Sunday, April 8, 2018

FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: CHECKS AND BALANCES


Somewhere back in grade school, we all learned that the United States government is composed of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches. All three branches have equal standing; none is superior to the others.
Article I of the Constitution of the United States vested all legislative power in the Senate and House of Representatives. Article IIdefined the powers and duties of the President and executive agencies, while Article III created the Supreme Court and gave Congress the power to create the judicial system of federal district courts and courts of appeals that we know today. Yet, while Article III authorized the federal courts to decide cases “arising under this Constitution,” it did not expressly grant the Supreme Court to make the ultimate decision as to whether an executive or legislative action passed constitutional muster; the court first asserted that power in 1803, when it decided the case of Marbury v. Madison, and has wielded it ever since.

The Constitution’s grants of exclusive authority to each branch of government created a system of checks and balances, in which every branch has unique powers that allow it to limit the actions taken by either of the other two branches.

The need for such a separation of powers is frequently raised in political debates, but many anglers don’t realize that it’s important for fisheries management, too.
It all begins with the Legislative Branch which, in 1976, first passed the law that we now know as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens). The 1976 version, known simply as the Fishery Conservation and Management Act, forced most foreign fishing vessels to stay at least 200 miles from United States shores, but was not effective at conserving fish stocks. In 1996, Congress amended the law to better address conservation concerns.

The 1996 version of Magnuson-Stevens prohibited overfishing, and required federal fishery managers to rebuild overfished stocks within 10 years, if it was biologically possible to do so.
At that point, it became the duty of the Executive Branch, in the form of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to transform the will of Congress, as expressed in Magnuson-Stevens, into a functioning fishery management program.
At first, NMFS didn’t do that very well.
In order to end overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, NMFS would have to compel fishermen to stop overfishing and reduce their landings to levels that fish stocks could sustain over the long term. Fishermen didn’t want that to happen, because reducing landings would also reduce their incomes, at least in the short term. Because fishermen held most of the seats on the regional fishery management councils that drafted the management plans and proposed fisheries regulations to NMFS, and most of those fishermen didn’t want to see landings reduced, the conservation provisions of Magnuson-Stevens were not immediately implemented.
Things finally came to a head in 1999, after the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC), acting against scientific advice, established a catch limit for summer flounder that was very unlikely to prevent overfishing.
That’s where the third branch of government, the Judicial Branch, played its role.
The facts of the matter were not in dispute. The biologists on MAFMC’s Summer Flounder, Scup and Black Sea Bass Monitoring Committee (Monitoring Committee) recommended that 1999 summer flounder landings be limited to 14.645 million pounds, but the MAFMC rejected that advice, and adopted a 20.20 million pound quota. However, NMFS refused to implement the MAFMC’s proposed quota because, if it did, there was only a 3% chance that overfishing wouldn’t occur.

Instead, NMFS decided to implement an 18.52 million pound quota, which was still significantly higher than the Monitoring Committee’s recommendation, and had only an 18% chance of preventing overfishing.
In response to what seemed to be a clear violation of both the letter and the spirit of the recent amendments to Magnuson-Stevens, a conservation group, the Natural Resources Defense Council, brought a legal action against the Secretary of Commerce, who had the ultimate responsibility for NMFS’ actions, and against other related parties.
The matter, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Daley, eventually ended up in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where the court decided that the Executive Branch, in the form of NMFS, failed to properly carry out its duties as defined in the relevant legislation, which was Magnuson-Stevens.

The court, interpreting the language of Magnuson-Stevens, decided that NMFS must prioritize effective conservation measures above economic concerns. Most importantly, it found that, in order to meet the requirements of federal law, measures adopted by NMFS, including annual catch quotas, must have at least a 50% chance of achieving their stated goals.
In a scathing rejection of NMFS’ proposed quota, the court observed that “The disputed 1999 [landings quota] had at most an 18% likelihood of achieving the target [fishing mortality rate]. Viewed differently, it had at least an 82% chance of resulting in [a fishing mortality rate] greater than the target [fishing mortality rate]. Only in Superman Comics’ Bizarro World, where reality is turned upside-down, could [NMFS] reasonably conclude that a measure that is at least four times as likely to fail as to succeed offers a ‘fairly high level of confidence’ [in its success].”
Thus, the system of checks and balances worked just as intended, with the Legislative Branch passing Magnuson-Stevens, the Executive Branch failing to properly comply with the law, and the Judicial Branch interpreting the Legislative Branch’s actions and, in so doing, requiring the Executive Branch to correct and improve its management system.
We need to think about that this year, as Congress considers new amendments to Magnuson-Stevens, because effective fishery management that rebuilds and conserves the nation’s fish stocks begins with a strong and effective federal fisheries law. Without a good legislative base on which the judiciary can build, fish stocks are left vulnerable to executive agency actions.
We saw an example of that last year.
Upon taking office, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross expressed his desire to obtain “maximum sustainable yield from our fisheries,” and at the same time, he spoke of the need to “relieve the current burden of regulation that has shifted American economic growth overseas and made us uncompetitive on the world stage.”

