The American Sportfishing Association—the trade association
representing the fishing tackle industry—typically holds a huge, week-long
trade show in Florida at this time each year, when exhibitors show off new
products, political initiatives are discussed, and educational webinars for the
tackle industry, the press and other interesting parties are held.
This year, because of COVID-19, the live show was cancelled,
and replaced with an on-line event. Included in that event were a series of political/educational webinars, somewhat euphemistically
called the “Conservation Seminar Series,” which were sponsored by the Theodore Roosevelt
Conservation Partnership, the Center for Sportfishing Policy and the
Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation.
That certainly seemed to be the case with the webinar addressing
striped bass recovery.
Both of those speakers gave honest and accurate appraisals
of the current state of the striped bass stock and how stock health impacts the
recreational striped bass fishery.
Mr. Blinkoff, for example, accurately described changes that
we’ve all seen in the approach that dedicated striped bass fishermen bring to
the fishery.
“Over the past 10-14 years, what we’ve really seen is a shift
in angler attitude. Fishermen are now
looking more toward catch and release.
They especially did not want to keep the bigger fish, what they referred
to as the “breeders” or the “spawning size fish.”
Dr. Armstrong dedicated much of his speaking time to explain
the realities of striped bass management, beginning with the somewhat ironic
statement that
“Striped bass is always one of the most pleasurable species
to manage, because for every angler there is another interest in how you want
it managed, and from north to south we have very different interests.”
He went on to say that
“The [Chesapeake] Bay, they fish on little fish and we fish
on big fish. So trying to come to a
consensus in a management regime is very difficult, but we did it. We got the amendment [sic], the Addendum [VI],
finished. We got the [28 to 35-inch]
slot size put in [for most coastal recreational fisheries]. So we accomplished a lot and we think we’re
poised to bring this stock back. But it’s
not easy, and it won’t be without bumps in the road going forward…”
Dr. Armstrong also emphasized the fact—and it is a
fact--that while the striped bass stock has experienced unsustainable fishing
pressure, its current state is not primarily due to overfishing. Instead,
“Recruitment in striped bass is highly variable…When you have
a series of lows…we start seeing spawning stock biomass eroding, and that’s exactly
what has caused the [current] erosion of spawning stock biomass, it’s these
poor year classes. It’s primarily not
fishing, it’s primarily environmental causes.
And the primary cause is…the water regime in Chesapeake Bay. When you have flood springs, you get bad
recruitment. When you get really dry
springs, you get bad recruitment. When
you get nice cool, wettish springs, you get big year classes…”
He also expressed no doubt about what striped bass managers
need to do to overcome the environmental issues and restore the striped bass
population.
“We have to husband the big year classes along the best we
can. The only way to do that is to
keep [fishing mortality] low.
[emphasis added]”
Few people with any real grasp of the principles of striped
bass management are going to disagree with that statement.
But now we get to the current problem.
Managers failed to properly husband the striped bass
resource, allowing excessive harvest of the big 2001 and 2003 year classes, and
arguably of the 2011 year class as well.
The stock has become overfished.
How do we now keep fishing mortality low enough to protect
the remaining 2011s, and the strong 2014 and 2015 year classes, long enough to
rebuild the spawning stock biomass to its target level.
This is where the webinar starts getting a little fuzzy, and
fails to tell listeners the entire truth.
And it’s not surprising, given that the moderator was Michael Waine, ASA’s
Atlantic Fisheries Policy Director. He
is one of the people that helped push striped bass management off the rails in
the first place, and it seems that getting it back on track isn’t high on his
priority list.
Amendment 6 contains so-called “management triggers,” which require
the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board to take clearly
specified actions when certain events occur.
Most particularly, for purposes of this discussion, are management
triggers 1, 2 and 4, which read
“1) If the Management Board determines
that the fishing mortality threshold is exceeded in any year, the Board must
adjust the striped bass management program to reduce the fishing mortality rate
to a level that is at or below the target within one year.
2) If the Management Board determines that
the biomass has fallen below the threshold in any given year, the Board must
adjust the striped bass management program to rebuild the biomass to the target
level [in no more than 10 years]…
4) If the Management Board determines that
the female spawning stock biomass falls below the target for two consecutive
years and the fishing mortality rate exceeds the target in either of those
years, the Management Board must adjust the striped bass
management program to rebuild the biomass to a level that is at or above the
target [in no more than 10 years].
[emphasis added]”
But even though the
2012 benchmark stock assessment, as updated in 2013, demonstrated that
management trigger 4 had, in fact, been tripped, and that the Management Board
must begin a 10-year rebuilding plan, nothing happened.
The rebuilding plan was neither drafted nor
put in place. And Mr. Waine is a big
part of the reason why.
At the time, he wasn’t working for the ASA, but instead for
the ASMFC, where he served as the Fishery Management Plan Coordinator for
striped bass. After the 2013 stock
assessment update revealed that the striped bass female spawning stock biomass
had fallen below the target, and that the fishing mortality rate had risen
above the target, the Management Board began work to reduce fishing mortality
back to the target (in response to another management trigger which required
that it do so).
