According
to the most recent information, the striped bass stock remains overfished. The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission’s striped bass management plan requires that it be fully rebuilt by
2029, but given the current trajectory of the stock, such rebuilding remains
unlikely. Thus, at its May meeting, the
Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board adopted emergency management measures
intended to combat a recent increase in recreational landings, which nearly
doubled (when measured in numbers of fish, and more than doubled when measured
in pounds) between 2021 and 2022.
The emergency measures were intended to be just a stopgap, and are nowhere near enough to put rebuilding back on track. On August 1, the Management Board will
consider a new draft Addendum II to its management plan, and even that
will probably need to be enhanced by more restrictive regulations once a new update
to the stock assessment is released in the fall of 2024.
A memo written by Emilie Franke, the ASMFC’s Fishery
Management Plan Coordinator for striped bass, reveals that 224 stakeholders
attended the hearings, and that 94 provided oral comments. Of those comments, 62 supported the emergency
management measures, while 24 opposed them (the other comments did not directly
address the emergency measures). While
those numbers demonstrate a healthy, if not overwhelming, 72% level of support
for the emergency measures, they also overstate public opposition to the
emergency measures.
Ms. Franke’s memo notes that
“62 people, including representatives from 11 organizations,
commented in support of the emergency action.
Comments noted support for taking proactive, swift action to protect the
strong 2015 year class so those fish can contribute to the spawning stock
biomass and rebuild the stock. Comments
noted the importance of the 2015 year class and the need to get those fish out
of the slot limit, especially considering recent low recruitment and the lack
of strong younger year classes. Some
comments noted the importance of all sectors contributing equally to stock
rebuilding…”
In other words, those supporting the emergency management
measures were concerned with the long-term well being of the striped bass, and
were willing to make the sacrifices needed to rebuild the stock.
Ms. Franke’s memo also noted that
“24 people, primarily charter captains, and including
representatives of 3 organizations, commented in opposition to the emergency
action. Comments noted the narrow slot
limit will increase recreational releases and mortality due to fishing longer
to find a fish within the slot. Comments
noted this action only targets those who harvest striped bass, and that there
should be measures to address the catch-and-release fishery. Comments noted the negative economic impacts
of the narrow slot limit on for-hire businesses, and expressed support for
managing the for-hire sector separate from private recreational anglers. Some noted concern about the accuracy and use
of MRIP data.”
Thus, unlike the general public, those opposing
the emergency measures were concerned with the short-term impacts of such
measures on themselves, not the resource, the public and the bass be damned.
But that’s OK; self-interest is always a potent motivator;
the for-hires’ opposition was completely predictable from the moment that the
emergency action was passed.
But what many people, and very possibly even many members of
the Management Board, probably don’t realize is just how small the for-hire
sector is, at least with respect to the striped bass fishery. On
average, since 2017, anglers have taken a little under 17 million trips per
year primarily targeting striped bass (annual trips held remarkably steady,
even during the peak COVID year, at somewhere between 15.7 and 16.7 million,
until spiking to over 20 million last year).
Of those trips, only about 300,000 were taken aboard for-hire boats.
Thus, for hire boats account for well under 2% of all
directed striped bass trips (1.67 over the last five years or, to address the
impacts of COVID, 1.80% for the five years including 2017-2019 and 2021-2022). However one chooses to make the calculation,
the for-hire fleet doesn’t contribute all that much to the social and economic
benefits accruing from the recreational striped bass fishery, which is overwhelmingly
the province of shore-based fishermen and private boats.
Thus, while the for-hires may have accounted for 28% of the comments--all opposed--on the emergency action, we can never forget that they also only represent 2% of the striped bass fishery. That 2% figure places their comments in a far clearer context than the 28% figure, standing alone, ever could.
Thus, the for-hire fleet already lands about six times the
number of fish that might be predicted by the number of trips taken on for-hire
boats. Yet they’re still looking for
special privileges that would allow them to take more, at least in comparison
with the rest of the angling sector.
That seems an unreasonable ask. As
Dr. Michael Armstrong, a Massachusetts fishery manager noted in an article published
in the Boston Globe last May,
“For next year, everything is going to be looked at, and if
fishing mortality has to be cut, it will need to involve the commercial fishery
too. They won’t get a pass on this
one. There will be debate, and they will
be arguing that they didn’t cause this, but at some point if you’re part of the
harvest you need to be part of the solution.”
