STRIPED BASS AMENDMENT 7: SO DO WE AGREE, AT LEAST ON THE KEY POINTS?

 The Striped Bass Amendment 7 process is moving forward. 

By now, we’ve largely figured out what issues the Public Information Document For Amendment 7 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass (PID) is asking us to address, and most of us have also figured out which of those issues is most important to the bass, and what direction Amendment 7 ought to take.

A few public hearings have already been held (if you want to know when a hearing will be held in your state, you can find it in a schedule on the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s website), and some recreational fishing organizations have published their positions, so this is a good time to call a brief halt and evaluate where things stand right now, to provide some understanding of how the striped bass might fare in the upcoming debate.

Right now, it looks like recreational fishermen, and the more involved recreational fishing organizations, are more-or-less on the same page.  Some are standing staunchly on the center crease, while one is edging a bit too close to the margins, but none have taken up a position so far from the center that they can be deemed opposition, although I suspect that might change when some industry voices from New York, New Jersey and Maryland begin to chime in.

But right now, it looks like most people and organizations are, to a greater or lesser degree, putting the needs of the striped bass first.  I didn’t get a chance to listen to any of the hearings that have been held so far, in New Hampshire, Maine, and Virginia, but from what I’ve been told, the public comment generally supported the striper, particularly in northern New England, where a strong conservation ethic has long prevailed.  I have only received a couple of reports from Virginia, but from what I’m hearing, anglers were also supporting conservation-oriented measures there.

The various angling-related organizations are also generally staking out pro-bass positions, particularly on the goals and objectives of the management plan and the biological reference points.  In that regard, the American Saltwater Guides Association’s commented that

“We believe that the current goals and objectives of the Atlantic Striped Bass [Fishery Management Plan], as stated in Amendment 6 [to that plan], continue to be appropriate for striped bass management.  A robust spawning stock characterized by a broad age structure is critical for reducing recruitment variability for a species whose spawning success largely depends on favorable environmental conditions.  Such a diversity of age classes promotes long-term stock health and stability, which in turn supports the health and stability of commercial and recreational fisheries…”

With respect to the biological reference points, the Guides’ Association said that

“…We continue to believe that 1995 is an appropriate reference year [on which to base the spawning stock biomass target and threshold] given the abundance and broad age structure of the striped bass population at that time, in accordance with Amendment 6’s goals and objectives…”

The Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership's postion was similar, saying, in part, that

“The number one priority of Amendment 7 should be to restore and maintain an age structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long-term abundance of striped bass populations…

“The current biomass reference points are based on verifiable observation and represent the best science currently available.  There are no viable model-based alternatives available to managers at this time, and potential replacements for the current reference points are restricted by data and modeling limitations.  Modifying the reference points has no scientific basis and it is inappropriate to weaken the standards without any new science to support the change…”

Coastal Conservation Association Maryland, which is probably reflecting the position of most or all of the CCA’s few chapters on the striper coast, and the American Sportfishing Association, which represents the fishing tackle industry, were generally on the same page, but hedged their comments to some degree.

CCA Maryland, for example, said that the ASMFC should

“Manage striped bass as primarily a recreational fishery, which means manage them for increased abundance and age structure,”

retain the current biological reference points, and

“Focus on maintaining fishing mortality to rebuild the stock and avoid future declines in the population.”

But it also starts getting into “cut the baby in half” territory with recommendations that the ASMFC also

“Balance the needs of catch and release anglers with those who like to take a fish home.”

and

“Stabilize the fishery with regulatory consistency across space and time.”

Those are troubling comments because the “needs” that Amendment 7 ought to be concerned with are the needs of the striped bass--setting reference points that will maintain abundance and a broad age structure, and best assure the long-term health of the stock.  For in the end, striped bass anglers don’t have “needs,” they have desires.  No catch-and-release angler needs to catch a bass; no bass angler needs to take a fish home.

When managers start giving equal weight to fishermen’s desires and the needs of the resource, and trying to manage for both, they usually fail to achieve either goal.  Instead, all should learn from the words of the late Art Neumann, founder of Trout Unlimited, who said

“Take care of the fish, and the fishing will take care of itself.”

