STRIPED BASS: HOW DID WE GET HERE (AGAIN)

 I’m not going to be very creative today.

The story of the striped bass, which went from stock collapse in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to a full recovery by 1995, to true abundance in the early 2000s, to becoming overfished again today is one that I, and many others, have told before.

Concerns unaddressed become problems; problems unaddressed grow larger and, if ignored long enough, become crises that threaten the health of the stock.

There is little point in me recounting that story once more, in my own words.

But it might be worthwhile to recount that tale, one more time, in the words of those responsible for the striped bass resource:  The scientists who are responsible for monitoring the stock, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, which is responsible for taking the scientists’ findings and using them to craft management measures that will maintain the health of the striped bass stock and ensure abundance for future generations.

Stories are best understood when told from the beginning, so this tale begins with some words from the ASMFC’s Interstate Fisheries Management Program Charter, which establishes the policies and procedures that apply to every fishery management plan, including that for striped bass.  In that regard, the Charter directs that

“Above all [a fishery management plan] must include conservation and management measures that ensure the long-term biological and productivity of fishery resources under management.  To this end, the Commission has adopted the following standards:

(1)             Conservation programs and management measures shall be designed to prevent overfishing and maintain over time, abundant, self-sustaining stocks of coastal fishery resources.  In cases where stocks have become depleted as a result of overfishing and/or other causes, such programs shall be designed to rebuild, restore, and subsequently maintain such stocks so as to assure their sustained availability in fishable abundance on a long-term basis.

(2)             Conservation programs and management measures shall be based on the best scientific information available…”

With those governing standards in mind, we can examine the public record, and see how well the Management Board discharged its duty to the striped bass and to the public in this twenty-first century.

All appeared well for the first few years.  The most recent benchmark stock assessment, released in 2019, tells us that 2001 and 2003 saw strong year classes produced in the Chesapeake Bay, and that spawning stock biomass steadily climbed steadily until 2003.  But after that, things began to head the wrong way.

The first flickers of concern about declining abundance appeared at the August 2008 Management Board meeting, when Terry Stockwell, a Maine fishery manager, voiced worries about increasing striped bass landings in response to a favorable stock assessment.

“While the stock overall appears to be doing very well, the catch in Northern New England this past year has been quite dismal.  In fact, there has been a multi-year in declining abundance altogether [sic], so I’m a little anxious about doing anything too aggressive.  You know, is this just a redistribution issue; I’m not sure.  The large fish are disappearing.  This year the schoolies have disappeared.  Before we open Pandora’s Box, at least from the northern end of the range, we would like to stay on course and see our way through this.”

If striped bass abundance was truly declining (as biologists later confirmed that it was), then Maine, at the northern extreme of the striped bass’ range, would be one of the first places to feel the effects.  But Mr. Stockwell’s concerns were casually dismissed by Management Board members such as Pat Augustine, the Governor’s Appointee from New York, who responded,

“…I’ve often asked the question as how many more striped bass do we have to have in the ocean and do the surplus, quote-quote, above the threshold—and there are some folks that are not going to like what I say, but the reality is what kind of damage are those fish doing to the sub-species below them, including the forage fish that other species are feeding on?

“…I know the Chesapeake Bay folks have spent many, many thousands of dollars and hours looking at the food chain for the striped bass and so on in the Chesapeake Bay, and they came up with some interesting results as to what they feed on, when they feed on them and so on.

“…The question that still remains open and unanswered is what are the extra fish over and beyond the threshold doing to the other sub-species?  I’m not trying to start a fight with anybody.  I’m just saying that it is a question.  Look at what happened to winter flounder.  We blame weather conditions and water conditions, lack of eelgrass, lack of phytoplankton, zooplankton, et cetera, on that end, yet what is eating them?...”

And based on that sort of logic, Mr. Stockwell’s early concerns about a decline in the stock were ignored.

At the next Management Board meeting, in October 2008, proposals were put on the table to liberalize recreational striped bass regulations in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, even if such liberalization was not necessarily in accord with the fishery management plan.  Dennis Abbott, the Legislative Appointee from New Hampshire, objected, saying

“…To me what is going on is, as I would term it, we’re dealing with striped bass management as becoming death by thousand cuts.  We keep adding little things to our management plan; we can do this in one place and we can do things in another place, and it doesn’t affect overfishing…

“Though I appreciate what Pennsylvania and Delaware are trying to do to have a better opportunity, we’re really going off the rails here.  When we adopted a coast-wide size limit of 28 inches and 18 inches for the producer areas, that is what we said but we keep weakening that.  I just think that it’s the wrong way to go because in a lot of circles people think that striped bass fishing is not as good as it was; and continuing as a management board to do these things is not going in the right direction.”

But Mr. Abbott’s early concerns were ignored, too.  Yet at the May 2009 Management Board meeting, there were indications that some of the concerns expressed were justified, and that the bass might just be facing a problem.

The exhibits presented at that meeting are not readily available.  However, some of the comments made make it clear what such exhibits revealed.  Douglas Grout, a New Hampshire fishery managers, observed such exhibits and noted

“…There was only one thing that surprised me here…I notice under the fishing mortality rates the only fishing mortality rates that result in either a level [spawning stock biomass] or age 8-plus or an increase is 0.25 or lower.

“I kind of expected the leveling, given that is pretty close to our target, that there would be [a fishing mortality rate of] 0.32, that we would see a leveling of the [spawning stock biomass] or age 8-plus, but clearly the analysis shows that at that level of fishing mortality there would be a rather significant decline in both of those…”

The fishing mortality target at the time, which would remain in place until the 2015 season, was 0.30. 

Dr. Desmond Kahn, speaking for the Atlantic Striped Bass Technical Committee, did not seem overly concerned by the issue raised by Mr. Grout.  He responded that

“…I share your surprise.  This was done by Gary Shepherd [of the Northeast Fisheries Science Center]…The thing that is kind of striking about the graph is that if you look the peak on this appears—it looks like about 2003.  Then we have seen a decline already through 2006, according to this.

