Gulf of Maine cod have been in trouble for a long time.
Compared to a management-track assessment completed two years earlier, the 2021 assessment modestly reduced the target biomass which, again depending on the assumed level of natural mortality, was either lowered from 42,692 metric tons to 39,912 mt, or from 63,867 mt to 60,010 mt; the latest assessment also reduced the corresponding estimates of maximum sustainable yield from either 7,580 mt to 7,171 mt, or from 11,420 mt to 10,873 mt. In what seems like somewhat better news, the mean number of fish recruited into the population each year increased from either 4,377,000 to 4,677,000 recruits or from 8,464,000 to 9,249,000 recruits, with natural mortality again determining which one is closer to the truth.
Yet, while the estimates of biomass, MSY, and
recruitment vary depending on whether biologists assume a constant M=0.20 or a
rate that ramps from M=0.20 to M=0.40, the fishing mortality threshold remains
relatively constant, at F=0.173 for the former natural mortality rate, and
F=0.175 for the latter.
Still, despite slightly improved recruitment, any fish stock
that can increase tenfold and still be perched right on the biomass threshold
that defines an overfished stock is in a very bad place.
Thus, the
New England Fishery Management Council’s announcement that it had approved new
fishery management measures that had a 70% probability of rebuilding the stock
within ten years came as a very big surprise.
Rebuilding the stock to its target level by 2033 will
require the stock to increase to twenty times its current size within just ten
years. The New England Council proposes
to do that by reducing the fishing mortality rate to 0.104, about 60% of the
fishing mortality threshold rate, and keep it there for a decade, at which
point the stock will hopefully be rebuilt.
The rebuilding plan was included in Framework Adjustment 65
to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, which was adopted by the
New England Council at its December 2022 meeting, and is now awaiting final
approval by the National Marine Fisheries Service. Materials
from the December meeting explain,
“The rebuilding plan for Gulf of Maine (GOM) cod developed
under Amendment 13 was revised in Framework Adjustment 61 due to inadequate
progress. In an August 13, 2021, [sic]
letter from [NMFS’ Greater Atlantic Region Fisheries Office] to [the New
England Fishery Management Council], GOM cod was identified as making
inadequate progress toward rebuilding following the 2019 stock assessment. The letter explains that the Council must implement
a new rebuilding plan withing two years of the date of notice (i.e., by August
13, 2023), as required by Section 304(e)(3) of [the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act].
Furthermore, the cod rebuilding plan may need to be modified after the
2023 research track [stock assessment] for Atlantic cod is completed…”
The meeting materials state that, if fishing mortality could
somehow be reduced to zero, there was a 67% probability that the stock could be
rebuilt within seven years; unfortunately, eliminating all fishing mortality is
a practical impossibility, as some level of bycatch will always occur, even
setting aside the likelihood of some illegal landings by both commercial and
recreational fishermen. But even if
fishing mortality was cut by a lesser amount, the stock might still be rebuilt;
if the fishing mortality rate could be reduced to just half of the fishing mortality
threshold, there is a 52% chance of rebuilding the stock within eight years,
while a fishing mortality rate equal to 75% of such threshold has a 58% chance
of rebuilding the stock within a decade.
However, such rosy projections require us to ignore that troublesome devil that is inevitably found carousing among the details.
Earlier, I noted that both the 2019 and the
more recent 2021 management-track stock assessments produced two different
estimates of target biomass, maximum sustainable yield, and recruitment, which
differed substantially depending on whether the assessors assumed a consistent,
and relatively low, natural mortality rate of 0.20, or whether they assumed
that natural mortality ramped between 0.20 and 0.40.
Framework 65 only has a 70% chance of rebuilding the stock
within 10 years if the lower, M=0.20 assumption holds true. Otherwise, the meeting materials advise,
“Projections examined under the M-ramp, M=0.4 model, which assumes
natural mortality remains high, indicates the stock cannot rebuild even when
F=0.”
Right now, managers aren’t sure which natural mortality model
best reflects reality, so the best that it can do is hope that it is M=0.20, and that
rebuilding can be achieved.
At the same time, the meeting materials reveal that
uncertainty regarding the natural mortality rate isn’t the only concern. It also notes that
“this stock has exhibited below average recruitment in recent
years, and recruitment may not increase as is assumed in the rebuilding
projections,”
and
“Based on experience with many groundfish projections,
concerns remain that long term projections tend to be overly optimistic such
that future levels of biomass are overestimated, and fishing mortality is
underestimated.”
So while, in the largely distant past, I did a fair amount
of cod fishing on boats departing various ports in New York and New England,
and would love to see the stock rebuild in time for me to put a few more fish
on ice before I end up dropping dead, I’m not getting my hopes up. When I first heard that there was a 70%
chance of rebuilding Gulf of Maine cod by 2033, it sounded too good to be true. Now that I’ve researched the issue a bit, it’s
clear that such 70% probability reflects the sort of best-case scenario that usually
just paves the road to disappointment.
I also can’t help thinking about Newfoundland’s northern cod
stock.
Like the Gulf of Maine cod, the fish off Newfoundland were
once incredibly abundant, and supported a very large, thriving fishing
industry. Like the Gulf of Maine cod,
the fish off Newfoundland attracted too much attention, from both local
vessels, which became more and more sophisticated as time went on, and also
from foreign fleets, until such fleets were pushed farther offshore. And like the Gulf of Maine cod, the Newfoundland
cod stock collapsed.
Conditions affecting the Newfoundland fishery are not the
same as those impacting the Gulf of Maine, although both stocks of cod are
victims of severe overfishing, and both now face the prospect of significant
ocean warming, and its impacts on the ecosystems in which the fish must
survive. Even so, it’s hard to ignore
the voice in the back of my head that keeps saying that Gulf of Maine cod are
more apt to follow the Newfoundland fish’s fate, rather than to enjoy a speedy
recovery.
Yet, there is nothing lost by putting the proposed
rebuilding plan in place, and seeing how the Gulf of Maine cod respond.
Maybe they’ll beat the odds, and conform to the best-case scenario. Even if that doubtless unlikely outcome does
not occur, reducing the fishing mortality rate could spur a modest recovery, if
not a full rebuilding. While a fully
rebuilt stock is the ideal, and certainly a worthwhile goal, if the Gulf
of Maine stock only manages to double or triple its numbers by 2033, and not
achieve the 20-fold increase needed to fully rebuild, it will be in a better
place than it is in today.
And while that’s not good enough in the long term, it’s far
from the worst of all the possible outcomes.
What befuddles me is that in the document, there were no significant changes to the GOM cod harvest, while GB cod quotas were significantly increased.
ReplyDeleteI know I think that the reductions may kick in for the 2024 fishing year, although I'm not sure about that. But the entire rebuilding plan strikes me as a house of cards that will almost certainly prove unable to stand. I hope I'm wrong, but don't believe that I am.
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