In 2017, Secretary Ross turned his beliefs into action when he authorized the reopening of the 2017 red snapper season for private-boat anglers in the Gulf of Mexico, largely for economic reasons, even though staff had clearly informed him that such action would cause anglers to exceed their annual catch limit by forty percent.

Once again, an executive agency’s action violated Magnuson-Stevens’ prohibition against overfishing, and once again, conservation advocates asked the judiciary to intervene. In this instance, the season ended too soon to allow the court to take any action; however, the court ultimately retained jurisdiction over the matter, to prevent the agency from ignoring the law, with respect to red snapper, in 2018.

Yet the possibility that NMFS will violate the law again, with respect to another fishery, remains.
In March 2018, NMFS’ head Chris Oliver addressed the Seafood Expo North America, a commercial fishing industry event held in Boston where, according to the industry publication Undercurrent News, “he made it clear that he was using his leadership role to both follow the administration’s charge to combat excessive regulation and also looking out for harvesters.”

Mr. Oliver reportedly reaffirmed his support for science-based management, but also said that “I also believe that there is room for flexibility and a greater role for common sense frankly in our approach to fishery management. And I want to bring a more business-minded approach to that process.”
Over all, the tone of Mr. Oliver’s comments was far too reminiscent of NMFS’s tone in 1999, when it set the summer flounder quota, and the comments that accompanied the reopening of the 2017 red snapper season. Such an agency outlook can easily lead to agency actions that don’t comply with the law.

Thus, to keep the system of checks and balances intact, it is important to have strong fisheries laws that can be readily enforced by the courts. Pending legislation, such as H.R. 200, the Strengthening Fishing Communities and Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries Management Act, along with H.R. 2023 and S. 1520, the Modernizing Recreational Fisheries Management Act, chip away at such laws by granting the executive agency too much discretion to allow overfishing and delay the rebuilding of overfished stocks.

Both H.R. 200 and Mr. Oliver call that “flexibility,” but what it is, in fact, is the sort of legal uncertainty that makes it much more difficult for the courts to protect the public’s interest in healthy fish stocks.
Without the checks and balances provided by clear legislation, which the judiciary can easily enforce, we could easily revert to the days when an executive agency such as NMFS again believed that a management plan with a mere 18% chance of success came close enough for government work, although it never really came close at all.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/


Thursday, April 5, 2018

ANOTHER SKIRMISH IN THE RESOURCE WARS


Perspective is important.

Without it, it’s tough to see how things tie together, and events can easily seem to be either more or less important than they actually are.

That’s certainly true in the fisheries world, where rational dialogue is too often replaced by an unreasoned emotion that fuels angry crowds, every time a management decision doesn’t turn out the way someone might prefer.

Here in New York, we’ve come to expect at least one blowup each spring, as regulations for fish such as fluke (a/k/a “summer flounder”), scup and black sea bass are reviewed and revised, and the new rules for at least one of those species inevitably upsets someone.

This year, black sea bass triggered the blowup, as a combination of a bad allocation decision at the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, high harvest levels, the decline of the dominant 2011 year class of fish and, perhaps, managers’ failure to take adequate account of what looks like another good year class in 2015 caused tightened regulations in 2018.

But here’s where the perspective comes in.

The blowup seemed to be big, but only occurred in one state—New York—even though the three other northeastern states, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, were looking at similarly tightened rules.  And almost all of the loud voices and assorted vulgarity belonged to a small sector of New York’s angling community—mostly members of its party boat fleet—with representatives of other sectors either more politely unhappy with the situation or, in the case of most, not caring enough to come out and complain.