“Management trigger 2 [he should have addressed trigger 4] in
Amendment 6 says that you need to rebuild the [spawning stock biomass] back to
its target over a specified timeline that should not exceed 10 years. I think there is sort of a combination of
things happening. The board is acting to
reduce [fishing mortality]. Through that
action we see the projections showing that [spawning stock biomass] will start
increasing towards its target, but we’re uncomfortable about projecting out far
enough to tell you when it will reach its target because the further on the
projections we go the more uncertainty that is involved. Therefore, I think the trend is to get back
towards the target, but we can’t tell you exactly how quickly that will happen.”
Of course, we know now that the trend wasn’t “to get back
towards the target,” but a further decline in the striped bass stock. Yet listening to Mr. Waine moderate the ASA
webinar, you get the distinct impression that he, maybe acting on his own
belief, maybe reflecting the views of his employer, are willing to ignore the
clear language of Amendment 6 once again, and delay the rebuilding of the
striped bass stock.
Now, though, the stakes are higher, as the
spawning stock biomass isn’t merely below target, but below threshold. The latest benchmark stock assessment found
that the striped bass stock is now overfished.
Management trigger 2 should have already kicked in but, somehow,
it hasn’t. And Mr. Waine’s comments suggest
that is OK with that.
He asked Dr. Armstrong
“How does the Management Board actually rebuild striped
bass? What can it control and what can’t
they control? Functionally, what is the Management
Board doing when they take reductions in the striped bass [fishing mortality]
level?”
Dr. Armstrong responded to the fishing mortality question,
saying
“There’s really only one way to rebuild the stock…The only
thing we can control is fishing mortality…We can cut that down to a level that
the projections show will rebuild. And
we’ve done that. So we’ve taken
criticism that the management plan says…we have to cut [fishing mortality] to
the target [fishing mortality] in one year.
We did that…so we’re already starting rebuilding. Cutting [fishing mortality] is the only way
to rebuild… [emphasis added]”
Dr. Armstrong went on to describe the monitoring that would take
place now that the addendum is done.
But that was only a partial answer, addressing management
trigger 1, reducing fishing mortality to the target level within one year if
overfishing occurs. The real rebuilding
language is in management trigger 2, that requires the spawning stock biomass
to be rebuilt within 10 years if it becomes overfished. During the webinar, the 10-year rebuilding issue wasn’t addressed
at all.
One might have hoped that Mr. Waine, as moderator, would
have followed up on the 10-year rebuilding issue; he’s certainly familiar
enough with the management plan, including Amendment 6, to know that the
language was there.
But, instead, he left the rebuilding plan question
unanswered, and said
“So this is not a set-it-and-forget-it scenario. The Management Board will continue to monitor
the progress of this fishery and will make adjustments as needed to address any
changes that they see that they didn’t expect.
And I think that’s the way management has gone, and it sounds like that’s
where it’s headed.”
As Mr. Waine knows perfectly well from his experience and
actions at the ASMFC, reducing fishing mortality back to target, and ignoring
the management plan’s clear requirement of a 10-year rebuilding plan, certainly
is the way striped bass management “has gone,” although he probably shouldn’t
really believe that the Management Board will “make adjustments as needed” to
address unexpected changes.
After all, in
2014, the Chesapeake Bay states were required to adopt management measures that
would reduce their fishing mortality by 20.5 percent compared to 2012, and
when the data
showed that such measures instead allowed recreational landings in the
Chesapeake—mostly in Maryland—to increase by more than 50 percent—something
that everyone should hope qualified as a change that the Management Board didn’t
expect—the
Management Board responded by…doing nothing to fix it at all, and allowing
such excessive harvest to continue for at least another five years.
That sort of inaction is at least part of the reason why the
stock was allowed to become overfished once again. So doing the same thing again—failing to
institute a 10-year rebuilding plan, as Amendment 6 requires—and trusting that
the stock will rebuild at some unknown point in the future, possibly with
Management Board intervention, comes dangerously close to Albert
Einstein’s alleged remark that
“Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting
different results.”
Striped bass need a clearly drafted rebuilding plan, that
will recover the stock within ten years.
But that fact that Mr. Waine didn’t seem to push Dr. Armstrong on that
issue, coupled with his role as the ASA’s Atlantic Fisheries Policy Director
and his past actions at the ASMFC, suggest that at least some parts of the recreational
industry might just be indifferent, if not opposed, to establishing a 10-year
rebuilding deadline.
That wouldn’t only be too bad for the bass, and for
striped bass fishermen, but for the fishing industry itself.
For as Dr. Armstrong noted later in the webinar, striped
bass abundance drives angler effort.
When there are a lot of bass, he acknowledged,
“Fishing effort skyrockets…If the stock doubles, the fishing
effort doesn’t double, it quadruples…It behooves everyone to keep this stock
healthy.”
Everyone presumably includes the tackle manufacturers,
wholesalers and retailers who belong to ASA.
So let’s hope that omitting the 10-year rebuilding
requirement from the webinar was just a coincidence, and not a reflection of ASA policy.
But hope is not a plan. Let’s also make sure that we push the ASMFC to adopt such a rebuilding
plan soon.
Rebuilding striped
bass “someday” is not good enough. Those
of us who lived through the last collapse want to see the stock fully rebuilt
and healthy again, and not just in our lifetimes—we want to still be young and active
enough to enjoy it when it happens.
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