Last Tuesday, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s
Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board held a meeting, where it planned to
discuss its response to the benchmark stock assessment’s finding that that theAtlantic striped bass stock is both overfished and experiencing overfishing.
So what happened?
It may be too early to say.
There were certainly some good moments.
The Technical Committee advised the Management Board that in
order to have a 50-50 chance of reducing fishing mortality to the target level,
the coastal size limit would have to increase from 28 to 35 inches, Maryland’s
Chesapeake Bay size limit would have to increase from 19 inches to 21, and
Virginia’s Chesapeake limit would have to go up from 20 to 22 inches. Having received that information, the
Management Board moved forward with a new addendum intended to end
overfishing.
In a somewhat related
management action, and in a very lopsided vote, it also agreed to send a letter to
NOAA Fisheries advising it to keep the so-called “transit zone,” an area of
federal waters north and west of Block Island, closed to all striped bass fishing.
The Management Board also tasked the Atlantic Striped Bass Technical
Committee with preparing a sample set of management measures that would rebuild
the striped bass stock to target levels within 10 years, as required by the
current striped bass management plan.
However, the Management Board did not specify that any such rebuilding
measures be included in the draft addendum that’s being prepared.
Even so, the fact that the Management Board is even talking
about rebuilding puts us in a better place than we were in five years ago, when the last addendum was being drafted and ASMFC staff decided that it didn’t want to address the uncertainty inherent in a set rebuilding timeline.
As things stand now, the draft addendum, which will be
prepared by the Atlantic Striped Bass Plan Development Team and presented to
the Management Board for possible amendment, at the August meeting, will
conform to the following motion, which was initially made by Douglas Grout, a
state fishery manager from New Hampshire, and seconded by Dr. Justin Davis, who
represents the Fisheries Division of the Connecticut Department of Energy and
Environmental Protection, and later amended by the Management Board to add the
final provision
“Move to initiate an addendum to address the overfishing
status of striped bass and implement measures to reduce [the fishing mortality
rate] back to the [fishing mortality rate] target. Task [Plan Development Team] to develop
options that would reduce [the fishing mortality rate] to the target that would
include:
·
Minimum fish size for the coast and a minimum
fish size for Chesapeake Bay.
·
Slot limit that would prohibit harvest of fish
over 40 inches.
·
Mandatory use of circle hooks when fishing with
bait coastwide to reduce discard mortality.
·
A provision that states could use seasonal
closures in conservation equivalency proposals.
·
Apply needed reductions equally to both
commercial and recreational sectors.
·
Apply needed reductions proportionally based on
total removals in 2017 to both commercial and recreational sectors.”
I was a little surprised to see that the motion passed
without objection—although, as I’ll explain later on, maybe that fact is
actually a little less surprising than it initially appears, as some folks had other plans for undercutting striped bass conservation.
But just on its face, what does the motion mean?
The first and most obvious meaning is that it intends to
address only “the overfishing status of striped bass” and completely ignores
the language in Amendment 6 to the
Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, which states that
“If the Management Board determines that the biomass has
fallen below the threshold in any given year, the Board must adjust the striped
bass management program to rebuild the biomass to the to the target level
within [10 years], [emphasis added],
even though Max Appelmann, the Fishery Management Plan
Coordinator, presented the Management Board with a slide presentation that very
explicitly spelled out that requirement.
So the only link between rebuilding and the pending addendum came in a comment from a Technical Committee member, who said
that if fishing mortality was reduced to or below the target rate, the stock
would “theoretically” rebuild to the target biomass at some undetermined point
in the future.
Of course, we
heard something similar five years ago, too, and that didn’t work out very
well.
The problem with depending on only one reference point—fishing
mortality—to cure the ills besetting the stock, without the assistance of rebuilding
timelines, annual catch limits, accountability measures and such, is that
fishing mortality is one of the hardest things to predict. While it does rely, to some extent, on
the regulations in place, it also depends upon other factors, such as weather
and angling effort, with the latter, in turn, impacted by such things as the
availability of both striped bass and other, alternative species. Technical Committee representatives freely
admitted that fishermen’s behavior, and their response to new regulations, is
something that they can’t easily predict.
Thus, the lack of a rebuilding provision in the pending addendum
is troubling, although once the Technical Committee reports back on what such
rebuilding would require, it’s possible—although I won’t be holding my breath—that
such provision could be added in August, before the addendum is released for public
comment.