So while many newspapers carried stories of fishermen’s discontent, and various appointed and elected officials made the necessary acknowledgement of the complainers’ concerns, there was a lot more sound and fury than substance to the entire event.  And even if the party boats win a concession this year, it will likely come at the price of greater restrictions—which will spawn even more complaining—in 2019.

But—and here’s where perspective plays a role once again—that would be nothing new, not only in the context of fisheries issues, but in the context of America’s ongoing war over how to manage its natural resources.  


In the end, although the fight is over resources, it is primarily about philosophy.  It pits those who effectively believe, whether they realize it or not, in Aldo Leopold’s assertion that we should

“Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right; as well as what is economically expedient.  A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise,”
against those who, with adjustments for the particular resource and means of extraction, are ardent supporters of “Drill, baby, drill;” people who see fish, land and timber, and everything else, as nothing more than a vehicle for personal and corporate profit.

For a very long time, that was the only way that natural resources were valued.  

From the time the first European colonists sunk roots into the New World’s soil, they began to fill in Manhattan’s extensive marshes, built dams that blocked shad, herring, and salmon from their spawning grounds and killed and marketed anything that could swim, walk, or fly, from cod and Atlantic right whales to canvasback ducks and American bison.

Somewhere along the way, we lost the Eskimo curlew and passenger pigeon, after a few too many were shot, packed in barrels, and shipped to the cities; east of the Mississippi River, elk, gray wolves, mountain lions and bison were wiped from the earth.  Ancient forests were cut down for timber, thousands of years of prairie soils eroded away and, in Cleveland, Ohio, the Cuyahoga River caught fire.

Some of those things might have been inconvenient, but they all made someone money, and so were deemed good.

But not everyone felt that way.  Beginning in the late 1800s, people began to see the need to conserve the lands, the waters and the life that remained, and with their efforts, the natural resources wars began.


Outside the parks, the fighting heated up pretty quickly.  One of the biggest battles was fought over market hunting for ducks and geese.  

On one hand, such market hunting was a tradition that dated back to the earliest settlers, and the commercial gunners strongly resented anyone who tried to end the practice; on the other hand, the number of ducks was steadily declining, even though abundance was still fairly high, and sportsmen saw that the days of unrestricted gunning were over.

Even so, the market gunners weren’t willing to give up their trade; anyone who tried to compel them to do so was likely to be physically threatened, if not attacked.  In Arkansas, market hunters twice burned down a sportsmen’s club, and shot the club’s game warden no less than twelve times.  But, eventually, those who wanted to see ducks in their future prevailed, when Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 and gave waterfowl needed protection.

Since then, there have been other battles, and no obvious end to the war, which arguably entered its “modern phase” in the late 1980s, when loggers in the Pacific Northwest threatened that region’s last old-growth forests, which were the home of the endangered Northern spotted owl.

The logging industry was already struggling to survive, and loggers claimed that they had to cut down the old trees to stay in business, while biologists argued that such cutting lead to the owls’ extinction.  The timber companies rejected efforts to reach a compromise that would leave some stands of timber untouched; they claimed that any such compromise

“tied up too much forest and would impose major economic hardships.”

“Given that the industry had slowed its rate of clearing trees, and has even attempted to sell back logging rights to the Forest Service, this is a curious claim.”
The loggers were also facing the reality that, if they continued to cut the old-growth forest, they would run out of the big trees in no more than 15 years; even so, they refused to accept the long-term truth.  They clung to the claim that their business depended on cutting the old-growth timber, seemingly denying the fact that, whatever happened with the owls, change was inevitably going to come.  It was almost as if they had made a conscious decision to ignore the future, and focus only on the short term.

Of course, the fact that they didn’t want anyone telling them what they could and couldn’t do was almost certainly part of the picture.

That sort of stubbornness certainly played a role in one of the more recent resource war battles, the standoff at the Bundy ranch in Nevada.

Cliven Bundy, owner of the ranch, doesn’t like anyone—particularly the government—telling him what to do.  That attitude brought him into direct conflict with the federal authorities, beginning in 1993, when the Bureau of Land Management began buying back outstanding grazing leases in order to protect habitat needed by the threatened desert tortoise.

