Thursday, May 10, 2018

DIPLOMACY DOMINATES BLACK SEA BASS DEBATE


Fishery management meetings can be very mundane, on those rare days when there’s no one disputing the data, allocations aren’t being contested and the need for management measures is clear. 

Or they can be bare-knuckled brawls, which pit sectors against sectors, regions against regions or conservationists against the fast-buck crowd.  At those times, tempers flare, pointed comments are thrown and the lambent hostility seems to thicken the air in the room—and that’s just at the management table.  The mood of the audience can make a lynch mob seem tame.

Yet hostility seldom solves problems, and often makes it far more difficult for people to find workable solutions.  While it may be immediately satisfying to posture and make a lot of hostile noise, particularly when cronies are cheering out in the crow, such posturing only causes folks on the other side of an issue to dig in their heels, and be less willing to forge any sort of compromise.

Often, the louder you yell, the less you are heard.

Thus, when the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission held its spring meeting a little over a week ago, it was refreshing to see a particularly thorny black sea bass debate resolved through well-crafted diplomacy, rather than by forcing votes that, regardless of the outcome, were likely to lead to more problems.

Allocation was the key issue, and as anyone familiar with fisheries issues knows, allocation squabbles can be very bitter, and are some of the most difficult fights to resolve.


A recent benchmark stock assessment divided the stock into northern and southern components, and recognized the northern shift in black sea bass abundance.  However, regulations remained mired in past patterns, allowing the southern states, that used to have a lot of fish, to maintain very liberal management measures, while forcing the northern states, where most of the fish now are found and are caught, into ever more restrictive regulatory regimes as their anglers  merely caught the fish that teemed at their doorstep.

That was true even though such benchmark assessment found that

“Relative to F40% (0.355 in the north, 0.365 in the south) [which represents the fishing mortality threshold], the retro adjusted [fishing mortality] in the north (0.14) is well below the threshold wheras retro adjusted [fishing mortality] in the south (0.39) is slightly above…”
meaning that the southern states were arguably overfishing their local black sea bass population (although, since one set of reference points are used for the entire stock, such local overfishing does not trigger any sort of remedial action).

The northern states—those between New York and Massachusetts—believed that the historical approach to black sea bass led to an inequitable result, and tried to correct the problem.  Unfortunately, when the issue ultimately came to a vote, the southern states remained deeply committed to their outdated catch histories, and were unwilling to adopt a new allocation that fully reflected the current distribution of black sea bass.  Because there are more southern than northern states, which lets them control ASMFC’s Summer Flounder, Scup and Black Sea Bass Management Board, the northern states were forced into a so-called “compromise” that compelled them to increase restrictions on harvest once again.


“I don’t need to go to two decimal places to count 6 to 4.  That is my problem.  I do appreciate the fact that we just spent a lot of time trying to cooperate.  When you’re bargaining from a losing position to start with, it really doesn’t make you all that comfortable…”
In the end, the northern states appealed the Management Board’s decision to ASMFC’s Policy Board, and that’s where the diplomacy came in.

At first, it appeared that the northern states had only two choices.  They could take an appeal on the merits of their case and, if the appeal was not successful, they could go out of compliance with ASMFC’s black sea bass management plan, as New Jersey defied ASMFC on summer flounder last season.

Neither option was all that palatable. 

Historically, appeals to the policy board usually failed; there was no assurance that a black sea bass appeal, however meritorious, would fare any better. 

And going out of compliance could have led to even worse outcomes than the Management Board’s decision imposed.  

Ultimately, the states would have to justify their noncompliance to the Secretary of Commerce who, if he ended up dismissing their arguments, had the power to shut down their black sea bass fisheries until they complied.  On the other hand, if the Secretary found their noncompliance justifiable, such finding, combined with the similar finding made with respect to New Jersey’s summer flounder fishery last year, could have emasculated ASMFC’s enforcement powers, and caused serious long-term harm to East Coast fisheries.

Fortunately, the northern states found a more diplomatic approach to their problem, and like most good diplomacy, it involved both a carrot and a stick.



So the stage was set for a true compromise that would give everyone some sort of win in 2018. 

But the really big win for the northern states will come in the future, as the Policy Board directed the Management Board to base 2019 recreational measures and, eventually, commercial measures as well, on current patterns of black sea bass abundance, and not on obsolete historical data.

