STRIPED BASS AMENDMENT 7: SO DO WE AGREE, AT LEAST ON THE KEY POINTS?

 The Striped Bass Amendment 7 process is moving forward. 

By now, we’ve largely figured out what issues the Public Information Document For Amendment 7 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass (PID) is asking us to address, and most of us have also figured out which of those issues is most important to the bass, and what direction Amendment 7 ought to take.

A few public hearings have already been held (if you want to know when a hearing will be held in your state, you can find it in a schedule on the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s website), and some recreational fishing organizations have published their positions, so this is a good time to call a brief halt and evaluate where things stand right now, to provide some understanding of how the striped bass might fare in the upcoming debate.

Right now, it looks like recreational fishermen, and the more involved recreational fishing organizations, are more-or-less on the same page.  Some are standing staunchly on the center crease, while one is edging a bit too close to the margins, but none have taken up a position so far from the center that they can be deemed opposition, although I suspect that might change when some industry voices from New York, New Jersey and Maryland begin to chime in.

But right now, it looks like most people and organizations are, to a greater or lesser degree, putting the needs of the striped bass first.  I didn’t get a chance to listen to any of the hearings that have been held so far, in New Hampshire, Maine, and Virginia, but from what I’ve been told, the public comment generally supported the striper, particularly in northern New England, where a strong conservation ethic has long prevailed.  I have only received a couple of reports from Virginia, but from what I’m hearing, anglers were also supporting conservation-oriented measures there.

The various angling-related organizations are also generally staking out pro-bass positions, particularly on the goals and objectives of the management plan and the biological reference points.  In that regard, the American Saltwater Guides Association’s commented that

“We believe that the current goals and objectives of the Atlantic Striped Bass [Fishery Management Plan], as stated in Amendment 6 [to that plan], continue to be appropriate for striped bass management.  A robust spawning stock characterized by a broad age structure is critical for reducing recruitment variability for a species whose spawning success largely depends on favorable environmental conditions.  Such a diversity of age classes promotes long-term stock health and stability, which in turn supports the health and stability of commercial and recreational fisheries…”

With respect to the biological reference points, the Guides’ Association said that

“…We continue to believe that 1995 is an appropriate reference year [on which to base the spawning stock biomass target and threshold] given the abundance and broad age structure of the striped bass population at that time, in accordance with Amendment 6’s goals and objectives…”

The Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership's postion was similar, saying, in part, that

“The number one priority of Amendment 7 should be to restore and maintain an age structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long-term abundance of striped bass populations…

“The current biomass reference points are based on verifiable observation and represent the best science currently available.  There are no viable model-based alternatives available to managers at this time, and potential replacements for the current reference points are restricted by data and modeling limitations.  Modifying the reference points has no scientific basis and it is inappropriate to weaken the standards without any new science to support the change…”

Coastal Conservation Association Maryland, which is probably reflecting the position of most or all of the CCA’s few chapters on the striper coast, and the American Sportfishing Association, which represents the fishing tackle industry, were generally on the same page, but hedged their comments to some degree.

CCA Maryland, for example, said that the ASMFC should

“Manage striped bass as primarily a recreational fishery, which means manage them for increased abundance and age structure,”

retain the current biological reference points, and

“Focus on maintaining fishing mortality to rebuild the stock and avoid future declines in the population.”

But it also starts getting into “cut the baby in half” territory with recommendations that the ASMFC also

“Balance the needs of catch and release anglers with those who like to take a fish home.”

and

“Stabilize the fishery with regulatory consistency across space and time.”

Those are troubling comments because the “needs” that Amendment 7 ought to be concerned with are the needs of the striped bass--setting reference points that will maintain abundance and a broad age structure, and best assure the long-term health of the stock.  For in the end, striped bass anglers don’t have “needs,” they have desires.  No catch-and-release angler needs to catch a bass; no bass angler needs to take a fish home.

When managers start giving equal weight to fishermen’s desires and the needs of the resource, and trying to manage for both, they usually fail to achieve either goal.  Instead, all should learn from the words of the late Art Neumann, founder of Trout Unlimited, who said

“Take care of the fish, and the fishing will take care of itself.”

Beyond that, the CCA Maryland position is internally inconsistent.  On one hand, it recommends that the striped bass stock be managed for abundance and a broad age structure, and states that that the ASMFC should focus on maintaining fishing mortality and avoid further population declines.  But on the other hand, it supports the notion that the fishery—and not the striped bass stock—be stabilized with “regulatory consistency across…time.”

Those suggestions embrace conflicting approaches to striped bass management. 

To successfully manage for abundance and age structure, maintain fishing mortality, and avoid population decline, managers must stand ready to change regulations, as and whenever needed, when fishing mortality gets too high or abundance begins to drop.

On the other hand, to maintain regulatory consistency over time, managers must ignore increases in fishing mortality or decreases in abundance, and maintain consistent regulations until the problem gets so bad that it can no longer be ignored.

We saw that happen in November 2011, when the management board decided that reducing landings, in response to a stock assessment update that warned the stock would be overfished within six years, constituted “overmanaging” because striped bass fishery was still “a green light fishery” and hadn’t run into serious problems yet.

