The piece went on to describe how, instead of heeding the
scientists’ advice, the Management Board dithered, seeking ways to avoid
closing down the Southern New England lobster fishery. While such advice made it clear that nothing
less than a 50% reduction in landings, if not a full moratorium, held any
chance of reversing the stock’s decline, the Management Board was more
concerned with maintaining the short-term economic health of the lobster fishermen and, in
the end, only imposed a 10% reduction.
“A Lesson from Lobsters” then explained that such trivial
reduction did the lobsters no good, and that a new stock assessment urged the
adoption of measures that might provide real protection for Southern New
England stock until oceanographic conditions, which were hostile to lobster
recruitment, might allow an increase in lobster abundance.
The piece ultimately earned an award at the New York
State Outdoor Writers’ Association’s Excellence in Craft competition, taking first place in the “Online Publication” category, but it didn’t do the lobsters
any good. The
latest benchmark stock assessment found that
“The Southern New England (SNE) stock was significantly
depleted as the three-year average abundance from 2016-2018 was considerably
below the abundance threshold. The
stock was at record low abundance, and stock projections conducted as
part of the assessment show a low probability of the condition changing among
the most credible scenarios. [emphasis
added]”
Given that the decline in lobster abundance is driven by
environmental factors, in particular by warming ocean waters, it is possible
that nothing the Management Board would have been able to do could have
prevented the decline. At the same time,
following the scientific advice might have been the Board’s only viable way to
avoid a stock collapse, but it was the one course of action that the Board
adamantly refused to take.
The one saving grace for the American lobster fishery, if one wanted to find a bright spot among all the gloom, was that the same stock assessment found that the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank stock of lobster was enjoying “record high” abundance.
However, all was not necessarily well with the Gulf of Maine-Georges
Bank stock. Addendum XXVII to Amendment 3 to the
Interstate Fishery Management Plan for American Lobster, which the
Management Board adopted last May, noted that
“Since the early 2000s, landings in the GOM/GBK stock have
exponentially increased. In Maine alone,
landings have increased three-fold from 57 million pounds in 2000 to a record
high of 132.6 million pounds in 2016.
Maine landings have declined slightly but were still near time-series
highs at 97.9 million and 108.9 million in 2020 and 2021, respectively. However, since 2012, lobster juvenile settlement
surveys throughout the GOM have generally been below the time series averages
in all areas. These surveys, which
measure trends in the abundance of newly-settled lobster, can be used to track
populations and potentially forecast future landings. Consequently, persistent lower
densities of settlement could foreshadow decline in recruitment and landings. In the most recent years of the time series, declines
in other recruit indices have already been observed. [emphasis added]”
The Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank stock remains very abundant,
and is not currently facing a crisis. At
the same time, it was a decline in juvenile settlement that precipitated the
collapse of the Southern New England stock.
Addendum XXVII observed that the Southern New England young-of-the-year
index
“began to decline in 1995, two years before landings peaked
in 1997, and roughly five years before landings precipitously declined in the
early 2000s.”
Thus, it was wise for the Management Board to adopt a
precautionary stance in its response to the juvenile settlement trends in the
Gulf of Maine. What the Board ultimately
decided to do, and implemented in Addendum XXVII, was to establish
“a trigger mechanism whereby pre-determined management changes
will be triggered upon reaching a defined trigger level based on observed
changes in recruit (71-80 mm [2.8-3.15 inch] carapace length) abundance
indices. The trigger index is based on
recruit conditions observed in three surveys used to inform the assessment
model estimates of reference abundance and stock status of the GOM/GBK
stock. These recruit indices include: 1)
combined Maine/New Hampshire and Massachusetts spring trawl survey index, 2)
combined Maine/New Hampshire and Massachusetts fall trawl survey index, and 3) model-based
VTS index.
“The management trigger is defined by a certain level of
decline in the indices from an established reference period. The reference value for each index is calculated
as the average of the index values from 2016-2018…”
Addendum XXVII provided that management action would be
triggered if the trigger index fell more than 35% below the reference value for
the years 2016-2018. At the time the
Addendum was adopted, the trigger index was already 23% below such reference
value. Should the trigger index fall
more than 35% below the reference value, Addendum XXVII required that the
minimum gauge size (carapace length) in the Gulf of Maine (designated Lobster
Conservation Management Area 1) would increase from 3 ¼ inches to 3 5/16 inches
in the following year, and to 3 3/8 two years after that. Four years after the trigger was tripped, the
minimum vent sizes in lobster traps used in LCMA1 would increase. In federal offshore waters (designated Lobster
Conservation Management Area 3) and in waters of Outer Cape Cod, nothing would
happen until five years after the trigger was tripped, at which point the
maximum gauge size would decrease from 6 ¾ to 6 ½ inches.
Addendum XXVII was adopted as a precautionary measure, which
the Management Board did not expect to be quickly invoked. However, when
the ASMFC’s American Lobster Technical Committee released its “2023 American Lobster
Data Update and Addendum XXVII Trigger Index Update” on October 2, the Management
Board learned that, in 2022, the trigger index had declined by 39.1% from the
reference period, triggering Addendum XXVII’s supposedly required changes to the
management measures for American lobster.
Needless to say, lobster fishermen did not take that
information well.
