I recently spent a couple of days down in Washington, D.C.,
where I spoke to legislative staff, and to a few reporters, about the need to
preserve the conservation and management provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act, which are currently being threatened by Alaska
Representative Don Young’s H.R. 1335, the so-called “Strengthening
Fishing Communities and Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries Management Act”.
As I spoke with various members of the House and Senate
staff, one theme came up a number of times, the notion that, at least for some
species, the current scientifically rigorous system of annual catch limits and
rebuilding overfished stocks should be replaced with a system built around “soft”
catch targets and relaxed rebuilding deadlines, similar to that employed by the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission.
The interesting thing about such views were that they were
expressed exclusively by the staff of representatives and senators from states
bordering the Gulf of Mexico. There was
quite a bit of talk about red snapper being “managed like striped bass”—one representative,
Louisiana
Republican Garret Graves, has already attempted to introduce legislation that would
put such a management approach in place.
After my two days of wandering the halls of the capitol were
done, it became pretty clear that some people down in the Gulf, where Atlantic
striped bass don’t swim and ASMFC doesn’t manage the fisheries, are pretty
impressed with ASMFC’s management of the striped bass.
It also became pretty clear that when you
talked to folks from the Mid-Atlantic and New England states, who hear about
striped bass from their constituents on a regular basis, no one was spouting
any foolishness about managing federal fisheries the way ASMFC manages
stripers.
I suppose that ASMFC’s striped bass management program is a
lot like a grainy photograph or a badly done painting. It looks fine if you stand far enough away,
but once you start getting close, it starts looking bad; the flaws just can’t be ignored.
It also doesn’t help that a lot of the Gulf Coast
legislators are being sold a bill of goods by representatives of the angling
industry and “anglers’ rights” groups who are quick to talk about how the stock
recovered between 1984 and 1995, but tend to leave out the part about abundance
declining steadily from 2003 right through today.
And they never veer off the topic of striped bass to point
out that the same “soft target” management system used by ASMFC hasn’t restored
a single stock managed solely by the Commission since 1995, although weakfish,
tautog, American shad, alewives, American eel, blueback herring and southern
New England lobster have declined pretty badly since then, and northern
shrimp have completely collapsed.
But if you live in Louisiana or Texas, or anywhere else
along the Gulf, you probably don’t see all of the problems, and the folks who
are trying to weaken Magnuson-Stevens are doing their best to keep your vision
firmly focused at least twenty years in the past.
Anyone interested in finding out how striped bass management has worked out today would do well to start with the most
recent, peer-reviewed benchmark stock assessment, along with its
2013 update, which states
“If the current fully-recruited [fishing mortality] (0.200) is
maintained during 2013-2017, the probability of being below the [spawning stock
biomass] reference point increases to 0.86 by 2015. After 2016, the probability is expected to
decline slightly. If the current
fully-recruited F increases to Fthreshold (0.219), and is maintained
during 2013-2017, the probability of being below the SSB reference point
reaches 0.93 by 2015 and declines thereafter.
If the fully-recruited F decreases to the current Ftarget
(0.180) and is maintained during 2013-2017, the probability of being below the
SSB reference point reaches 0.77 by 2015 and declines thereafter…”
In other words, despite the striped bass stock having been
declared rebuilt in 1995, and biomass peaking in 2003, even under the most
optimistic scenarios, that stock is likely—between a 77% and 93% chance—to fall
to overfished levels again this year.
People saw the problem coming for a number of years. ASMFC’s Striped Bass Technical Committee
began work on an amendment to the management plan that would reduce fishing
mortality, and in
November 2011 was advised by a member of ASMFC’s Striped Bass Technical
Committee that
“Under the current [fishing mortality] of 0.23 the female
spawning stock biomass will fall below the threshold by 2017…”
Some members of the Management Board tried to cut off the
problem. Douglas Grout, a fishery
manager for the State of New Hampshire, clearly stated that
“That is the line in the sand. It’s not going below the target, its going
below our established threshold here.
Even under average recruitment, which includes the good years, we’re
going to be right at that threshold by that time. The question to me here is do we want to get
out ahead of this and prevent this from occurring and help us achieve our
vision of healthy and sustainable stocks by 2015 or do we want to wait and
react?”
As has been typical of ASMFC for the past decade or two, a
majority opted for “wait and react” and action was deferred until after the
benchmark assessment was done.
Yet even then, when the peer-reviewed benchmark assessment—the
closest thing to a “gold standard” in fisheries management—advised that fishing
mortality should be reduced, and that overfishing was likely by 2015, there
were a number of Management Board members who wanted to do nothing.
One of the most adamant was Tom
Fote, Governor’s Appointee from New Jersey, who essentially dismissed the
conclusions of the peer-reviewed assessment, saying in October 2013 that
“We have been looking at some figures for a period of time
and then decided we’re going to do a drastic cut. Two years later they’re finding out that we
didn’t need the drastic cuts and had to change the regulations in New Jersey
again…
“I see that we’re coming to where we have decided where a
threshold will be and then we’re getting close to that line, but we’re not
under that line. It is not overfished
and overfishing is not taking place…”
In other words, Fote was opposed to any action that would
reduce harvest and perhaps prevent the stock from becoming overfished. Instead, he would wait until the crisis
occurred, and then try to react and correct things, rather than trying to avert
the crisis in the first place.