We can see, to our sorrow, where such “regulatory consistency over time” got us today…

The same comments that apply to CCA’s Maryland’s position also apply to the position taken by the American Sportfishing Association, although ASA hedges its bets even more.  While it acknowledges that

“The current goals and objectives of Amendment 6 (outlined in the PID) provide a strong foundation for striped bass management,”

and states that

“We support the current [biological reference points] because they are adequate to achieve the current fishery goals and objectives,”

it also includes the two problematic recommendations made by CCA Maryland, and adds a third, that the ASMFC

“Achieve the conservation goals while still allowing sustainable fishing access.”

“Access,” of course, is one of those undefined weasel words that can be used to disguise its intended meaning.  

To surfcasters in the northeast, “access” means the ability to drive their vehicles on, and fish from, the beach and other shorelines.  To most bass fishermen, it means the ability to utilize—to fish for—the striped bass resource.  But based extensive comments made by the American Sportfishing Association with respect to the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery, “access” has a different, and quite specific meaning to ASA—the ability to not only fish for, but to retain, the fish in question.

So what they’re really talking about is splitting the baby again, supporting meaningful conservation while also killing—who knows how many, but judging from the red snapper debate, probably quite a few—striped bass.

At this rate, that poor baby won’t just be split in half; it’s likely to end up in quarters…

That doesn’t mean that there’s anything wrong with taking a bass or two home, so long as it’s done correctly:  First, managers figure out what regulations the bass need, to keep the stock healthy in the long term.  Then, they consider the inevitable release mortality.  Only after that’s done, should they calculate how much of the rest goes to harvest.

Approach things that way, rebuilding biomass to the target, and there will ultimately be plenty of fish available to put in folks’ coolers.

The other key issues, management triggers and rebuilding times, see the same sort of disparity between the organizations.

The Guides Association supports most of the current management triggers, which require action within one year when overfishing either looms or too much fishing mortality coincides with a drop in abundance, and instituting a 10-year rebuilding plan when biomass drops and the stock either becomes overfished or the biomass falls below target while fishing mortality rises too far.  However, the Association does recommend revisiting the recruitment trigger, which sets the bar for poor recruitment so low that it has never been tripped, and even if it had been, does not compel management action.

With respect to the rebuilding timeline, the Guides Association clearly states that

“We strongly believe that the 10-year rebuilding timeline currently specified in Amendment 6 should be maintained.  A longer rebuilding timeline would not only extend the period during which the stock is not at the target level, but would also inject greater uncertainty regarding the outcome of the rebuilding process.”

That latter concern is well-rooted in history, for after the 2013 benchmark stock assessment triggered the 10-year rebuilding requirement, the management board took no action, on the advice of then-fishery management plan coordinator Michael Waine, who advised that a 10-year rebuild involved too much uncertainty, and that the stock would eventually recover just from a reduced fishing mortality rate.

For the record, the stock didn’t rebuild, and instead went the other way.  It seems that there was too much uncertainty involved with not setting a 10-year deadline, too.

The management board shouldn’t be allowed to make that mistake again.

The Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership’s position on triggers and rebuilding is in harmony with that of the Guides Association; it simply states that

“The management triggers and rebuilding timelines are consistent with the biological understanding of the species and should be maintained.”

Like the Guides Association, the TRCP believes that the recruitment trigger should be revised.

Again, when we get to CCA Maryland and the ASA, we see similar basic positions, but we see more hedging, too.

CCA Maryland states that

“Management should focus on a set of triggers that recognize a decline in abundance that so that [sic] corrective action could be taken,”

and would like to see the ASA

“Utilize a 10-year rebuilding plan that focuses on maintaining [fishing mortality] at its target level.”

In those regards, it is in line with the Guides Association and TRCP.  But then the hedges start.

CCA Maryland endorses “the value of regulatory stability” again, and suggests that the ASMFC should

“Allow for flexibility in the rebuilding timeline if the Technical Committee determines that factors other than [fishing mortality] have contributed to a slow recovery for striped bass.”

Unfortunately, granting such “flexibility” to the management board is like handing a fifth of Scotch to a hard-core alcoholic, and expecting him to take one--and only one--small sip.  Given the opportunity, the management board would always find that there was always a factor “other than” fishing mortality that “contributed,” at least a little, to slow striped bass recovery, and would use the “flexibility” provided to set a recovery date that falls somewhere between “eventually” and “never.”

Given the management board’s track record, that is, sadly, not an exaggeration.

At the same time, there is good reason for CCA Maryland’s concerns.  As it noted,

“Beginning in the late 2000s, striped bass have undergone a prolonged period of below average recruitment, which is one of the primary reasons we are in the predicament we are in today.”

That’s very true.  Fishery managers can only control fishing mortality; they can’t control striped bass spawning success.

But where CCA Maryland goes astray is in the conclusions that it draws from that fact, believing that

“It will be difficult if not impossible for striped bass to rebuild to the current [spawning stock biomass] target level if the below average recruitment regime continues...”

History shows us why that statement is probably wrong.