But at least the overfishing will, hopefully, be addressed.
Size limits are the obvious way to do that, so I found the
addition of the slot limit provision interesting. Historically, striped bass have been managed only
through a minimum size, although a handful of states have adopted slot limits
from time to time. However, the purpose of such slots has typically been to increase the number of fish killed, not to
reduce fishing mortality. A former Maine
slot limit, instituted in the mid-1990s, was intended to allow anglers to
harvest fish from the big 1993 year class before they matured into the coastal
28” limit; because of its negative conservation impact, such slot resulted in
Maine’s bag limit to be cut from two fish to one, so it was hardly a conservation measure.
Thus, it will be interesting to see what impact a slot with
a 40-inch top end would have. Here in
New York, I’ve heard a fair amount of support for a slot, with numbers like
28-32 inches, 28-34, 32-36 and similar combinations—which had no hard data
behind them—suggested by anglers.
If
the low end any slot size adopted was no less than 28 inches, such slot shouldn’t
increase the number of immature fish killed, while hopefully providing some
protection for the largest, most important spawning females. However, it would also concentrate fishing
pressure on a narrow portion of the bass population—which might or might not be
a detriment, given how dependent striped bass are on intermittent large year
classes—and, given that larger fish can be difficult to release, might increase
the percentage of released bass that don’t survive the experience.
But that’s something for the Technical Committee to figure
out. If a slot makes biological sense—and
at this point, we’re not sure whether or not it will—then it makes management sense as
well.
After that, we start getting to the less pleasant aspects of the motion, based on comments that arose after people, instead of standing together for
the striped bass, tried to escape their share of the
conservation burden, and place it on other folks’ shoulders.
Questions and comments made early in the session hinted that
was coming, but it wasn’t until Michael Luisi, Maryland’s state fishery manager,
asked whether it would be possible to remove commercial fishery measures from
the pending addendum, and so place all of the rebuilding burden on anglers’
shoulders, that the effort really broke into the open.
Once the idea was on the table, it was quickly pounced on by Russel Dize, a
commercial fisherman who serves as Maryland’s Governor’s Appointee, who
complained that commercial fishermen would be “punished” for “doing a good job”
and staying within their quota if they, and not just recreational fishermen,
were forced to reduce landings.
In a way, Dize’s had a point. After harvest reductions were required by a 2014 addendum, Maryland's commercial fishermen successfully cut landings, while Maryland's anglers didn’t
reduce fishing mortality at all, and actually substantially increased their
landings. So it's easy to understand why Dize might think that the folks who overfished for the past five years ought to make the required reductions now, while those who lived up to their responsibilities before should be left alone. But if you took that logic to its ultimate conclusion, coastal anglers also made more than their required reductions, and shouldn't be forced to atone for Maryland anglers' sins.
This fight debate shouldn't see commercial fishermen pitted against recreational fishermen, it should see all fishermen working together for the striped bass.
But even within the recreational community, some members of the Management Board sought to push rebuilding obligations off onto others.
Adam Nowalsky, a New Jersey charter boat
captain, complained that harvest reductions wouldn’t have any impact
at all on anglers who generally release their bass, but that anglers who want
to kill their fish—and boats (such as his, though he didn’t exactly say that) who might
carry such anglers—would take a disproportionate hit from such cuts.
It was a sort of “duh!” moment—after all,
harvest restrictions will only impact people who harvest fish, and not those who
already release them—but his comments did underline the fact that some members
of the relatively small for-hire fleet, which accounted for only about 1.75% ofall directed recreational striped bass trips during the five years between 2014and 2018, want to avoid having more restrictive regulations placed on their sector, so that they could keep on
producing dead bass for their customers.
Thus, in the end, the motion contained two differently
worded, but perhaps not very different, proposals on allocating responsibility
for harvest reductions.
One would
allocate reductions “equally,” the other “proportionately.”
It’s easy to argue that they mean the same thing,
for if both sectors were subject to an “equal” 17% landings reduction, the
outcome of such reduction would end up with the recreational sector, which
accounts for 90% of the fishing mortality, being responsible for 90% of the
fish NOT killed as a result of the harvest cuts, with the commercial sector
accounting for the remaining 10%. That
is also very “proportional.”
No split of the recreational reductions was proposed in the final motion, although something
still could pop up in August.
So, with respect to the pending addendum, the meeting’s outcome
was far from perfect, but it certainly could have been worse.
