Thursday, January 20, 2022

STRIPED BASS AMENDMENT 7, ITS PROMISE AND PERILS: PART III--RECREATIONAL RELEASE MORTALITY AND CONSERVATION EQUIVALENCY

Today’s edition of One Angler’s Voyage represents the last part in a three-part series describing the latest version of the Draft Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, which the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board will review, possibly amend, and hopefully release for public comment when they meet next Wednesday afternoon.

The first two parts of the series addressed possible changes to the triggers for management action, special protections for the 2015 year class, and stock rebuilding, issues that could directly impact the ASMFC’s ability to rebuild the striped bass stock and keep it healthy in the long term.  Today, I look at two other issues that, while not necessarily critical to the long-term health of the stock, could do some real harm to both the stock and to the recreational striped bass fishery if the Management Board gets them wrong.

Recreational release mortality

The Management Board uttered what really should have been the last word on recreational release mortality when it issued the Public Information Document to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass a little less than a year ago.  Such Public Information Document unequivocally stated

“Recreational release mortality constitutes such a large component of annual fishing mortality because the striped bass fishery is predominantly recreational and an overwhelming majority of the catch is released alive.  The source of mortality does not matter to the health of the stock, as long as the overall fishing mortality is below the threshold.  [emphasis added]”

Such statement stands in sharp contrast to the comments of several members of the Management Board who, when participating in the so-called Striped Bass Work Group prior to the creation of the Public Information Document, reportedly stated that

“recreational dead discards may be the single most important issue at this time, and addressing (or reducing discards) is the most important action that can be taken going forward.”

The Work Group’s report to the Management Board further noted that

“Many [Work Group] members pointed to the fact that recreational discards accounted for just under 50% as a basis for the critical need to address this issue.  Others noted that, particularly in states with primarily catch and release fisheries, the Board is running out of ways to control removals in the fishery.”

When one stops to think about those statements, they don’t make too much sense.  True, the last benchmark stock assessment found that recreational release mortality accounted for 48% of all striped bass fishing mortality.  But it also found that landings, commercial (8%) and recreational (42%) combined, accounted for fully 50% of fishing mortality, yet no one is complaining that there is a “critical need” to approach the landings issue, even though such landings kill more bass than recreational releases do.

Similarly, if a state has a “primarily catch and release” fishery, controlling removals by further restricting landings would appear to be a very logical and doable approach.”

After all, promoting catch and release fisheries is hardly a novel approach to management.  Many fisheries, including those for sailfish and marlin, permit, and freshwater fish such as muskellunge, largemouth and smallmouth bass, and wild trout, are managed as primarily catch and release fisheries, where landings occur, but are not the primary focus of fishery managers.  

It’s not unreasonable to add striped bass to the list of fish managed in that manner even though, in such fisheries, release mortality may be the primary cause of removals.

Unfortunately, most saltwater fisheries are plagued by an old and outdated paradigm that views yield, measured in dead fish, as the primary goal, and views any fish that dies of old age as wasted.  The concept of a fishery that provides its greatest social and economic benefits when it is managed for recreational values such as abundance and the maintenance of older, larger fish in the population is anathema to those still committed to the management strategies of the previous century.

An exchange that occurred at the October 2021 Management Board meeting clearly revealed that clash of philosophies, as Dr. Justin Davis, a Connecticut fishery manager who often represents a more enlightened approach to fishery management, observed that efforts to quell the catch and release fishery were

“maybe an outdated or inaccurate sort of idea of like, what do we want out of this fishery?  I mean I think this is a fishery that is primarily recreational.  The benefit we want from this fishery is opportunity for people to go fishing, which in turn provides economic benefits to society, because people are going fishing and spending money to do it.