When the striped bass collapsed in the late 1970s, recruitment levels fell through the floor.  From 1975 through 1988, the Maryland juvenile striped bass abundance index, probably the best gauge of striped bass recruitment, ranged between 1.22 and 8.45, compared to a long-term average of 11.7; it only rose above 5 twice, 1n 1975 and again in 1982.  Yet fishery managers, relying on the relatively healthy 1982 year class (8.45), adopted Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass late in 1985, and were able to rebuild the then-collapsed stock back to health by 1995—within 10 years.

Their success was remarkable, given how little they had to work with.  

According to the 2109 benchmark stock assessment, most striped bass mature when approximately 6 years old, with some not maturing until the age of 8.  That means that the youngest striped bass to be included in the 1995 spawning stock were from the 1989 year class, which returned a relatively high 25.20 in the Maryland juvenile index.  Yet 1989 was an exceptional year, and it takes more than one year class to make a successful recovery.  The 10-year average for the years 1980-1989, which included the all-important 1982 year class, was a little under 5.70—less than half of the current long-term average.

But the stock was rebuilt despite that.

We can’t know when, or if, the ASMFC will ever initiate a striped bass rebuilding plan, and we have no way of knowing what recruitment will be in then future.  Yet if we look at the past 10 years of spawning success, which includes the lowest Maryland JAI index ever recorded, we find that managers now have a lot more to work with than they did the last time that they managed to successfully rebuild the stock.

The years between 2011 and 2020 saw both very good and very bad recruitment occur, with Maryland JAI ranging from 0.89 in 2012 to 34.58 in 2011.  There were six years when the JAI exceeded 5, five years when it exceeded 10, and four years when it exceeded the long-term average; the 10-year average of the most recent JAI figures is 11.25—just slightly below the average recruitment figure.

While there is no guarantee that recruitment over the next ten years will resemble that of the past decade, it’s clear that if rebuilding began now, managers would have far more to work with than they had in 1985, and should be able to more than duplicate their previous 10-year rebuilding success.

There is no reason to believe that a rebuilding delay—“flexibility”—would be needed.

Still, the last time the stock was rebuilt, it was only to threshold, not to the target, which is 25 percent higher.  So what about CCA Maryland’s question”

“what happens when managers have maintained [fishing mortality] at the target level for 10 years and the stock does not rebuild?”

The answer to that question is very, very simple:  While the fishing mortality target ought to be able to sustain the spawning stock biomass at or around its target level, in order to rebuild the spawning stock within ten years, the fishing mortality rate will probably have to be a little lower.  It’s hard to predict what that rate would be, but it will almost certainly be necessary to forego a little more yield, compared to yield at the fishing mortality target, in order to get rebuilding done in time.

But it can be done.  It will only take the moral and political courage to make hard decisions to get then job done.  No “flexibility” would be required.

Again, the American Sportfishing Association’s comments parallel CCA Maryland’s, and then add a few quirks that make them a bit worse.  In this case, ASA claims that

“Finding a balance between being precautionary to ensure a healthy population and while also maintaining stability in the fishery is the sweet spot for management triggers.”

In doing so, the ASA seems to suggest that “stability in the fishery” somehow conflicts with, and needs to be balanced with, ensuring a healthy striped bass population.  Nothing is further from the truth.  If one wants to maintain a stable striped bass fishery, one must first maintain, to the extent possible, a stable striped bass population, even if that means changing the regulations on a regular basis to ensure stock health.

Even a cursory examination of Marine Recreational Information Program data will demonstrate that angler effort is directly tied to striped bass abundance; more anglers fish, and anglers fish more often, when there are a lot of fish around to catch.  Between the years of 1995 and 2014, recreational striped bass regulations remained largely unchanged, with a 2-fish bag limit and 28-inch minimum size, yet angling effort varied widely throughout the period, in direct response to the abundance of striped bass, and to the abundance of larger individuals. 

The goal of “stability in the fishery,” and the goal of a healthy striped bass stock are complimenbtary; a healthy and abundant striped bass stock is likely to stabilize angler effort at a relatively high level, maximizing both recreational opportunity and the economic benefits to the ASA’s members, even if regulations need to change a bit in order to keep abundance near target.

But after those comments about stability came the big kicker, which was not only the worst of the ASA’s ideas, but the worst of any Amendment 7 proposal that I’ve heard up to now:

“Consider stocking of hatchery-raised fish from wild brood stock in major producer areas if recruitment continues to be poor.”

Hatcheries don't provide the solution to any of the problems facing the striped bass.  In the end, they represent nothing less than an tacit admission that fishery management has failed.  

While fish hatcheries have existed in the United States for more than 150 years, there is little or no evidence that such hatcheries, created to allow fishing to continue after a fish stock became depleted, has ever successfully restored a wild fish population to sustainable levels of abundance.  In the Pacific Northwest, where salmon have been heavily stocked for more than a century, many runs of salmon, despite such stocking, are at historically low levels of abundance, and are listed under the federal Endangered Species Act.