That just shows what diplomacy—and hard work—can do.


But that was never going to happen.  Those who claim otherwise are just fooling themselves—or, perhaps, trying hard to fool someone else.  There are real limits to what the fishery management system allows, and changing that system takes time.

But change, for black sea bass, is coming next year, thanks to the effective diplomacy of fishery managers in the northern states.

For that, they deserve a big round of thanks.




Sunday, May 6, 2018

LIVE BLUEFISH MATTER


Anglers and bluefish have a complicated relationship.
We call them “yellow-eyed demons” when they show up in the surf, attacking lures meant for striped bass. And we call them worse things farther offshore, when they show up to ruin shark baits and mangle carefully-rigged—and expensive—ballyhoo intended for tuna.
But when they burst through the surface of a calm summer sea, leaping completely clear of the water before landing headfirst on a topwater plug, we have to admit, however reluctantly, that they are one of the great gamefish of our northeast coast.
Still, great gamefish aren’t always great food fish, and that’s certainly true with big blues.
Small bluefish, fresh from the sea and still lean from their travels, can taste pretty good. Even larger ones that have been feeding on squid, sand eels and butterfish in deep ocean waters can be enjoyable. But once bluefish invade inshore waters and begin feeding on menhaden, their flesh becomes too oily and strong-tasting for most people’s palates.
Thus, most bluefish caught by anglers today are released.
That wasn’t always the case.
During the early years of the fishery, recreational fishermen killed most of their catch, even if they had no intention of eating them. I remember boats coming back to the dock in the 1960s and ‘70s, the anglers on board calling out “Who wants some bluefish?” even before the boats were tied up in their slips.
They got very few takers.
In those days, before states licensed their commercial fishermen, some of the unwanted bluefish were sold to local restaurants. Some were given to (often, almost forced on) reluctant neighbors, while others fertilized gardens. Far too many ended up in a dumpster or were returned, dead, to the bay.
Because bluefish weren’t in much demand as a food fish, the commercial fishery was small; through the 1980s, it only amounted to about 10% of the overall landings. As noted in the initial Fishery Management Plan for the Bluefish Fishery, released in 1989, “bluefish comprise a small percentage of all finfish harvested commercially along the Atlantic coast primarily because the commercial bluefish market is unstable, easily saturated, and characterized by low dockside prices.”

Because anglers so dominated bluefish landings, the original fishery management plan allocated 80% of the bluefish harvest to the recreational sector. When the management plan was amended in 1998, the allocation was amended as well, to 83% recreational and 17% commercial, with the proviso that if the commercial quota in any year was less than 10.5 million pounds, and recreational fishermen were not expected to land their entire quota in that year, a portion of the unharvested recreational quota could be transferred to the commercial sector.

That allocation was based on recreational and commercial landings during the years 1981 through 1989.
During those years, anglers in the New England/Mid-Atlantic region still killed most of their bluefish, releasing only 21% of all the fish caught. Since then, a conservation ethic has pervaded the fishery. In the most recent decade, 2008-2017, that release rate has tripled, with 62% of all bluefish caught returned to the water.

Anglers have come to realize that fishing is more enjoyable when fish were abundant, and that they can help to assure such abundance by releasing unwanted bluefish, instead of using them for crab bait. Unfortunately, it seems that the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (Mid-Atlantic Council) and Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) now want to penalize bluefish anglers for adopting that conservation ethic.
On April 30, in a joint meeting, the Mid-Atlantic Council and ASMFC’s Bluefish Management Board (Management Board) approved a Draft Scoping and Public Information Document for a proposed Bluefish Allocation Amendment to the Bluefish Management Plan(Scoping Document). One of the primary issues to be addressed in the Scoping Document is whether the current recreational/commercial allocation should be changed.