Bundy refused to sell his grazing rights back to the feds, continued to graze his cattle on what is now federal land, and refused to pay any fines imposed for such illegal actions.  And he was not alone in his displeasure.  According to a story published in USA Today, and quoted in the Washington Post,

“ranchers who say that they can’t afford to graze livestock without access to public land are taking matters into their own hands—setting up what some officials fear is an inevitable and dangerous confrontation.”
The dispute went on in the courts, in the BLM and on the land for over twenty years.  Finally, in 2014, the BLM had had enough, and began preparing to confiscate Bundy’s illegally-grazing cattle.  Bundy family members and armed, self-proclaimed “militia” members gathered on the Bundy ranch to confront the government agents.  Hoping to avoid violence, the government backed down for the moment, although Bundy was eventually arrested, then freed after the judge declared a mistrial.

In both the Bundy case and that of the loggers, individuals demanded to access public resources, and incidentally put species at risk, in the name of a dubious economic necessity.

Which brings us back to black sea bass here in New York.

While New York got a bad deal at ASMFC, the data supporting the overall catch limit is sound, and based on a benchmark stock assessment that was completed less than 18 months ago.  So the only choices that New York really has is to accept ASMFC’s action, or to appeal it in accordance with ASMFC policy and current law.  To do anything else would risk overfishing, and not be in the long-term interests of fish or fishermen.

However, folks who live in the short-term don't care about the impacts of overfishing at all.


“No reduction is acceptable!”

“None of the options currently suggested are anything that we can work with,”
even though all were designed to allow the largest permissible harvest, without overfishing the stock.  As noted in one Long Island daily, Newsday,

“They rejected the state’s plan to choose one of the seven options to manage the black sea bass fishery under the [required] reduction.  Instead, they demanded that officials do more to increase the quota—even if it means violating the regulations.  The room broke into raucous applause at the prospect.”
They applauded because violating regulations designed to maintain healthy fish stocks would represent a big win in the resource wars.  At least, it would if you believe that the best way to promote recreational fishing is to advertise a “sea bass and ling beat down,” (or, on another boat that apparently found fewer ling, an “offshore sea bass beat down”) and thus let your customers know that they should value a big short-term kill above a sustainable fishery.

Folks who believe such things have typically

Laws’ effects on the health of fish and game stocks are given far less consideration.

And that’s ultimately what ties it all together, and makes it clear that bison poachers in the newborn Yellowstone Park, market gunners who’d rather burn down a clubhouse and take shots at a warden  than stop killing ducks for pay, old-growth loggers, Cliven Bundy and the folks who curse and carry on  about fishery rules don’t represent isolated incidents of outrage and/or bad acts, but are instead are all linked together by a philosophy that discounts the future and places all value on short-term gain.

None stand alone.  Each is a skirmish, a battle in the greater war for the future of America’s natural resources or, all too likely, the war that will, in the end, determine whether those natural resources will have any meaningful future at all.






Sunday, April 1, 2018

FARMING ISN'T FISHING, BUT IT COULD BE FINAGLING



In response, Washington fined Cooke Aquaculture $332,000 for its poor maintenance policies.  The fine might be seen as little more than a cost of doing business for Cooke Aquaculture, a Canadian company which maintains operations in six different nations and grossed $2.5 billion in revenues last year.  However, it will be harder for Cooke to shake off a recent law passed by the Washington legislature, which will require all Atlantic salmon farms to be gone from the state by 2025.



Thus, I was more than a little surprised last Wednesday when Bill Shedd, the keynote speaker at the National Marine Fisheries Service’s 2018 Recreational Fishing Summit, endorsed open-water fish farms as a way to improve the health of fish stocks and the quality of saltwater angling.

Now, Mr. Shedd knows about open-water fish farms.  He’s the Chairman of the Board of the Hubbs-SeaWorld Research Institute, which has “played a leadership role for over 35 years in developing innovative replenishment solutions,” so it’s probably not surprising that when he talks about making “a bigger pie” that can supply a larger user base, he thinks first of farms—and thinks nothing of serving as Vice Chairman of an organization, the Center for Sportfishing Policy, which praised last summer’s Commerce Department decision to overfish Gulf of Mexico red snapper and delay their overbuilding by as much as six years.

Overfishing a stock and delaying its recovery hardly seems to be the logical way to bake a “bigger pie,” but if you’ve got fish farms…

But then, when you stop to think about it, fish farms don’t provide any fish to anglers at all—unless you’re talking about the kind of fish farms that we call “hatcheries,” which pump out man-made substitutes for naturally-reproduced fish so that anglers can continue to fish at biologically unsustainable levels.  So exactly how do fish farms help recreational fishermen?

