Many years ago, all fish were managed by politicians. The basic rule was that you could catch whatever
you wanted, in whatever numbers that you wanted, of whatever size that you
wanted, and you could do what you wanted with the fish—eat them, sell them,
give them away, feed them to the tomatoes, or dump them back in the bay—because
no law said otherwise.
Sometimes, someone would start to worry that a stock of fish
wasn’t doing too well, or decided that some sort of net was killing too many
fish (or, perhaps, interfering with another sort of net), or maybe one group
of people decided that another group of people were killing fish that the first
group wanted for themselves. Whatever
the issue, and whoever the concerned group might be, the only way to change the
status quo was to go to the state (or very, very rarely federal)
legislature, and convince the politicians to pass a law imposing a bag limit
and/or a minimum size, or outlawing a particular gear, or to have a species
declared a “gamefish” so that commercial fishermen couldn’t kill any of them
anymore, and anglers could kill all of them instead.
It was a difficult, time-consuming process, and the results
often weren’t very good, because laws were too often passed based on emotion,
or because a particular group of fishermen wanted all of the fish for
themselves, rather than being based on sound science and a coherent fisheries
management policy.
Even the legislators eventually recognized that, although
they held the ultimate management authority, they generally didn’t know all
that much about fish, and both the public and the resource were usually better
off if they delegated management authority to fisheries professionals who had
the expertise needed to conserve and manage fish stocks.
That didn’t mean that the politicians were completely out of
the picture—they still could legislate management measures if they wanted to—but
it did mean that fisheries management measures were generally based on something
more than largely uninformed opinion, and that any regulations that were put in
place had to be based on facts, and were not merely “arbitrary and capricious”
actions based on some people’s whim.
For the most part, and for most people, the administrative
approach to fisheries management works a lot better than the legislative one,
but for those who are trying to do something that’s a little outside the
mainstream, and maybe unsupported by any sort of data or objective facts,
management by politician rather than by professional fisheries experts is still
the preferred way to go.
From a biological perspective, it doesn’t make a lot of
sense, as the affected species are, in large part, unrelated, and have very
different life histories that should be considered in the management process.
From a management perspective, it doesn’t make much sense
either, as some of the impacted fish stocks are already very healthy, some are
overfished, and others are somewhere in between those extremes.
Trying to cram them all into a one-size-fits-all executive order doesn’t make very much sense, which is why the proponents are seeking a purely political solution, knowing that professional fisheries managers wouldn’t give such a scattershot approach even passing consideration.
The
executive order that they’re seeking would reportedly 1) ban the use of
midwater trawls for forage fish species, 2) end the reduction fishery for
menhaden and other forage fish, 3) direct the National Marine Fisheries Service
to manage forage fish for ecosystem health, and 4) set science based catch
targets for forage fish to protect predator species. Forage
fish would have to be managed to a biomass target that is 75% of the unfished
biomass for each managed species.
“misrepresent the science and seek to shut down menhaden
harvests through lawsuits, media pressure, and unilateral federal action—bypassing
the state and interstate regulatory bodies that have successfully managed the
fishery for decades.
“These efforts are often driven by ideology or competing
commercial interests, not by genuine concerns for science-based conservation. Our fisheries are sustainable, with robust
management frameworks ensuring ecological balance and long-term viability.”
A look at the fisheries potentially affected by the
requested executive order demonstrates where it parts from good science and
good management principles—and sometimes from reality as well.
In
the case of Illex and longfin squid, both species have lifespans of less
than one year, which exempts them from the annual catch limit and
accountability measures requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act. The existing fishery management plan allows both
species to be harvested at rates higher than those that would be permissible
under the proposed executive order, while maintaining a sustainable fishery. Reducing the fishing mortality rate in order
to achieve a biomass at least 75% as large as an unfished stock would
unnecessarily reduce landings without providing appreciable offsetting
benefits.
In addition, squid are generally harvested with bottom
trawls, not mid-water trawls, which renders the remainder of the executive
order irrelevant to them.
“The [annual catch limit] is divided into sub-[annual catch
limits] for management areas in a manner to prevent overfishing on individual
stock components,”
a smaller-scale management approach that it more sensitive to such regional differences.
While Atlantic
herring are caught in mid-water trawls, it’s not clear whether a court would
support efforts to ban the trawl fishery, for after
the New England Fishery Management Council adopted an amendment to the herring
management plan that would ban mid-water trawling in some inshore areas to
prevent alleged regional depletion of herring, the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts invalidated the resulting regulation, finding
that it was “arbitrary and capricious” because there was no evidence linking
the mid-water trawls with localized depletion.
If a court found that there was no grounds for banning
mid-water herring trawls in even a relatively small expanse of ocean, it is
difficult to believe that there is any factual justification to ban them in all
federal waters of the East Coast.
“The stock is overfished, but the fishing rate established
under a rebuilding plan promotes population growth,”
“Fishing gears used to harvest Atlantic mackerel have minimal
impacts on habitat,”
and
“Regulations are in place to minimize bycatch,”
which makes it appear that mackerel are being appropriately
managed, and are in little need of the proposed executive order’s protections.
And, finally, we get to menhaden, the fish that was
undoubtedly the primary driver behind the proposed executive order, and the
fish that, more than the others, illustrates why the proposed executive order
is more a bit of political theater than a legitimate management measure.
Taking the primary features of the proposed executive order,
we find:
1) The executive order would ban the use of mid-water trawls for forage fish. But the largest percentage of menhaden, by far, are caught in purse seines, making that provision irrelevant.
2) The executive order would ban the reduction fishery for menhaden. This is a purely ideological issue. Atlantic menhaden are neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing. If the stock is healthy and the fishery sustainable, why does it matter what vessels and gear catch the fish, and why does it matter what the fish are used for once they’ve been killed? The next stock assessment could well tell us that menhaden need further management measures, but it may also tell us that the current fishery is completely sustainable. So until the science tells us that new management measures are needed, the fact that someone doesn’t like the reduction industry is hardly a reason to end the fishery.
3) The executive order would require NMFS to manage forage fish for ecosystem health. But as Atlantic menhaden are managed by the ASMFC, this point would, like the first, be irrelevant.
“The [ecological reference point] assessment evaluates the health of the stock in an ecosystem context, and indicates that the fishing mortality (F) reference points for menhaden should be lower to account for menhaden’s role as a forage fish…[It uses] an ecosystem model that focuses on four key predator species (striped bass, bluefish, weakfish, and spiny dogfish) and three key prey species (Atlantic menhaden, Atlantic herring, and bay anchovy).”
Thus, it is clear that the proposed executive order
constitutes a political statement rather than a bona fide fisheries management
action. It is an ideology-driven appeal
to the politicians in the Executive Branch that would accomplish nothing that
is not already being done, and done more efficiently, by means of conventional
fisheries management—except, of course, shutting down the reduction fishery,
which is the whole point of the exercise.
But that is hardly a management measure. The menhaden stock seems to be doing just
fine, even with that fishery in place.
And should the menhaden stock falter, a reduction in quota, rather than
shutting down an entire fishery, would be a far more justifiable measure.
Because there’s a problem when you turn to politicians to
shut down a fishery that you don’t like:
If you can use politics that way, other people can, too.
And the fishery that they don’t like might
very well be yours.
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