“…I think it is something we’re going to explore further this summer.  I’d like to learn more about why this gives this appearance.  I can’t make a judgment as to whether it is totally accurate or not at this point…”

Of course, recent stock assessments have confirmed that the spawning stock biomass did, in fact, hit its peak in 2003, and then began a decline that lead to the stock being overfished today.  But despite the early warning of a possible problem, and some Management Board members expressing concerns over falling recreational catch, the Management Board was not particularly worried about the apparent decline, and so did nothing to intervene as the population began to wane.

Some were even loudly calling for an increase in commercial landings, with New York’s Mr. Augustine saying

“…We’re talking about there is a possible impact on the stock.  We think that there might be a lack or loss of big fish in certain waters, baits have changed, water temperatures have changed.  The bottom line is it seems like every time we put off making a hard decision and in this particular case a commercial sector happened on the short end of the stick, their bag limit of quota has increased once in the last five or seven years…

“So, the question is what are we protecting?  Are we protecting the fish so that recreational fishermen can continue to grow in terms of numbers and harvest their fair share of two fish per person or are we being fair and equitable allowing the commercial sector, which is a valid sector just as the recreational sector is in terms of what it brings to the economy—those people who don’t fish who like to eat striped bass want to be able to eat a fish off the marketplace.

“…Are we doing single-species management and by having an overabundance of striped bass in my mind are surplus, what is the negative effect those striped bass are having on fish down the food chain?

“We can’t blame all the demise of the winter flounder strictly on striped bass.  We say there are the birds, we say there’re the seals, but the bottom line is they are eating down the food chain.  Whether they’re porgies, black sea bass, it doesn’t matter what they are.  So, if in fact we’re going to try to keep our spawning stock biomass above that threshold, the question we have to answer is how far above that threshold?...”

While the commercial increase never occurred, the striped bass’ decline continued.

Finally, in 2011, biologists formally confirmed that the striped bass stock was facing future problems, when a stock assessment update informed the Management Board that

“Female [spawning stock biomass] will fall slightly below the threshold by 2017 under both [the average and the low] recruitment scenarios.”

 Knowing that the stock would become overfished within the next six years, the Management Board began to rouse itself, and initiated work on a addendum to the management plan that could have significantly reduced fishing mortality, and might have halted the stock’s decline.  However, at the November 2011 Management Board meeting, progress was halted.

Once again, New York’s Mr. Augustine took the offensive, saying, despite the conclusions of the 2011 assessment update,

“We’ve heard a lot of gnashing of teeth concerned about the actual status of the stock, and we, the board, have to take some serious action to prevent a variety of things happening, particularly mortality on the larger fish.  I know we’ve gone off on a venture here in the last couple of meetings saying that we’ve got to protect, got to protect, got to protect, and at the same time the reality of what you’ve presented is so starkingly black and white that the status of the stock is not in harm’s way.”

Dr. Jaime Geiger of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service effectively agreed, saying

“if I had to put it in a simplistic way, red light, yellow light, green light, we have a green light fishery with getting ready to enter possibly a yellow light phase.”

For him, the prediction of an overfished stock six years down the road didn’t merit more than that.

Tom Fote, Governor’s Appointee from New Jersey, clearly opposed reducing striped bass landings, saying

“how can I be a hypocrite and go out to my public in New Jersey and basically say, oh, by the way, we’ve been doing so great with striped bass and there really is no—we haven’t hit any of the triggers [for management action contained in Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass] and now I’m going to reduce your catch by 40 percent.”

Jim Gilmore, New York’s fishery manager, agreed that striped bass constituted a “green light fishery” and noted

“If we take action now of the magnitude that was recommended in this addendum, we are overmanaging this fishery and that’s one of the things we’ve got to start getting away from.  From anything that I’ve seen and read in all the reports, I think the fishery is in good shape and we really need to do nothing at this point.”

While Mr. Gilmore was concerned about “overmanaging” striped bass, it’s worth pointing out that, after going through many years of Management Board transcripts, no one has ever expressed concern that the Board might be “undermanaging” the resource, and not taking action when action was needed.

Still, there were voices at the November 2011 meeting that expressed concern for the striped bass.

Mr. Stockwell of Maine supported the possible landings reductions, saying

“I’ve been hearing a lot of good news today, but frankly I don’t hear any good news from the northern Gulf of Maine.  A number of our charterboat businesses have gone out of business.  Our recreational fishermen are not finding the fish.”

G. Ritchie White, New Hampshire’s Governor’s Appointee, concurred.

“…If there is a reasonable possibility that we will be overfishing in 2017 and 2018, I would much rather take a baby step now [and move forward with harvest reductions] than take some drastic action then.  Whether we need the 40 percent [reduction] or not, I’m not sure, but doing something at this point to slow down the mortality on a spawning stock biomass I think is important…”

Mr. Grout of New Hampshire also supported some sort of action.

“…Clearly we’re seeing a decline in the [spawning stock biomass]…what we’re looking at is under a low recruitment scenario there is a projection that by 2017 we’re going to be in that overfished condition.

“That is the line in the sand.  It’s not going below the target; it’s going below our established threshold here.  Even under average recruitment, which includes the good years, we’re going to be right at that threshold by that time.  The question to me here is do we want to get out ahead of this and prevent this from occurring and help us achieve our vision of healthy and sustainable stocks by 2015 or do we want to wait and react?”

The Management Board’s choice, by a vote of nine to six, was to wait and react to an impending crisis.

Their chance to do just that came only two years later, after the 2013 benchmark stock assessment reported conditions that tripped two of the management triggers in Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.  Those triggers, approved in 2003 by the Management Board, stated that

“If the Management Board determines that the fishing mortality target is exceeded in two consecutive years and the female spawning stock biomass falls below the target in either of those years, the Management Board must adjust the striped bass management program to reduce the fishing mortality rate to a level that is at or below the target within one year,”

and

“If the Management Board determines that the female spawning stock biomass falls below the target for two consecutive years and the fishing mortality rate exceeds the target in either of those years, the Management Board must adjust the striped bass management program to rebuild the biomass to a level that is at or above the target within [no more than ten years].”