I guess it’s red snapper time once again…


So it has become pretty clear that if anglers aren’t staying within their annual catch target and are unwilling to adopt management measures likely to constrain their harvest, the only other choice that they have is to try to steal some fish from the commercial sector.


Thus, the recreational folks needed a new way to grab some of the commercial landings.

Fish farms might be a way.


A number of organizations led by the Center for Food Safety, and including a number of environmental, commercial and for-hire fishing groups, immediately filed suit in an effort to prevent any permits from being granted.  Their primary contention was that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, pursuant to which the Aquaculture Management Plan was adopted, did not in fact give NMFS any authority to regulate aquaculture; Magnuson-Stevens only governed fishing, and aquaculture wasn’t any sort of “fishing” at all.

The plain language of Magnuson-Stevens, which defined “fishing” as

“the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; the attempted catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; any other activity which can reasonably be expected to result in the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; or any operations at sea in support of, or in preparation for, any [of the aforementioned activities] [internal numbering deleted]”
doesn’t appear to apply to farming activities.  While “harvesting” is mentioned, breeding, growing, feeding,  or any of the other activities normally associated with farming are not.

In addition, since the last reauthorization of Magnuson-Stevens in 2006, there have been a number of bills introduced in Congress that were intended to give NMFS authority to regulate aquaculture, the most recent of them being the National Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture Act of 2011, which included among its stated purposes

“To establish a regulatory system for sustainable offshore aquaculture in the United States exclusive economic zone,”
and

“To authorize the Secretary of Commerce to determine appropriate locations for, permit, regulate, monitor, and enforce offshore aquaculture in the exclusive economic zone.”
While not clearly dispositive of the issue, the fact that Congress was contemplating establishing a regulatory system for offshore aquaculture, and authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to oversee such regulation, strongly suggests that neither the system nor the authority exists today.


“the escape of confined fish from their containment; the spread of potentially deadly diseases and parasites from aquaculture facilities to wild fish and other marine wildlife; the pollution of ocean ecosystems from the inputs (e.g., drugs, pesticides, fungicides, algaecides) and outputs (wastes) of industrial aquaculture; the privatization of ocean resources; threats to marine life and marine ecosystems from aquaculture systems; market displacement and price competition from cheaply produced farmed fish; adverse economic effects on fishing businesses; and trickle-down effects to communities and families that depend on healthy wild fish stocks and ocean ecosystems for their livelihoods.  [emphasis added]”

Assuming that such devices do not also increase the reproduction of such species, they would have the effect of aggregating wild fish in an area not accessible to recreational (or commercial) fishermen and, in so doing, reduce recreational access to fishery resources.

That would be a strange thing for recreational fishermen to support, particularly considering all of the emphasis that recreational fishing groups are placing on “access” these days…

And it’s not entirely clear that the Puerto Rico research completely addresses some of the other risk issues.  A 2004 paper made available by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council notes that

“fish escapements from net cages could arguably be detrimental to the environment.  Even though these fish are native, endemic to the region and healthy, many researchers believe that such escapements could compromise the genetic makeup of the local population of the species.”
Aside from the genetic concerns raised in that passage, recreational fishermen should note the statement that the fish in question are “native” to the area—that is, at least the initial breeding stock, and perhaps later spawners, are removed from the natural population of fish. 


“Putting ownership of a wildlife resource into the hands of a private business for its own profit is a dramatic departure from the way this country has traditionally managed wildlife resources”
seem to have no problem when fish farmers obtain their broodstock from the public resources that swim in the open sea.

But maybe everything else is worth it to them if they can just hurt the commercial fishery by undercutting its sales with cheap, factory-farmed fish, and maybe put commercial fishermen out of business.  They can use the farms as one big finagle; with the commercial fishery crippled, they could take over its unused quota. 

It’s hard to think of any other reason that members of the angling community would support private farming activities that are based on wild broodstock removed from a public resource. 

It’s hard to think of another reason why anglers might support an industrial fish production process, that ties up large areas of ocean where access is denied to anglers, a process that attracts fish from still-public waters and aggregates them around inaccessible pens, where they’re at risk from any diseases or parasite infestations that spring up in the crowded factory farms—or, even if the farms are pestilence-free, are at risk of genetic pollution from farm escapees.

But it’s easy to think of a safer alternative to industrial fish farms, a risk-averse path to Mr. Shedd’s bigger pie.

It’s called conservation.