Beyond that, the CCA Maryland position is internally inconsistent.  On one hand, it recommends that the striped bass stock be managed for abundance and a broad age structure, and states that that the ASMFC should focus on maintaining fishing mortality and avoid further population declines.  But on the other hand, it supports the notion that the fishery—and not the striped bass stock—be stabilized with “regulatory consistency across…time.”

Those suggestions embrace conflicting approaches to striped bass management. 

To successfully manage for abundance and age structure, maintain fishing mortality, and avoid population decline, managers must stand ready to change regulations, as and whenever needed, when fishing mortality gets too high or abundance begins to drop.

On the other hand, to maintain regulatory consistency over time, managers must ignore increases in fishing mortality or decreases in abundance, and maintain consistent regulations until the problem gets so bad that it can no longer be ignored.

We saw that happen in November 2011, when the management board decided that reducing landings, in response to a stock assessment update that warned the stock would be overfished within six years, constituted “overmanaging” because striped bass fishery was still “a green light fishery” and hadn’t run into serious problems yet.

We can see, to our sorrow, where such “regulatory consistency over time” got us today…

The same comments that apply to CCA’s Maryland’s position also apply to the position taken by the American Sportfishing Association, although ASA hedges its bets even more.  While it acknowledges that

“The current goals and objectives of Amendment 6 (outlined in the PID) provide a strong foundation for striped bass management,”

and states that

“We support the current [biological reference points] because they are adequate to achieve the current fishery goals and objectives,”

it also includes the two problematic recommendations made by CCA Maryland, and adds a third, that the ASMFC

“Achieve the conservation goals while still allowing sustainable fishing access.”

“Access,” of course, is one of those undefined weasel words that can be used to disguise its intended meaning.  

To surfcasters in the northeast, “access” means the ability to drive their vehicles on, and fish from, the beach and other shorelines.  To most bass fishermen, it means the ability to utilize—to fish for—the striped bass resource.  But based extensive comments made by the American Sportfishing Association with respect to the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery, “access” has a different, and quite specific meaning to ASA—the ability to not only fish for, but to retain, the fish in question.

So what they’re really talking about is splitting the baby again, supporting meaningful conservation while also killing—who knows how many, but judging from the red snapper debate, probably quite a few—striped bass.

At this rate, that poor baby won’t just be split in half; it’s likely to end up in quarters…

That doesn’t mean that there’s anything wrong with taking a bass or two home, so long as it’s done correctly:  First, managers figure out what regulations the bass need, to keep the stock healthy in the long term.  Then, they consider the inevitable release mortality.  Only after that’s done, should they calculate how much of the rest goes to harvest.

Approach things that way, rebuilding biomass to the target, and there will ultimately be plenty of fish available to put in folks’ coolers.

The other key issues, management triggers and rebuilding times, see the same sort of disparity between the organizations.

The Guides Association supports most of the current management triggers, which require action within one year when overfishing either looms or too much fishing mortality coincides with a drop in abundance, and instituting a 10-year rebuilding plan when biomass drops and the stock either becomes overfished or the biomass falls below target while fishing mortality rises too far.  However, the Association does recommend revisiting the recruitment trigger, which sets the bar for poor recruitment so low that it has never been tripped, and even if it had been, does not compel management action.

With respect to the rebuilding timeline, the Guides Association clearly states that

“We strongly believe that the 10-year rebuilding timeline currently specified in Amendment 6 should be maintained.  A longer rebuilding timeline would not only extend the period during which the stock is not at the target level, but would also inject greater uncertainty regarding the outcome of the rebuilding process.”

That latter concern is well-rooted in history, for after the 2013 benchmark stock assessment triggered the 10-year rebuilding requirement, the management board took no action, on the advice of then-fishery management plan coordinator Michael Waine, who advised that a 10-year rebuild involved too much uncertainty, and that the stock would eventually recover just from a reduced fishing mortality rate.

For the record, the stock didn’t rebuild, and instead went the other way.  It seems that there was too much uncertainty involved with not setting a 10-year deadline, too.

The management board shouldn’t be allowed to make that mistake again.

The Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership’s position on triggers and rebuilding is in harmony with that of the Guides Association; it simply states that

“The management triggers and rebuilding timelines are consistent with the biological understanding of the species and should be maintained.”

Like the Guides Association, the TRCP believes that the recruitment trigger should be revised.

