ATLANTIC MENHADEN MANAGEMENT: PEOPLE ARE GETTING IT DONE

On April 28, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission unanimously voted to reduce the amount of Atlantic menhaden that the reduction fishery could remove from Chesapeake Bay from 87,000 metric tons in 2019 to a little over 36,000 metric tons.  That amount reflected both the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s decision to reduce the so-called “Bay Cap” in 2017, and the fact that Omega Protein Corporation, the sole participant in the Chesapeake reduction fishery, exceeded the Bay Cap by nearly 15,000 metric tons in 2019.

A lot of people interested in maintaining a healthy Chesapeake Bay ecosystem celebrated that vote, which was an important milestone in a conservation battle that dates back well over twenty years, and still has a way to go before all of the issues are resolved.  Now, there is reason to believe that a full resolution stands within reach.  How that occurred provides important lessons on the both the potential value of public advocacy, and of the need for patience.

Because whatever happened, and will yet happen, with respect to menhaden management, we should understand that it didn’t happen overnight.

I first got seriously involved in menhaden management issues around 1997, and there are people I know who were involved with those issues for years before that.  Back then, the ASMFC managed menhaden pursuant to a plan that established an Atlantic Menhaden Management Board that was composed of

“up to five state directors, up to five industry representatives, one National Marine Fisheries Service member, and one representative from the National Fish Meal and Oil Association.”

That was a big difference from the way all of the other ASMFC management boards were made up at the time.  

With the exception of the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, all of the ASMFC’s species management boards were composed of the directors of every state with a declared interest in the species, plus representatives from NMFS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  No seats at all were reserved for industry reps on the other management boards.

The special treatment of the menhaden industry didn’t stop there.  The American Menhaden Advisory Committee, which provided technical support to the Management Board and was responsible for assessing the health of the stock and recommending regulatory action, was composed of

“members from interested states desiring to participate in the committee, industry representatives, personnel from NMFS, and a representative from the [National Fish Meal and Oil Association]”

Given that makeup, it’s not hard to understand why the Advisory Committee reliably gave the menhaden stock a clean bill of health regardless of trends in abundance, and even recommended an education program to support the menhaden reduction fishery, writing in the management plan itself that

“All too frequently, arguments made in support of [management] actions have been based on opinion, not fact.  Misconceptions continue about the menhaden stock and fishery, such as the following:  the stock is recruitment-overfished, purse seines take a large bycatch, and many gamefish are dependent on menhaden as forage to the exclusion of other forage species.  The ASMFC menhaden program and then industry have prepared a number of educational products since 1990.  A comprehensive positive education program aimed at the public, anglers, and government officials to present the facts concerning menhaden and the menhaden fishery should be implemented.  [emphasis added]”

In those days, it was common to hear folks who were trying to reform menhaden management to say that “the fox was watching the henhouse,” but if you took a good look at the management plan, it was clear that the fox wasn’t just watching the henhouse, but held all of the keys to the henhouse’s door.

But people were becoming more and more aware that “the facts concerning menhaden and the menhaden fishery” might not be the “facts” that the Atlantic Menhaden Advisory Committee wanted everyone to believe.

The first steps to finding out what the facts really were was to organize a fox hunt, toss the industry representatives—including the rep from the National Fish Meal and Oil Association—off the Management Board and Advisory Committee, and create a Management Board and Technical Committee that resembled those that managed every other species under the ASMFC’s jurisdiction.

That meant a Management Board representing not just five states with significant menhaden industries, but every state between Maine and Florida--without any industry seats.  And it meant a Technical Committee composed of independent state biologists, rather than persons representing and beholden to the reduction industry.

That was far easier said than done, because the fox truly loved being close to those hens, and wasn't going to give up without a fight.

The fox hunters got a break in 1998, after the ASMFC instituted a peer review process for stock assessments.  The menhaden stock had been assessed in that same year, so that stock assessment was one of the first to go through the ASMFC’s peer review process.

The peer review panel found a number of problems with the stock assessment, and made a number of recommendations for improving future efforts.  Most notably, the peer reviewers stated that

“The Atlantic Menhaden Advisory Committee (AMAC) made no recommendations for changes in regulation of menhaden fisheries in 1998.  The Panel believes that this inaction was inappropriate based on the following:  1) indications of recruitment declines and stock contraction; and 2) lack of clear relationships between management indicators, actions, and evaluation of efficacy of management actions in the current management framework…The trigger-based management system has not served the function of guiding regulatory actions in the menhaden fishery.  The detailed information on stock status…has not been utilized in full advantage in guiding management.”

Which is about what you’d expect when the fox is in charge.

The need for change was becoming obvious, and public outcry was growing.  Conservation and angling organizations became more aggressive in their calls to oust industry from the Management Board and Advisory Committee.  Finally, in July 2001, the ASMFC adopted Amendment 1 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Menhaden which, among other things, ousted industry from the Management Board, and replaced the Advisory Committee with a Technical Committee made up of scientists who were not connected to the menhaden industry.

That marked an important beginning.  While the reduction industry would continue to cast a large shadow on Management Board proceedings, it was no longer in a position to cast decisive votes.  Instead, it had to work through proxies, usually one or more of Virginia’s three Management Board representatives, which severely limited its influence.  For the first time in its history, the Management Board was able to focus on developing the science necessary to properly manage the menhaden resource, rather than serving as an adjunct of the reduction fleet.