Instead, hatcheries have proven to be an excuse to abandon serious management efforts, replace natural reproduction with industrial-scale fish production, all to justify harvest levels far beyond what a natural stock could sustain.  Natural fish populations are forced to compete with hatchery fish that are less fit to live in the wild, but nonetheless take up resources—both food resources and essential feeding, spawning, and nursery habitat—that wild fish need.

And there is a difference between wild fish and hatchery fish from wild brood stock.  Research with steelhead (sea-run rainbow) trout has demonstrated that gene expression in even the first generation of hatchery fish differs from that in their naturally-spawned parents.  In that study, the expression of genes affecting wound healing, immunity and metabolism all changed from those in wild-spawned fish, possibly because the crowded conditions in the hatchery require different genetic responses.

The fish were already becoming more domesticated, and less suited to the wild.

There is still more than enough time to rebuild striped bass without the need for hatcheries; should things ever start getting so bad that hatcheries might be required, a moratorium on all striped bass fishing ought to be imposed before artificially produced fish are even considered.  Hatcheries should be, and remain, the management measure of last resort, and should never be a tool used to avoid making difficult conservation decisions.

And that bad idea probably provides a good place to end.  There are five other topics in the PID, but this essay has already run too long.  We’ve already looked at the issues that matter most.

The good news—and it is good news—is that on the key issues of goals and objectives, biological reference points, management triggers and rebuilding times, there is widespread, essential agreement on the need to maintain a broad age structure and high striped bass abundance, to retain the current reference points, to employ effective management triggers and to try to rebuild the stock within ten years.

The bad news is that some folks still don’t understand that Mother Nature can’t compromise, and that when managers seek to strike some sort of balance between the needs of the fish and the wants of the fishermen, the fish—and in time, the fishermen, too—will always lose.

Let’s just hope that, going into Amendment 7, the good news wins out.

 

STRIPED BASS MANAGEMENT DEMOSTRATES WHY STAKEHOLDERS ARE "LOSING FAITH" IN THE ASMFC

 

Striped bass are one of the United States’ most important recreational fish. Between 2010 and 2019, anglers landed more striped bass (measured in pounds) than any other saltwater fish.

 

The bass has paid for its popularity. A benchmark stock assessment released in April 2019 found that female spawning stock biomass (SSB) had fallen so low that the stock has become overfished. It also found that fishermen were still removing too many bass from the water, subjecting the stock to continued overfishing.

 

The benchmark assessment’s findings seemed to catch some state fishery managers by surprise. But they didn’t surprise striped bass anglers, some of whom had spent the past decade trying to convince the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board to take steps to reverse the species’ decline.

However, the management board showed no inclination to do so. Over the past decade, it has been given repeated warnings that the SSB was in decline, and that the striped bass stock was headed for trouble. Yet each time, the management board has opted to either do nothing, or to take indifferent action that fell far short of what was needed to rebuild the stock, even when rebuilding was explicitly required in the striped bass management.

 

Its long history of ineffective management culminated in 2019 when, after learning that the striped bass stock was both overfished and experiencing overfishing, the management board adopted an addendum to the striped bass management plan that it knew was more likely to fail than to succeed in reducing fishing mortality to its target level. At the same time, the management board, for the second time in just five years, ignored its clear obligation to initiate a 10-year rebuilding plan.

 

The management board has now embarked on a path that will end in the adoption of a new amendment, Amendment 7, to its striped bass management plan. Given the importance of the striped bass fishery, and the fact that the striped bass stock is now overfished, we can only hope that the management board will do everything in its power to ensure that the new amendment, when finally adopted, will promote the long-term health and sustainability of the striped bass stock.

That may be expecting too much from the management board.

For when the Public Information Document For Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass (PID), which seeks public comment on the direction that Amendment 7 should take, was released, we learned that the rebuilding the SSB and achieving sustainable fishing mortality levels were not among the management board’s highest priorities. In fact, those two pillars of competent fisheries management didn’t appear to be priorities at all.

 

Instead, the PID informs readers that “The [Management] Board identified management stability, flexibility, and regulatory consistency as guiding themes for future striped bass management.”

That’s troubling, for the management board’s past embrace of two of those favored “themes,” management stability and flexibility, only accelerated the SSB’s decline.

Yet the management board seems eager to double down on its flawed approach to striped bass management. The PID includes statements like “the shorter timetables for corrective action [in the current management plan] are in conflict with the desire for management stability,” and “a quota-based management approach conflicts with the stated objective of management stability for the fishery.”

Yet PID doesn’t comment on far more important questions: Would shorter timetables for corrective action and a quota-based management approach allow more effective management of the striped bass stock? Would such management measures make it easier to rebuild the SSB, prevent overfishing, and keep the stock from being overfished again?

After all, the primary job of the management board is to protect the long-term health and sustainability of the striped bass stock. Subordinating that obligation to a bureaucratic ideal like management stability is a clear dereliction of the management board’s duty to both the public and to the striped bass resource.

History teaches us how that works out.

In November 2011, the management board failed to reduce fishing mortality after a stock assessment update warned that striped bass would become overfished by 2017. Believing that the SSB was still above the biomass target, it declared striped bass to be a “green light fishery,” decided that any action taken to avert future problems would constitute “overmanaging,” and opted for stability.

