THE ASMFC: WHERE THINGS STAND TODAY

It’s impossible to fish anywhere on the East Coast, and not have your fishing experience impacted by the actions of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission.  

That’s particularly true in the Mid-Atlantic and southern New England, where some of our most important recreational species, including striped bass, weakfish and tautog, are managed solely by the ASMFC, while others, such as bluefish, black sea bass, summer flounder and scup, are managed by the ASMFC in state waters, and by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council in federal waters more than three miles from shore.

Regular readers of this blog know that I’m a frequent critic of the ASMFC, not so much because of what it does, but because of its failure to live up to both its potential and its self-professed standards.  The ASMFC has a very qualified and dedicated staff—you would have a hard time finding a better team anywhere in the fisheries arena—and if you take the time to read its Interstate Fisheries Management Program Charter, you’ll find that it states, among other things, that 

“Conservation programs and management measures shall be designed to prevent overfishing and maintain over time, abundant, self-sustaining stocks of coastal fishery resources.  In cases where stocks have become depleted as a result of overfishing and/or other causes, such programs shall be designed to rebuild, restore, and subsequently maintain such stocks so as to assure their sustained availability in fishable abundance on a long-term basis.”

But in the real world, that somehow doesn’t seem to happen.

For example, despite the Charter’s injunction to “prevent overfishing,” the most recent amendment to the tautog management plan, adopted in 2017, adopted management measures that allow overfishing to continue in Long Island Sound until 2029, with only a 50 percent probability of it finally ending even then.

And despite the Charter’s instruction that “where stocks have become depleted…[conservation] programs shall be designed to rebuild, restore, and subsequently maintain such stocks so as to assure their sustained availability,” in its entire 78-year history, the ASMFC has failed to rebuild, and then subsequently maintain, even a single fish stock under its sole jurisdiction at sustainable levels “on a long-term basis.” 

It came the closest with striped bass, which it successfully restored after the stock collapsed in the late 1970s and early ‘80s.  But then, in 2011, it knowingly and intentionally refused to respond to scientists’ warnings that the stock was on the road to becoming overfished again, and in 2014, after a benchmark assessment informed the ASMFC that biomass was trending too low while fishing mortality was above the target level, it chose not to comply with clear language in its own striped bass management plan that required it to implement a 10-year rebuilding plan.  

As a result of such failures, the most recent benchmark stock assessment found that the stock had become overfished, and subject to overfishing, once again.

The Charter also states that

“Conservation programs and management measures shall be based on the best scientific information available.”

While the ASMFC has a much better record of following the science than it does of ending overfishing and rebuilding overfished stocks, there have been far too many times when the science is subordinated to short-term economic concerns.  Unfortunately, that is most often the case with species in the greatest distress, which may be suffering not only from excessive harvest, but from non-fishing-related causes as well.

We saw that in the case of both northern shrimp and the southern New England stock of American lobster, where a warming ocean severely imperiled the health of the stocks.

In the case of northern shrimp, the scientists on the ASMFC’s Northern Shrimp Technical Committee consistently warned of poor spawning success, advised that quotas be set very conservatively, and warned against opening the fishery before mid-February, to protect the egg-bearing females needed to replenish the stock.  Yet despite that advice, and despite the threat posed by a warming ocean, ASMFC’s Northern Shrimp Section, which actually crafted the rules, set quotas high enough to assure overfishing, and opened the season in January, when the females were still carrying their eggs.  So through some combination of overfishing and warming seas, with an assist from an imprudent ASMFC, the stock collapsed, and has not been fished since 2014.

The case of southern New England lobster is not yet quite so dire, but is another example of the ASMFC ignoring scientific advice.  

In 2010, the ASMFC’s American Lobster Technical Committee issued a report titled “Recruitment Failure in the Southern New England American Lobster Stock,” which among other things stated that

“The southern New England stock is critically depleted and well below the minimum threshold abundance.  Abundance indices are at or near time series lows, and this condition has persisted…

“Given additional evidence of recruitment failure in [the southern New England stock] and the impediments to stock rebuilding, the Technical Committee now recommends a 5 year moratorium in the [southern New England] stock area.  [emphasis added]”

That recommendation was peer reviewed by a panel of international experts, and was upheld by a majority of the panel.  The dissenting panelist didn’t see the need for a moratorium, but did believe that fishing effort should be cut by 50 to 75 percent.

Yet the ASMFC refused to take any meaningful action, being more concerned with a moratorium’s—or deep harvest cuts’--impact on fishermen than on fishermen’s impact on the “critically depleted” lobster stock.

So much for basing management “on the best scientific information available.”

In light of the ASMFC’s multiple failures to live up to the standards set in their own organic documents and management plans, it was interesting to read that organization’s 2019 Annual Report, which was recently released, and like all annual reports, strives to provide the organization’s best face to the public.

The Report’s introduction notes that

“In this report, you’ll find a quick guide to stock status for the 27 species groups the Commission manages,”

goes on to state that

“In 2019, the Commission maintained sustainable fisheries for a number of rebuilt species such as Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank American lobster; Atlantic cobia, Atlantic menhaden, black sea bass, and summer flounder,”

and also acknowledges that

“there is still substantial work ahead to rebuild valuable Atlantic coastal fisheries resources such as Atlantic shad and river herring, American eel, Atlantic striped bass, tautog, and bluefish.”

Those statements probably deserve some additional thought.

Start with the number of stocks that the ASMFC manages.  

