THE ASMFC PUNTS ON ATLANTIC MENHADEN--AGAIN

 

Earlier this week, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Menhaden Management Board met on two separate afternoons, to set annual catch limits for 2027, 2028, and 2029.

There were a lot of people who hoped, and in many cases really expected, the Management Board to reduce menhaden landings by at least the 39% that was needed to have a 50% probability of achieving the fishing mortality target in 2027.

They should have known better.  That was never going to happen.  A motion to reduce the annual catch limit to 114,200 metric tons—the level that would have provided the 50% probability—was made by Matthew Gates, Connecticut’s Administrative Proxy, and seconded by Maryland’s Allison Colden, but never made it to a vote before being pushed aside by a substitute motion.

Going into the meeting, I figured that the best anyone could realistically hope for was a three-year phase-in of steadily declining catch limits that finally achieved the 50% probability goal in 2029.  A substitute motion made by Nichola Meserve, Massachusetts’ Administrative Proxy, and seconded by Capt. Rick Bellavance of Rhode Island would have gotten us partway there, reducing the ACL to 158,814 metric tons in 2027 and 134,992 metric tons in 2028, leaving the 2029 catch limit up to a future management board to decide, but it failed on a vote of 8 in favor, 10 opposed, which pretty well killed any chance of meaningful action being taken this year, and almost certainly next year as well.

The meeting boiled down to a standoff between the Virginia reduction fleet and the northern New England lobstermen digging in to protect their current income streams, and a host of advocates from various states, all seeking to cut menhaden landings in the name of conservation, who were undoubtedly well-meaning but, in many cases, were basing their arguments on false premises and overblown claims.

If one wanted to eulogize the meeting as a whole, the words of Martin Gary, director of the New York Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Division, spoken on the second day of the meeting, serve as well as any:

“I’m struggling like everyone else to say something meaningful…Both sides are so polarized that they’re intractable on both sides of the continuum…Somebody needs to step up, and make some concessions.”

Yet the unpleasant truth was that, particularly on the first day of the meeting, meaningful concessions were hard to find.  In the end, the Management Board largely followed the path that it forged in 2025, and settled on an action that was more form than substance, and would cause the least distress to all concerned—except, very possibly, to the menhaden themselves.

But it took them quite a while to get to decide on even that largely meaningless action.

The meeting began—at least, after the preliminaries of public comment and an overview of the Draft Addendum II to Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Menhaden, the document that the Management Board was seeking to adopt—with Mr. Gates aforementioned motion to reduce the annual catch limit to 114,200 metric tons.

Mr. Gates explained that he made the motion because it was based on the best available science, and because a higher total allowable catch might, he believed, leave too few menhaden in the water to fulfill their ecological role.  He also felt that it was important to achieve the target fishing mortality rate set in the 2025 ASMFC Atlantic Menhaden and Ecological Reference Points stock assessment, because

“the Board asked for [ecological reference points], and I think we should use them.”

Dr. Colden, in seconding the motion, also said that she believed that the Management Board should continue with the ecological reference points, which would mean adopting the 114,200 metric ton catch limit, and acknowledged that the Management Board had effectively just “kicked the can down the road” when it adopted the 20% catch limit reduction in 2025.

Mr. Gary quickly spoke in favor of the motion, also noting that the Management Board had wanted ecological reference points and that they were supported by “really good science.”  He went on to describe an unsettling trend, noted not only in New York, but also in Massachusetts and Maine, of menhaden demonstrating a decreasing size at age, then ended up pointing to the overwhelming public comment supporting a meaningful harvest reduction, saying that

“I’ve never seen as strong a signal from the public”

in his 40 years as a fisheries manager.  He added a sort of warning to his comments, saying that if anyone opposed Mr. Gates’ motion, they’d better let the public know why the best available science was ignored, because “When people care, it matters.”

Unfortunately, Mr. Gary, and everyone else attending or listening in on the meeting, was about to learn why the science would be ignored. 

Eric Reid, Rhode Island’s Legislative Proxy, rose to acknowledge that

“I’m not going to disagree with that methodology”

used to set the ecological reference points, but then subordinated science to socioeconomic considerations, asking how many communities would be endangered if the motion to reduce the annual catch limit passed, and noting that the fish meal produced by the reduction industry was widely used for animal feed.

That opened up the door for the Virginia delegation, and they were quick to follow up.