 

If the management board had instead taken decisive action when the stock was still healthy instead of waiting for things to get worse, the striped bass might not be overfished today.

History teaches us about “flexibility,” too.

A “Work Group” report, which guided the PID drafting process, explained

 

Some [Work Group members] felt that incorporating more flexibility into the management triggers [that require Management Board action] could give managers the ability to make adjustments that make sense while still being accountable for their management actions. For example…there is a 1-year response [requiring the Management Board to take action] for exceeding the F-threshold [and overfishing the striped bass stock]…Some stakeholders support the 1-year requirement for change while others believe that it promotes ‘knee-jerk’ reactions that may not always be necessary. It was discussed that there could be a goal to find balance that promotes conservation while also considering the impacts that changes in regulation have on commercial and recreational industries.

Incorporating that sort of “flexibility” into Amendment 7 would merely reinforce the management board’s inclination to do nothing when problems that threaten the striped bass stock first arise, and can most easily be addressed.

Even without a formal endorsement of “flexible” striped bass management, the management board ignored its clear obligation to initiate a 10-year rebuilding plan in 2014, when the SSB was in steep decline, and again in 2019, when it became overfished. Given the management board’s track record of inaction when the bass stock is threatened, it’s daunting to contemplate how little they’d do if such inaction was explicitly condoned in Amendment 7.

 

The management board’s long history of inaction renders its fixation on making management stability and flexibility the focus of Amendment 7 difficult to understand. A quarter-century ago, the striped bass stock was declared fully recovered; recreational management measures that included a 2-fish bag limit and 28-inch minimum size for the coastal fishery, and complimentary measures for nursery areas such as the Hudson River and Chesapeake Bay, were adopted. Since then, recreational management measures were only changed twice.

The first change came in 2014, in response to a stock assessment that found the SSB in decline. The second came in 2019, after the stock was declared overfished. Two changes over the course of twenty-five years, both in response to clear and present threats to the health of the stock, hardly justify such a focus on stability and inaction, instead of rebuilding the SSB.

If the management board was governed by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), as federal fishery managers are, such issues would never arise, as MSA elevates the health and sustainability of fish stocks above all other concerns.

 

Pursuant to MSA, managers must “develop annual catch limits…that may not exceed the fishing level recommendations of its scientific and statistical committee;” thus, such limits are set by scientists, not by the amateur fishery managers who dominate the management board. If fishermen exceed those limits in any given year, MSA holds them accountable for doing so.

 

Had striped bass been managed pursuant to MSA back in 2011, it’s very likely that the management board’s scientific advisors would have set a lower annual catch limit, and so reduced fishing mortality to prevent the stock from becoming overfished. The management board would have been unable to idly sit by and observe the SSB’s decline.

And had bass been managed pursuant to MSA in 2014, when the management board, finally recognizing the need to reduce fishing mortality, adopted Addendum IV to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan (Addendum IV), the management board would not have been able to just sit on its hands and watch when state regulations failed to adequately constrain fishermen’s landings.

 

That would have made a particular difference in Maryland where anglers, instead of reducing their fishing mortality by 20.5 percent, increased it substantially. Instead of landing 570,000 fish each year, as contemplated by Addendum IV, they took home far more in every year between 2015 and 2019, reaching a high of over 1,500,000 striped bass in 2016.

 

The management board knew that, yet did nothing. Instead of holding Maryland anglers accountable, it opted for management stability, and allowed such excessive harvests to continue, while the SSB continued to decline. Had MSA applied, Maryland anglers would have been held accountable for their excesses. At the least, state regulations would have been changed to adequately constrain anglers’ future landings, but pound-for-pound paybacks might also have been in the cards.

If striped bass were managed pursuant to MSA back in 2014, the Atlantic State Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) might also have found itself in court. The ASMFC’s striped bass management plan clearly states that, when the SSB falls below target for two or more years, and fishing mortality also rises above its target level, “the Management Board must adjust the striped bass management program to rebuild the biomass to a level that is at or above the target [emphasis added]” in no more than 10 years. Such management trigger was tripped in 2014, but the management board took no action.

It could ignore the clear language of the management plan because, in 2010, a federal appellate court found that the ASMFC’s management actions weren’t subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. MSA, on the other hand, specifically provides for judicial review of all actions taken under its aegis.

 

In 2019, when the striped bass was found to be both overfished and experiencing overfishing, MSA would have made even a bigger difference.

Although the management plan required the management board to initiate a 10-year rebuilding plan upon learning that the stock had become overfished, that provision of the management pan was, once again, ignored. Depending on how Amendment 7 turns out, such rebuilding may never occur. If bass had been governed by MSA, the management board would have been legally obligated to implement a rebuilding plan no more than two years after being notified that the stock was overfished. Under such a provision, rebuilding would have been underway by May 2021, in time for the upcoming season.

Even the limited action that the management board did take, when it implemented Addendum VI to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan (Addendum VI) at the end of 2019, wasn’t enough to meet the MSA’s standards. Addendum VI was intended to reduce fishing mortality to the target level, but because the management board allowed states to adopt their own, flexible regulations, and so limited Amendment VI’s effectiveness, the addendum only has a 42 percent probability of achieving its goal. Under MSA, that’s not good enough; management measures must have at least a 50 percent chance of success to pass legal muster.