The Management Board’s duty was clear, and to its credit, it began work on an addendum to the management plan that would, at least partially, address the management triggers.  But that doesn’t mean that everyone agreed.  Tom Fote of New Jersey opposed any additional conservation measures, saying

“It seems I’ve been here over the years doing the same thing.  We have been looking at some figures for a period of time and then decided we’re going to do a drastic cut.  Two years later they’re finding out that we didn’t need the drastic cuts and had to change the regulations in New Jersey again…

“I’m really concerned to do this in such a fast-track method when it has such an impact on the people involved that basically harvest these fish and the industry is there.  We’re not doing any social and economic impact of what will happen going from two fish to one fish.  As I said, I look at these figures and I don’t see the sky falling.

“I see that we’re coming to where we have decided where a threshold will be and then we’re getting close to that line, but we’re not under that line.  It is not overfished and overfishing is not taking place.  People have been pushing for closing this or doing something.  The people that basically send the emails are the people who want to do that.  The people that are out fishing a lot times, which are a majority of the fishermen that I go around and talk to, they’re not ready to jump through this type of hoop.  I really think we have some real concerns here.”

But this time, folks like Mr. Fote were in the minority.  As Mr. White of New Hampshire observed,

“I’m hearing from a lot of constituents; and I’m hearing terms like ‘collapse’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘you’re going to manage this like Atlantic cod’…”

Pat Kelliher, the Maine fisheries manager, said that

“The trends are very disturbing with this fishery.  Mr. Fote’s comments about Maine having a good year this year, I’m not sure if you have fished there but I did and it was still below average compared to what it has been in years past.”

Given such sentiments, an addendum to reduce harvest was begun.  However, it didn’t take long before people began looking for ways to undercut the management triggers on which the addendum was based.  While most such efforts failed, it was the ASMFC staff, rather than members of the management board, that managed to successfully circumvent Amendment 6’s requirement that the stock be rebuilt within no more than ten years.

Michael Waine, then the ASMFC’s fishery management plan coordinator for striped bass, explained it this way at the August 2014 Management Board meeting:

“Management trigger 2 [sic] in Amendment 6 says that you have to rebuild [spawning stock biomass] back to its target over a specified timeframe that should not exceed ten years.  I think there is sort of a combination of things happening.  The board is acting to reduce [fishing mortality].  Through that action we see projections showing that [spawning stock biomass] will start increasing towards its target, but we’re uncomfortable with projecting out far enough to tell you when it will reach its target biomass because the further on the projections we go the more uncertainty that is involved.  Therefore, I think the trend is to go back toward the target, but we can’t tell you exactly how quickly that will happen.”

As a result, no rebuilding plan was ever put in place, although fishing mortality was, for a while, reduced to target.  Yet the ink was barely dry on the new addendum before Michael Luisi, fishery manager from Maryland, tried to again increase fishing mortality at the November 2015 Management Board meeting.

“…I think some people—I know a lot of my stakeholders are under the impression that this addendum was a one-year plan to get the fishing mortality to the target and they’re expecting that there be some consideration of relief.

“There has been a great deal of hardship in Maryland.  The commercial charterboat captains have gone out of business as a result of the actions that have been taken.  I would like to have it on the record, Mr. Chairman, in your opinion when will the shareholders have an opportunity and when will this board have an opportunity to look at making management change for the future or are we just expecting to hold the line where we are indefinitely into the future?”

In retrospect, Mr. Luisi’s words seem more than a little ironic, as it turns out that Maryland was experiencing no sacrifices at all.  When the impacts of the management measures adopted in 2014 were analyzed, it turned out that instead of achieving a 20.5% reduction in recreational landings, as required by the new addendum to the management plan, Maryland anglers actually enjoyed more than a 50% increase in the number of striped bass killed.

Even so,  Mr. Luisi tried to further increase the striped bass kill.  Because the 2015 fishing mortality rate was calculated to be 0.16, just a statistically insignificant 0.02 below the target of 0.18, he argued at the October 2016 Management Board meeting that

“if we were to move from 0.16 to 0.18, it would be a small tick, maybe a 5 to 8 percent liberalization, in terms of numbers.  Maybe that’s what it would be…But what I’m thinking about and what I’m looking at, is the fact that perhaps just that very small change could be something that saves a few of the fishermen in my state.

“A half an inch in minimum size could mean a lot to our fleets, our charterboat and recreational fleet; more so the charterboat community…”

For a while, the Management Board seemed inclined to go along with his request; it even initiated a new addendum to increase striped bass landings.  However, in the end, such addendum was not approved.  Still, Mr. Luisi was not done trying to maximize striped bass landings. 

Ms. Nichole Lengyel presented the Technical Committee report at the February 2017 Management Board meeting, at which she noted that

“preliminary 2016 removals were estimated at 3.6 million fish.  This is an 18 percent increase from 2015.  Keep in mind these are just preliminary estimates; they could increase when they become final…

“…2016 removals are likely an underestimate…”

Dr. Katie Drew, the Technical Committee Chair, followed up with a comment that

“[the data] is suggesting that if we did the update in 2016 with 2016 data, it would suggest that we were above the [fishing mortality] target in 2016…

“We are forecasting that if you took the same level of removals out that you took in 2016, you would most likely be above target again in 2017.”

At that point, the same Mr. Luisi who had just attempted to increase landings based on the ephemeral difference between a fishing mortality rate of 0.16 and one of 0.18 said

“I just want to make sure it’s clear that there is no plan right now to do a 2016 or 2017 assessment, which will give us more certain values for the 2016 [fishing mortality rate] as it relates to coastwide harvest.”