It’s a lot less expensive than industrial fish farms.  It doesn’t wall off acres of water, breed disease, or cause genetic dilution.

But it does take patience.  It takes responsibility.  It takes anglers willing to put aside the destructive, childish demands for instant gratification, the sort of demands that led to the Gulf red snapper reopening last spring, and replace them with a more mature view that can conceive of the greater, long term good for both the fish and the fisherman—recreational and commercial—that conservation can bring.

Conservation is not as high-tech as a fish farm.  It takes a bit longer.  But it produces a big and nourishing pie, without the use of any artificial ingredients at all.

And that’s a good thing, for in building a bigger fish “pie,” organic is the right way to go.



Thursday, March 29, 2018

THE ALLOCATION MORASS


Everybody wants more fish.
Commercial fishermen make more money when they can harvest more product, while recreational fishermen have long cast envious glances at the commercial harvest, and tried, by various means, to convert some of those commercial landings into their own.

It’s not just an inter-sector conflict. In both commercial and recreational fisheries, there are sub-allocations that divide up the harvest between fishermen in various states, or those fishing from private versus for-hire vessels, or those using different types of gear.
At the same time, deciding who catches the fish, rather than how many are ultimately caught, isn’t a conservation issue. A dead fish is a dead fish, no matter who lands it, so as long as the overall annual harvest doesn’t exceed sustainable levels, allocation has no impact on stock health.
Allocation of harvest to the various sectors and sub-sectors is the responsibility of the various regional fishery management councils, and of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). In making allocation decisions, fishery managers rely heavily upon “catch history”—historical patterns of harvest—but also give some consideration to various social and economic factors, as well as to the distribution of fish stocks.
Once allocations are set, they very seldom change, despite often significant changes in markets, in the fishery, and in fish distribution.
There are a number of reasons for that, but the biggest one is that fisheries managers just don’t like to get bogged down in allocation debates. Such debates tend to be long, bitter and filled with rancor, because allocation is usually a zero-sum game. Unless some portion of the annual catch limit typically remains unused, the only way to give someone more fish is to take fish away from someone else.
Thus, no matter what fishery managers do, they’re going to get someone upset. Most managers, given a choice, would rather avoid the issue.
Some of the recent allocation debates demonstrate why that is so.
On the East Coast, water temperatures are rising, and fish stocks are moving north in response. For fish such as summer flounder and black sea bass, that has created a situation where southern states hold most of the quota, but northern states host most of the fish. As a result, southern fishermen are forced to steam hundreds of miles from port in an effort to catch all of their quota, while northern fishermen are forced to dump hundreds and sometimes thousands of pounds of dead fish back into the ocean because of the very small quotas assigned to the New England and upper Mid-Atlantic states.

The current summer flounder allocations are based on landings during the years of 1980-1989. Throughout those years, the commercial fishery was largely unregulated, and badly overfished; the spawning stock fell to its lowest level of abundance in 1989. Most of the fish, and so most of the harvest was concentrated at the lower end of the species’ range. As a result, the southernmost states of North Carolina and Virginia were awarded 27.4% and 21.3%, respectively, of the overall quota.

Today, the situation has changed. Biologists at the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC) recognize that “the [summer flounder’s] range may be extending farther north. In addition, warmer water temperatures have resulted in the fish moving to the North and the East. These changes may also be driven by a stronger population now that the stock is rebuilt…The population itself is likely distributed with about 50 percent North of Hudson Canyon and the other 50 percent to the South. Approximately 70% of the allocation is to the states from New Jersey to North Carolina, which sets up a bit of an overfishing situation in the southern areas.”

Such circumstances seem to demand a reallocation of summer flounder quota among the states. But reallocation, no matter how compelling the circumstances, in never a quick nor an easy process.
At its December 2013 meeting, the MAFMC decided to initiate a new amendment to its Summer Flounder, Scup and Black Sea Bass Fishery Management Plan. Such amendment was to consider four issues, including the states’ commercial allocations. However, despite the clear changes in the fishery, the reallocation idea was not well received by commercial participants on the MAFMC’s Summer Flounder Advisory Panel.

One advisor argued that “some states (especially New York) have been left out of the current system,” and that as a result, “this system went against Magnuson National Standard 8,” which is intended to protect fishing communities. Most of the comments supported the status quo even though conditions had changed.

