One of the biggest disappointments at the Annual Meeting of
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission last October was the
Atlantic Menhaden Management Board’s failure to adopt meaningful reductions in
menhaden landings.
“not overfished and overfishing is not occurring.”
the assessment update noted a marked change in the perceived
condition of the stock. Previous to the
update, it was believed that fecundity was above the fecundity target, and that
the fishing mortality rate was below the fishing mortality target, which
suggested that the stock was in something close to perfect health. But the stock assessment update informed
managers that, in fact,
“The fishing mortality rate for the terminal year of 2023 is
below the [ecological reference point] threshold and above the ERP target…and
the fecundity for the terminal year of 2023 is above the ERP threshold and but
[sic] below the ERP target.”
Thus, while the stock is neither overfished nor experiencing
overfishing, it is also at suboptimal abundance and being fished at a somewhat
excessive rate. Somewhat ominously, fecundity
was low enough—just 105% of the fecundity threshold—at the end of 2023 that it
is entirely possible, depending on the number of new fish recruited into the
stock, that a new stock assessment might find that Atlantic menhaden are
overfished today.
The menhaden fishing industry, and particularly the
“reduction fishery,” which purse seines menhaden by the ton and “reduces” the
fish to fish oil and fish meal, was naturally opposed
to such a large reduction, particularly if it was made in a single year. Some New England states were also opposed to
reductions, not because they had lucrative menhaden fisheries, but because their
lobstermen needed the menhaden for trap bait, since the traditional bait, Atlantic herring,
became overfished and are far less available than they once were.
“I think we have to recognize that when we set the TAC at
233,000 metric tons…[w]e did not know what we know now about the natural
mortality of the species. The fact that
we’re looking at a 20% reduction from that number seems to me to be, it’s
almost like a false compromise…”
Despite the near-meaningless impact of the motion, it passed
on a vote of 16 to 2.
The only good thing was that, instead of setting the total
allowable catch for 2026 through 2028, as originally intended, the Management
Board only set the TAC for a single year, 2026, and will revisit future years
when they meet again.
That has created a situation ripe for clashes between the
menhaden industry and those trying to rein in menhaden harvest.
As I’ve
noted before, menhaden are a “political fish” where emotional arguments have
taken over the management debate, and largely drowned out the rational voice of
science. Menhaden have often been in
the news this year, as advocates
for reduced landings and advocates
for the menhaden industry throw accusations back and forth. Lyrics
from that old Buffalo Springfield song, “For What It’s Worth, are probably
applicable:”
“What a field day for the heat
A thousand people in the street
Singing songs and a-carrying signs
Mostly say, ‘Hooray for our side.’”
As the August and October Management Board meetings draw
closer, the volume of the rhetoric has been going up.
That’s not necessarily bad, as anecdotal reports indicate a
lack of menhaden along much of the East Coast, something that is somewhat
predictable when the fishing mortality rate is well above target and biomass—or
in menhaden’s case, fecundity—is dangerously close to dropping below the
threshold.
But what we’re seeing, particularly from the folks who
purport to support menhaden conservation, are videos and press releases
intended to evoke emotion rather than rational thought and, from some with an
economic axe to grind, self-serving proposals with public relations appeal,
which are not, at their heart, really conservation-oriented proposals at all.
For when we talk about conservation, we need to keep two
basic precepts in mind:
1) If you want to have more fish, you need to
kill fewer of them, and
2) It
doesn’t matter to the fish who kills it; either way, it’s still dead.
Many of the people involved in the menhaden debate seem to
be missing those points, and thus make it more difficult to adopt management
measures that everyone—most particularly the menhaden—can live with.
I was reminded of that the other day when I happened across a
video released by the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, titled “A
Tiny Atlantic Fish—A Major Controversy.”
The interesting thing about the video is that it hardly mentioned
conservation at all—something that seems somewhat startling in a video released
by an outfit calling itself the “Theodore Roosevelt Conservation
Partnership.”
Instead, after a few cameo appearances from anglers and
fishing guides who merely provided their views on how important menhaden were
to coastal ecosystems and to fishing success, the only mention of conservation occurred
when Jaclyn Lunaas, a Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership Employee
responsible for the organization’s forage fish program, noted that the ASMFC
was responsible for menhaden management, and that
“In order to have ecological and economic resilience across
the entire East Coast, we need fair allocation of this public resource between
states…Right now, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission is going to
be debating two decisions: First,
whether or not to reduce the total amount of menhaden that can be caught
coastwide, and second, how to reallocate how that catch is divided between Atlantic
states.”
