Sunday, November 15, 2026

AT THE ASMFC: KNOW HOW TO COUNT

 

For 17 years, ending in 2014, I was very active, at both the state and the national level, with the Coastal Conservation Association.  During those years, I had the opportunity to speak with, work with, and learn from the Association’s national lobbyist, who taught me most of what I know about fisheries advocacy.

And one of his first lessons was that, when fisheries managers—whether a regional fishery management council, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, or a state management body—is going to make a decision on an important issue, one of the most important skills that a conservation advocate must have is to know how to count.  More precisely, how to count the people on the management panel who are likely to support your position, likely to oppose it, or who are sitting on the fence and might go either way—and thus are the key to getting the result that you want.

I started thinking about that the other day, after the ASMFC’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board voted in favor of making disappointingly small reductions in the coastwide annual catch limit and, in response, many in the angling and conservation communities responded indignantly, accusing Management Board members of ignoring the science at best, and outright corruption at worst.

I found that reaction, particularly when it came from experienced members of the advocacy community, somewhat surprising, as a simple count of the Management Board members should have made them aware that such an outcome wasn’t unlikely.

And “corruption” had little or nothing to do with it.

First, they should have identified the 18 members of the Management Board.  They are

Maine

New Hampshire

Massachusetts

Rhode Island

Connecticut

New York

New Jersey

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Maryland

The Potomac River Fisheries Commission

Virginia

North Carolina

South Carolina

Georgia

Florida

The National Marine Fisheries Service

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service

Their next step should have been to figure out how those states and other entities might be inclined to vote, and why.  Given that there are 18 members of the Management Board, absent any absences, abstentions, or null votes, it takes at least 10 votes for a motion to pass; 9 votes would result in a tie and the motion failing.

So the advocates job was figuring out how to round up those 10 critical votes.

Looking at the list, it wasn’t hard to spot the members most likely to oppose meaningful harvest reductions.  They included:

Virginia and New Jersey, which both support large menhaden fisheries, with Virginia’s by far the largest.  The two states have the largest menhaden quota allocations on the entire East Coast, 75.21% and 11.00%, respectively, and the menhaden fishery makes a significant contribution to both states’ marine economies.  During the years 2018 through 2025, Virginia was responsible for between 68.82% and 80.79% of all Atlantic menhaden landings, while New Jersey’s share ranged between 10.62% and 14.7% of such landings.  At the October 2025 Management Board meeting, both states supported a motion to reduce the 2026, 2027, and 2028 annual catch limits by only 20%, far too little to have a 50% probability of reducing fishing mortality to the target level and roughly equal to menhaden landings in recent years.

Maine and New Hampshire, which need menhaden to provide bait for their lobster fishermen, now that Atlantic herring, the formerly preferred bait, have become too scarce to serve as the primary bait source.  Maine is allocated a quota equal to 4.80% of the annual catch limit, third behind Virginia and New Jersey, while New Hampshire’s 1.19% quota allocation is the fifty-largest on the coast.  In addition, the states receive millions of pounds in additional menhaden quota transfers from other states.  During the aforementioned 2018-2025 period, Maine was responsible for between 3.48% and 9.95% of Atlantic menhaden landings, while New Hampshire share of coastwide landings was not disclosed in order to preserve the confidentiality of its few menhaden fishermen, although it was known to exceed the state’s quota allocation, sometimes by well over 100%, in five of the eight years.  In 2025, both Maine and New Hampshire also supported the motion to reduce the 2026, 2027, and 2028 catch limits by just 20%.

The National Marine Fisheries Service and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service are both administrative agencies that are part of the Trump administration.  As such, they are subject to Trump’s Executive Order 14276, “Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness,” issued on April 17, 2025, which lamented the restrictions affecting the commercial fishing industry and sought to largely deregulate the commercial fishing industry.  Both agencies voted to support the 20% reduction as well.

Given those members’ motivations, and their votes at the October 2025 Management Board meeting, they could reasonably be considered hard noes on any vote to reduce the 2027, 2028, and 2029 annual catch limits to 114,200 metric tons, the maximum level that would provide at least a 50% probability of reducing fishing mortality to the target level, and probably on any vote to meaningfully reduce menhaden landings.

So, the pool of members that might have supported a meaningful landings reduction at last week’s meeting was reduced, even before the meeting began, from 18 to 12. 

The chances of achieving a 10-vote majority then hinged on a far smaller number of members.

On the plus side, at the October 2025 meeting, six members—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina—opposed the initial motion to substitute the 20% reduction for a three-year  annual catch limit of 108,450 metric tons, the level that would have provided a 50% probability of reducing fishing mortality to the target level if adopted for the 2026, 2027, and 2028 seasons, so it is reasonable to assume that they would have also supported a significant harvest reduction for the 2027, 2028, and 2029 fishing years.

However, it is not clear that every one of those states would be willing to cut landings all the way back to 114,200 metric tons in 2027.

Given that Maryland was concerned with the difficulty its pound netters were having finding menhaden, it might well have been willing to make such a big one-year cut, and given that Connecticut’s fishery managers made the motion to cut 2026 landings to 108,450 metric tons, Connecticut could probably be depended on to support similar cuts in 2027.  But Massachusetts, in particular, clearly expressed concern about taking the entire reduction in only one year, and eventually made a motion to phase it in over the 2026, 2027, and 2028 fishing seasons.

