Sunday, November 5, 2023

GULF OF MAINE LOBSTER: A LESSON NOT LEARNED

 

A little over eight years ago, I wrote a piece for the Marine Fish Conservation Network’s blog titled “A Lesson from Lobsters.”  The essay described the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Management Board’s failure to address the approaching collapse of the Southern New England lobster stock, despite advice from its own scientific staff that a five-year harvest moratorium was in order, advice that was effectively confirmed by a peer-review panel of international experts put together to consider the staff’s recommendation.

The piece went on to describe how, instead of heeding the scientists’ advice, the Management Board dithered, seeking ways to avoid closing down the Southern New England lobster fishery.  While such advice made it clear that nothing less than a 50% reduction in landings, if not a full moratorium, held any chance of reversing the stock’s decline, the Management Board was more concerned with maintaining the short-term economic health of the lobster fishermen and, in the end, only imposed a 10% reduction. 

“A Lesson from Lobsters” then explained that such trivial reduction did the lobsters no good, and that a new stock assessment urged the adoption of measures that might provide real protection for Southern New England stock until oceanographic conditions, which were hostile to lobster recruitment, might allow an increase in lobster abundance.

The piece ultimately earned an award at the New York State Outdoor Writers’ Association’s Excellence in Craft competition, taking first place in the “Online Publication” category, but it didn’t do the lobsters any good.  The latest benchmark stock assessment found that

“The Southern New England (SNE) stock was significantly depleted as the three-year average abundance from 2016-2018 was considerably below the abundance threshold.  The stock was at record low abundance, and stock projections conducted as part of the assessment show a low probability of the condition changing among the most credible scenarios.  [emphasis added]”

Given that the decline in lobster abundance is driven by environmental factors, in particular by warming ocean waters, it is possible that nothing the Management Board would have been able to do could have prevented the decline.  At the same time, following the scientific advice might have been the Board’s only viable way to avoid a stock collapse, but it was the one course of action that the Board adamantly refused to take.

The one saving grace for the American lobster fishery, if one wanted to find a bright spot among all the gloom, was that the same stock assessment found that the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank stock of lobster was enjoying “record high” abundance.

However, all was not necessarily well with the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank stock.  Addendum XXVII to Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for American Lobster, which the Management Board adopted last May, noted that

“Since the early 2000s, landings in the GOM/GBK stock have exponentially increased.  In Maine alone, landings have increased three-fold from 57 million pounds in 2000 to a record high of 132.6 million pounds in 2016.  Maine landings have declined slightly but were still near time-series highs at 97.9 million and 108.9 million in 2020 and 2021, respectively.  However, since 2012, lobster juvenile settlement surveys throughout the GOM have generally been below the time series averages in all areas.  These surveys, which measure trends in the abundance of newly-settled lobster, can be used to track populations and potentially forecast future landings.  Consequently, persistent lower densities of settlement could foreshadow decline in recruitment and landings.  In the most recent years of the time series, declines in other recruit indices have already been observed.  [emphasis added]”

The Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank stock remains very abundant, and is not currently facing a crisis.  At the same time, it was a decline in juvenile settlement that precipitated the collapse of the Southern New England stock.  Addendum XXVII observed that the Southern New England young-of-the-year index

“began to decline in 1995, two years before landings peaked in 1997, and roughly five years before landings precipitously declined in the early 2000s.”

Thus, it was wise for the Management Board to adopt a precautionary stance in its response to the juvenile settlement trends in the Gulf of Maine.  What the Board ultimately decided to do, and implemented in Addendum XXVII, was to establish

“a trigger mechanism whereby pre-determined management changes will be triggered upon reaching a defined trigger level based on observed changes in recruit (71-80 mm [2.8-3.15 inch] carapace length) abundance indices.  The trigger index is based on recruit conditions observed in three surveys used to inform the assessment model estimates of reference abundance and stock status of the GOM/GBK stock.  These recruit indices include: 1) combined Maine/New Hampshire and Massachusetts spring trawl survey index, 2) combined Maine/New Hampshire and Massachusetts fall trawl survey index, and 3) model-based VTS index.

“The management trigger is defined by a certain level of decline in the indices from an established reference period.  The reference value for each index is calculated as the average of the index values from 2016-2018…”

Addendum XXVII provided that management action would be triggered if the trigger index fell more than 35% below the reference value for the years 2016-2018.  At the time the Addendum was adopted, the trigger index was already 23% below such reference value.  Should the trigger index fall more than 35% below the reference value, Addendum XXVII required that the minimum gauge size (carapace length) in the Gulf of Maine (designated Lobster Conservation Management Area 1) would increase from 3 ¼ inches to 3 5/16 inches in the following year, and to 3 3/8 two years after that.  Four years after the trigger was tripped, the minimum vent sizes in lobster traps used in LCMA1 would increase.  In federal offshore waters (designated Lobster Conservation Management Area 3) and in waters of Outer Cape Cod, nothing would happen until five years after the trigger was tripped, at which point the maximum gauge size would decrease from 6 ¾ to 6 ½ inches.

Addendum XXVII was adopted as a precautionary measure, which the Management Board did not expect to be quickly invoked.  However, when the ASMFC’s American Lobster Technical Committee released its “2023 American Lobster Data Update and Addendum XXVII Trigger Index Update” on October 2, the Management Board learned that, in 2022, the trigger index had declined by 39.1% from the reference period, triggering Addendum XXVII’s supposedly required changes to the management measures for American lobster.

Needless to say, lobster fishermen did not take that information well. 