 

At the management board’s February 2021 meeting, Dr. Justin Davis, Connecticut’s chief marine fisheries manager, advised the board that stakeholders were “losing faith” in the management board’s stewardship of the striped bass stock. Dr. Davis is right.

How can stakeholders not lose faith in a management board that has repeatedly failed the striped bass, and believes that maintaining “management stability” is more important than promptly rebuilding an overfished stock?

At one time, the federal fishery management councils were just as ineffective as the management board. They failed to rebuild overfished stocks, didn’t get fishing mortality under control, and, like the management board, often prioritized the short-term wants of the fishing industry above the long-term needs of fish stocks.

Congress responded to that problem by passing the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, which amended the MSA to include clear legal standards for the conservation and management of federal fisheries. Ten years later, Congress amended MSA again, to require science-based annual catch limits for all managed species, and hold fishermen accountable when those limits are exceeded. Now, MSA is arguably the most successful fishery management law in the world.

 

Considering the management board’s history of inaction when faced with a declining and depleted stock, it may take similar congressional action to secure the future of the striped bass, and restore stakeholder’s faith in the ASMFC’s management system.

-----

This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/

 

STRIPED BASS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED IN THE PAST TWENTY YEARS?

 

I was digging around in my archives, and came across a report that was released almost exactly two decades ago.  Titled “A Population Study of Atlantic Striped Bass 2001 Report to Congress,” it was prepared by Gary R. Shepherd of the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Northeast Fisheries Science Center, in cooperation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Technical Committee.

That report played a big role in the debate preceding adoption of the most recent amendment to the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan, Amendment 6, which was finalized in 2003.  Much like the nascent debate over the proposed Amendment 7, the conversation twenty years ago pitted a group of angler/conservationists who wanted to see a healthy striped bass stock, managed in a sustainable manner, against pro-harvest stakeholders and Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board members, who were trying to push harvest up as high as the science might possibly allow.

Thanks to the Report to Congress, the conservationists didn’t lose.

I can’t say that we won, because we were seeking a target fishing mortality rate somewhere below 0.25, and the final Amendment 6 set it at 0.31.

But I can’t say that we lost, either, because the other side was seeking a rate closer to 0.40, and they didn’t get what they wanted, either.

Instead, the Management Board sort of split the baby down the middle.  As typically happens in such situations, the baby died; or, at least, the Management Board’s actions killed off the likelihood that we’d have a healthy and sustainable striped bass stock over the long term.  But we do have enough bass around to give us a solid base, upon which such a healthy stock can be built, if the Management Board is willing to take appropriate action in Amendment 7.

That, of course, is never a sure thing.

So it’s interesting to see whether the twenty-year-old Report to Congress provides any guidance on the situation that we face today.

In some ways, the report is ‘way out of date.  When it was written, scientists still believed that there was a stock/recruitment relationship that tied spawning success to the size of the spawning stock.  Now, we know that’s not true.

And when it was written, scientists were comfortable with the idea of a target fishing mortality rate around 0.30, with a fishing mortality threshold of 0.40 or thereabouts.  Today, we know that’s not true either.

But there is one bit of wisdom that we ought to think about, because it still applies.  The Report to Congress noted that

“at fishing mortalities higher than 0.2, the proportion of large fish in the population would decline well below the 2000 level.  In this model, large fish are considered all fish greater than age 10 (about equal to or greater than 36 inches in total length).  Since female striped bass are estimated to reach full maturity at age eight, the decline in older fish results in a decreased spawning stock biomass…

“The distribution of age classes in a population has important implications for stock productivity and stability.  Studies on striped bass have shown that larger fish produce larger eggs and larvae, and larger individuals of these life stages have a greater chance of survival…

“…even modest levels of fishing mortality reduce the proportion of older fish in the stock and shift the bulk of egg production towards younger fish…Maintaining a diverse number of ages in the population has the biological advantages of increased spawning potential through inclusion of older more fecund fish, and a reduced risk of poor recruitment associated with dependence on younger fish for egg production…”

Right now, the target fishing mortality rate just happens to be 0.20.  The models used to determine such things have changed in the past 20 years, so we can’t be certain that raising mortality a little bit above 0.2 will necessarily cause the number of larger fish to go into steep decline,  Still, raising the target fishing mortality rate, as some would like to see Amendment 7 do, is certainly ill-advised, absent data indicating that such a decline won’t happen.

Whether 0.20 is still deemed to be the pivotal fishing mortality value or not, retaining a well-structured spawning stock, that contains many older, larger fish, remains important.  Dr. David H. Secor, a biologist who is well-known for his work with striped bass, explained why in his paper “Spawning in the nick of time?  Effect of adult demographics on spawning behavior and recruitment in Chesapeake Bay striped bass.”