As the Scoping Document notes, “These allocations were developed using catch data from 1981-1989 (the years prior to regulations that may have affected both recreational and commercial landings) and are still the basis for current bluefish allocations. Stakeholders would like to see allocations reviewed using more recent catch histories.”
While that statement may be true, there are problems with its underlying premise.
Although the terms “catch data” and “catch histories” are widely used in fishery management, it would be far more accurate to say that the allocation and any reallocation of bluefish that might occur are based on “kill” data and “kill” histories, because fish that anglers return to the waters alive were never a part of the calculation.
That skews the allocation discussion, for in catch-and-release fisheries, the most important consideration isn’t sustainable yield, or the number of fish that can safely be removed from the water, but instead sustainable abundance, the number of fish available for anglers to catch, release, then hopefully catch again. Fish can be, and are, utilized, even if they are not killed.
That’s acknowledged in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens), which defines “optimum” yield as “the amount of fish which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and recreational opportunities… [emphasis added]”

Yet, despite the fact that such language clearly values recreational opportunity as much as it does food production, fishery managers still give purely recreational considerations little weight in their decisions, and instead practice what might be termed “dead fish management,” placing all of the emphasis on harvest. The Mid-Atlantic Council has never acknowledged that recreational fishermen are fully utilizing their bluefish allocation when they maximize recreational opportunities through catch and release.
Capt. John McMurray, an ASMFC commissioner from the State of New York, raised that point at the joint meeting, pointing out that the Scoping Document failed to address “the value of keeping fish in the water.” ASMFC staff agreed to add such language before the document was released to the public.
Capt. Tony DiLernia, who represents New York on the Mid-Atlantic Council, raised another important issue. He pointed out that the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP), which estimates recreational catch and recreational harvest, is revising its figures for angling effort. And, as noted in the Scoping Document, “Preliminary MRIP calibration work suggests all effort estimations will increase ~3-5 times. This increase has the potential to drastically alter bluefish catch/landings/effort data for the shore and private angler modes.”

Thus, there is a very good chance that recreational bluefish landings will turn out to be much higher than previously believed, probably high enough that no reallocation of recreational quota to the commercial sector could be justified. Because of that, Capt. DiLernia suggested that the Scoping Document not be released until the revised MRIP data becomes public.
Until then, no one will know how many bluefish anglers truly catch, or kill.
New Jersey ASMFC commissioner Tom Fote agreed. He also reminded everyone that while striped bass may be considered more glamorous, bluefish are the “money fish” on the coast, the fish that, when they are abundant, attract tourists to the party boat fleets and force anglers to replace lures and other gear that the bluefish destroy. An abundance of bluefish is an economic boon.
Despite such arguments, the Mid-Atlantic Council and Management Board, on near-unanimous votes, decided to move forward with the reallocation process and release the Scoping Document for public comment.
That is unfortunate, because the Scoping Document effectively tells anglers that their conservation efforts will prove to be futile, for the fish that they choose to release will only be reallocated to, and killed by, the commercial sector. It tells them that, from an allocation standpoint, they were better off in the days when they fed their dead bluefish to rose bushes and dumpsters, compared to today, when they set most of their live bluefish free.
That is the wrong message to send, and not only because it is contrary to the clear language of Magnuson-Stevens.
It is wrong because it values dead fish more than live ones, when it is only live bluefish, abundant and available, that will allow both the recreational and commercial fisheries to thrive in the future, as well as today.
-----

This essay first appeared in "From the Waterfront," the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which may be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/ 

Thursday, May 3, 2018

NEXT STEPS FOR STRIPED BASS: PART II



ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board has now held its meeting, and the path ahead has become a little—if just a little—clearer.  Whether you’re optimistic or pessimistic about the future of striped bass management, you could find something that was said at the meeting to support your views.

Once again, ASMFC staff mentioned that the reference points used to define the target spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate (as well as the ones used to determine whether the stock is overfished and/or overfishing is occurring) represented a policy decision on “preserving biomass versus allowing fishing.”  

More conservative reference points generally lead to greater abundance, including a greater abundance of the larger, more fecund females, and thus a spawning stock that is more resilient and better able to maintain the population in the face of consecutive years of poor spawns, but require lower levels of harvest.  Less conservative reference points lead to larger harvests in the short term, but increase the likelihood of a depleted stock, or even a stock collapse, should there be poor recruitment for an extended period.


“Manage [fishing mortality] to maintain an age structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long-term abundance.”
Such an objective would require relatively conservative reference points, which would in turn lead to an abundance of striped bass.  

The need for such abundance was also reflected in Board and Technical Committee visions of what constituted a “quality and viable fishery.” 