Again, when we get to CCA Maryland and the ASA, we see similar basic positions, but we see more hedging, too.

CCA Maryland states that

“Management should focus on a set of triggers that recognize a decline in abundance that so that [sic] corrective action could be taken,”

and would like to see the ASA

“Utilize a 10-year rebuilding plan that focuses on maintaining [fishing mortality] at its target level.”

In those regards, it is in line with the Guides Association and TRCP.  But then the hedges start.

CCA Maryland endorses “the value of regulatory stability” again, and suggests that the ASMFC should

“Allow for flexibility in the rebuilding timeline if the Technical Committee determines that factors other than [fishing mortality] have contributed to a slow recovery for striped bass.”

Unfortunately, granting such “flexibility” to the management board is like handing a fifth of Scotch to a hard-core alcoholic, and expecting him to take one--and only one--small sip.  Given the opportunity, the management board would always find that there was always a factor “other than” fishing mortality that “contributed,” at least a little, to slow striped bass recovery, and would use the “flexibility” provided to set a recovery date that falls somewhere between “eventually” and “never.”

Given the management board’s track record, that is, sadly, not an exaggeration.

At the same time, there is good reason for CCA Maryland’s concerns.  As it noted,

“Beginning in the late 2000s, striped bass have undergone a prolonged period of below average recruitment, which is one of the primary reasons we are in the predicament we are in today.”

That’s very true.  Fishery managers can only control fishing mortality; they can’t control striped bass spawning success.

But where CCA Maryland goes astray is in the conclusions that it draws from that fact, believing that

“It will be difficult if not impossible for striped bass to rebuild to the current [spawning stock biomass] target level if the below average recruitment regime continues...”

History shows us why that statement is probably wrong.

When the striped bass collapsed in the late 1970s, recruitment levels fell through the floor.  From 1975 through 1988, the Maryland juvenile striped bass abundance index, probably the best gauge of striped bass recruitment, ranged between 1.22 and 8.45, compared to a long-term average of 11.7; it only rose above 5 twice, 1n 1975 and again in 1982.  Yet fishery managers, relying on the relatively healthy 1982 year class (8.45), adopted Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass late in 1985, and were able to rebuild the then-collapsed stock back to health by 1995—within 10 years.

Their success was remarkable, given how little they had to work with.  

According to the 2109 benchmark stock assessment, most striped bass mature when approximately 6 years old, with some not maturing until the age of 8.  That means that the youngest striped bass to be included in the 1995 spawning stock were from the 1989 year class, which returned a relatively high 25.20 in the Maryland juvenile index.  Yet 1989 was an exceptional year, and it takes more than one year class to make a successful recovery.  The 10-year average for the years 1980-1989, which included the all-important 1982 year class, was a little under 5.70—less than half of the current long-term average.

But the stock was rebuilt despite that.

We can’t know when, or if, the ASMFC will ever initiate a striped bass rebuilding plan, and we have no way of knowing what recruitment will be in then future.  Yet if we look at the past 10 years of spawning success, which includes the lowest Maryland JAI index ever recorded, we find that managers now have a lot more to work with than they did the last time that they managed to successfully rebuild the stock.

The years between 2011 and 2020 saw both very good and very bad recruitment occur, with Maryland JAI ranging from 0.89 in 2012 to 34.58 in 2011.  There were six years when the JAI exceeded 5, five years when it exceeded 10, and four years when it exceeded the long-term average; the 10-year average of the most recent JAI figures is 11.25—just slightly below the average recruitment figure.

While there is no guarantee that recruitment over the next ten years will resemble that of the past decade, it’s clear that if rebuilding began now, managers would have far more to work with than they had in 1985, and should be able to more than duplicate their previous 10-year rebuilding success.

There is no reason to believe that a rebuilding delay—“flexibility”—would be needed.

Still, the last time the stock was rebuilt, it was only to threshold, not to the target, which is 25 percent higher.  So what about CCA Maryland’s question”

“what happens when managers have maintained [fishing mortality] at the target level for 10 years and the stock does not rebuild?”

The answer to that question is very, very simple:  While the fishing mortality target ought to be able to sustain the spawning stock biomass at or around its target level, in order to rebuild the spawning stock within ten years, the fishing mortality rate will probably have to be a little lower.  It’s hard to predict what that rate would be, but it will almost certainly be necessary to forego a little more yield, compared to yield at the fishing mortality target, in order to get rebuilding done in time.