Clearly, he far preferred relying on the 2015 data, which probably understated landings, than the updated and likely more accurate landings data from the two following years.

And so things remained at the status quo until a new benchmark stock assessment, released in 2019, found the stock to be both overfished and subject to overfishing.  Once again, the Management Board chose to address the problem by reducing fishing mortality to the target level, but ignoring the requirement to initiate a 10-year rebuilding plan.

But the story of the striped bass continues today, when the stock remains overfished, and recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay, the single most important producer of striped bass, has been dismally low for the past three years.

On Wednesday, the Management Board will meet again, to write the next chapter in the continuing saga.  In doing so, they have a choice:  They can act decisively, and take the actions most likely to rebuild the bass stock, and keep it healthy in the future.

Or, they can reprise the past, and dither, and further delay, while the bass stock suffers for their inaction.

Those words, we’ve read before.

 

 

 

 

 

 

TAUTOG: SOMETIMES, IT'S GOOD TO BE WRONG

I’ve been a consistent critic of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s efforts to manage tautog (a/k/a “blackfish”), and for very good reason.

The ASMFC first learned that tautog had become overfished in1996.  However, faced with dogged fishing industry opposition to every effort to reduce fishing mortality, the Commission delayed taking decisive action to rebuild the stock.  Instead, it adopted a long series of half-measures that were never restrictive enough to make a significant difference; as a result, tautog stubbornly refused to rebuild.

It wasn’t until 2017, fully twenty-one years after the stock was declared to be overfished, that the ASMFC’s Tautog Management Board finally adopted an amendment to its management plan that had a decent chance of rebuilding the stock.  Even then, with respect to the tautog in Long Island Sound, arguably the single most productive piece of water in the species’ entire range, the Management Board failed to adopt biologists’ recommended measures.  Instead, it opted for significantly less restrictive regulations, which were not expected to end overfishing until 2029.

Given that, I predicted that Long Island Sound’s tautog stock would not only fail to rebuild, but would continue to decline.  As recently as last week, I also suggestedthat tautog would be the next northeastern fish species to become too scarce tosupport significant recreational or commercial fisheries.

For once, it appears that I was overly pessimistic about the tautog’s future, and that my predictions were wrong.

I’m happy about that.

Recently, the ASMFC released a stock assessment update that covered all four tautog stocks which, to my surprise, seem to be doing better than they were in 2017.

Back then, only the Massachusetts-Rhode Island stock was doing well.  The Long Island Sound and New Jersey-New York Bight stocks were both overfished and experiencing overfishing, while the Delaware-Maryland-Virginia stock was overfished, although overfishing was not occurring.

Today, the Massachusetts-Rhode Island stock remains healthy.  The Long Island Sound stock, although not fully recovered, is no longer overfished, and is no longer experiencing overfishing.  The New Jersey-New York Bight stock remains overfished, but overfishing is no longer occurring; there is a 53% chance that biomass will rise above the threshold denoting an overfished stock by 2025.  The Delaware-Maryland-Virginia stock, like the Long Island Sound stock, is not yet rebuilt but no longer overfished.

Over all, the tautog news is pretty good.

At the same time, it doesn’t mean that managers shouldn’t proceed with caution for, except in the case of the Rhode Island-Massachusetts stock, the tautog’s recovery remains somewhat fragile.

With respect to the Long Island Sound stock, the assessment update noted that

“Short term projections (five years) were conducted to evaluate the risk to the stock for maintaining status quo management.  While there is little risk that the stock will be overfished in the near future, the stock is still at risk of overfishing with the current level of removals, so precaution should be taken in management decisions.  [emphasis added]”

The need for precaution is reinforced by the level of uncertainty inherent in the stock assessment.  A Preliminary Risk and Uncertainty Report prepared in connection with the assessment stated that, with respect to the Long Island Sound stock,

“The [Marine Recreational Information Program] estimates have high [Percent Standard Errors], especially as a result of splitting New York between Long Island Sound and New York Bight.  The interruptions to the recreational sampling surveys and fishery independent surveys in 2020 increase uncertainty.  There is high uncertainty in catch and catch-at-age due to poor sample sizes.  There is an age 1+ fishery independent index with a long time series; however, it is a trawl survey, which is not ideal for tautog.  Overall, there are few biological observations.  There are not enough catch and length observations for all modes, particularly headboats (no length observations since 2016), spear fishing (no observations at all), and the commercial fleet (few observations).  Length-age observations had to be borrowed from different years and different regions to fill out a minimal age-length key.  The retrospective patterns were large but in a conservative direction.  The retrospective patterns fit within the 95% confidence intervals, however the percent difference in [fishing mortality] is as high as 250% different from 2020.  Retrospective patterns in recruitment are distributed more evenly, some years overestimating some underestimating.  Harvest is fairly variable.”

In addition,

“The recreational fishery accounts for about 96% of tautog removals in the LIS region in weight.  Tautog fishermen are poorly encountered in [Marine Recreational Information Program] sampling and MRIP estimates for the region have moderate to high [Percent Standard Errors], indicating limited ability to accurately estimate catch.  As a result, there is limited capacity to regulate removals and assess recreational compliance.  In addition, there are difficulties with separating Long Island Sound catch from New York Bight catch for New York.  There are significant concerns with illegal and unreported harvesting in the region, however, the commercial tagging program was implemented to help combat these issues.  There is a high level of fishing activity and interest in tautog from fishermen in the LIS region.”

Given that degree of uncertainty, it’s only prudent to view the Long Island Sound tautog’s recovery with more than just a grain of salt.  Still, there is other data that, while largely anecdotal, supports the notion that the stock’s health is improving.

One is angler effort.  On the Connecticut side of Long Island Sound (unfortunately, because publicly available New York MRIP data doesn’t distinguish between the Sound and the New York Bight, I can’t make the same comparisons for that state), the number of trips primarily targeting tautog has been increasing since the new management measures took effect.  In 2018, Connecticut anglers made more than 353,000 targeted tautog trips.  That number increased to 464,000 in 2019 and 490,000 in 2021.