The 27 “species groups” cited in the introduction can be broken down into 33 separate stocks, as some species are composed of more than one regional stock, and the health of those regional stocks can vary widely.  One species group, river herring, is made up of two species, and the health of such species differs from watershed to watershed, while the coastal sharks group is made up of multiple species, some of which remain very abundant, and some of which are in real peril.

Also consider what it means to say that the ASMFC “manages” a species.

Some species, such as striped bass, are under the ASMFC's sole jurisdiction, and thrive or fail based on the ASMFC's chosen actions.  Other species, such as black sea bass, summer flounder, and bluefish, are only managed by ASMFC when in state waters, and are otherwise governed by the legally-enforceable conservation provisions of the Magnuson-StevensFishery Conservation and Management Act.  It’s not difficult to argue that, in the case of those species, federal managers are primarily responsible for any rebuilding that went on.

Looking at the health of fish stocks from that management perspective, there are 18 species groups, and 23 distinct stocks, managed solely by the ASMFC.  Of those 23 stocks, 11—about 48 percent—are listed as depleted/overfished, while only 5 stocks—not quite 22 percent—are listed as not depleted/not overfished.  The state of the other 7 stocks is unknown.

Of the 11 depleted/overfished stocks, the “status trends” of 7 remains “depleted/declining,” 3 more are of “concern” and only one, Atlantic sturgeon, is listed as “recovering/rebuilding.”  

So it doesn’t appear that the Charter’s mandate that “In cases where stocks have become depleted as a result of overfishing and/or other causes, such programs shall be designed to rebuild, restore, and subsequently maintain such stocks” is being followed with any particular vigor.

Outgoing ASMFC Chairman Jim Gilmore, the Director of New York’s Division of Marine Resources, included an upbeat but clear-headed assessment of where the ASMFC stood at the end of 2019 in the Annual Report.  Reading it as a critical observer, you can see both the ASMFC’s potential and where its problems lie.

He directly addressed striped bass, saying

“I am very pleased about our quick and decisive response to the decline in the striped bass resource and am hopeful the measures that we approved in October will end overfishing within one year.  While this is an important first step in recovering the stock, there will be more that we will have to do to fully rebuild it.  But, rest assured, we will do so.  We’ve been in a much more dire position before with the striped bass resource and were successful in restoring the stock.  There is no reason why we cannot do so again.  [emphasis added]”

So yes, he understands that there is more work to be done.

He knows that “there is no reason why” the stock can’t be fully rebuilt.  

But what no one can predict is whether the ASMFC will have the political will, and the courage, to adopt the management measures needed to get the job done.  It lacked that will in 2011, and it lacked that will in 2014, despite the clear language of the management plan.  Is it realistic to expect them to exhibit greater will today?

Certainly, there will be those who will oppose such rebuilding, in order to increase their short-term kill.

In the case of menhaden, he observed that

“the [environmental reference point] assessment has the potential to significantly change the way we manage menhaden and its primary predators.  However, there is much more work to be done before we get there and decisions will need to be made about management goals and objectives for each of the species involved.  We are heading into uncharted territory…  [emphasis added]”

Again, it’s a question of motivation and political will.  

Will the ASMFC opt for a naturally functioning coastal ecosystem, with sufficient forage to support healthy, sustainable population of all the major predators?  

Or will it choose to play God, and attempt to manipulate the relationships of predators and prey, in order to create some sort of economically-optimized ecosystem where species considered more desirable for one reason or another are given a greater priority than others, and abundance is manipulated based on the potential financial gain?

If the latter choice is chosen, things will probably not end very well.

Finally, he noted

“…I remain deeply concerned about the political and stakeholder pressure placed upon us as individual states and as an organization as a whole that can fracture our unity and undermine interstate cooperation.  We all face the dilemma between state needs and the greater good for the resource, and the real possibility that if you go for the greater good, you might not have a job when you get home.  While I have no easy fix, the one constant that will aid us in our decision-making and in ensuring the sustainability of our fishery resources is the absolute need to put the science first.

“When faced with challenges or conflicts, the tendency is want to [sic] bunker down and take care of what’s mine.  But in the world of fisheries management, there really is no mine, there is only ours.  The only way to protect what’s ours and do what’s best for the resource and our stakeholders is to remain united and approach problem solving together.  Let’s find ways to harness the vast array of knowledge and expertise we have among our Commissioners, scientists, and stakeholders to find creative solutions to the problems before us.  Most importantly, let us not forget that we are all here for the same reason—we are genuinely committed to being good stewards of the resource under our care not just for short-term gain but for the benefit of future generations.  [emphasis added]”

All that needs to be said is in those two attenuated paragraphs.  With those words, Mr. Gilmore showed his fellow Commissioners their only route to success.

We need science-based management.  We need managers acting for the overall good, not for parochial interests.  And we need to think always of the long term, and of future generations, and not merely about short-term gain.

That’s the kind of management we should expect from the ASMFC.  That’s the kind of management that the ASMFC’s Charter calls out for.  But it is not the kind of management that we have seen from the ASMFC so far.

So far, we still see too many Commissioners tolerate overfishing, oppose needed rebuilding, and try to avoid taking the science-based measures needed to rebuild and maintain sustainable stocks.  

We still see far too much parochialism of the sort displayed at the February meeting of the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board,where states such as New Jersey and Maryland fought only for themselves, andnot the health of the striped bass resource.

That needs to change.

Hopefully, Commissioners like Mr. Gilmore, who have already demonstrated their will to sustainably manage those species under their control, will bring about needed change.

But even if change doesn’t come from within, it must come, though it takes an act of Congress to get there.