The latter figure was completely unsustainable, and led the
stock to collapse, with landings falling to 139,000 metric tons (306,442,544
pounds) just 10 years later. A report
issued by Canada in 1992, titled "The\Northern Cod Crisis,” noted that
“This has led one recent federal Commission to conclude that ‘an
annual harvest of 300,000 tonnes was a sustainable figure in the years between
1902 and 1958, while harvests in excess of 600,000 could not be sustained
during the later 1960s and early 1970s as was clearly evident from the notable
and rapid decline in both catches and estimated stock size.”
But, while the cause of the slow recovery was never
completely established, Canada was sure that it had the right answer to rebuild
the stock—keeping a moratorium on targeted commercial landings in place. And the
stock seemed to respond, slowly growing larger until, in 2024, Canadian
fisheries managers decided that the stock had grown large enough to justify reopening
the commercial fishery with a quota of 18,000 metric tons (39,683,207 pounds),
not quite 13% of what the quota had been in 1992, when the fishery was closed.
Last
June, Canadian fisheries managers went one step further, and upgraded the northern
cod’s stock status from “critical” to “healthy.” Along with that upgrade came an increased
commercial quota, which is now 59,000 metric tons (130,072,735 pounds). Although that is still less than half of what
the quota was in 1992, it is another positive sign that Canada’s approach to
cod rebuilding works. And by allowing
fishermen to remove only five to seven percent of the population each year,
rather than a supposedly sustainable 20%, Canadian fisheries managers have
settled upon a precautionary management approach that could, with time, allow
the stock to recover to, or at least near, pre-collapse levels.
That doesn’t mean that Newfoundland’s cod are out of the
woods. Questions
still remain, including the question of whether large trawlers, which have been
blamed for the original collapse, produce substantial bycatch, and can harm
bottom habitat, should be allowed to continue in the offshore fishery (they are
already not fishing inshore, where 70% of the quota is caught). But one good omen is that the fishing
industry itself seems to support a precautionary approach, with the owner of
one fish processing plant reportedly saying,
“This is the most hope we’ve had in Newfoundland for the cod
fishery in years…[But] nobody wants to repeat what happened in 1992.”
The next question is whether the Canadian approach might be
adopted by the National Marine Fisheries Service, and whether it would work on
the four cod stocks caught off of New England.
There is no question that it would be a hard sell, as New
England fishermen typical fight back against any harvest reduction, no matter how
badly needed, and instead constantly seek to increase quotas for various
groundfish, including cod. But there is
also no question that the approach that NMFS has used to manage cod over the
past 50-plus years has been a dismal failure.
However, United States fisheries managers never embraced, or
even seriously considered, the sort of moratorium that was embraced by their
counterparts in Canada. Instead, even
when New England cod abundance reached historical lows, NMFS allowed fishing to
continue, although at a vastly reduced landings level compared to 1950. There is no evidence that NMFS ever seriously
considered imposing a moratorium on the cod fishery, despite it’s current poor
condition.
“Additional socioeconomic information on the fishery and communities
associated with this newly defined stock area.”
Such request is similar to the comment made, with respect to
Western Gulf of Maine cod, that the
“SSC is concerned about the socioeconomic impacts these
[Acceptable Biological Catch estimates] will have on the fishery.”
While it isn’t unreasonable to be concerned about
participants in a fishery and how they might be impacted by management
measures, focusing on those socioeconomic impacts, in the face of an ongoing
collapse of a stock, is wrong-headed, as nothing will cause greater
socioeconomic harm than the complete or near-complete loss of a fishery.
Thus, the Newfoundland cod closure, even given the 37,000
lost jobs and economic disruptions that it caused, can be justified in the
slow, but very real, increase in cod abundance that is allowing Canadian
fisheries managers to begin increasing landings limits once again.
It is far harder to justify NMFS’ failure to take hard and
meaningful action—which might very well include a moratorium—to rebuild the
four New England cod stocks, and instead continuing its long-time policy of maintaining
a fishery, albeit at very low levels, in a sort of death by one thousand cuts,
in which fishermen are given small and steadily decreasing quotas, in the face
of a small and decreasing cod population, but are not given the
one thing they need most: A reasonable
hope that cod stocks might, in time, be managed back to health.
Thus, with the Newfoundland
example standing bright and clear in front of them, perhaps it is time for
federal fishery managers to stop torturing the domestic groundfish fleet with
more timid and ineffective harvest reductions, and instead take a bold stance,
shutting down the New England cod fishery in the hope of resurrecting it in a more
meaningful form than anything we have seen in the last few decades.
There is no
guarantee that such moratorium on all cod fishing would work. It might jumpstart the recovery of overfished
stocks, or it might just cause the quick and merciful demise of a fishery that
has been languishing on life support for the past 25 or 30 years.
But, either way, it
would likely lead to a better start than the ineffective management measures
that are in place today.
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