Given that angler effort is typically tied to the abundance of the targeted species, steadily increasing effort can be an indicator of increasing abundance.

The number of fish landed seems to vary from year to year, with 2018 seeing the lowest landings, 2019 the highest, and 2020 falling in between, making it hard to say that anglers are actually catching more fish.  Given that the percent standard error for those years are 37.7, 25.7, and 20.6, respectively, and indicate a high degree of uncertainty, the fact that fewer fish seem to have been caught in 2020, despite increasing effort (PSEs for effort were nearly as high, at 25.7, 32.4, and 19.1, admittedly adding uncertainty to the “increasing effort” argument as well) probably shouldn’t be seen as a sign that tautog were becoming less available.

Another factor that seems to suggest that the health of the tautog stock may be improving is the ratio between fish harvested and fish released.  In 2018, that ratio was 13.6 tautog released for every one kept.  Such ratio dropped to 3.4 in 2019, then increased to 7.9 in 2020.

Once again, the inherent uncertainty, expressed as PSE, in the estimates clouds the trend of the numbers.  However, when effort, landings, and the number of larger fish in the population all seem to be increasing, it is much easier to become comfortable with the optimistic conclusions in the stock assessment, despite the existing uncertainty.

Yes, it is possible that the stock assessment could still be wrong, that the tautog stock in Long Island Sound remains overfished, and that overfishing is still continuing.  But given the data, and the trends in such data, since 2018, it seems more likely that I was wrong about the species’ outlook, and that the state of the tautog is slowly and steadily improving.

It’s a mistake that I’ll gladly own up to.  I grew up fishing for tautog from the Connecticut shore, and from boats on Long Island Sound.  I recall when the fish were abundant.

Nothing would make me happier than to see tautog abundant again.  The assessment update gives me hope that could happen.

It also gave me the incentive to take a ride up to my old fishing grounds this weekend, where I’ll check out tautog abundance for myself.

I’m looking forward to the trip.

STRIPED BASS: IF WE GET AMENDMENT 7 WRONG

We all know that, right now, striped bass aren’t in good shape.  A recent stock assessment found them to be overfished, and the recruitment of new fish into the population isn’tgoing all that well.

There were big year classes in 2001 and 2003, but that was two decades ago, and the survivors are dwindling fast, although if you catch a high-40s or 50-plus fish, those two year classes are probably responsible.

Spawning was generally below average from 2004 to 2010.  After that, there was a big year class in 2011 that Amendment IV to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan was supposed to protect, but for whatever reason, failed to do; the 2011s never recruited into the spawning stock in the expected numbers, although there still seems to be fair numbers of them around.

2012 saw the lowest Maryland juvenile abundance index ever recorded.  2013 was better, but far from good, 2014 just below average; 2015 produced a solid year class that, while not as big as the 2011s, recruited into the stock in greater numbers and arguably forms the current last, best hope for rebuilding the spawning stock biomass.

Very slightly above-average year classes in 2017 and 2018—I tend to think of them as “strong average” given the statistical uncertainty and the fact that they’re only a couple of points above the average level—could provide the 2015s with an assist in rebuilding the stock if we don’t kill them off before they mature (both year classes can already be legally killed in the Chesapeake Bay).  

On the other hand, 2016,2019, and 2020 produced dismally below-average abundance indices of 2.20, 3.37,and 2.48, respectively (the long-term average is around 11.6); the whispers I’m hearing out of Maryland are suggesting that the 2021 numbers won’t be much, if any better—we should know that for certain in a few days, when the numbers ought to be released.

All of which means that, given the current age structure of the population, if we lose the 2015s, the striped bass is probably screwed.

There are a lot of folks out there who realize that.

At the May meeting of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, Maine fishery manager Meagan Ware made a motion to include measures to protect the 2015 year class in the draft Amendment 7 to the striped bass management plan, even though such measures weren’t specifically contemplated in the Public Information Document that sought stakeholder comment on issues to be addressed in such amendment.  The motion passed by a vote of 9 to 4, with two Management Board members abstaining, showing broad-based support for the concept.

In supporting her motion, Ms. Ware stated

“While I don’t think we are at the place where the stock was in the 1980s, at this point we have had five years of average or below average recruitment.

“It is this repeated poor recruitment that got us in trouble last time, so I think how we deal with this 2015-year class could be kind of make or break on where this stock goes, and how successful we are in rebuilding…”

David Sikorski, Maryland’s Legislative Proxy, seconded Ms. Ware’s motion.  In doing so, he observed

“recent Addendum VI measures probably failed to meet reducing fishing mortality on this 2015 stock, as implemented by all three [Chesapeake] Bay jurisdictions.

“I really have the utmost concerns of the impact we’re already having on these fish.  I think the best way to address this is to be laser focused on limiting fishing mortality on these fish that are left in the system, recognizing that they hold a lot of the hope for the future, as we all cross our fingers and hope that 2021 brings us brighter recruitment projections.”

It’s difficult to disagree with either Ms. Ware’s or Mr. Sikorski’s comments.  As Michael Armstrong, the Massachusetts fishery manager, noted,

“we’ve got five-year classes locked and loaded, with nothing behind 2014 [sic].  We have the 2015-year class, and 2014 was not bad out of the Hudson.  That is all we’ve got to rebuild with.  You know we targeted that for [a fishing mortality rate of] 0.2, and we never achieved it, so I’ve got to assume we didn’t hit it this time.  We have to start doing draconian things to get this stock back.  That is the bottom line, and so I support that.”

Of course, protecting the 2015s is easier said than done. 

The simple expedient of a 35-inch minimum size, originally one of the options included in Addendum VI, would have accomplished that goal for a few years, until the 2015s reached that size, at which point the current 28- to 35-inch slot limit might have been adopted to protect what would then have been the older, larger females.  By adopting the slot limit for the 2020 season, just as the 2015s were approaching 28 inches in length, the Management Board placed a huge bullseye on the very year class they must depend upon to rebuild the stock.