The greatest number of Management Board respondents described such fishery as one that featured a

“Broad age structure with high abundance of larger, older fish.”
Other highly-ranked options included

“High abundance of market-size fish (>18” in producer areas, >28” on the coast)”
and

“High catch rates, even if not all fish could be retained.”
Advisory panel members chose two of the same three options, ranking an abundance of market-sized fish first, with broad age structure and an abundance of larger, older fish in second place.  Their third choice was

“High abundance of trophy-size fish (>28’ in producer areas, >36” on the coast)”
So it was clear that to many, if not most, members of both groups, abundance—and thus conservative reference points—is a good thing.

But pessimists could also find plenty of comments to justify their view of the striper’s future.  

There are a lot of folks who find the current reference points too conservative; there was also an expressed desire to consider reference points that reflected periods, prior to 2015 (the first season when the current reference points were reflected in regulations),

“when the stock was in good condition.”
At first, that didn’t sound too bad, given that it seemed to include the possibility of biomass reference points reflecting the 2000-2006 period, when there were plenty of striped bass around.  

However, things quickly went downhill after a clarification that such retrospective glance would apply primarily to the fishing mortality reference points—Ftarget=0.30 and Fthreshold=0.41—in place at the time (Fthreshold was reduced to 0.34 in a 2011 stock assessment update), with which allowed a substantial kill, and not the biomass reference points, which would have required something close to today’s level of harvest.

Such past reference points would certainly incorporate a higher level of risk than the current Ftarget=0.18 and Fthreshold=0.219.  While it’s impossible to deny that such higher reference points allowed the striped bass spawning stock to reach high levels of abundance in the early years of this century, and didn’t prevent the production of dominant year classes in 1993, 1996, 2001, 2003 and 2011, it’s also impossible to ignore the fact that they also permitted the sharp, decade-long decline in bass numbers that anglers are lamenting today.

More conservative reference points could better avoid such steep declines, and provide a more consistent—but still varying—level of abundance.

It’s harder to categorize some Management Board members’ aversion to biologically-based fishing mortality and biomass thresholds.

Because there was no clear consensus on whether the Management Board wanted to manage the striped bass stock for stability and abundance or for short-term yield, a motion was made to include a range of fishing mortality and spawning stock biomass reference points in the stock assessment, which the Management Board could later review when deciding upon the appropriate risk profile.

Doug Grout, a fisheries manager representing New Hampshire, attempted to amend that motion, to provide that the fishing mortality and spawning stock biomass thresholds be biologically-based, and not based on the 1995 level ofabundance, as is currently the case.  

Presumably, such biological reference points would be tied to the fishing mortality rate and spawning stock biomass calculated to produce maximum sustainable yield; the corresponding targets would be calculated to reflect the risk of overfishing, or producing an overfished stock, that the Management Board was willing to accept.

That seems logical, and is largely how federal fisheries are managed, in order to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks.  However, ASMFC is not subject to the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, so absent a clear mandate to set fishing mortality and spawning stock thresholds at sustainable levels, it is free to allow overfishing to occur (as it did in the most recent tautog management plan, which permits overfishing to continue in Long Island Sound until at least 2029) and does not require overfished stocks to be rebuilt by any predetermined deadline, if at all (also the case with Long Island Sound tautog, as well as for weakfish, Southern New England lobster and a number of other depleted stocks).

Thus, when the Management Board voted 9 to 6 against requiring that threshold reference points be biologically based, it provided real reason to worry that some members wanted the “flexibility” to allow overfishing and delay rebuilding the stock, should it ever become too small to produce maximum sustainable yield.

On the other hand, given that the 2011 stock assessment update revealed that Fmsy=0.34, and that unless such calculation changed, a biologically-based Fthreshold would equal 0.34 as well, it might turn out that non-biological reference points would set the threshold somewhat lower, and result in fewer fish being killed.  While the Management Board might have set Ftarget well below 0.34, in order to minimize risk to the stock, it also would have been free to set Ftarget=Fthreshold, even though that normally isn’t done.

Thus, the jury will remain out on this issue until the stock assessment is completed, and we see what set of reference points the Management Board actually prefers.

With respect to such Management Board action, this week’s meeting conveyed a bit of good news.  Going in, there was concern that the Management Board might adopt a set of reference points that would not fulfill the current goal of the management plan, which is

“To perpetuate, through cooperative interstate fishery management, migratory stocks of striped bass; to allow commercial and recreational fisheries consistent with the long-term maintenance of a broad age structure, a self-sustaining spawning stock; and also to provide for the restoration and management of their essential habitat.”
However, Max Appleman, ASMFC’s Fishery Management Plan Coordinator for Atlantic Striped Bass, reassured all present that

“the goal of this exercise [to recommend reference points] is to give the stock assessment team a starting point,”
and that any change to the fishery management plan goals, or to the current reference points, would have to be done through the customary adaptive management process, requiring an amendment or addendum and extensive public comment.