The
Maine Lobstermen’s Association issued written comments in which it
“urge[d] the Lobster Board to delay the gauge increase
schedule for one year to address unresolved issues with Canada and to allow the
industry adequate time to prepare for this change.”
The Maine Lobstermen’s objections were based solely on economic
concerns. They argued that
“Addendum 27 was adopted less than 6 months ago which has not
been enough time to address issues that will arise if Canada has a smaller
minimum size than the Northeast U.S. lobster fishery…the primary concern raised
by MLA is that changes in the LMA 1 minimum gauge could negatively impact the
boat price for U.S. caught lobster.
“Downeast Maine lobstermen will also have the additional
problem of throwing back short lobsters that likely would be legally harvested
by Canadian lobstermen. This will
undermine both the conservation impact of the measure increase and the boat
price, as the lobsters thrown back and caught by Canadian lobstermen could be
sold to U.S. dealers and drive down the boat price.
“Although ASMFC did not adopt MLA’s recommendation to conduct
a market impact study of a U.S.-only gauge increase, MLA strongly supports the
efforts of ASMFC’s subcommittee to engage with Canada on this issue. While MLA is pleased that discussions between
the U.S. and Canada are underway, substantive issues presented by the gauge
increase have not yet been addressed.”
I’m not a lobsterman, so I can’t gauge the validity of the
Maine Lobstermen’s comments about ex vessel price. However, as
someone who does eat lobster, I’m puzzled by the claim that
Canada’s ability to land smaller lobster will negatively impact the price paid
for larger lobster landed by U.S. boats; the last time that I ponied up cash
for crustaceans at a local market, the bigger lobsters cost more, both per
individual and per pound.
Similarly, I have a problem with the claim that lobsters returned to the water by fishermen operating off downeast Maine—the northernmost section of the Maine coast—will “likely” be harvested by Canadian lobstermen.
While there is undoubtedly
significant movement of lobsters across the Maine/Canada border, it seems a
stretch to claim that most of the lobsters that wander across the line from
Maine will be harvested; that implies a fishing mortality rate in excess of
50%, which would be unsustainable in the long term; the
most recent benchmark stock assessment suggests that overfishing would occur at
a fishing mortality rate of 0.475, which would equate to removing only about 38% of the population each year.
And, of course, any market study conducted to determine the
impact of a U.S.-only increase in gauge size is completely irrelevant to the
biological impacts of such an increase, and biology—in terms of minimizing the
size of any population decline—and not markets should be the primary driver of
fisheries decisions.
Unfortunately, pleas such as the Maine Lobstermen’s have a
lot of impact at the ASMFC, and it didn’t help the lobster that the Maine
Lobstermen weren’t alone. A
relatively new group, which calls itself the New England Fishermen’s Stewardship
Association, made claims similar to those of the Maine Lobstermen, although one
of its comments might be worthy of particular notice. The Stewardship Association wrote that
“in May of 2023 [when Addendum XXVII was adopted], no one
expected that the trigger would be met in just five short months. Due to the previous rate of decline, it was
anticipated that it would take at least two years to exceed a reduction of 35%.”
It’s hard to see why such an argument would support a delay
in adopting more restrictive management measures. When managers see a stock beginning to
decline faster than expected, it’s an indication that such stock
might be in more trouble than previously believed, and that restrictions need
to be put in place sooner than originally planned, not later.
But that’s not the way the Management Board viewed the
situation.
But once again, we need to ask whether concerns about the
lobster trade should override concerns about the health of the lobster stock.
“having gone through the southern New England collapse, I was
basically the State Director at the time.
“Having gone through that, that was a totally awful
experience, not only for the industry, but for the regulators. It was just astounding what the negative
consequences were for a whole group of really hard working, dedicated
individuals who had generations in their families who had grown up working he
water.
“Anything we can do to avoid that type of situation, I think
we should do. It’s the main reason that
I am very concerned about the triggers…If we set a trigger, we’re essentially
acknowledging the fact that we’re going to allow the stock condition to
deteriorate until we hit that trigger…”
He argued for a 15%, and not a 35%, trigger, to prevent
things from going too far downhill before action was taken, for he had seen the
impact of an unchecked decline on the southern New England stock. But after the October Management Board
meeting, we find that Mr. Borden’s warning that “we’re going to allow the stock
condition to deteriorate until we hit that trigger” was not pessimistic enough. The Management Board has decided to wait for
another half-year after hitting the trigger before taking action.
It seems that while Mr. Borden learned all too well the hard lesson taught by the southern New England stock’s collapse, the majority of the Management Board failed to do so. While a six-month delay is not an equivalent to the years of inaction that preceded such collapse,it’s certain that any delay will do the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank stock no good.
When the decline of
a stock accelerates beyond managers’ expectations, such managers’ response should
accelerate, too.
Delay is contraindicated.
Yet it appears that in the case of Gulf of Maine—Georges Bank
lobster, delay is what we’re going to get, despite the lessons provided by not
only the southern New England stock of lobster, but by the southern New
England/mid-Atlantic stock of winter flounder, by the striped bass, by the
tautog, and by other species that fell further into decline, and posed greater
challenges to managers, because their respective management boards failed to
take prompt action when action was called for, and instead dithered and delayed.
In the end, the lessons are out there. But they do no good when managers are
unwilling to learn.
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