It’s unclear whether they will be able to change management measures quickly enough to prevent severe damage to those fish.

The ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Plan Development Team is certainly trying to get that done.  It has developed a number of proposals that will be presented to the Management Board at its October meeting, all of which are intended to reduce fishing mortality of the 2015 year class, enhance the female spawning stock biomass, and facilitate the recovery of the striped bass stock.

Now, it’s up to the Management Board to decide which, if any, of the PDT’s proposals to include in the draft Amendment 7 that will be released for public comment, and which to include when the final version of the Amendment is adopted, probably at next February’s Management Board meeting.

It’s possible that the Management Board will decide to abandon any special protections for the 2015s, and just leave the current slot limit in place, but I don’t expect that to happen.  I don’t think the real question is whether the Management Board will adopt measures to protect the 2015s, but rather whether, if it adopts such measures, they will be put in place soon enough to make any real difference.

The current thought is that Amendment 7 won’t be implemented until 2023; that means that at least some portion of the 2015 year class will have been bracketed by the 28- to 35-inch slot limit for three full fishing years, 2020-2022—and that doesn’t include earlier attrition that occurred in the Chesapeake Bay, where immature females may be legally harvested, beginning when they’re about two years old. 

Between 2017 and 2019, the period when the immature females would have been legal to harvest, but before a significant number would have entered either the spawning stock or the current coastal slot, Maryland landings totaled around 2,850,000 fish, with annual harvest steadily decreasing over that period.  While not all of the landed fish would have been 2015s, the size distribution of the such bass strongly suggests that, at least in 2019 and 2020, 2015s comprised the majority of the harvest.

So by 2023, the 2015 year class will have been heavily targeted for no less than five years.  It’s hard to say how many will remain when any Amendment 7 protections finally go into effect.

The Management Board might make an exception for the 2015-specific management measures, and implement them a year earlier than the rest of Amendment 7.  However, the Board is usually reluctant to implement measures mid-season, and any measures adopted in February 2022 probably couldn’t be implemented by the states until April or May, when the bass season along most of the coast is already well underway.

In addition, implementing new size limits, bag limits, or seasons a year before any new restrictions on the use of conservation equivalency go into effect would allow states like New Jersey and Maryland, which typically seek advantage through the conservation equivalency process, to undercut the 2015-specific measures with proposals designed to evade their full share of the conservation burden.

Thus, the question of what happens if we get Amendment 7 wrong, and we lose a large portion of the 2015 year class, looms large and real.

As Mr. Armstrong recognized in his statement quoted above, “We have the 2015-year class, and 2014 was not bad out of the Hudson.  That is all we’ve got to rebuild with.”  If we lose the 2015s, rebuilding will become very, very difficult to achieve, unless some unexpectedly good year classes emerge from the Chesapeake Bay.

That could happen.  But a continuing string of low recruitment years could happen, too, and in fact has happened before. 

From 1975 through 1988, the Maryland striped bass juvenileabundance index never rose above 8.45, well below the current long-termaverage, and bottomed out at 1.22.  In an exchange of thoughts with one of my management-savvy striped bass fishing friends, I commented that the years that teed up the stock collapse of the late 1970s and 1980s—that is, the recruitment decline between 1970 and 1975—bore an uncomfortable resemblance to the last few years of recruitment, between 2015 and 2020.

From what I could remember at the time that I made the comment, both periods saw a strong year class followed by a few near-average year classes, before below-average recruitment.

But I said that based on memory.  When I actually looked at the numbers, I found that the last 6 years of recruitment in Maryland—which tends to be the bellwether for striped bass abundance along the coast—was significantly worse than it was in the early 1970s.

Although we have seen larger year classes since, the 1970 year class was, when it was produced, the largest ever seen on the striper coast, with a value of 30.52.  The next five years saw the Maryland juvenile abundance index produce values of 11.77, 11.01, 8.92, 10.13, and 6.69, for a 6-year average of about 13.17.  That’s actually above the current long-term average of 11.6.

Of course, the ten years after that produced an average juvenile abundance index of 4.26 and a stock collapse.

Comparing the early 1970s to the past six years, we begin with another big year class in 2015, although with a juvenile index of 24.20, the 2015 year class was about 20% smaller than 1970.  The next five years saw juvenile abundance indices of 2.20, 13.19, 14.78, 3.37, and 2.48, for a 6-year average of 10.04, below both the long-term average and the average for the first six years of the 1970s.

That is an unsettling comparison.

At the same time, the management environment is very different today than it was in 1975.

For one thing, there is now a formal, coastwide management structure.  The Management Board may not be perfect, but it is far better than the management vacuum that existed forty-five years ago, when state managers’ greatest concern was maintaining a level playing field for their fishermen, an attitude that severely hampered the adoption of needed regulation.

Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, there were no commercial striped bass quotas, no limitations on who could sell fish (many so-called “recreational” fishermen routinely did so, even in what were supposed to be “gamefish” states), and no meaningful recreational regulations.  The 1970 year class, which held out such promise, was largely wiped out by the middle of the decade.

Current management measures should prevent the sort of wholesale slaughter that went on back then.

At the same time, striped bass were under far less recreational fishing pressure than they are today.  During the 1970s, there were plenty of winter flounder, tautog, weakfish, bluefish, and other inshore species to absorb fishing pressure, particularly pressure brought by those who wanted to take fish home to eat.  Striped bass were not yet a panfish.

Charter boats had more plentiful targets offshore, with cod still relatively abundant, pollock teeming as far south as Block Island, and pelagic species such as mako sharks, white and blue marlin, and the various tunas more available in more places than they currently are.

So the two periods are not directly comparable.

Still, it’s clear that bass could be in serious trouble if we lose the 2015s.  There have been no big year classes since, and even if we get a good one in 2022, such year class won’t be fully recruited into the spawning stock until after the end of this decade.