Thus, we’re all now in a waiting mode.

The stock assessment, which will include a range of reference points and an explanation of their consequences, will be prepared over the next few months, and peer-reviewed late this year.  It will probably be presented to the Management Board next February.

We can only guess what happens then.

There is the likelihood that a coalition of Chesapeake Bay jurisdictions, almost surely abetted by New Jersey and Delaware, will push for less conservative reference points, and an increased striped bass kill.

There is also a distinct possibility that the reference points ultimately provided in the stock assessment will not apply to the entire striped bass stock, and will instead be specific to each of the three sub-stocks (fish spawned in Chesapeake Bay, the Delaware River estuary and the Hudson River, although the Delaware and Hudson fish might, at least for a time, be combined).  If that occurs, some of the reference points may look very different from what we see now, even if they are substantially similar in effect.

Thus, for the next nine months or so, anglers concerned with the striped bass’ future won’t have too much to do. 

We need to keep our ears open, in case there are new developments.  We need to network, and get folks prepared for bad news.  And we need to again do what we did in 2014; get out and fight for the long-term health of the striper, once the draft addendum/amendment is finally released, and the inevitable effort to increase the kill begins.

No, tha fight never ends.  But at least this time, we’re coming off a win, and have something to defend.

Sunday, April 29, 2018

H.R. 200: THE PENDING THREAT



That’s not good news.

H.R. 200 is a very bad bill, that contains broad exceptions to current requirements that stocks be rebuilt within a time certain and that annual catch limits be established for nearly all managed stocks.  Worse such exceptions are so ambiguously worded that they could arguably be applied to just about any fish stock.

One provision would exempt from rebuilding deadlines

“…one or more components of a mixed-stock fishery [that] is depleted but cannot be rebuilt within that time-frame without significant economic harm to the fishery.”
That would pretty much be the kiss of death to any chance of rebuilding overfished cod or winter flounder stocks in the foreseeable future.

Another would exempt any

“stock that has been affected by any unusual event that make rebuilding within the specified time period improbable without significant economic harm to fishing communities.”
That one creates a loophole big enough to drive a truck through, because just about anything can be considered an “unusual event.” 

Climate-driven ocean warming is making the Gulf of Maine less hospitable to northeastern groundfish.  That’s never happened before.  Sounds like an “unusual event” that justifies delaying the rebuilding of all of those species until…who knows?  The bill doesn’t say.  Could be forever.

At least six consecutive years of below-average spawning success are causing the summer flounder stock to decline.  It’s not clear when good spawns might occur again, and it’s possible that flounder could become overfished.   Such a long period of poor reproduction could seem unusual, so if overfishing occurs, under H.R. 200, the stock wouldn’t have to be rebuilt any time soon.  Or, really, at any time.


H.R. 200 is written loosely enough to allow that to happen.
And H.R. is slowly making its way to the floor of the House of Representatives for a final vote.


Since being reported out of committee, H.R. 200 has lain dormant, awaiting the Congressional Budget Office’s action.  Now that it has received a favorable report—meaning that it will not have a meaningful impact on the federal deficit—the bill can be brought up on the floor for a vote.

That’s expected to happen in the next month or two, and there is little doubt that it will be approved. 

Unlike previous Magnuson-Stevens reauthorization bills, which represented broad bipartisan cooperation, H.R. 200 is an intensely partisan bill, written by Rep. Don Young (R-Alaska) and other members of the House majority, with little or no meaningful input from minority members.  It was voted out of committee on a party-line vote which presaged its eventual outcome on the House floor.

The good news is that no companion bill to H.R. 200 has yet emerged in the Senate, which even in today’s charged political environment maintains more of a deliberative, bipartisan nature than does the House.

Normally, that would mean that it was likely that H.R. 200, like its predecessor H.R. 1335, would bloom in the House, only to go to the Senate to die.



However, the anglers rights crowd were so desperate to increase their kill, and the industry folks were so hungry to increase their sales in the short term, that they supported folding the House Modern Fish Act into H.R. 200, regardless of the harm that the latter bill would do to fish stocks in the 
long term.