“I don’t know why we would want to take opportunity to fish away from people, without a clear idea of exactly what we’re getting from it…  [emphasis added]”

Not surprisingly, Dr. Davis’ view was contested by Michael Luisi, the Maryland fishery manager who, in response to Addendum VI to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan, shut down his state’s early spring catch and release fishery in order to convert the questionable reduction in release mortality there into an extra dead fish for passengers on Chesapeake Bay charter boats, who responded to Dr. Davis by saying

“I’m of the complete opposite opinion…The one thing that made me most happy about this document when I read through it, was that these options on recreational release mortality were really starting to cut into a new way of thinking and a new way of approaching fishing mortality.  Emile [Franke, the Fishery Management Plan Coordinator] started off explaining that part of the problem with this fishery is that we have a tremendous amount of recreational release mortality occurring coastwide…

“…Unless we deal with recreational mortality and release mortality, through non-targeting closures, we’ve basically done nothing.  To modify harvest is one thing, but this is where we really need to put our focus…”

And thus the philosophical battle lines which shaped the current draft amendment were drawn.

Section 4.2.2 of the current Draft Amendment 7 addresses the issue.  It breaks efforts to reduce recreational release mortality into three options, Option B, which would require closed seasons, Option C, which would address gear restrictions beyond the current circle hook requirement, and Option D, voluntary outreach and education on the part of the states.

Closed seasons

With respect to Option B, the draft amendment contemplates two possible approach to closed striped bass seasons.  Sub-option B-1 would require each state to close its striped bass fishery not only to harvesting striped bass, but for even targeting the species in a release fishery,

“for a minimum two-week period to reduce fishing effort during times when the striped bass fishery is particularly active in each state.  As defined in sub-options B1-a and B1-b, a minimum threshold of directed trips targeting striped bass will be used to define ‘active’ waves for each state in which to implement its closure…”

It's important to note that the language would seem to allow a state to close any two weeks that it chose, provided that such period fell within any two-month “wave” deemed to support a “particularly active” striped bass fishery in such state.  The number of directed striped bass trips taken in the state would determine whether a wave was “particularly active,” with sub-option B1-a defining “particularly active” as a wave with at least 15% of directed striped bass trips, and wave B1-b raising the threshold to 25% of directed trips.

While that might sound reasonable, to the extent that reducing recreational effort, and the resultant social and economic benefits such effort generates, might be deemed reasonable, the concept has other flaws.  A state dedicated to gaming the management system would still seem to be able to time its closures in a way that would do little to reduce effort or release mortalitu, while states which chose to act in good faith would feel greater impacts.

As an example, consider New Jersey, a state which has long invested considerable effort in finding ways to escape its full obligation to help conserve striped bass and other fish stocks, and push some of its proper burden onto the shoulders of other states.  Its “particularly active” waves are Wave 2, March and April, and Wave 6, November and December, both periods when striped bass are migrating through New Jersey waters (Wave 3, May and June, would also qualify under sub-option B1-a, but not under B1-b).  

But the spring migration isn’t yet well underway by March 1, and the fall migration is largely over by mid-December, at least in most of the state.  So New Jersey could probably comply with the proposed closure requirement by opening its season on March 15, or closing it on December 17, without appreciably impacting either its fishery or the number of bass that die after being caught by New Jersey anglers.

On the other hand, a state such as Maine, where bass are only caught during three warm-weather waves, would have to shut down for two weeks sometime between May and October (May and August, if sub-option B1-b was adopted) when the closure would be likely to have a far greater impact on anglers.

Apart from such manipulations, the ban on targeting striped bass is an unrealistic approach to management.  As Massachusetts fishery manager Michael Armstrong noted at last October’s Management Board meeting,

“as long as you have bluefish in the water, you are fishing for striped bass.  It’s just an unenforceable thing.”

Connecticut’s Dr. Davis concurred, saying

“no targeting closures are, certainly speaking from Connecticut’s standpoint, I suspect for a lot of other jurisdictions are a regulatory nightmare and unenforceable.”

Predictably, Maryland’s Luisi again disagreed.  But regardless of his lonely dissent, for all of the reasons discussed above, option B1 deserves rejection.

Option B2 might be a different story.  It would impose closures that protect spawning striped bass in the Chesapeake Bay, and in the Kennebec, Hudson, and Delaware rivers.  The argument for such closures is that

“Spawning area closures during the spawning season could contribute to stock rebuilding by eliminating harvest and/or reducing releases of spawning and pre-spawn fish.  Reducing releases during this time is particularly important to reduce stress and injury to fish as they move into lower salinity spawning areas…”

That argument seems to make sense.  It would also seem to imply a ban on targeting spawning fish, even if they would ultimately be released, a prohibition that already exists in part of the Chesapeake Bay and Delaware River.  While enforceability of the no-targeting rule might remain somewhat problematic, it would likely be less of an issue in the spawning areas, where striped bass could be the only large fish present during the spawning season, than it would be elsewhere, although anglers ostensibly fishing for catfish or white perch could still illicitly target bass.