Joseph Grist, the Virginia fisheries manager, endorsed Mr. Reid’s comments, and said that he, too, had concerns about the motion’s socioeconomic impacts.  He took the opportunity to point out the hypocrisy of various recreational fishing groups—presumably groups such as the Coastal Conservation Association, American Sportfishing Association, and National Marine Manufacturers Association—that were perfectly willing to support harvest reductions for Atlantic menhaden, which are neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing, regardless of the cuts’ economic impact on the hundreds of people who work in the menhaden fishing industry, but opposed last year’s proposed 12% reduction in landings of the overfished striped bass, because the recreational fishing industry might suffer some economic harm as a result.

While many of the comments made by Mr. Grist over the course of the two-day meeting were of dubious validity, including his comment that

“We manage this [menhaden stock] very conservatively,”

his comment about the hypocrisy of the various recreational fishing industry groups hit pretty close to the mark.  It was a point that others also made at different times during the meeting, and one that didn’t help the credibility of those supporting significant harvest reductions. 

At that point, Adele McClure, Virginia’s Legislative Appointee, rose to made a substitute motion that would carry the 2026 catch limit of 186,400 metric tons forward for the next three years.  Her motion was seconded by Craig Pugh, Delaware’s Legislative Proxy, and set off a lengthy debate.

In making her motion, Ms. McClure argued that

“The status quo is not nothing,”

noting that there has already been a 20% catch limit reduction in 2026 (even though that was a paper reduction that didn’t impact actual landings at all) and asserting that the stock is “healthy, and not overfished,” despite the fact that, in 2025, menhaden fecundity was just 5% above the threshold that defines an overfished stock.  She expressed concern about a reduction’s impact on the bait fishery, and argued that more information was needed before action was taken, saying that managers

“need another assessment, not another knee-jerk precautionary measure.”

Mr. Pugh, the seconder, focused on a landings reduction’s impact on bait prices, saying that in 2012, when the harvest was cut by 20%, bait prices increased by 100%, and that another, similar increase would make it “unaffordable” to commercially target lobster, crabs, black sea bass, and other species.

Stephen Train, a commercial fisherman who serves as the Governor’s Appointee from Maine, also expressed support for the status quo, repeating the argument that the stock was neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing, and noting that a reduction in Atlantic herring landings, adopted earlier in the week, would already have a negative impact on bait costs and availability.

Similar comments were expressed by Doug Haymans, Georgia’s fisheries manager, who wanted to wait for information that was already being developed by researchers in Virginia, and who noted that Georgia fishermen had already experienced a tripling of bait prices, and could face additional expenses if the annual catch limit for menhaden was cut.

J. J. Minor, Virginia’s Governor’s Appointee, focused solely on economic issues, noting that there were some families who had seen six or seven generations work at the menhaden reduction plant in Reedville, Virginia.  He asserted,

“That plant is an economic engine.  It is the heartbeat of the Northern Neck [of Virginia].”

He argued, like his colleagues on the Virginia delegation, that menhaden were not overfished, and made the accusation that

“Folks fundraise off of lies,”

an accusation that, sadly, is in some cases true, and calls attention to some organizations that, through their overblown and sometimes completely false claims, further hurt the credibility of menhaden advocates as a whole.

Other Management Board members supported neither the original nor the substitute motion, but hoped to see something that fell somewhere between the two.

Douglas Abbott, New Hampshire’s Legislative Proxy, said that he was neither for nor against the motions, but that the Management Board needed to decide the issue based on science, and that while

“It’s always the case that we’re waiting for more science,”

decisions need to be made based on the science that is already available.  He said that he cares about the people at the Reedsville plant, noting that a decline in the menhaden population, and not just a decline in the annual catch limit, would hurt the Reedsville workers.  He also said that he cares about the lobstermen that need menhaden for bait, and that in making menhaden decisions, there comes a time when the Management Board will have to “cut the baby in half” in compromise.  He asked whether nearly 50,000 commenters can all be wrong, and warned against

“kicking the can down the road and making decisions that are leading us to bad places.”

Robert Lafrance, the Governor’s Appointee’s Proxy from Connecticut, made a similar comment, acknowledging the people who claimed that menhaden were not overfished by saying,

“and we want to keep it that way,”

by following the science.  He also noted that the declining size of menhaden at various ages was “not a good sign.”

After a bit more back-and-forth, a vote was finally taken.  Only Maine, Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service—the most hard-core opponents of harvest reductions—supported the status quo.  Ms. McClure’s substitute motion failed on a vote of 7 in favor, 11 opposed.

And then, the folks seeking some sort of middle ground—that nonetheless favored their interests—emerged.