There, he noted that striped bass spawning success is not dependent upon the number of spawning females, but rather on temperature, water flow, and other conditions in the rivers where the fish spawn.  Such changes vary not only from year to year, but also from time to time during the same year; even during years when conditions are generally unfavorable, there may be short windows of time when more favorable conditions exist.  Since older, larger striped bass are believed to spawn earlier in the season, while younger, smaller fish spawn later, having a broad range of age and size classes in the population makes spawning failure less likely.

In Dr. Secor’s words,

“Increased age diversity in the spawning stock may increase the temporal and spatial frequency of spawning (spawning dispersion) and thereby increase the probability that some offspring will encounter favorable conditions.

”…In periodic strategists like striped bass, moderately long reproductive lifespans and low adult mortality rates result in accumulation of spawning stock biomass.  When environmental conditions favor recruitment, this large reproductive reservoir generates dominant year classes which drive population growth.  Diversity in age structure and spawning behavior contribute to this storage effect.  If minority spawning behaviors—for instance spawning during early or late parts of a season—in some years resulted in successful offspring, a diverse age structure should contribute to sustained annual recruitment and accumulation of spawning stock biomass.

“Striped bass epitomize periodic strategists, spreading risk of failed replacement through variability of spawning behavior over many spawning seasons.  This life history tactic suggests that a truncated age distribution would result in stock abundance being more closely linked to annual changes in year-class strength.  [emphasis added]”

Not only does a broad age structure better assure that at least some females will meet with spawning success each season, but a truncated age structure would make striped bass more vulnerable to years when conditions in the spawning rivers are unfavorable.  It’s not hard to see how consecutive years of below-average spawning conditions, and so below-average spawning success, suchas most recently occurred between 2005 and 2010, could significantly increase the risk to the spawning stock, particularly if there were fewer larger, older fish to provide what Dr. Secor referred to as “a hedge against a long period of recruitment overfishing,” or a long period of poor recruitment due to any other cause.

Which brings us back to today, and the Public Information Document For Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass which, among other things, asks for comment on two closely related questions:  Are the current goals and objectives of the management plan still germane to striped bass management, and are the biological reference points used to gauge the health of the stock appropriate, or should they, too, be changed.

The current goal of the management plan is

“To perpetuate, through cooperative interstate fishery management, migratory stocks of striped bass; to allow commercial and recreational fisheries consistent with the long-term maintenance of a broad age structure, a self-sustaining spawning stock; and also to provide for the restoration and management of their essential habitat.  [emphasis added]”

There are a number of different objectives intended to help to achieve that goal, but none is more relevant to this discussion than the one directing the Management Board to

“Manage fishing mortality to maintain an age structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long-term abundance of striped bass populations.  [emphasis added]”

So even 20 years ago, we knew that raising fishing mortality will reduce the number of older, larger striped bass in the spawning stock, make it more dependent upon younger, smaller fish, and increase the risk to the striped bass population.  And Dr. Secor informs us that maintaining a broad age structure helps to maintain the stability of the striped bass stock.

Thus, it’s difficult to understand why the Public Information Document would ask

“Are the existing goals and objectives of Amendment 6 still in line with fishery needs and priorities?”

Because it’s hard to imagine anything more important--and more "in line with fishery needs and priorities"--than a heathy, stable, and sustainable striped bass stock (and if you are one of those who honestly believes that management stability and flexibility matter more than the health of the stock, you aren’t fit to be making decisions that impact a public fishery resource).

And it’s difficult to understand why the Public Information Document would be seeking comments on whether to change the biological reference points to something that would allow a higher fishing mortality rate, and reduce the number of older, larger fish in the population, knowing that by doing so, it can only increase the risk to the stock.

The title of this edition of One Angler's Voyage asks “What have we learned in the past twenty years” about managing striped bass.

What have we learned?

Sadly, when I see such questioins being asked by the Management Board, it seems that the answer is “Nothing.”

 

STRIPED BASS--THE SOLUTION IS SIMPLE

 

In his classic work On War, career Prussian soldier and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz observed that

“Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

The same can be said about striped bass management.

I was thinking about that just a few days ago, after reading an editorial titled “The Solution is Simple” in The Falmouth Enterprise, a newspaper that has been published on Massachusetts’ Cape Cod since 1895.  The topic was striped bass, and the article noted

“There is a good deal of concern about striped bass these days.  It is evident that the numbers of these popular fish are down, especially with big fish, which makes the striper the most popular sport fish on the East Coast.

“Amendment 7 [to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s striped bass management plan] is being developed to address this.

“Fisheries managers have a knack for making an easily defined problem very complex.  That much is clear in the commission’s motion to develop its new striped bass amendment [which contemplates an amendment that addresses nine different, and individually complex, issues].

“It’s mind-numbing.

“The simple truth is that the way to protect striped bass, or any species, is to protect their habitat and kill fewer of them.  The problem arises when there are competing interests…”

Thus, von Clausewitz’s quote.  For it’s those “competing interests” that makes that very simple way to conserve and rebuild striped bass—killing fewer of them—so very hard to accomplish.

As I started to think about von Clausewitz a little bit more—and, believe it or not, when your undergrad degrees are in History and English, and you’ve kept up those interests in the decades since, idly thinking about folks like von Clausewitz is the sort of thing that you do—I realized that some of his other thoughts on war were also very relevant to the fisheries arena.