Although Dr. Armstrong was specifically addressing the
commercial fleet when he made the comment, his logic clearly applies to the
for-hire fleet as well.
That being the case, the conflict over the emergency rules—as
well as the inevitable upcoming conflict over Addendum II—is not a conflict
between private anglers and the for-hire fleet, but rather one waged
between those who are willing to change to accommodate the current demands of
both the fish and the fishery, and those who insist that the regulatory
environment must change to accommodate their own desires.
Canadian
author Louise Penny once noted that
“Life is change. If you
aren’t growing and evolving, you’re standing still, and the rest of the world
is surging ahead.”
Some members of the for-hire fleet have accepted the need to
adapt to the times, and have adopted business models that allow them to take
advantage of new opportunities when old approaches are no longer profitable. They recognize that one of the most basic
imperatives in business can be summed up as “Chege or die.”
Yet professional fishermen, whether commercial or for-hire,
tend to be “small-c” conservatives, with their outlook, if not necessarily their politics, driven by an aversion to change.
Thus, in this third decade of the 21st Century, they cling to
a business model that originated just after—or perhaps before—the Second World
War, that could be summed up as “Leave the dock. Find fish.
Kill fish. Bring fish back to the
dock for your fares to take home.”
It’s kind of funny but, as anyone who has jigged parachutes
from a charter boat’s cockpit can tell you, such a business model doesn’t
necessarily even involve the fares enjoying themselves; they might have to spend
hours jigging with wire line, or sit in a chair, cranking in umbrella rigs
festooned with striped bass, while the boat chugs relentlessly forward, or engage in
other, similar labors intended solely to put fish on ice. Having an enjoyable and rewarding outdoor experience is not the primary goal; any reward, under such model, takes the form of good catch, and not necessarily a good time.
It is, in many ways, a commercial philosophy wrapped in recreational trappings. Pinhookers--commercial fishermen who employ rod and reel--use about the same productive, if uninspiring, tactics that the charter boats do.
Their commitment to that unchanging, “the way we always did it” approach was brought home a month or so ago, when I heard from a friend, who is also a charter boat captain, describing something he witnessed at Montauk this spring.
“I thought I’d seen it all.
Yesterday Montauk with the fish pushing tiny sand eels tight to the
beach in a blitz a well known charter boat insisted on trolling parallel to the
shore trying to pull wire thru 7 feet of water.
This despite clear signs all you needed to do was lob an Ava jig and
make a few cranks…
“It was amazing they went back and forth a few times and didn’t
put them down. My son thought it was
very funny.”
It may have been very funny, but it was also very
illustrative of many for-hire’s mindset.
The captain in question was clearly out to put bass in the
boat, and was doing what he always did to accomplish that goal. Never mind that fishing wire resembles work
more than play, and that his customers probably would have taken far more
pleasure from casting to and hooking the blitzing fish, and fighting them to
the boat, rather than winching in bass being dragged through the water on a
pool-cue rod and wire line. It’s even
possible that, if none of the blitzing bass fell within the legal slot, his customers might even have enjoyed themselves so much that they wouldn’t have
minded going home with an empty cooler.
But their enjoyment wasn’t the point. The captain saw his job as killing bass, and tried, to to the best of his ability, to get that job done.
And that brings us right into the middle of an important policy discussion that, unfortunately, has yet to occur at the management table: If an industry is so averse to change that clings to a business model even though, pursuant to such model, it cannot survive unless its customers are awarded special privileges that allow it to harvest a public resource at a far greater rate than the rest of the public, does it make sense to subsidize that industry with a disproportionate share of that public resource?
Or does it
make more sense to let the industry make its own choice to change or not
change, grant no special privileges, and let economic and social forces decide its fate?
If an industry cannot both abide by and thrive pursuant to
the science-based management measures that regulate all other participants in
the fishery, how does the industry's continued survival benefit the public as a whole?
Right now, all available information suggests that the striped bass stock is facing real problems. That being the case, as Dr. Armstrong noted, “if you’re part of the harvest you need to be a part of the solution.”
I might have chosen to add, “If you take a disproportionate share
of the harvest, you ought to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden,”
but I’m not going to take things that far.
I am, however, going to argue that no one, whether private angler,
for-hire operator, or commercial fisherman, should get away with contributing
less than others to the striped bass’ recovery.
If someone wants a full share of the bounty, they must accept
a full share of the burden as well.
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