But Sub-options B2-a (no spawning-season harvest) and B2-b (no targeting for two weeks during the spawn) both deserve to go out for public comment in the final Draft Addendum 7.

Gear restrictions

The Option C gear restrictions also have merit.

Sub-option C-1 would ban the use of gaffs, and other potentially lethal devices, when landing striped bass. 

While it’s not clear how much mortality such provision would actually prevent, leaving it in Draft Amendment 7, despite the protestations of New Jersey Legislative Proxy Adam Nowalsky that

“There are many ways to use a gaff that remains non-lethal,

is a no-brainer.  A number of states already have such a prohibition, and in today’s striped bass fishery, where fish over 35 inches (36 inches in Virginia, 38 inches in the perpetually “special” New Jersey) must be released, there is just no reason to employ a gaff.  Bass that small fit into even a modest-sized landing net, and really don’t require any landing device at all, as it’s not hard to just reach down and grab the fish by its toothless lower jaw and either haul it aboard, if it’s going to be kept, or release it without taking it out of the water.

The use of treble-hooked lures could make jaw-grabbing a little more hazardous; unfortunately, a proposal to ban the use of trebles was deleted from the draft amendment at last October’s meeting.

Sub-option C-2 is also an valuable part of the draft amendment.  It would require that

“Striped bass caught on any unapproved method of take would be returned to the water immediately without unnecessary injury.”

Right now, that language would probably apply only to circle hooks.  Many states already adopted such a provision when their mandatory circle hook rules went into effect in early 2021.  However, there are some states (yes, New Jersey is one of them) where an angler could bait up an old-fashioned J-hook with a big hunk of clam while claiming to fish for bluefish, or fluke, or maybe even false albacore, and then keep any striped bass that “accidentally” latched onto that bit of bivalve while it was resting on the bottom.  

Sub-option C-2 would help keep such “accidental” striped bass fishermen on the straight and narrow path.

Outreach and education

Option D contains sub-options which would either require (sub-option D-1) or recommend (D-2) that states establish a striped bass “best handling and release practices” outreach and education program, to educate anglers and encourage them how to best avoid seriously injuring or killing bass during the catch and release process.

It's a nice idea, but not worth discussing here, as states will probably oppose any mandatory outreach requirement, while the benefits of a voluntary (or mandatory) outreach program are, at best, moot.  Responsible anglers already understand the basics of proper release; they’re already widely distributed on the Internet and discussed in striped bass fishing circles.  Irresponsible anglers, who dead-stick bait, take fish out of the water for photos, and think that kicking a bass back into the wash or bouncing one off a few jetty rocks on its way to the water constitutes "good release" aren’t going to listen to what the states might have to say.

Whether this option stays or goes will have little impact on the bass’ future.

Conservation equivalency

The final section to be discussed is Management Program Equivalency, which is more frequently referred to as “conservation equivalency.”  The ASMFC’s Interstate Fishery Management Program Charter defines “conservation equivalency as

“Actions taken by a state which differ from the specific requirements of the [fishery management plan], but which achieve the same quantified level of conservation for the resource under management.  For example, various combinations of size limits, gear restrictions, and season length can be demonstrated to achieve the same targeted level of fishing mortality.  The appropriate Management Board/Section will determine conservation equivalency.”

If the Management Board required all states to adhere to the Charter’s definition, Amendment 7 might not have had to address the issue at all.  Unfortunately, the Management Board has allowed some states, particularly New Jersey, to become adept at manipulating the conservation equivalency process, and gaining a special advantage for their fishermen while undercutting the effectiveness of the management plan.  Thus, more responsible members of the Management Board are calling out for reform of how conservation equivalency is used.

In response, the Plan Development Team has incorporated a number of important reforms, and one really bad idea, into the draft amendment.

Those reforms are discussed in section 4.6.2 of Draft Amendment 7.