Megan Ware, the Maine fisheries manager, put a new substitute motion on the table, which would reduce the 2027 total allowable catch to 170,000 metric tons, about a 9% cut, and then cut the 2028 TAC by another 9%, to 155,000 mt.  That motion, which would result in an aggregate reduction of about 17%, compared to 2026 levels, was seconded by New Hampshire fisheries manager Renee Zobel.

That 17% reduction might sound like some sort of progress, until one recalls that coastwide Atlantic menhaden landings in 2025 were approximately 147,000 metric tons, well below the new annual catch limits for 2027 and 2028.  Thus, as was the case for the 2026 catch limit, the limits established at this week’s meeting appear to be more theoretical than real, and will not reduce actual menhaden landings at all.  (Note that the menhaden industry contests this allocation, and argues that 2025 landings were as low as they were because of unusually poor weather that began in August and ran through the end of the year, which created safety hazards and prevented the reduction fleet from fishing as much as they typically would.  Weather data appears to support those claims, so it will be interesting to see whether landings are significantly higher in 2026, when the weather, although occasionally stormy, appears to be less hostile than it was during the previous year.

Joseph Cimino, New Jersey’s fisheries manager, expressed support for the supposed compromise motion.  He noted that rebuilding the menhaden stock to the target level was not a “silver bullet” that would solve all of the current fisheries problems, and that comments to the effect that rebuilding would end the “plight” of species such as weakfish, bluefish, and striped bass were “not really accurate.”  To that end, he noted that the ecological reference points were tied to the size of the striped bass stock, and that the menhaden biomass target assumed that the striped bass stock was also at its target level, and not in its current, overfished state.

A few other managers also supported the idea of a phased-in reduction, although they believed that Ms. Ware’s motion did not go far enough.  But when the vote was finally taken, Ms. Ware’s motion passed with 14 votes in favor, and only 4—Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, and Florida—voting against.

At that point Ms. Meserve rose to offer the substitute motion described earlier in this essay, which would reduce the annual catch limit by 15% in each of the next two years, but as stated above, that motion failed by a two-vote margin.

At that point, Ms. Ware’s substitute motion became the main motion, which was approved on an 11 to 7 vote. 

In the end, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, and Florida were defeated by a coalition of convenience, made up of Virginia and New Jersey protecting their industrial-level purse seine fleets, Maine and New Hampshire seeking to protect their lobstermen’s bait supply, the National Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife carrying out Trump’s executive order to deregulate commercial fisheries, and a handful of other states seeking to keep bait costs low for their trap fishermen.

It was an unusual but largely predictable (except, perhaps, for South Carolina and Georgia), temporary alliance of jurisdictions that have little in common other than a desire to protect their local fishermen’s cash flows—at least in the short term.

And their vote doomed any possibility of meaningful action being taken at this year’s Management Board meeting.  The coastal catch limit was the single most important issue to be decided at this week’s meeting, and it was clearly decided in the wrong way.

Still, having said that, the outcome of the second day of the meeting wasn’t quite as dismal, and the menhaden within the Chesapeake Bay made out a little bit better than the overall coastal stock.

Once the preliminary portion of the meeting was done, the debate began with Dr. Colden moving to replace the current 51,000 metric ton cap on the amount of menhaden that the reduction fleet could remove from the Chesapeake Bay each year with a cap equal to 13.6% of the coastwide annual catch limit.  Mr. Lafrance seconded the motion, and to no one’s surprise, Mr. Grist immediately rose to oppose it and offer a substitute motion that would, similar to the motion that passed the previous day, reduce the Bay cap by 9% in 2027 and by another 9% in 2028.  His motion was seconded, once again, by Mr. Pugh.

He argued that Dr. Coldren’s motion, should it pass, would reduce the annual Bay cap so far that it could threaten the research already being done on Virginia’s menhaden and its menhaden fishery, but that a 9% reduction in each of the next two years probably wouldn’t be disruptive.  However, he made it clear that he would prefer to see the status quo remain in place until at least 2028, by which point some preliminary information from the current research should be available.

Ms. McClure also asked the Management Board to “please be patient” and adopt the status quo.  She then attempted to play on the Management Board’s emotions, reading comments made by members of the Reedville community that emphasized that community’s dependence on the menhaden fishery, and were clearly intended to make Board members feel guilt for supporting conservation measures.  The third member of the delegation, Mr. Minor, also asked for patience and supported the status quo.