There was almost no further messaging on the need to reduce
the total allowable catch, and no mention of the need to get fishing mortality
down to the target level. Instead, the
majority of the video was all about allocation, with Ms. Lunaas continuing,
“We just want a fair share of a public resource. This resource keeps ecosystems healthy, boats
running, businesses open, and communities out on the water. We need a reallocation of menhaden quota in
order to stabilize bait supply, particularly in northern states. This would lower costs for lobstermen and
charter captains, and it would keep economic value in coastal communities, while
a modest reduction in overall catch would ensure that the
resource remains healthy for everyone coastwide and long-term.”
That’s a somewhat strange position for any group that holds
itself out as a conservation organization to take. After all, if the concern is reducing
menhaden landings—as it should be—it makes no difference whether those landings
take place in Virginia,
which is currently allocated 75% of the landings, or in Delaware, South
Carolina, Georgia, or Florida, which are each allocated roughly 0.25%.
Wherever a menhaden is landed, it is killed, and will make
no further contribution to the growth or fecundity of the stock.
And a broad ireallocation doesn’t even make much sense from
a practical standpoint. If we look at the ASMFC’s review of the 2024
menhaden fishery—the last such annual review available—we find that one state,
Massachusetts, exceeded its base menhaden quota by about 20% (although it made
up the overage by receiving quota transfers from other states), and Maine came
close to harvesting its quota, but the other states’ landings fell far
short. At best, a couple states
harvested less than half of their quotas, New York landed about 25%, but the
other states landed far less—anywhere from about 3% in Connecticut to 19% in
North Carolina.
So, in the case of most states, it’s hard to understand how
reallocation is going to do more to keep “ecosystems healthy, boats running,
shops open, and communities out on the water,” when those states aren’t coming
close to landing the allocations that they already have.
Of course, if the annual catch limit was cut significantly,
more states would come close to landing their full quotas, but even a 50%
reduction would only have a material impact on three states—Maine,
Massachusetts, and Virginia—with the other states’ landings, based on landings
in 2024, still falling at or below their quotas. And TRCP has already demonstrated that it
couldn’t care less whether Virginia takes a cut.
So what would seem to make sense, from a strategic and a
conservation standpoint, would be to reallocate some of Virginia’s menhaden to
the northern New England states that need lobster bait, in exchange for their
support of an annual catch limit—which might have to be phased in over two or
three years—that would have a reasonable chance of reducing fishing mortality
to the target level.
But a general reallocation to other states, which are
already falling far short of filling their quotas, makes no sense at all.
Still, when it comes to the Theordore Roosevelt Conservation
Partnership video, parhaps the most startling thing is that it calls for
nothing more than a “modest reduction” in menhaden landings. Since it’s hard to imagine anyone calling a near-50%
reduction “modest,” it would seem that the TRCP isn’t all that concerned with
real conservation—that is, getting landings down to the point where they’d have
a 50% probability of keeping fishing mortality at or below target—and far more
concerned with a largely unnecessary allocation.
Again, that seems to be a somewhat surprising stance for a
supposed conservation organization to take.
But then, when we look a little deeper into the video, things
become a little more clear; the reallocation effort is less an attempt to
conserve menhaden, as it is a way to cripple the menhaden reduction fishery, long
a boogeyman for many of the menhaden advocates, which is based in Virginia and
would take a significant economic hit if Virginia’s state quota was cut.
The buzzwords are all there.
The narrator talks about the Virginia quota being
“caught by a single industrial company,”
while the video streams pictures of reduction boats setting
their seines, and multiple vessels returning to port, as if the menhaden would be
somehow less dead if they were caught by anyone else.
The narrator goes on to say,
“So even though it’s a coastwide fishery, most of the
pressure is happening in one place, and that’s largely coming from a single
industrial organization. Whether you’re
a recreational angler, a fishing guide, charter captain, or tackle shop owner,
it’s one industrial company that’s taking a significant portion of the most
important fish that’s the key and the backbone to our fishery and all the small
businesses that rely on it.”
The narrator can’t seem to say “industrial” too many times;
he knows that it evokes a knee-jerk reaction.