One of the most important of such reforms is designated “Sub-option B-1,” and would prohibit the use of conservation equivalency if the stock is overfished (sub-option B1-a), or if the stock is below the biomass target (sub-option B1-b), or if overfishing is occurring (sub-option B1-c).  All would apply only to

“the non-quota managed recreational fisheries in the Ocean region and Chesapeake Bay region, with the exception of the Hudson River, Delaware River, and Delaware Bay recreational fisheries,”

unless the Board also adopts other sub-options that would apply the such restrictions to other fisheries.

Sub-option B-1 deserves to remain intact, and be a part of the draft amendment when it goes out for public comment.

Another set of options, designated sub-option B2, would determine whether other fisheries would be bound by the sub-option B-1 prohibitions.  They present somewhat thornier problems.

Sub-option B2-a would apply the B-1 prohibitions to recreational fisheries in the Hudson River, Delaware River, and Delaware Bay.  The benefits of doing so are debatable.  Some might argue, for example, that the current New York regulations for the Hudson River, which establish an 18- to 28-inch slot instead of the 28- to 35-inch slot that would otherwise be applicable, provides better protection to spawning females than the coastwide regulations do.

Others might acknowledge that fact, but argue that eliminating the restrictions on conservation equivalency in the relevant fisheries could also lead to more “creative” regulations that do harm to the stock, particularly given the states involved in the Delaware River and Delaware Bay fisheries.

The right thing to do would probably be to memorialize any river- or bay-specific regulations in the management plan, and then let the sub-option B1 restrictions on conservation equivalency apply, but that would require a separate management action.  For the time being, sub-option B2-a should go out for public comment, to see what folks think.

Sub-option B2-b would apply conservation equivalency restrictions to quota-managed recreational fisheries.  There aren’t many of those; the best-known is New Jersey’s “bonus fish” program, which allows recreational fishermen to land a portion of the state’s commercial quota. 

The argument for allowing conservation equivalency to apply to such fisheries, even if the stock is overfished or experiencing overfishing, is that because the fishery is quota-based, conservation equivalency wouldn’t lead to a state harvesting too many fish.  

However, the issue is more nuanced than that, as the New Jersey bonus fish program illustrates.  Even when a fishery is constrained by a quota, such quota assumes that fish fall into a certain size bracket; the fact that the New Jersey bonus program has a 24- to 28-inch slot limit, and so kills a lot of immature female bass before they can spawn even once, raises the question of whether conservation equivalency restrictions should be applied when the stock is having problems.

That issue, too, deserves a public hearing.

Sub-option B2-c asks a similar question, whether conservation equivalency restrictions should be applied to commercial fisheries.  It deserves a similar answer.  If the coastal commercial fisheries are fishing on a 28-inch minimum pursuant to the management plan, should any state’s coastal commercial fishermen be allowed to fish on a smaller bass when the stock is not in good shape?  If recreational fishermen are limited to a 35-inch maximum length, in order to protect the larger, more fecund females, should commercial fishermen in any state be able to kill the otherwise protected larger fish? 

The public ought to be able to weigh in on that issue, as well.

And if a state is allowed to adopt conservation equivalency proposals, must there be a minimum standard for data quality?  That’s the question asked by Option C, and it’s important.

The Marine Recreational Information Program is reasonably accurate when applied on a coastwide basis.  For the most recent five year period, 2015 to 2019 (I didn’t use 2016-2020 because of possible COVID-related distortions), the percent standard error of its annual striped bass landings estimates ranged between 6.8 and 9.9, which is low enough to make sound management decisions.  But MRIP’s accuracy is heavily dependent on the number of samples made, and when the number of samples declines, accuracy declines as well.

So when MRIP is used at the state level, over the same time period, the lowest percent standard error for any state estimate is 12.3, for Maryland in 2015.  But plenty of estimates have a high PSE, with 11 of the 50 estimates—over 20%--having a PSE of 40 or more, topping out with a PSE of 54 for Delaware in 2019.  Error levels get even worse when state data is broken down by fishing mode (party boat, charter boat, private boat, shore) and/or two-month wave.

As a result, state conservation equivalency proposals can be based on very uncertain data.

