On the morning of August 8, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council held a joint meeting with the Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management
Board, to consider specifications for the 2024 and 2025 fisheries.
The meeting didn’t run very long, and was remarkably free
from controversy. However, it did reveal
that the summer flounder fishery might be undergoing real, and perhaps long-lasting,
changes, that will cause landings over the next two years to be substantially
reduced.
The problem seems to be focused around an extended period of
below-average recruitment of new fish into the population. The
average annual recruitment of Age 0 summer flounder for the period 1982-2022 is
51 million fish. But for the period 2011-2022,
recruitment fell to an average of just 36 million fish per year, with annual
production ranging between 27 and 43 million annually.
While the 15 million recruit difference between the
long-term average and the average over the past 12 years is stark enough on its
face, it nonetheless fails to convey the full magnitude of the recent
decline in recruitment, since the years 2011-2022 comprise over one-quarter of
the long-term recruitment time series, and the low recruitment during those 12
years drags down the long-term average.
If average recruitment for the period 1982-2010 was compared to the
average for the past 12 years, the difference would be even more marked.
The stock’s persistent failure to produce even a single
average year class is now causing fishery managers to ask whether they might be
seeing a fundamental, long-term alteration—what one Mid-Atlantic Council staff
member referred to, during the meeting, as possible “regime change”—in summer flounder
productivity, although they have not determined why such reduced productivity
is occurring.
Lower recruitment isn’t the only change that scientists are
seeing. It was noted at the meeting that
summer flounder seem to be smaller, at any given age, than they had been in the
past, and that the proportion of males in the population is increasing. At
the same time, it seems that current regulations are allowing some summer flounder
to live to older ages. In 2018, NMFS’ sampling
of commercially caught fish turned up a 22-inch male summer flounder believed
to be 20 years old; it is the oldest summer flounder ever collected. Two other fish sampled in the same year, one
a male and one a female, were believed to be 17 years old. The presence of such large fish led Council
staff to note that
“These samples indicate that increased survival of summer
flounder over the last two decades has allowed fish of both sexes to grow to
the oldest ages estimated to date.”
“Declining trends in growth rates and changes in the sex
ratio at age may change the productivity of the stock and in turn affect
estimates of the biological reference points.
Changes in growth, maturity, and recruitment may be environmentally
mediated but mechanisms are unknown.”
Overestimating the size of the 2018 year class also had more
immediate impacts. The
2023 management track assessment found that the summer flounder stock
experienced overfishing in 2022, something that caught a lot of people by
surprise, because the overfishing limit, which had been set earlier, was never
exceeded. Kiley
Dancy, a biologist employed by the Council, explained what happened in a July
13 memo to Dr. Christopher Moore, the Council’s executive director.
“Despite the previously specified [Overfishing Limits] not
being exceeded…the new 2023 [management track assessment] now estimates that
overfishing was occurring for summer flounder in 2022. This is primarily driven by the latest model
run adding three years (2020-2022) of fishery catch, survey catch, and
biological data (including continued decreases in mean weights and maturities
at age). While the average retrospective
errors for [spawning stock biomass] and [the fishing mortality rate] are small,
adding multiple years of data contributed in this case to overestimating stock
size and underestimating [the fishing mortality rate]. The previous [Overfishing Limits] were set
using an assessment with terminal year 2019 and creating biomass projections
for 2020-2023, which now appear to have been overoptimistic.”
In other words, we all thought that the summer flounder
biomass was bigger than it actually was, so fishermen were allowed to take more
fish than they would have, had the actual size of the stock been known. As a result, the 2022 fishing mortality rate
was 103% of the fishing mortality threshold, and overfishing occurred.
On August 8, the Council and Management Board set about
fixing the problem.
The first step was to set an Overfishing Limit that was in
accord with both the actual size of the stock and with the current level of
scientific uncertainty. That job fell to
the
Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee, which reduced the OFL from
34.98 million pounds in 2023 to 22.98 million pounds in 2024 and 2025 (the SSC
also gave the Council the option of setting varying OFLs of 22.98 million
pounds in 2024 and 25.39 million pounds in 2025, but the Council preferred not to do so). Such change would lower the Acceptable
Biological Catch from 33.12 million pounds in 2023 to 19.32 million pounds in 2024
and 2025 (again, the Council also decided against setting a varying ABC of 17.88
million pounds in 2024 and 20.75 million pounds in 2025).
Such reductions will naturally lead to substantial
reductions in both the commercial quota and the recreational harvest limit over
the next two years. For both sectors,
reductions are expected to be in the 40 percent range.
The Council settled on a commercial quota of 8.79 million
pounds, which is a 42 percent reduction from the 2023 quota, but only about a
30 percent reduction from actual 2022 landings.
The Council also set a recreational harvest limit of 6.35
million pounds, which represents a 40 percent reduction from the 2023 RHL, but just
a 28 percent reduction from estimated 2022 landings.
We don’t yet know how the reduction in the recreational harvest limit might affect 2024 regulations. That decision will wait until the December joint meeting of the Council and Management Board, when managers will have a better estimate of what anglers landed during the 2023 season.
Of course, given the
recent discovery that the Marine Recreational Information Program may be
overestimating recreational fishing effort, and so recreational catch and
landings, by somewhere between 30 and 40 percent, there is going to be
significant uncertainty as to what recreational landings really were this
year. Depending on whether, and how,
that uncertainty is addressed when calculating the confidence interval
surrounding the estimate of recreational landings, the lower recreational
harvest limit might or might not have a big impact on the regulations governing
the recreational summer flounder fishery next year.
That’s because recreational
management measures are now governed by the so-called “Percent Change Approach”
of the Harvest Control Rule adopted last year.
However, if the new recreational harvest limit falls below
the lower bound of such confidence interval, the Control Rule would require
that new management measures reduce landings
by the difference between the harvest estimate and the recreational harvest
limit, but under no circumstances may such reduction exceed 40 percent.
If the 2023 recreational landings estimate
tracks that of 2022, the landings estimate will probably be about 30 percent above the recreational harvest limit for 2024; whether the
RHL will fall within or below the confidence interval for such landings
estimate is anyone’s guess (we should also remember that the
entire Harvest Control Rule/Percent Change Approach is being challenged in a
federal lawsuit, and might possibly be invalidated by the court, adding
another layer of unknowns to the issue).
Barring any big, unexpected change in the size of 2023
landings, anglers can probably expect to see new management measures, intended
to reduce summer flounder landings by somewhere between 20 and 30 percent, in
place for 2024.
We’ve seen reductions of that magnitude before.
The only difference is, in the past, such reductions were usually
driven by excessive recreational landings, which occurred at a time when the
stock was either expanding or, at worst, maintaining a stable level of abundance. An increasing biomass, or a decrease in
recreational landings, led to relaxed management measures after a year or two.
This time, 2022 landings fell well below both the commercial
quota and the recreational harvest limit, yet overfishing still occurred due to
a smaller than expected summer flounder stock.
No one knows why the stock isn’t expanding. No one knows why recruitment has been low for
over a decade, why summer flounder are growing more slowly, or why the stock
has become less productive.
And no one knows when, or even whether, recruitment, or
growth, or productivity will increase again. The current situation could be here to stay.
No comments:
Post a Comment