For most of the next two decades, the Management Board focused on just two issues:  How to properly assess the health of the menhaden resource, and how the health of the menhaden resource affected the health of other fish stocks.

A dynamic emerged in which the public, typically represented by a coalition of angling and conservation groups, argued for precautionary management that recognized the menhaden’s role in coastal food webs, squared off against the reduction industry, which consistently maintained that the fish’s population was healthy, that harvests could be maintained or even increased, and that there was no clear connection between menhaden abundance and the health of other marine predators.

The latter issue led to a 15-year-long clash that was, in part, resolved by the Virginia Marine Fisheries Commission’s recent actions to cut reduction industry landings in Chesapeake Bay.  But the debate still echoes in efforts to have coastwide menhaden landings governed by “ecological reference points” that would limit harvest to a level that will allow Atlantic menhaden to also fulfill their role as forage fish.

The idea of limiting menhaden harvest in order to benefit predator populations first arose around 2005, as people and organizations voiced their concerns that too many of the fish were being removed from the Chesapeake Bay.  The upshot was Addendum II to Amendment 1 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Menhaden, which sought to prevent “localized depletion” of Chesapeake Bay menhaden, and the resultant negative impacts on striped bass and other predators, by establishing the first Bay Cap.

Thanks to the advocacy of various organizations and many private citizens, the Bay Cap is now far smaller than it once was.  It began as the average of landings for the years 1999-2004, went to 109,200 metric tons in 2006, was reduced to 87,216 metric tons in 2012, and cut again, to 51,000 metric tons, in 2017.  

Each time, the idea of a Bay Cap received very strong public support.

Omega Protein, the lone survivor in the Atlantic reduction fishery, grudgingly accepted the initial Bay Caps, but refused to abide by the 51,000 metric ton cap adopted in 2017.  It fished in the Virginia section of Chesapeake Bay (the reduction fleet is barred from Maryland waters) and was able to convince the Virginia legislature, which had the sole responsibility for managing menhaden in that state, not to adopt the 2017 cap.  

Thus, when Omega removed about 65,000 metric tons of menhaden from Chesapeake Bay in 2019, it didn’t break Virginia law.  But Virginia law was not in accord with the management plan.

Normally, such noncompliance would be reported to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, who could then shut down Virginia’s menhaden fishery until it agreed to abide by the ASMFC’s plan.  But the Secretary had allowed New Jersey to go out of compliance with the ASMFC’ summer flounder plan in 2017, and the ASMFC feared that its authority would be further undercut if the Secretary bailed out Virginia.  Thus, so long as Omega stayed under the 51,000 metric ton Bay Cap, the ASMFC held its fire.  However, when Omega exceeded the cap in 2019, it forced the ASMFC’s hand.

Again, many people and organizations rose to the occasion.

The ASMFC found Virginia out of compliance with its menhaden plan in November 2019, and forwarded that finding to the Secretary of Commerce.  There was little doubt that Omega was asking the Secretary to let Virginia skate.  But many advocates, including organizations representing the recreational fishing and boating industries, also stood up and asked the Secretary to support the ASMFC.  Although Omega has considerable political influence, the combination of groups arrayed against it had more.  Virginia was found out of compliance with the management plan; the Secretary gave them six months to get their house in order, or have their fishery shut down.

And thus the stage was set for the final act in that particular play.  Virginia’s legislature still had to either adopt the new Bay Cap, or hand over management authority to the Virginia Marine Fisheries Commission, if it wanted to have any menhaden fishery at all.  Bills were introduced to cede authority to the Commission.  They garnered public support, and were passed into law, setting the stage for this week’s decision to reduce the Bay Cap.

One long fight had finally ended.  But the battle to adopt ecological reference points is yet to be won.

Thanks to broad public support, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board moved forward with a stock assessment to establish such reference points.  At the Management Board’s February 2020 meeting, a motion was made to adopt such reference points for management purposes.  But that motion was postponed to the Management Board’s May meeting, pending some additional information.

Now, due to COVID-19, the vote on that motion has been postponed again, perhaps to August, perhaps to sometime later.  But given the dedication of people and organizations who have been willing to fight for well over 20 years to get better menhaden management, and continue to do so, I believe that it will ultimately be adopted by the Management Board.

I tell this long story not merely to celebrate this week’s victory in the Chesapeake, and the hoped-for win on ecological reference points, but also to help reassure those fighting for other fisheries that a win is not out of reach.

I address this particularly to those who fight for striped bass. 

I was just as disappointed as anyone else with Addendum VI’s failure to achieve the needed 18 percent reduction in fishing mortality, its excessive use of conservation equivalency, and it’s failure to even address the management plan’s requirement that that spawning stock be fully rebuilt within ten years. 

I’m concerned that the ASMFC will adopt a new amendment to the striped bass management plan that reduces the biomass target, and permanently stunts long-term striped bass abundance.

So I understand why people might be frustrated.

But there’s no reason to abandon the fight.  If menhaden teaches us anything, it is that persistence and patience are very powerful weapons, that can successfully defeat a well-financed adversary, if we’re only willing to use them.

So long as the fight continues, a win remains possible.  The only sure way to lose is to quit.