In the Senate, the Modern Fish Act took the form of S. 1520, which was a somewhat better bill than its House companion.  A markup that occurred in February toned it down quite a bit more, so that the bill reported out of the Senate committee was less a malign piece of legislation that would harm fish stocks and more of a mean-spirited one, that contained a number of provisions seemingly intended more to harm the commercial and charter fishing sectors than to help the recreational folks.

But the seemingly harmless S. 1520 could easily become a Trojan horse that leads to the defeat of the current federal fishery management system.

Should a majority of senators be convinced by the anglers’ rights groups’ blandishments that the bill is benign, and S. 1520 is passed, it is not at all unlikely that the Senate bill would be sent to conference along with H.R. 200, as the 115th Congress’ version of Magnuson-Stevens reauthorization.

At that point, all of the truly bad provisions of H.R. 200, including the more extreme House version of the Modern Fish Act, would be back in play, and could easily be included by the majority into an ostensible “compromise” bill that might be passed by both House and Senate.  

Should that happen, Magnuson-Stevens reauthorization, and a wholesale weakening of the key parts of current law, would be achieved through a back-door maneuver that provided little or no meaningful chance for consultation, deliberation and debate on the Senate side.

We could end up with a very bad bill becoming law, largely by default.

Thus, despite all of the upbeat propaganda about S. 1520, it is important that conservation-minded anglers contact their senators and let them know that those who speak in favor of S. 1520 do not speak for them. 

S. 1520 may seem harmless, but appearances can be deceptive.  In reality, it is a dangerous tool. 

It is a tool that critics of Magnuson-Stevens would use to pry open the doors of Congress, so that all that is bad in H.R. 200 can enter and destroy key provisions of federal fisheries law.

There is one way to keep that from happening.

To end the threat of H.R. 200, S. 1520—the Modern Fish Act—must not pass.

Thursday, April 26, 2018

NEXT STEPS FOR STRIPED BASS


The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission is preparing to put together a new benchmark stock assessment for striped bass.

That’s not unexpected, and it’s not a bad thing.  

Back in 2013, when the last benchmark stock assessment was completed, managers had already announced their intention to do a benchmark assessment of fishery at the end of the 2017 season.  Such regular assessments are the only way for fishery managers to learn whether the stock is doing well, or whether it’s having problems and management needs to change in order to put it back on the right track.

That’s what happened after the last assessment, which informed managers that they had to substantially lower the fishing mortality reference points—the target and the overfishing threshold—to keep the stock from becoming overfished and allow it to rebuild.

The reference points used to manage a fishery can be based on a number of factors.  Most often, they are based on the productivity of the stock. 

In federal fishery management plans, the fishing mortality threshold (Fthreshold) is normally the upper limit of sustainable harvest; that is, the level of fishing mortality that produces maximum sustainable yield.  Fishing at any rate above Fthreshold would be unsustainable, and would eventually cause abundance to decline; when fishing mortality exceeds Fthreshold, overfishing is said to occur.  The fishing mortality target (Ftarget) is typically set below Fthreshold; that can be done for many reasons, including to create a buffer that accounts for scientific and/or management uncertainty, to produce a greater abundance of fish and/or larger fish than would be available at Fthreshold, to allow more older fish to remain in the spawning stock, etc.

The biomass target (Btarget) generally represents the minimum number of fish needed to produce maximum sustainable yield; because it is a measure of productivity, and only mature fish can reproduce and perpetuate the stock, it is often expressed as a spawning stock biomass target (SSBtarget).  Fish populations fluctuate naturally, and seldom remain at or very near Btarget (or SSBtarget) for long; they are usually somewhat above or below that mark.  However, there are times that, usually because of fishing activity, populations fall to unusually low levels, and are deemed to be “overfished.”  The level at which that occurs is the biomass or spawning stock biomass threshold (Bthreshold or SSBthreshold, respectively).

In the case of striped bass, things work a little bit differently.  They are managed by the states through ASMFC, and not by federal fishery managers pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.  Thus, there is no legal provision that protects the striped bass from overfishing—that is, a harvest level that exceeds maximum sustainable yield—or, should the stock again become overfished, requires that it be rebuilt.  That being the case, there is no requirement tying Fthreshold or Btarget to maximum sustainable yield, or Bthreshold to an overfished stock.