Under Magnuson-Stevens, that can’t occur. The law requires that
“The Secretary shall report annually to the Congress and the
Councils on the status of fisheries within each Council’s geographical area of
authority and identify those fisheries that are overfished or are approaching a condition of
being overfished. For those
fisheries managed under a fishery management plan or international agreement,
the status shall be determined using the criteria for overfishing specified in
such plan or agreement. A fishery shall be classified as approaching
a condition of being overfished if, based on trends in fishing effort, fishery
resource size, and other appropriate factors, the Secretary estimates that the
fishery will become overfished within
two years. [emphasis added]”
Federal law also requires that
“Within one year after [the Secretary determines that a
fishery is approaching a condition of being overfished], the appropriate
Council…shall prepare a fishery management plan, plan amendment, or proposed
regulations for the fishery…to prevent overfishing from occurring in the
fishery…”
Approaches such as Fote’s, which would take no action until
overfishing actually occurs, are not allowed under federal law.
But then, many things that are prohibited—or required—by the
conservation and management provisions of Magnuson-Stevens are not binding on
the Striped Bass Management Board, or any other ASMFC management panel.
For example, Magnuson-Stevens requires that the best
available science be used in making fishery management decisions, and at the federal
level, a peer-reviewed stock assessment would surely qualify. Yet at the October 2014 Striped Bass
Management Board meeting, when the regulations would be set for 2015 and
succeeding years, there was actually opposition to accepting the assessment’s
conclusions. John Clark, a
proxy for Delaware’s marine fisheries director, discounted the conclusions of the peer-reviewed assessment, saying
“I just think the current peer-reviewed benchmark assessment
is an excellent model, but I think, as has been pointed out, the reference
points are extremely conservative…I just look at the new reference points in
regards to the spawning and stock biomass as tracked over the past few years,
and it looks to me that we’re going to have to keep the stock at almost an
unsustainably high level.
“…I just don’t see the urgent need for us to adopt such a
conservative set of reference points at this time.”
It probably should be noted that Delaware, along with
neighboring New Jersey, were the only two states to later adopt “conservation-equivalent”
regulations that allowed their anglers to kill two fish, as opposed to the
one-fish bag limit adopted everywhere else…
Kyle Schick, legislative proxy from Virginia, took a similar
course, arguing
“…I don’t see the high urgency to do such a drastic measure
at this time…
“We don’t have to stop it in one year; we don’t have to do
such a drastic thing over three years.
We do need to do something, but I don’t think that the economic impact
that this is going to catch [sic]—and recreational fishermen, they don’t want
to go to one fish. They don’t want to
have this huge catch reduction. They may
talk about it now, but we’ll see what happens.
Right now we have marinas have been going out of business at the highest
rate in history; the same thing with tackle shops…”
And thus we have the classic argument for “flexibility,”
that there is no hurry to end overfishing or rebuild overfished stocks; yes,
they present a problem, but not so much of a problem that managers should
elevate healthy fisheries in the future above healthy profits
right now…
It’s exactly the sort of argument, justifying continued over-exploitation of already depleted and
often collapsed fisheries two decades ago, that led to the passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act
of 1996. Its
prevalence even today is why federal fisheries law requires that overfishing
be promptly halted and overfished stocks promptly rebuilt.
In the case of striped bass, that didn’t exactly
happen.
Yes, the recommendations of the
benchmark assessment were ultimately accepted, and new, lower fisheries
mortality reference points put in place.
But while Amendment
6 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass requires
fishing mortality to be lowered to target levels within
one year once the management trigger is tripped, it didn’t work
out that way last October.
ASMFC’s Striped Bass Technical Committee had determined that if
overall striped bass harvest was reduced by 25%, there would be a 50-50 chance
of reducing fishing mortality to the target level by the end of 2015.
Such 50% chance of success is the bare
minimum for a federal fishery management plan; the court decision in Natural
Resources Defense Council vs. Daley made that perfectly clear.
However, ASMFC was under no such legal stricture, so some
members of the Management Board, led primarily by representatives from
Chesapeake Bay, decided to
completely ignore the language of the management plan, and moved to stretch out
the recovery for three full years.
When that failed, another motion
was made to extend the time from one year to two. When that failed as well, the Management Board eventually approved a
motion that said
“Move that prior to the start of the 2015 fishing season, all
jurisdictions implement rules to achieve the new fishing mortality target by
implementing a 25 percent harvest reduction in the coastal fisheries and a 20.5
percent reduction in the Chesapeake Bay fisheries.”
Of course, because the rules were eased for Chesapeake Bay, the final Board action didn't have a 50% chance of complying with
the management plan’s requirement that harvest be reduced to target within just
one year. When a Technical Committee
representative was asked about that, he said
“We didn’t do the math, but I guess a weighted average, it
would be some time less than two years, technically, within a year and a
half. It would be less than two years
for sure.”
And the likelihood of achieving the mandated reduction
within the required one year became even lower after the Management Board
decided to reduce the commercial striped bass quota, rather than actual
harvest, by 25%, something later calculated to provide a real-world reduction
in the 25% range.
Under Magnuson-Stevens, such approach would have been dead
on arrival, but when you “manage fish like striped bass,” saying “didn’t do the
math” and “I guess” meets the standards just fine. As does just ignoring the management plan…
So yes, I suppose that the “flexibility” to avoid
science-based catch limits and rebuilding mandates might look pretty good from
some distance away.
But I live and fish on the striper coast. I have seen a fish once restored to abundance from the depths of collapse become overfished
yet again.
From that close perspective, managing any species “like striped bass” doesn’t look good at
all.
I agree 100% with your statement that striped bass management under ASFMC is not the model that should be used to manage any federal fishery. The bottom line in the Gulf of Mexico is that the cca wants all the fish. It's really that simple and the argument that started in the 1800s will never be stopped. Four words tell the story, WHO GETS THE FISH.
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