Thus, we must get Amendment 7 right.

The bass are running out of options.

 

 

THE LOST SEAFOOD FEAST

I’m interested not only in fish, but in food, and I’ll sometimes find myself reading a book about some aspect of food history, the development of American cuisine, or a similar subject.

I just finished Lost Feast, by Lenora Newman.  Subtitled

“Culinary extinction and the future of food,”

Lost Feast chronicles once-abundant foods that have been lost, beginning with Pleistocene megafauna such as the mammoth and the aurochs (the latter the imposing, wild ancestor of our domestic cow), through the more modern extinction of the passenger pigeon, which was once shipped in barrels to provide cheap nutrition to the new hordes of factory workers in industrializing urban centers, to the varieties of fruits and vegetables that have been sacrificed to serve the needs of mechanized agriculture.

Some such losses, like that of the mammoth and aurochs, took place over millennia.  Some, like the extinction of the passenger pigeon, took place over centuries, while others, such as the loss of more than half of the named cultivars of the tomato, took decades and is still going on.

As I read the book, I began to think of the fish that are gone from my table, that disappeared in the course of my lifetime.  Ms. Newman spent some time discussing issues with seafood, but in a book, no matter how well written, such discussions can feel too abstract to take personally. 

When I think of the fish that have become lost to me, even if they remain scattered thinly across a few pieces of ocean, the ghost of their taste and texture still haunts my tongue.  I can think of the times when I caught them, and the friends and family who were once able to share the fishing and the food, but never will again.

Fall is a good time for such thoughts, because the lost fish all favored cool weather.

Winter flounder was probably foremost among them...

The remainder of this post can be found at the website of Hatch Magazine, https://www.hatchmag.com/articles/our-lost-fish/7715368

BECAUSE IT'S ALWAYS EASIER TO CONSERVE SOMEONE ELSE'S FISH

In September 2021, at a meeting of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), the United States, supported by the European Union and other nations, proposed that NAFO ban the retention of Greenland sharks accidentally caught in the Arctic and western Atlantic waters that fall under such organization’s jurisdiction. Intentionally targeting Greenland sharks had been prohibited by NAFO since 2018.

Many species of shark take many years to mature and have very low rates of reproduction, characteristics that can make shark populations vulnerable to even modest levels of fishing mortality. The life history of Greenland sharks is particularly problematic. They can live for at least 272 years (based on a tissue sample taken from an individual of that age), and perhaps for more than 400, and females might not become sexually mature until about 150 years old.

Scientists have characterized the species as “both data deficient and vulnerable to human threats such as fishery-related mortality.” Because of “possible population declines and limiting life-history characteristics,” the International Union for the Conservation of Nature has included Greenland sharks on its Red List as “Near Threatened.”

Given those concerns, it is entirely reasonable for the United States and European Union to take a precautionary approach and call for an end to all Greenland shark landings. While such proposal was withdrawn at NAFO’s 2021 meeting due to objections from Iceland, the supporting parties intend to reintroduce it next year.

When the conversation shifts to conserving shortfin mako sharks, a species frequently landed by both the U.S. and E.U., the picture changes completely. Although a prohibition on landings is strongly supported by the most recent stock assessment, such prohibition has been actively opposed by both the United States and the European Union.

The issue first arose in 2017, when two different studies revealed that shortfin makos were probably experiencing excessive levels of fishing mortality.

One study, conducted by a team of scientists from Nova Southeastern University, the University of Rhode Island, and other institutions, was limited in scope. It saw 40 shortfin makos, caught in the western Atlantic Ocean, released after being fitted with satellite tags, which allowed the researchers to obtain real-time information on the tagged sharks’ location.

To the scientists’ surprise, the satellite tags revealed that 30 percent of the tagged makos were soon caught again; each such shark only had a 72 percent chance of surviving for a year without being recaptured. Their fishing mortality rate was ten times higher than previous estimates, which were based on the reported recaptures of makos implanted with traditional dart tags, and raised concerns that fishermen were killing too many shortfin makos.

Such concerns were echoed in a report issued by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) which, despite its name, has been granted the authority to manage all of the Atlantic’s highly migratory species. Such report found that the North Atlantic stock of shortfin makos was in decline, and that such decline could only be averted if fishing mortality was reduced by 80 percent. Yet even such a large reduction would only provide a 25 percent chance of rebuilding the population by 2040.

In response to the ICCAT report, a group of conservation organizations wrote a letter to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), asking that the United States take the lead in shortfin mako conservation, and support a complete prohibition on retention. If that were done, the organizations noted, there would be a 54 percent chance of rebuilding the shortfin mako stock by the same 2040 deadline.

The United States ignored such request. Instead, at ICCAT’s 2017 general meeting, the U.S. supported “measures to reduce fishing mortality and efforts to further strengthen data collection, while protecting opportunities for U.S. commercial and recreational fishermen to retain small amounts of shortfin mako sharks.”

Fishermen kept landing shortfin makos, and the species prospects got worse. ICCAT released a new stock assessment in 2019, which stated that

"regardless of the [total allowable catch] (including a [total allowable catch] of 0), the stock will continue to decline until 2035 before any biomass increases can occur; a [total allowable catch] of 500 tons has a 52% probability of rebuilding the stock levels above [the spawning stock fecundity needed to produce maximum sustainable yield] and below [the fishing mortality rate that will produce maximum sustainable yield] in 2070; to achieve a probability of at least 60% the realized [total allowable catch] would have to be 300 tons or less…All the rebuilding projections assume that the [total allowable catch] account for all sources of mortality—including dead discards."

Given that some level of discard mortality, particularly in the pelagic longline fishery, is inevitable, the 2019 stock assessment effectively advised against any retention of shortfin makos that were still alive when caught.

Declining mako abundance began to draw real international attention. At the 2019 meeting of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), Mexico offered a proposal to list shortfin makos on CITES Appendix II.