But it can be done.  It will only take the moral and political courage to make hard decisions to get then job done.  No “flexibility” would be required.

Again, the American Sportfishing Association’s comments parallel CCA Maryland’s, and then add a few quirks that make them a bit worse.  In this case, ASA claims that

“Finding a balance between being precautionary to ensure a healthy population and while also maintaining stability in the fishery is the sweet spot for management triggers.”

In doing so, the ASA seems to suggest that “stability in the fishery” somehow conflicts with, and needs to be balanced with, ensuring a healthy striped bass population.  Nothing is further from the truth.  If one wants to maintain a stable striped bass fishery, one must first maintain, to the extent possible, a stable striped bass population, even if that means changing the regulations on a regular basis to ensure stock health.

Even a cursory examination of Marine Recreational Information Program data will demonstrate that angler effort is directly tied to striped bass abundance; more anglers fish, and anglers fish more often, when there are a lot of fish around to catch.  Between the years of 1995 and 2014, recreational striped bass regulations remained largely unchanged, with a 2-fish bag limit and 28-inch minimum size, yet angling effort varied widely throughout the period, in direct response to the abundance of striped bass, and to the abundance of larger individuals. 

The goal of “stability in the fishery,” and the goal of a healthy striped bass stock are complimenbtary; a healthy and abundant striped bass stock is likely to stabilize angler effort at a relatively high level, maximizing both recreational opportunity and the economic benefits to the ASA’s members, even if regulations need to change a bit in order to keep abundance near target.

But after those comments about stability came the big kicker, which was not only the worst of the ASA’s ideas, but the worst of any Amendment 7 proposal that I’ve heard up to now:

“Consider stocking of hatchery-raised fish from wild brood stock in major producer areas if recruitment continues to be poor.”

Hatcheries don't provide the solution to any of the problems facing the striped bass.  In the end, they represent nothing less than an tacit admission that fishery management has failed.  

While fish hatcheries have existed in the United States for more than 150 years, there is little or no evidence that such hatcheries, created to allow fishing to continue after a fish stock became depleted, has ever successfully restored a wild fish population to sustainable levels of abundance.  In the Pacific Northwest, where salmon have been heavily stocked for more than a century, many runs of salmon, despite such stocking, are at historically low levels of abundance, and are listed under the federal Endangered Species Act.

Instead, hatcheries have proven to be an excuse to abandon serious management efforts, replace natural reproduction with industrial-scale fish production, all to justify harvest levels far beyond what a natural stock could sustain.  Natural fish populations are forced to compete with hatchery fish that are less fit to live in the wild, but nonetheless take up resources—both food resources and essential feeding, spawning, and nursery habitat—that wild fish need.

And there is a difference between wild fish and hatchery fish from wild brood stock.  Research with steelhead (sea-run rainbow) trout has demonstrated that gene expression in even the first generation of hatchery fish differs from that in their naturally-spawned parents.  In that study, the expression of genes affecting wound healing, immunity and metabolism all changed from those in wild-spawned fish, possibly because the crowded conditions in the hatchery require different genetic responses.

The fish were already becoming more domesticated, and less suited to the wild.

There is still more than enough time to rebuild striped bass without the need for hatcheries; should things ever start getting so bad that hatcheries might be required, a moratorium on all striped bass fishing ought to be imposed before artificially produced fish are even considered.  Hatcheries should be, and remain, the management measure of last resort, and should never be a tool used to avoid making difficult conservation decisions.

And that bad idea probably provides a good place to end.  There are five other topics in the PID, but this essay has already run too long.  We’ve already looked at the issues that matter most.

The good news—and it is good news—is that on the key issues of goals and objectives, biological reference points, management triggers and rebuilding times, there is widespread, essential agreement on the need to maintain a broad age structure and high striped bass abundance, to retain the current reference points, to employ effective management triggers and to try to rebuild the stock within ten years.

The bad news is that some folks still don’t understand that Mother Nature can’t compromise, and that when managers seek to strike some sort of balance between the needs of the fish and the wants of the fishermen, the fish—and in time, the fishermen, too—will always lose.

Let’s just hope that, going into Amendment 7, the good news wins out.