Unfortunately, there
was another motion made at the meeting that, if passed, could render all of the
good work meaningless.
It was made by Michael
Luisi, who has been working to undercut striped bass conservation efforts for
years, in order to increase Maryland fishermen’s kill. The motion read
“Move to initiate an Amendment to the Atlantic Striped Bass
Fishery Management Plan to address the needed consideration for change on the
issues of fishery goals and objectives, empirical/biological/spatial reference
points, management triggers, rebuilding biomass, and area-specific
management. Work on this amendment will
begin upon the completion of the previously discussed addendum to the management
plan.”
No vote was taken on that motion; that was deferred until
the August. Hopefully, the motion will
die then and there. But if it doesn’t,
all of the work done to date could be in vain.
Early in this week’s meeting, ASMFC’s Striped Bass Fishery
Management Plan Coordinator made it clear that most of the aspects of striped
bass management—reference points, size limits, management triggers, etc.—could be
accomplished in the pending addendum.
The only thing that would require an amendment—a far more complex and time-consuming document—would be changing the goals and objectives of the plan.
And what are those goals and objectives? Amendment 6 lays them out.
“The Goal of Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery Management
Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass is:
‘To perpetuate, through
cooperative interstate fishery management, migratory stocks of striped bass; to
allow commercial and recreational fisheries consistent with the long-term
maintenance of a broad age structure, a self-sustaining spawning stock; and
also to provide for the restoration and maintenance of their essential habitat.’”
That sounds like a very sensible goal. Changing it could easily lead to increased
harvest levels, which would reduce the number of larger, more fecund females in
the spawning stock. That's a risky course, for reducing the number of older fish in the spawning stock makes the population more dependent on the recruitment of newly-mature bass, and so also makes the stock more
vulnerable to long periods of below-average recruitment. And those periods come more often that some may realize, with the last spanning the years between the large 2003 and 2011 year classes; a new drought could begin at any time.
But managing a stock that way also allows a bigger kill, and Maryland has been trying to increase the striped bass kill since at least 2016.
As far as the Objectives go, Amendment 6 says,
“In support of this goal, the following objectives are recommended
for Amendment 6:
·
Manage striped bass fisheries under a control
rule designed to maintain stock size at or above the target female spawning
stock biomass level and a level of fishing mortality at or below the target
exploitation rate.
·
Manage fishing mortality to maintain an age
structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long-term
abundance of striped bass populations.
·
Provide a management plan that strives, to the
extent practical, to maintain coastwide consistency of implemented measures,
while allowing the States defined flexibility to implement alternative
strategies that accomplish the objectives of this FMP.
·
Foster quality and economically viable
recreational, for-hire, and commercial fisheries.
·
Maximize cost effectiveness of current
information gathering and prioritize state obligations in order to minimize
costs of monitoring and management.
·
Adopt a long-term management regime that
minimizes or eliminates the need to make annual changes or modifications to
management measures.
·
Establish a fishing mortality target that will
result in a net increase in the abundance (pounds) of age 15 and older striped
bass in the population, relative to the 2000 estimate.”
Again, they all seem to be prudent and reasonable objectives—except,
perhaps, for the one that seeks to minimize changes to management
measures, a philosophy hich probably contributed to the Management Board’s failure to
timely respond to the sharp decline in striped bass abundance over the past
decades.
Again, changing some of those Objectives, to no longer require a spawning stock structure that better assure's the striped bass population's long-term health, and to maintain older fish in the spawning stock, would allow a bigger kill, but create greater risk in exchange.
Making such changes would be unwise, but wisdom doesn't always reign at ASMFC.
Thus, what happened at Tuesday's meeting--even the good things--may, in the long run, be far less important than what happens in August, and beyond.
Those concerned with the striped bass' future probably have their toughest fight ahead of them.
They need to convince the Management Board to stay the course and reduce fishing mortality to target levels next year, and do it in a way that holds everyone responsible for their share of the striper's recovery.
Along with that task, they should also convince the Management Board that merely ending overfishing in the coming year is not good enough; a healthy striped bass fishery requires a promptly rebuilt striped bass stock.
But those are relatively short-term goals. In order to adequately conserve the striped bass in the long term, the Management Board must vote down the motion to create a new amendment, that could undercut the structure of the spawning stock, and risk a future collapse.
Because increasing the risk of a stock collapse is a risk that no one ought to be willing to take.
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