Still, for purposes of vote-counting, it seemed that there were at least six Management Board members that were willing to support substantial landings reductions of some kind, even if they didn’t take all of the reductions in a single year.

Thus, the hard for-and-against votes seemed to be balanced, with six likely to be opposed to any substantial reductions and six in favor. 

When Massachusetts eventually made a motion to phase in the landings reduction over the 2026, 2027, and 2028 seasons, it was supported by New York as well, so going into the November 2026 Management Board meeting, advocates on both sides could reasonably believe that the final decisions on reduction was going to hinge on just five Management Board members—Delaware, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, all of which, in October 2025, favored the 20% reduction over a reduction—whether in one year or phased in—to a level that would ultimately provide a 50% probability of eventually reducing landings to the target level.

None of them supported Massachusetts’ motion to phase in the reduction, when that motion was made in October 2025.

That suggested that a significant reduction might not be approved at last week’s meeting, either, though from what I could see, a lot of people weren’t paying much attention to history, and expected the same cast of characters to put on a very different show.

None of the five swing-vote members were significant players in the menhaden fishery.  The Potomac River Fisheries Commission had the highest quota allocation, at 1.09% of the coastwide catch limit; the other allocations were 0.29% for Florida, 0.27% for Delaware, and 0.25% for South Carolina and Georgia. 

Actual landings were even less significant.  For the 2018-2025 period, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission’s landings ranged between 0.05% and 0.83% of the coastwide total, while Florida’s ranged from 0.01% to 0.06% of the total, Delaware’s were anywhere between 0.01% and 0.04%, and South Carolina’s and Georgia’s were, like New Hampshire, unreported for confidentiality reasons.

Yet, despite such tiny landings levels, those states’ votes carried the same weight as the votes cast by Virginia, New Jersey, and Maine.

To prevail, pro-landings reduction advocates had to convince three of the five states to vote their way; those who preferred the status quo needed to convince four.  While there were no comments made by the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, Delaware, South Carolina, or Florida at the October 2025 meeting to provide insights into their thoughts, Douglas Haymans, Georgia’s fisheries manager, said that

“I’m having a real difficult time with 20% in perpetuity or at least for the next three years.  I also have a difficulty taking a 50% cut over three years,”

suggesting that he was not going to be particularly receptive to the pro-landings reduction advocates’ position this year, even though he would probably be willing to support something other than the status quo.  At the same time, he also stated,

“We’ve heard through our e-mails a lot of impacts that each reduction might get but it’s varying sides of the industries or the recreational.  But I would like to hear from the [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] the number of jobs involved in both the reduction fishery and the bait fishery, as well as the recreational side, and what the true impact of a reduction may be to the number of jobs in those.  I would like to see that for next year’s meeting.”

That suggests that Mr. Haymans still had an open mind, and wasn’t staunchly opposed to reducing fishing mortality to the target level, if such action was justified by economic analysis.

As far as I know, the Stock Assessment Subcommittee never provided the requested analysis of how the reduction to 114,200 metric tons would have impacted the reduction, bait, and recreational fishing industries, and it’s not clear that Mr. Haymans would have accepted an analysis from a non-neutral source.  Still, we have to wonder how the vote might have turned out if the various advocates for meaningful harvest reduction had taken the money they threw into videos of the industrial fishing fleet, and instead invested that cash into the sort of economic analysis that Mr. Haymans described.

Such an analysis wouldn’t have generated 43,000 form letters that the Management Board might later ignore, but could it have generated just three more votes—not just Georgia but, if distributed to all five swing-vote members, perhaps at least three of the entities that were needed to vote in favor of getting fishing mortality down to something close to the target by 2029?

We’ll never know.

And we’ll never know whether the various advocacy groups might have accomplished their goal if they spent more time talking to the members of swing-vote jurisdictions, rather than talking to reporters, videographers, and public relations pros.

What we do know is that, when Massachusetts again made a motion to phase in reductions at last week’s meeting, it won the support of Florida, but was opposed by Delaware, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, South Carolina, and Georgia, and so the motion failed on a vote of 8 in favor, 10 opposed. 

If the various advocacy groups had worked harder at making their case to all the Management Board members, who had the authority to decide the issue, rather than to the general public, who had no authority at all, would the outcome have been any different?

It’s impossible to say.

But if just two of the four swing-vote jurisdictions that voted against Massachusetts’ phase-in proposal had voted the other way, the pro-landings reduction advocates would have prevailed.

And so, we have to wonder whether those advocates ever bothered to count the votes, decide who was still on the fence, and put in the time to convince those critical jurisdictions, that catch very few menhaden but cast very important votes, to support meaningful reductions in landings, or whether they focused more on wasting their time trying to inflame then public against the menhaden industry, just as they now seem to be trying to inflame the public against the ASMFC and the Management Board.

Rather than throwing a tantrum because the vote didn’t go their way, will the advocacy groups engage in a bit of introspection, and ask themselves whether they took the time to analyze which members represented the crucial swing votes, and whether they did enough of the hard work and put in enough of the time needed to create focused appeals intended to address the concerns of each on-the-fence state?

Or, to put it more simply, did they attempt to personally contact and try to sway the folks comprising, say, the Georgia and South Carolina delegations even once?

Although I admittedly don’t know for certain, my guess is that the answer is no.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No comments:

Post a Comment