For 17 years, ending in 2014, I was very active, at both the
state and the national level, with the Coastal Conservation Association. During those years, I had the opportunity to speak
with, work with, and learn from the Association’s national lobbyist, who taught
me most of what I know about fisheries advocacy.
And one of his first lessons was that, when fisheries managers—whether
a regional fishery management council, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission, or a state management body—is going to make a decision on an
important issue, one of the most important skills that a conservation advocate must
have is to know how to count. More
precisely, how to count the people on the management panel who are likely to
support your position, likely to oppose it, or who are sitting on the fence and
might go either way—and thus are the key to getting the result that you want.
I started thinking about that the other day, after the ASMFC’s
Atlantic Menhaden Management Board voted in favor of making disappointingly
small reductions in the coastwide annual catch limit and, in response, many in
the angling and conservation communities responded indignantly, accusing
Management Board members of ignoring the science at best, and outright
corruption at worst.
I found that reaction, particularly when it came from
experienced members of the advocacy community, somewhat surprising, as a simple
count of the Management Board members should have made them aware that such an
outcome wasn’t unlikely.
And “corruption” had little or nothing to do with it.
First, they should have identified the 18 members of the
Management Board. They are
Maine
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
The Potomac River Fisheries Commission
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
The National Marine Fisheries Service
The United States Fish and Wildlife
Service
Their next step should have been to figure out how those states
and other entities might be inclined to vote, and why. Given that there are 18 members of the
Management Board, absent any absences, abstentions, or null votes, it takes at
least 10 votes for a motion to pass; 9 votes would result in a tie and the
motion failing.
So the advocates job was figuring out how to round up those
10 critical votes.
Looking at the list, it wasn’t hard to spot the members most
likely to oppose meaningful harvest reductions.
They included:
Virginia and New Jersey,
which both support large menhaden fisheries, with Virginia’s by far the largest. The two states have the largest menhaden
quota allocations on the entire East Coast, 75.21% and 11.00%, respectively,
and the menhaden fishery makes a significant contribution to both states’ marine
economies. During
the years 2018 through 2025, Virginia was responsible for between 68.82% and
80.79% of all Atlantic menhaden landings, while New Jersey’s share ranged
between 10.62% and 14.7% of such landings.
At
the October 2025 Management Board meeting, both states supported a motion to reduce
the 2026, 2027, and 2028 annual catch limits by only 20%, far too little to have
a 50% probability of reducing fishing mortality to the target level and roughly
equal to menhaden landings in recent years.
Maine and New Hampshire, which need
menhaden to provide bait for their lobster fishermen, now that Atlantic herring,
the formerly preferred bait, have become too scarce to serve as the primary
bait source. Maine is allocated a quota
equal to 4.80% of the annual catch limit, third behind Virginia and New Jersey,
while New Hampshire’s 1.19% quota allocation is the fifty-largest on the coast. In addition, the
states receive millions of pounds in additional menhaden quota transfers from
other states. During the aforementioned
2018-2025 period, Maine was responsible for between 3.48% and 9.95% of Atlantic
menhaden landings, while New Hampshire share of coastwide landings was not
disclosed in order to preserve the confidentiality of its few menhaden
fishermen, although it was known to exceed the state’s quota allocation,
sometimes by well over 100%, in five of the eight years. In
2025, both Maine and New Hampshire also supported the motion to reduce the 2026,
2027, and 2028 catch limits by just 20%.
The
National Marine Fisheries Service and the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service are both administrative agencies that are part of the Trump
administration. As such, they are
subject to Trump’s Executive Order 14276, “Restoring American Seafood
Competitiveness,” issued on April 17, 2025, which lamented the restrictions
affecting the commercial fishing industry and sought to largely deregulate the
commercial fishing industry. Both
agencies voted to support the 20% reduction as well.
Given those members’ motivations, and their votes at the October
2025 Management Board meeting, they could reasonably be considered hard noes on
any vote to reduce the 2027, 2028, and 2029 annual catch limits to 114,200
metric tons, the maximum level that would provide at least a 50% probability of
reducing fishing mortality to the target level, and probably on any vote to meaningfully
reduce menhaden landings.
So, the pool of members that might have supported a
meaningful landings reduction at last week’s meeting was reduced, even before
the meeting began, from 18 to 12.
The chances of achieving a 10-vote majority then hinged on a
far smaller number of members.
On
the plus side, at the October 2025 meeting, six members—Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina—opposed the initial
motion to substitute the 20% reduction for a three-year annual catch limit of 108,450 metric tons,
the level that would have provided a 50% probability of reducing fishing
mortality to the target level if adopted for the 2026, 2027, and 2028 seasons,
so it is reasonable to assume that they would have also supported a significant
harvest reduction for the 2027, 2028, and 2029 fishing years.
However, it is not clear that every one of those states
would be willing to cut landings all the way back to 114,200 metric tons in
2027.
Given that Maryland was concerned with the difficulty its
pound netters were having finding menhaden, it might well have been willing to
make such a big one-year cut, and given that Connecticut’s fishery managers
made the motion to cut 2026 landings to 108,450 metric tons, Connecticut could
probably be depended on to support similar cuts in 2027. But Massachusetts,
in particular, clearly expressed concern about taking the entire reduction in
only one year, and eventually made a motion to phase it in over the 2026, 2027,
and 2028 fishing seasons.