Michael Luisi, the Maryland fisheries manager, said that he wanted something “in between” Dr. Coldren’s motion and Mr. Grist’s, saying that while the 51,000 metric ton cap worked during the previous decade, it was now time to shift the focus to the needs of the Chesapeake Bay, and reduce the Bay cap to something less than 20% of the coastwide annual catch limit.

After a few more comments, a vote was taken, and the substitute motion failed on a vote of 6 to 11, with one state, Pennsylvania, casting a null vote after a majority of its delegation could not agree on a position.  Once again, it was the hard-core defenders of the status quo—Maine, Virginia, Georgia, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—who supported the consecutive 9% cuts.

At that point, Mr. Luisi placed a new substitute motion before the Board, which would set the Bay cap at 21.8% of the coastwide catch limit.  He noted that was about the same proportion that the 51,000 metric ton cap had to the annual catch limit from 2023 through 2025, a proportion that everyone seemed to be able to live with, and that while he would have liked to have set the percentage below 20%, he thought that, for the reasons he stated, 21.8% might be “more achievable.”  Ms. Meserve seconded the motion.

There wasn’t much comment on Mr. Luisi’s motion, although Mr. Grist complained that, by saying that 2027 Bay harvest was still “in range” of what was caught in 2025, Mr. Luisi was comparing potential 2027 landings with the landings that occurred in a bad-weather—“the worst possible”—year.

Despite such objections, Mr. Luisi’s substitute motion passed by a wide, 15 to 3 margin, with only Virginia, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in opposition.  The substitute motion then became the main motion, and was adopted 14 in favor, 2 (Virginia and the Potomac River Fisheries Commission) opposed, and 2 (NMFS and USF&W) abstaining.

Mr. Luisi then moved to put bounds around the Bay cap, setting an upper limit at the current 51,000 metric tons and a lower limit of -0-.  Mr. Gates seconded.  There was little comment, although Mr. Grist didn’t like the idea that if the science suggested that the cap could be higher than 51,000 metric tons, it would take a new addendum to the management plan to put that higher cap in place.  When the vote was taken, the motion passed easily, with 13 in favor, 2 (Virginia and Delaware) opposed, and 3 (Maine, NMFS, and USF&W) abstaining.

And with that, all of the important votes had been taken.  Some other items were subsequently discussed, but the fate of the menhaden—both in the Chesapeake Bay and along the entire coast—had been sealed for the next two years.

So, we’re now at that point where we ought to ask whether we learned anything from the exercise, and how it turned out.

I hope the answer is yes, but I hoped that would be the case after last year’s debacle, and it turned out back than that the answer was no.  When I look at all of the groups who advocated for substantially lower annual catch limits—at all of the knowledge and experience of their leadership, at their public relations expertise, at the money invested in their campaigns—it still shocks me that they learn so little from the past, and do so many things wrong.

One of their biggest problems is that they are still playing to the wrong audience.  Just about one year ago, I wrote,

“they are going to have to shift their campaign from an emotional appeal to the general public to something that makes biological and—yes, I have to say it—economic sense to the Management Board.”

But I suppose, as the old cliché goes, a leopard doesn’t change its spots, so for the past several months we have been seeing the same old organizations, along with a new one or two, playing to the same old audience, trying to get them enraged with videos of reduction fleets sailing out of the Bay, or setting seines around menhaden schools, apparently never figuring out that while such scenes may get the public aroused and maybe even a little hysterical, the Management Board \was impressed with neither the videos themselves nor the 43,000-plus form letters that the videos inspired. 

In fact, I was having a conversation with one state’s (not New York’s) fishery manager a while ago, when he asked me whether I thought that most of the people commenting on the issue had any real idea what they were talking about.  In all honesty, I had to tell him no, that while a few took the time to read some of the relevant documents, most of them were whipped up by all the propaganda, just repeated what they had read, and had less than a clue about the actual facts.

After all, while “the most important fish in the sea” as a catchy slogan, we have to remember that it was created by a writer who had no formal training in biology, but was instead a cultural historian and social activist with a decidedly leftward lean, who was no more qualified to comment on menhaden ecology than RFK, Jr. is qualified to speak on the efficacy of vaccines.  So using that slogan to incite the public is probably not a winning tactic.

Yet even now, in the wake of the Management Board meeting, we see advocacy groups lashing out at the Management Board, calling its judgment into question, rather than questioning whether their tactics and their tendency to make overblown and even patently false arguments might have contributed to the meeting’s outcome. 

And so they set themselves up to fail again.