Like

“There are very few men—and they are the exceptions—who are able to think and feel beyond the present moment,”

for nothing makes the simplest aspects of striped bass management more difficult to execute than too many stakeholders’—and too many fishery managers’—excessive focus on the short-term impacts of the management measures needed to assure the long-term health and stability of the striped bass stock.

There are numerous examples.  One that I frequently cite is the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board’s response to a 2011 stock assessment update, which found that the stock would become overfished by 2017.  

The threat to the striped bass stock was clear.  There was plenty of time for the Management Board to take action to avoid the problem.  It even went so far as to prepare a suite of prophylactic measures.  But in the end, it did nothing to halt the stock's decline.

The transcript of the November 2011 meeting shows that a number of Management Board members wanted to defer action, despite the clear warning in the stock assessment update, because the declining stock had not yet hit any of the triggers for management action, and they didn't want to cause temporary problems for fishing-related businesses.  Pat Augustine, then the Governor’s Appointee from New York, most clearly articulated that position when he said

“Amendment 6 [to the striped bass management plan] gives you two major triggers.  We haven’t hit either one of them to meet that action yet…

“…we’re managing fishermen, we’re affecting livelihoods.  Yes, I understand that there is a tremendous amount of money driving the economy by partyboats and charterboats going out and fishing on these fish.

“We’ve created a bonanza for folks who have a vessel who have got a captain’s license, but how of you [sic] are taking three striped bass trips a day?  We have charterboat guys in New York who are taking three a day with six guys on each vessel.  And, oh, by the way, they can take two greater than 28 [inches].  Read the fishermen magazine in your backyard and tell me that you don’t see what the implications are.

“The minimum size is typically 28 inches.  What the heck did we expect to happen?  You’ve got all the states fishing greater than 28 except for those that have made changes where they allow for a third fish or a slot-size fish, but the reality is that’s what you’re fishing for.  You’re fishing for eight-year-old fish and older.  Wake up and smell the trees—the roses…

“…If there is an aberration in the stock and the myco[bacteriosis, a disease fatal to striped bass] goes forward and destroys the population in the Chesapeake, we’ve got an issue.  There will be a trigger [requiring management action when the stock’s condition gets worse] and we will take action, but I think we’ve got to be realistic in goals and desires to protect the most protected specie of fish in the ocean that we many [sic]; and to do it at the demise of other species of fish that are also costing livelihoods and having a negative economic impact in several states along the coast, shame on us.”

In other words, the Management Board knew that there was an incipient problem with the striped bass stock, and it knew that too many fish were being killed, but in order to prevent adverse short-term economic impacts on the fishing industry, it chose to take no action until things got worse, until a crisis occurs (“myco goes forward and destroys the population [emphasis added”) and it was forced to do something.

And things did get worse, but the Management Board did too little, even then, ignoring clear requirements to begin rebuilding the stock included in its own management plan.

That stock, as we now, is now overfished, and still the Management Board has failed to initiate rebuilding.  But then, as von Clausewitz noted,

“War is such a dangerous business that mistakes that come from kindness are the very worst.”

Fishery management may not be physically dangerous—at least, not most of the time—but they still make "mistakes that come from kindness," seeking to manage a depleted striped bass stock while avoiding short-term pain to stakeholders.  And such mistakes are dangerous, as they throw open the door to failure.

“…to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.”

Yet such absurdities abound in striped bass management, particularly with respect to the practice of “conservation equivalency,” which allows states to adopt management measures other than those chosen by the Management Board, provided that such alternate measures, in theory, provide the same conservation benefit.

Unfortunately, the Management Board’s desire to moderate the impacts of striped bass management—the greatest of its “mistakes the come from kindness”—cause its management efforts to fail, and leads to management travesties such as the recently-adopted Addendum VI to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan, which was intended to reduce fishing mortality to the target level but, primarily because of conservation equivalency concessions the Management Board was willing to make to Maryland and New Jersey, faces a 58 percent probability that it will not achieve its goal.

In the end, there is only way to successfully manage striped bass, and that is for the Management Board to, again in the words of von Clausewitz,

“Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination.”

And for the Management Board, such “one great decisive aim” can only be the full restoration of the striped bass spawning stock, and then maintaining the restored stock at healthy and sustainable levels in the future. 

For if they fail to achieve that biological goal, the subsidiary goals of maximizing the economic, social, and recreational benefits that flow from the bass fishery shall forever remain out of reach.

Which brings us back, full circle, to where this began, with the editorial in The Falmouth Enterprise, which concluded that

“[Needed fishery management measures] won’t be popular with everyone.  But it’s not about the fishermen, it’s about the fish.  Fisheries managers must look beyond competing interests if they are going to protect this important game fish.  [emphasis added]”

If the Management Board can accept that truth, and adopt the mindset and the principles necessary to achieve success, the striped bass spawning stock, and the striped bass fishery, can and will be restored.

But if it equivocates, tries to appease competing interests, and fails to understand that, in the end, the needs of the fish, not of fishermen, must come first, the Management Board’s efforts will fail.

Once again.