CITES states that “Appendix II includes species not necessarily threatened with extinction, but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival.” Thus, an Appendix II listing would not prohibit the harvest of, or international trade in, shortfin makos. It would merely seek to conform such trade to the needs of the stock.

More than fifty nations signed onto Mexico’s proposal; at the time, it was the greatest support given any listing proposal in the forty-six year history of CITES. Yet the United States voted no. Fortunately, it was in the distinct minority; while the U.S. opposed the Appendix II listing, the proposal received the support of over two-thirds of the treaty nations, and so was adopted.

That was the mako’s only international success. At ICCAT’s 2019 meeting, ten nations, led by Canada and Senegal, followed the advice of ICCAT scientists and proposed a ban on all retention of shortfin mako sharks. Six other nations, including some, such as Japan and China, which frequently oppose conservation efforts, supported the proposal as well. But the United States, joined by the European Union and Curacao, prevented such proposal from moving forward.

The United States presented the only proposal that would allow fishermen to retain makos that were brought to the boat alive, a position so unpopular that, of all the ICCAT nations, only Curacao chose to support it.

Sonja Fordham, president of Shark Advocates International, commented that “North Atlantic mako depletion is among the world’s most pressing shark conservation crises. A clear and simple remedy was within reach. Yet the EU and US put short-term fishing interests above all else and ruined a golden opportunity for real progress. It’s truly disheartening and awful.”

ICCAT’s 2020 annual meeting was no less disheartening and awful, as Canada and Senegal again offered a proposal to prohibit all retention of shortfin makos, which again failed because of U.S. and E.U. opposition.

At that meeting, the United States again presented a proposal that would allow the retention of live makos. Such proposal, which would have permitted the retention of live fish only if the nation where a fishing vessel is registered “requires a minimum size of at least 180 cm fork length for males and of at least 210 cm fork length for females,” was clearly intended to protect the U.S. recreational mako fishery, which currently functions under precisely those rules, although it would have permitted the retention of live makos encountered in the commercial fishery as well.

By that time, Canada had already decided that it shouldn’t wait for ICCAT to act, and unilaterally prohibited any retention of shortfin makos by vessels under its jurisdiction.

Now, the United States finds itself in an anomalous position.

On April 15, 2021, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, NMFS’ parent agency, issued a so-called “90-day finding” regarding shortfin makos, declaring that

"We, NMFS, announce a 90-day finding on a petition to list the shortfin mako shark (Isurus oxyrinchus) as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and to designate critical habitat concurrent with the listing. We find that the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted. Therefore, we are initiating a status review of the species to determine whether listing under the ESA is warranted. To assure this status review is comprehensive, we are soliciting scientific and commercial information regarding this species."

A 90-day finding that an Endanhgered Species Act listing may be warranted is far from a guarantee that such listing will occur. It is very possible that, after a comprehensive status review, NMFS will decide that such a listing is not justified. Still, finding does suggest that, after reviewing all of the information presented in the subject petition, NMFS believes that there is a reasonable chance that the shortfin mako’s plight could be dire enough to warrant a listing. Comments on the finding were due by June 14, 2021, there’s at least a remote chance that NMFS’ review will be completed before ICCAT meets again in November.

Whether or not a final decision is rendered before the next ICCAT meeting, it’s not unreasonable to presume that, if the shortfin mako stock is in enough trouble that an Endangered Species Act listing is even possible, the United States would support a retention ban. But that does not seem to be the case.

In July 2021, ICCAT members engaged in a three-day intercessional meeting dedicated to shortfin mako management. By then, the stalemate over management measures had gone on for so long that the Chair of the meeting asked that nations try to find some basis for agreement before such meeting began, and even took the very unusual step of providing his own proposal for the delegates’ consideration.

Ahead of the meeting, the American Elasmobranch Society, which represents the nation’s shark scientists, sent a letter to NMFS supporting a retention ban.

But those efforts seem to have been futile. The E.U. and U.S. still insisted on retaining makos, while the U.S., seeking to protect its recreational fishery, demanded the ability to harvest live mako sharks. The United States’ position appears to contradict not only NMFS’ 90-day finding, but its stated policy on shark management.

The 500 metric ton annual catch limit proposed by the U.S. would only have a 52 percent probability of rebuilding the shortfin mako stock by 2070. Yet Draft Amendment 14 to the 2006 Consolidated Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Fishery Management Plan states “when addressing management measures for overfished Atlantic shark stocks, NOAA Fisheries’ general objective is to rebuild the stock within the rebuilding period with a 70-percent probability…NMFS uses the 70 percent probability of rebuilding for sharks given their live history traits, such as late age at maturity and low fecundity (i.e., instead of 50 percent, which is commonly used for other species)…”

Given such policy, and the United States’ acknowledgement that the shortfin mako may be in peril, it’s not clear how the U.S. can continue to oppose a full retention ban when ICCAT convenes later this year.

It had no problem sponsoring a similar retention ban for Greenland sharks, even though some recent research suggests that they may still be relatively abundant; it is very possible that Greenland sharks are less imperiled than shortfin makos are.

But Greenland sharks rarely reach U.S. waters, and United States fishermen, whether recreational or commercial, neither target nor harvest the species. That makes Greenland sharks, like elephants and Bengal tigers, easy species for the United States to conserve.

But the North Atlantic’s shortfin makos are different. They swim off every state between Maine and Texas, and both commercial and recreational mako landings make small but significant contributions to local coastal economies. Calling for a ban on shortfin mako retention would have real economic consequences, and make NMFS few new friends in the fishing industry.

Thus, in the case of the shortfin mako, unlike that of the Greenland shark, economic and environmental concerns are in immediate conflict. So far, dollars have ruled the debate. In November, new leadership at both the Commerce Department and NMFS will have an opportunity to prove whether they are willing to make the sort of hard choices needed to conserve and rebuild the North Atlantic’s shortfin mako stock, or whether they will only lead the fight to protect sharks found off other nations’ shores.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/