Still, for purposes of vote-counting, it seemed that there
were at least six Management Board members that were willing to support
substantial landings reductions of some kind, even if they didn’t take all of
the reductions in a single year.
Thus, the hard for-and-against votes seemed to be balanced,
with six likely to be opposed to any substantial reductions and six in favor.
When
Massachusetts eventually made a motion to phase in the landings reduction over
the 2026, 2027, and 2028 seasons, it was supported by New York as well, so
going into the November 2026 Management Board meeting, advocates on both sides
could reasonably believe that the final decisions on reduction was going to
hinge on just five Management Board members—Delaware,
the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida,
all of which, in October 2025, favored the 20% reduction over a reduction—whether
in one year or phased in—to a level that would ultimately provide a 50% probability
of eventually reducing landings to the target level.
That suggested that a significant reduction might not be
approved at last week’s meeting, either, though from what I could see, a lot of
people weren’t paying much attention to history, and expected the same cast of
characters to put on a very different show.
None of the five swing-vote members were significant players
in the menhaden fishery. The Potomac River Fisheries
Commission had the highest quota allocation, at 1.09% of the coastwide catch
limit; the other allocations were 0.29% for Florida, 0.27% for Delaware, and
0.25% for South Carolina and Georgia.
Yet, despite such tiny landings levels, those states’ votes
carried the same weight as the votes cast by Virginia, New Jersey, and Maine.
To prevail, pro-landings reduction advocates had to convince
three of the five states to vote their way; those who preferred the status quo
needed to convince four. While
there were no comments made by the Potomac River Fisheries Commission,
Delaware, South Carolina, or Florida at the October 2025 meeting to provide
insights into their thoughts, Douglas Haymans, Georgia’s fisheries manager, said
that
“I’m having a real difficult time with 20% in perpetuity or
at least for the next three years. I
also have a difficulty taking a 50% cut over three years,”
suggesting that he was not going to be particularly
receptive to the pro-landings reduction advocates’ position this year, even though
he would probably be willing to support something other than the status quo. At the same time, he also stated,
“We’ve heard through our e-mails a lot of impacts that each
reduction might get but it’s varying sides of the industries or the
recreational. But I would like to hear
from the [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] the number of jobs involved in both
the reduction fishery and the bait fishery, as well as the recreational side,
and what the true impact of a reduction may be to the number of jobs in
those. I would like to see that for next
year’s meeting.”
That suggests that Mr. Haymans still had an open mind, and
wasn’t staunchly opposed to reducing fishing mortality to the target level, if
such action was justified by economic analysis.
As far as I know, the Stock Assessment Subcommittee never
provided the requested analysis of how the reduction to 114,200 metric tons would
have impacted the reduction, bait, and recreational fishing industries, and it’s
not clear that Mr. Haymans would have accepted an analysis from a non-neutral
source. Still, we have to wonder how the
vote might have turned out if the various advocates for meaningful harvest
reduction had taken the money they threw into videos of the industrial fishing
fleet, and instead invested that cash into the sort of economic analysis that
Mr. Haymans described.
Such an analysis wouldn’t have generated 43,000 form letters
that the Management Board might later ignore, but could it have generated just three
more votes—not just Georgia but, if distributed to all five swing-vote members,
perhaps at least three of the entities that were needed to vote in favor of getting
fishing mortality down to something close to the target by 2029?
We’ll never know.
And we’ll never know whether the various advocacy groups
might have accomplished their goal if they spent more time talking to the members
of swing-vote jurisdictions, rather than talking to reporters, videographers,
and public relations pros.
What we do know is that, when Massachusetts
again made a motion to phase in reductions at last week’s meeting, it won the
support of Florida, but was opposed by Delaware, the Potomac River Fisheries
Commission, South Carolina, and Georgia, and so the motion failed on a vote of
8 in favor, 10 opposed.
If the various advocacy groups had worked harder at making
their case to all the Management Board members, who had the
authority to decide the issue, rather than to the general public, who had no
authority at all, would the outcome have been any different?
It’s impossible to say.
But if just two of the four swing-vote jurisdictions that
voted against Massachusetts’ phase-in proposal had voted the other way, the pro-landings
reduction advocates would have prevailed.
And so, we have to wonder whether those advocates ever bothered
to count the votes, decide who was still on the fence, and put in the time to convince those critical jurisdictions, that catch very few menhaden but cast
very important votes, to support meaningful reductions in landings, or whether
they focused more on wasting their time trying to inflame then public against
the menhaden industry, just as they now seem to be trying to inflame the public
against the ASMFC and the Management Board.
Rather than throwing a tantrum because the vote didn’t go
their way, will the advocacy groups engage in a bit of introspection, and ask
themselves whether they took the time to analyze which members represented the
crucial swing votes, and whether they did enough of the hard work and put in enough
of the time needed to create focused appeals intended to address the concerns
of each on-the-fence state?
Or, to put it more simply, did they attempt to personally contact
and try to sway the folks comprising, say, the Georgia and South Carolina
delegations even once?
Although I admittedly don’t know for certain, my guess is
that the answer is no.
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