fishermen that I go around and talk to, they’re not ready to jump through this type of hoop.  I really think we have some real concerns here.”

But this time, folks like Mr. Fote were in the minority.  As Mr. White of New Hampshire observed,

“I’m hearing from a lot of constituents; and I’m hearing terms like ‘collapse’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘you’re going to manage this like Atlantic cod’…”

Pat Kelliher, the Maine fisheries manager, said that

“The trends are very disturbing with this fishery.  Mr. Fote’s comments about Maine having a good year this year, I’m not sure if you have fished there but I did and it was still below average compared to what it has been in years past.”

Given such sentiments, an addendum to reduce harvest was begun.  However, it didn’t take long before people began looking for ways to undercut the management triggers on which the addendum was based.  While most such efforts failed, it was the ASMFC staff, rather than members of the management board, that managed to successfully circumvent Amendment 6’s requirement that the stock be rebuilt within no more than ten years.

Michael Waine, then the ASMFC’s fishery management plan coordinator for striped bass, explained it this way at the August 2014 Management Board meeting:

“Management trigger 2 [sic] in Amendment 6 says that you have to rebuild [spawning stock biomass] back to its target over a specified timeframe that should not exceed ten years.  I think there is sort of a combination of things happening.  The board is acting to reduce [fishing mortality].  Through that action we see projections showing that [spawning stock biomass] will start increasing towards its target, but we’re uncomfortable with projecting out far enough to tell you when it will reach its target biomass because the further on the projections we go the more uncertainty that is involved.  Therefore, I think the trend is to go back toward the target, but we can’t tell you exactly how quickly that will happen.”

As a result, no rebuilding plan was ever put in place, although fishing mortality was, for a while, reduced to target.  Yet the ink was barely dry on the new addendum before Michael Luisi, fishery manager from Maryland, tried to again increase fishing mortality at the November 2015 Management Board meeting.

“…I think some people—I know a lot of my stakeholders are under the impression that this addendum was a one-year plan to get the fishing mortality to the target and they’re expecting that there be some consideration of relief.

“There has been a great deal of hardship in Maryland.  The commercial charterboat captains have gone out of business as a result of the actions that have been taken.  I would like to have it on the record, Mr. Chairman, in your opinion when will the shareholders have an opportunity and when will this board have an opportunity to look at making management change for the future or are we just expecting to hold the line where we are indefinitely into the future?”

In retrospect, Mr. Luisi’s words seem more than a little ironic, as it turns out that Maryland was experiencing no sacrifices at all.  When the impacts of the management measures adopted in 2014 were analyzed, it turned out that instead of achieving a 20.5% reduction in recreational landings, as required by the new addendum to the management plan, Maryland anglers actually enjoyed more than a 50% increase in the number of striped bass killed.

Even so,  Mr. Luisi tried to further increase the striped bass kill.  Because the 2015 fishing mortality rate was calculated to be 0.16, just a statistically insignificant 0.02 below the target of 0.18, he argued at the October 2016 Management Board meeting that

“if we were to move from 0.16 to 0.18, it would be a small tick, maybe a 5 to 8 percent liberalization, in terms of numbers.  Maybe that’s what it would be…But what I’m thinking about and what I’m looking at, is the fact that perhaps just that very small change could be something that saves a few of the fishermen in my state.

“A half an inch in minimum size could mean a lot to our fleets, our charterboat and recreational fleet; more so the charterboat community…”

For a while, the Management Board seemed inclined to go along with his request; it even initiated a new addendum to increase striped bass landings.  However, in the end, such addendum was not approved.  Still, Mr. Luisi was not done trying to maximize striped bass landings. 

Ms. Nichole Lengyel presented the Technical Committee report at the February 2017 Management Board meeting, at which she noted that

“preliminary 2016 removals were estimated at 3.6 million fish.  This is an 18 percent increase from 2015.  Keep in mind these are just preliminary estimates; they could increase when they become final…

“…2016 removals are likely an underestimate…”

Dr. Katie Drew, the Technical Committee Chair, followed up with a comment that

“[the data] is suggesting that if we did the update in 2016 with 2016 data, it would suggest that we were above the [fishing mortality] target in 2016…

“We are forecasting that if you took the same level of removals out that you took in 2016, you would most likely be above target again in 2017.”

At that point, the same Mr. Luisi who had just attempted to increase landings based on the ephemeral difference between a fishing mortality rate of 0.16 and one of 0.18 said

“I just want to make sure it’s clear that there is no plan right now to do a 2016 or 2017 assessment, which will give us more certain values for the 2016 [fishing mortality rate] as it relates to coastwide harvest.”

Clearly, he far preferred relying on the 2015 data, which probably understated landings, than the updated and likely more accurate landings data from the two following years.

And so things remained at the status quo until a new benchmark stock assessment, released in 2019, found the stock to be both overfished and subject to overfishing.  Once again, the Management Board chose to address the problem by reducing fishing mortality to the target level, but ignoring the requirement to initiate a 10-year rebuilding plan.

But the story of the striped bass continues today, when the stock remains overfished, and recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay, the single most important producer of striped bass, has been dismally low for the past three years.

On Wednesday, the Management Board will meet again, to write the next chapter in the continuing saga.  In doing so, they have a choice:  They can act decisively, and take the actions most likely to rebuild the bass stock, and keep it healthy in the future.

Or, they can reprise the past, and dither, and further delay, while the bass stock suffers for their inaction.

Those words, we’ve read before.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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