Sub-options C1-a, C1-b, and C1-c would set a maximum level for percent standard error in the data used for state conservation equivalency proposals at 50, 40, and 30, respectively.  Given that even the lowest value would allow data with a percent standard error more than thee times the coastwide level, it would seem to be a logical choice.

That conclusion is reinforced by information in the draft amendment which says

“NMFS warns that ‘[MRIP] Estimates should be viewed with increasing caution as PSEs increase beyond 30…’  In addition, NMFS is implementing new Recreational Fishing Survey and Data Standards under which estimates will not be published if the PSE is greater than 50 and estimates with a PSE of 30 or greater will be presented with a warning that they ‘are not considered sufficiently reliable for most purposes, and should be treated with caution.’”

Thus, sub-option C1-c is the only one worthy of consideration, although the Management Board is likely to send the others out for public comment, too.

Sub-option D deals with a related issue.

Even if sub-option C1-c is adopted, state conservation equivalency measures could still be based on data with a percent standard error as high as 30, which casts substantial doubt on such measures’ ability to achieve the intended result.  To reduce such uncertainty, sub-option D would create a buffer that would require the state to reduce fishing mortality by an additional 10% (sub-option D1-a), 25% (sub-option D1-b), or 50% (sub-option D1-c).

As an example of how that would work, if the Management Board adopted coastwide measures that would reduce a state’s landings by 20%, and sub-option D1-2 was in place, state conservation equivalency measures would have to reduce landings by 25% (the coastwide measures’ 20% plus another 5%--25% of the original 20%) to allow for the greater uncertainty in the state level data.

Given the relatively high level of uncertainty permitted even by sub-option C1-3, D1-a’s 10% would hardly seem to provide an adequate buffer for much of the state level data; D1-b or D1-c would appear to be much more reasonable options. 

However, as was the case with sub-option C, all three are likely to go out for public comment.

While sub-options B, C, and D would all, if adopted, improve the striped bass management program, sub-option E could do it, and the bass, meaningful harm.  That is true, in particular, of sub-option E-1, which would only require state conservation equivalency measures to achieve

“the percent reduction/liberalization projected for the [fishery management plan] standard at the coastwide level,”

as opposed to the level that the standard management measure would achieve in any particular state.

Such option has a number of flaws.

As noted in the draft amendment,

“sub-option E-1 may undermine an overall targeted reduction,”

and so cause a management measure to fail.

Conservation equivalency measures approved for Addendum VI to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan, largely for the benefit of New Jersey and Maryland, caused the Addendum’s probability of success fall from a marginal 50% to an unacceptable 42%, after the Management Board agreed to establish conservation equivalency on a sub-option E-1-like basis.

Formally endorsing such a flawed approach would only incentivize states with the heaviest conservation burden to choose the management measures—coastwide or conservation equivalency—that would require the smallest landings reduction, and so undercut the effectiveness of the management plan.

Worse, sub-option E-1’s approach is contrary to the provision of the Interstate Fishery Management Program Charter quoted at the beginning of this section, because it would not lead to management measures with “the same quantified level of conservation for the resource” nor to “the same targeted level of fishing mortality”; instead, under sub-option E-1, the level of conservation afforded the striped bass resource would be less, while the level of fishing mortality would be greater.

That is not what the Charter requires.

Thus, sub-option E-1 should be removed from the draft amendment, and from further consideration, at the earliest possible time.

What’s next?

If the Management Board approves Draft Amendment 7 and releases it for public review on Wednesday, as expected, the ASMFC will hold public hearings in just about every state on the striper coast, beginning in late February or early March.  When that happens, it is important that the public turn out, either to comment at the hearings (which, because of COVID, will probably held in a webinar format), and/or submit written comments.

Such public comment made a big difference last year, and caused the Management Board to delete a lot of bad ideas from the draft amendment.  We need a similar showing this year, not only to get the bad things out of the final Amendment, but to keep the good things in.

Once the comments have all been made and collated, they will be provided to the Management Board, which will probably finalize Amendment 7, which will become effective on January 1, 2023.

Until then, we need to stay alert and engaged, and do everything we can to convince the Management Board to produce an amendment that will do the right thing for the bass.

 

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