But the question is why a purported conservation
organization would take such a position, given that reallocation would have no
impact on menhaden populations.
Part of the reason might be that reallocation would make it
easier to convince Maine and Massachusetts to vote for a landings reduction, but
the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership had already stated that it supported
a “modest” reduction, so scraping up votes probably wasn’t a major motivation.
A
more likely answer can probably be found in another TRCP press release, which
announced that
“$1.5 Billion in Annual Economic Output Generated from
Recreational Angling That Involves Atlantic Menhaden as Bait,”
and begins
“As the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission prepares
to set a new menhaden catch limit and considers whether to initiate a
reallocation process among the states, a new study shows that recreational
anglers rely on this keystone species as one of the most important baitfish.”
Once again, it’s hard to understand why the Theodore
Roosevelt Conservation Partnership would be making conservation policy
decisions based on economic considerations in the recreational fishery, until
one realizes that the “new study” mentioned in the press release was not
commissioned by the TRCP, but by the American Sportfishing Association, the big
fishing tackle trade organization, which is very concerned with maintaining the
recreational fishing industry’s income stream, and which might logically be
concerned about landings reductions making menhaden less available, and about
local shortages of menhaden leading to anglers fishing less and the tackle
industry selling less stuff.
And the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership tends to
march hand-in-hand with the American Sportfishing Association on fisheries
issues, with the TRCP consistently echoing the ASA’s economic concerns (e.g., the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership’s
October 2025 opposition to a reduction in striped bass landings, in part
because of potential “unwarranted economic disruption,” in a letter that seems
to pirate its themes from the comments submitted by the ASA).
The economic study took the broadest possible measure of
economic impact, economic output, which an economist quoted in the press
release described as
“the full spectrum of spending that occurs for fishing trips
where menhaden are used as bait, from direct purchases of equipment, food,
fuel, and the many other items needed for a day of fishing, to the downstream
effects that spending has on retailers, manufacturers, and countless other
businesses,”
while
the study itself advised that
“This report does not suggest that these fishing trips and
the associated spending would not occur without the availability of menhaden;
some of the anglers who currently fish in saltwater using menhaden might
instead use different saltwater baits, target different saltwater fish or
decide to go freshwater fishing.”
So, while I wouldn’t be shocked to hear some of the less
responsible members of the advocacy community start putting out press releases
screaming something like, “Coastal communities to lose $1.5 billion from
menhaden crash!” which
would be pretty much in line with the sort of thing that they’ve been putting
out already, the truth is, as usually the case, less extreme.
Menhaden are an important forage fish. Menhaden are important to anglers, in part
because they make fishing easy—menhaden schools typically concentrate
predators, and tossing a live menhaden into the schools is often an easy way to
entice a bite—and in part because they are a popular bait and chum. And tackle shops sell quite a bit of menhaden
and menhaden-derived products.
But—and pay close attention to this one—even
with landings cut in half and no reallocations of any kind—the bait fishery in
all but a couple of New England states would be largely unaffected, and still
able to supply anglers’ needs, because those states are not coming close
to catching its quota today.
And to those who might want to argue that some states aren’t
catching their menhaden quota because the fish aren’t present in their waters,
I will make the obvious reply that reallocating fish that aren’t there
isn’t going to increase local landings.
However, making more than “modest” cuts to coastwide
landings very likely will restore menhaden abundance.
I hate to use an already overused cliché, but reallocating
menhaden among the states is much like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Neither action addresses the core problem.
If you wanted the Titanic to keep floating, you would have needed
to reduce the amount of water inside the hull, and put it back in the ocean.
And if we want more menhaden, whether to supply forage to
predators, supply more bait for anglers and lobstermen, or provide easier
fishing for guides, charter captains and recreational fishermen alike, we need
to reduce the amount of menhaden ending up dead on boats of various sizes, and
keep more in the ocean.
Changing who kills the menhaden won’t make a
difference, because they’ll still be dead.
Changing where the menhaden are killed won’t
make a difference, because they’ll still be killed.
The only way to increase menhaden numbers, which is what
legitimate conservation organizations surely want to do, is to reduce landings,
and kill fewer fish.
The sooner all of the various advocacy groups accept that basic
truth, and start working together to get fishing mortality back to its target
level, the sooner something meaningful might get done.
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