Advisors argued that “the industry…had been built on this system over the last 25 years,” and that “changes to this system will present significant economic and management losses.”
Not surprisingly, the greatest resistance came from fishermen enjoying the largest shares of the quota, who said that “The summer flounder commercial fishery is very important to Virginia and North Carolina; it is their bread and butter fishery since they do not have much else to target…Now interest in landing summer flounder in New England is increasing because there is no groundfish. Virginia and North Carolina should not be punished because of that.”
More than four years later, the debate continues. The MAFMC is yet to prepare a draft amendment that can be sent out for public review.

Things are no smoother on the recreational side.
In 2003, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) decided to allocate recreational summer flounder landings among the states, based on each state’s landings in 1998, a year when the stock was still overfished, overfishing was still occurring, and the recreational sector exceeded its landings target by nearly 70%. Such allocation gave New Jersey anglers 39.09% of the recreational quota; neighboring New York, allocated 17.63%, received the next-largest share.

But as the stock recovered, waters warmed and summer flounder moved north, the old allocation stopped making sense. New York anglers started encountering, and landing, a far larger number of summer flounder than they had before. In 2009, in order to shoehorn the state’s anglers into their decade-old allocation, New York was forced to adopt the most restrictive summer flounder regulations ever seen on the coast: two fish per day, a 21-inch minimum size and a short 78-day season.

During the same year, New Jersey anglers, who sometimes fished within shouting distance of their New York counterparts, were governed by regulations that included a six-fish daily limit, an 18-inch minimum size and a 103-day season, all because their state retained their large allocation even though it no longer hosted the greatest abundance of fish.

Although the ASMFC was already talking about replacing the outdated allocation with a new and more equitable approach, nothing was done for years; the states that benefitted from the old way of doing things didn’t want to cede fish to the other states.
When the ASMFC came up with a temporary plan in 2014, that both reallocated some unused recreational quota from the southern states and grouped the states into regions that shared the same regulations and a single allocation of fish, New Jersey was strongly opposed.

ASMFC’s temporary plan worked. Even so, after the ASMFC adopted a modified version of it in 2017, New Jersey refused to comply, adopted its own set of regulations, and appealed to the Secretary of Commerce for relief. The Secretary of Commerce sided with New Jersey

In 1989, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC) allocated 51% of red snapper landings to the commercial sector and 49% to anglers, based on historical landings. For many years, anglers have been seeking to increase their share even though, because they chronically overfish their quota, anglers usually land most of the fish. Finally, late in 2015, the GMFMC adopted Amendment 28 to its reef fish management plan (Amendment 28), which reallocated 51.5% of the red snapper to anglers, leaving 48.5% for the commercial sector.

Such reallocation was based on a recalculation of historical landings. It didn’t survive very long.

Commercial fishermen sued. In 2017 a federal court decided that the reallocation violated National Standard Four of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens), which requires, in part, that any allocation be “fair and equitable to all…fishermen.” The violation occurred because “Amendment 28 enables the recreational sector to catch more fish in the future because they caught more fish in the past, in excess of applicable restrictions. [emphasis added]” The court observed that Amendment 28 “created a system in which one sector must demonstrate an increase in landings in excess of its quota in order to obtain an increase in their allocation.”

Rewarding a sector for repeatedly overfishing was clearly not acceptable policy, so the years of work that the GMFMC spent preparing Amendment 28 ultimately accomplished nothing.
That’s not an uncommon outcome for allocation debates, which is another reason why regional fishery management councils usually avoid revisiting allocations unless there is a compelling reason to do so. Even when compelling reasons exist, and years of work is invested in reallocation efforts, such efforts often fail. Thus, it’s difficult not to be skeptical of legislation known as the Modernizing Recreational Fisheries Management Act (Modern Fish Act), designated S. 1520 in the Senate, which among other things would require the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regional fishery management councils to revisit allocations of all managed species two years after such bill was enacted, and every five years thereafter.

Given that the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council manages 75 different species, and that the GMFMC manages at least 35, repeatedly revisiting all of the species’ allocations would be a daunting task, one likely to devour much of such councils’ time and resources, leaving little remaining for the councils’ primary task of conserving and managing fish stocks.

Certainly, changing conditions in the ocean and in our fisheries justify taking a new look at some allocations, but creating arbitrary deadlines for allocation review guarantees neither a good result nor any result at all.
When, and whether, allocations should be reviewed is a matter best left up to those who know their fisheries and their local waters best, the people who sit on the regional fishery management councils.
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This post first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/