The Maine Lobstermen’s Association issued written comments in which it

“urge[d] the Lobster Board to delay the gauge increase schedule for one year to address unresolved issues with Canada and to allow the industry adequate time to prepare for this change.”

The Maine Lobstermen’s objections were based solely on economic concerns.  They argued that

“Addendum 27 was adopted less than 6 months ago which has not been enough time to address issues that will arise if Canada has a smaller minimum size than the Northeast U.S. lobster fishery…the primary concern raised by MLA is that changes in the LMA 1 minimum gauge could negatively impact the boat price for U.S. caught lobster.

“Downeast Maine lobstermen will also have the additional problem of throwing back short lobsters that likely would be legally harvested by Canadian lobstermen.  This will undermine both the conservation impact of the measure increase and the boat price, as the lobsters thrown back and caught by Canadian lobstermen could be sold to U.S. dealers and drive down the boat price.

“Although ASMFC did not adopt MLA’s recommendation to conduct a market impact study of a U.S.-only gauge increase, MLA strongly supports the efforts of ASMFC’s subcommittee to engage with Canada on this issue.  While MLA is pleased that discussions between the U.S. and Canada are underway, substantive issues presented by the gauge increase have not yet been addressed.”

I’m not a lobsterman, so I can’t gauge the validity of the Maine Lobstermen’s comments about ex vessel price.  However, as someone who does eat lobster, I’m puzzled by the claim that Canada’s ability to land smaller lobster will negatively impact the price paid for larger lobster landed by U.S. boats; the last time that I ponied up cash for crustaceans at a local market, the bigger lobsters cost more, both per individual and per pound.

Similarly, I have a problem with the claim that lobsters returned to the water by fishermen operating off downeast Maine—the northernmost section of the Maine coast—will “likely” be harvested by Canadian lobstermen.  

While there is undoubtedly significant movement of lobsters across the Maine/Canada border, it seems a stretch to claim that most of the lobsters that wander across the line from Maine will be harvested; that implies a fishing mortality rate in excess of 50%, which would be unsustainable in the long term; the most recent benchmark stock assessment suggests that overfishing would occur at a fishing mortality rate of 0.475, which would equate to removing only about 38% of the population each year.

And, of course, any market study conducted to determine the impact of a U.S.-only increase in gauge size is completely irrelevant to the biological impacts of such an increase, and biology—in terms of minimizing the size of any population decline—and not markets should be the primary driver of fisheries decisions.

Unfortunately, pleas such as the Maine Lobstermen’s have a lot of impact at the ASMFC, and it didn’t help the lobster that the Maine Lobstermen weren’t alone.  A relatively new group, which calls itself the New England Fishermen’s Stewardship Association, made claims similar to those of the Maine Lobstermen, although one of its comments might be worthy of particular notice.  The Stewardship Association wrote that

“in May of 2023 [when Addendum XXVII was adopted], no one expected that the trigger would be met in just five short months.  Due to the previous rate of decline, it was anticipated that it would take at least two years to exceed a reduction of 35%.”

It’s hard to see why such an argument would support a delay in adopting more restrictive management measures.  When managers see a stock beginning to decline faster than expected, it’s an indication that such stock might be in more trouble than previously believed, and that restrictions need to be put in place sooner than originally planned, not later.

But that’s not the way the Management Board viewed the situation.

On October 4, the ASMFC issued a press release stating that the Addendum XXVII management measures, originally scheduled to go into effect in June 2024, will be delayed until January 1, 2025.  To the extent that any justification for the delay was given, it largely followed the arguments made by the Maine Lobstermen.

But once again, we need to ask whether concerns about the lobster trade should override concerns about the health of the lobster stock.

At the May 2023 Management Board meeting that saw Addendum XXVII adopted, David Borden, a former fishery manager for the State of Rhode Island, who now serves as Rhode Island’s Governor’s Appointee to the ASMFC, cautioned that

“having gone through the southern New England collapse, I was basically the State Director at the time.

“Having gone through that, that was a totally awful experience, not only for the industry, but for the regulators.  It was just astounding what the negative consequences were for a whole group of really hard working, dedicated individuals who had generations in their families who had grown up working he water.

“Anything we can do to avoid that type of situation, I think we should do.  It’s the main reason that I am very concerned about the triggers…If we set a trigger, we’re essentially acknowledging the fact that we’re going to allow the stock condition to deteriorate until we hit that trigger…”

He argued for a 15%, and not a 35%, trigger, to prevent things from going too far downhill before action was taken, for he had seen the impact of an unchecked decline on the southern New England stock.  But after the October Management Board meeting, we find that Mr. Borden’s warning that “we’re going to allow the stock condition to deteriorate until we hit that trigger” was not pessimistic enough.  The Management Board has decided to wait for another half-year after hitting the trigger before taking action.

It seems that while Mr. Borden learned all too well the hard lesson taught by the southern New England stock’s collapse, the majority of the Management Board failed to do so.  While a six-month delay is not an equivalent to the years of inaction that preceded such collapse,it’s certain that any delay will do the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank stock no good.  

When the decline of a stock accelerates beyond managers’ expectations, such managers’ response should accelerate, too.

Delay is contraindicated.

Yet it appears that in the case of Gulf of Maine—Georges Bank lobster, delay is what we’re going to get, despite the lessons provided by not only the southern New England stock of lobster, but by the southern New England/mid-Atlantic stock of winter flounder, by the striped bass, by the tautog, and by other species that fell further into decline, and posed greater challenges to managers, because their respective management boards failed to take prompt action when action was called for, and instead dithered and delayed.

In the end, the lessons are out there.  But they do no good when managers are unwilling to learn.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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