Such set of reference points was in accord with the goal of Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, which is

“To perpetuate, through cooperative interstate fishery management, migratory stocks of striped bass; to allow commercial and recreational fisheries consistent with the long-term maintenance of a broad age structure, a self-sustaining spawning stock; and also to provide for the restoration and maintenance of their essential habitat.”

“…The current F target and threshold are those that will maintain the populations at the SSB target and threshold.
“Again, you can see…that F is well below both the target and threshold, as of the 2016 assessment.  There is a tradeoff between preserving spawning stock biomass and allowing fishing.  As we just heard, the Board has raised concern that the current biological reference points may be too conservative; for various biological, ecological, and socioeconomic reasons, and may be restricting fishing unnecessarily.  The current management objectives and acceptable risk levels were laid out in Amendment 6 to the striped bass FMP back in 2003.  The [Technical Committee] and [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] posed to the Board several questions.  Is the Board satisfied with the current management objectives, and acceptable risk levels, as laid out in Amendment 6?  Does the Board want to manage the stock to maximize yield, maximize catch rates, maximize the availability of trophy fish, and what is the acceptable level of risk when it comes to preventing stock collapse?”
Ms. Lengyei, speaking for the Technical Committee, suggested that the Management Board

“Develop and issue a survey for the Board to seek preferred direction for management, and preferred balance between spawning stock biomass and F…”
The results of such survey could then be used to provide guidance to those preparing the stock assessment, who might retain the current reference points, should that be the guidance, or instead develop less conservative reference points, should the guidance be to place greater emphasis on current harvest, and less on maintaining the long-term health of the stock.

There is no question that the Management Board has the power to change the goals and objectives of the striped bass management plan.  But one can easily question whether it is currently following the appropriate path to do so.

As noted by Capt. John McMurray, the legislative proxy from New York, in an objection raised at the meeting,

“…[I]f we do decide to revise the goals and objectives that were established in Amendment6, and put an emphasis on yield at the expense of opportunity, I’m pretty sure that needs to be at least an addendum, possibly an amendment…
“My concern here is that the public get a chance to weigh in on this; because I could tell you with some certainty that the New York recreational fishing public is not going to be okay with taking on more risk.  We really do need to consider the public when we do nd
However, McMurray’s concerns were given little consideration, they were essentially brushed off with the comment that

“The meetings will be open to the public, so as you go through this process they will have input through the process for that.”
But that’s not really true. 

There’s a big difference between traveling perhaps hundreds of miles to sit in the audience at a Management Board meeting (most are held in Alexandria, Virginia), where you will be given a very limited opportunity to provide any comment at all, and being given a full opportunity to provide written and oral comments at a site reasonably close to home, as would be the case if an addendum or amendment was proposed. 

If the Management Board is considering an action that may very well alter the core philosophy of the fishery management plan, and abandon management principles that have been in place—after long debate and deliberation—for fifteen years, the public should be allowed every possible opportunity to weigh in.

That’s particularly important now, because it seems that the Management Board itself doesn’t know what it wants to do.  The survey contemplated last October was in fact prepared and sent out but, as ASMFC reports,

“the survey was unable to identify an overwhelming majority regarding overall satisfaction with management of striped bass under Amendment 6 (including the management triggers), or with the current reference points.”
However,

“Across all respondents, ‘managing F to maintain an age structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long term abundance of striped bass populations’ stood out as the most important management objective.  ‘Broad age structure with high abundance of larger, older fish’ and ‘high abundance of market size fish’ were among the top three factors of a quality and viable fishery across all respondents.”
Of those three preferred factors, only the last is arguably inconsistent with the current goal of Amendment 6 as well as the current reference points.  Even in the case of the third factor, “high abundance of market sized fish,” it could easily be argued that the current reference points are most likely to assure continued abundance of such “market sized fish,” even if those reference points would prevent the harvest of such fish from increasing substantially.

The lack of clear majority support for any management objective inconstant with the current goal and reference points, the general agreement on the need to maintain a resilient and well-stratified spawning stock and the Management Board’s clear moral, if not legal, obligation to allow full public participation in any decision to alter Amendment 6’s current goal, militates against any change in the current reference points absent a public mandate.

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that ASMFC will agree.

Thus, anglers are well-advised to stay on top of the issue, and inform their ASMFC representatives of their preferences and concerns before the Management Board meets on May 1.