Any time fisheries managers suggest that a stock of fish—regardless
of species—is becoming depleted, and that more restrictive regulations are
needed to reverse the decline, someone will always rise in opposition, to claim
that harvest reductions will cause economic harm.
“…I mean it just seems like as a management [sic] has
to weigh both sides of this, of course we want to be cautious, but there is a
point where you might be foregoing fish that could be caught in the pursuit of
trying to keep a stock at a level that you think is necessary.
“But in the meantime, as we’ve heard, people are going out of
business and we are seeing a lot of people that are hurting. I mean I know we hear it from our commercial
guys all the time, they’ve taken since 2014 the quota has been cut almost in
half. You know that definitely comes out
of their pockets…”
He then questioned the need for additional restrictions on
the recreational fishery, saying
“…I mean we have been very precautionary about the size of
the stock. But we also have to be
precautionary about what we’re doing to the people who depend on these fish…
“I just think that we do have to start looking at the
socioeconomic side of this at this point too.”
However, he never even tried to explain what constituted “the
socioeconomic side” of the striped bass fishery.
We
saw similar concerns expressed in a letter, signed by six fishing tackle and
boating industry-aligned groups (the American Sportfishing Association, Coastal
Conservation Association, Boat Owners Association of the United States, Marine
Retailers Association of the Americas, Center for Sportfishing Policy, and
National Marine Manufacturers Association), which opposed the reductions in
recreational striped bass landings, achieved through closed seasons,
proposed in the Draft
Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for
Public Comment, and was submitted ahead of the October 2025 striped
bass management board meeting.
Even though such reductions would make it more likely that
the currently overfished striped bass stock would be fully rebuilt by the 2029
deadline mandated by the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan, the six industry
groups opposed them because
“The economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery
cannot be overstated:
·
In 2016, striped bass trip and
equipment spending across Atlantic coastal states generated approximately $13
billion in total economic output, supported over 104,000 jobs, contributed more
than $7.7 billion to regional GDP.
·
On a per-pound basis, the recreational sector
generates 17 times more retail sales value, 8 times more economic activity, and
nearly quadruple the jobs compared to the commercial sector.
“The proposed season closures—whether prohibiting harvest or
targeting—will undoubtedly erode these substantial economic benefits and
disproportionately impact coastal small businesses, bait and tackle shops,
marinas, boat manufacturers, charter operators, and the entire recreational
boating and fishing supply chain.
“…Maintaining consistent seasons is the most equitable
solution: it preserves both regional
economic stability and angler access across preference lines, without
inflicting unnecessary economic hardship.
[emphasis added, references omitted]”
Similar comments, made by both stakeholders and state
fisheries managers, can be found whenever harvest reductions are proposed,
regardless of the species involved and regardless of how badly more restrictive
management measures are needed.
But no one ever seems to consider the harm caused by the stock
decline itself.
To examine that harm, let’s go back to the industry letter
quoted above, and note that in the first bullet point, it references various
economic statistics from 2016, nearly a decade before Addendum
III was ever proposed.
And that’s a little misleading, because things change over
time.
National
Marine Fisheries Service data tells us that, in 2016, recreational fishermen on
the northeast and mid-Atlantic coasts took about 17.4 million fishing trips
primarily targeting striped bass, but by the time the industry letter was
sent, in 2025, striped
bass abundance had declined from an estimated 328.5 million fish in 2016 to
just 177.9 million in 2023 (no abundance data is yet available for later
years). And in response to declining
abundance, the number of directed striped bass trips taken by anglers declined
as well, falling to 13.9 million by the time 2025 rolled around.
That’s a 20% decline in fishing trips, and it can probably
be assumed that the economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery
dropped by a similar percentage over those years.
But even that doesn’t tell the whole story, because by 2016,
the striped bass stock was already in trouble, and the number of directed trips
was already falling. Directed trips
peaked in 2006 at 25.8 million, at a time when female spawning stock biomass
was estimated at 107,341 metric tons, compared to just 69,211 mt in 2016, and
the population contained about 13.6 million fish that were at least 8 years
old, compared to 2016’s 6.7 million.
So it would seem that striped bass abundance drives
recreational fishing effort, and effort clearly drives the economic value of
the striped bass fishery, because if people don’t fish, they don’t buy bait,
fishing gear, or fuel, and they don’t spend money on charter and party boat
fares.
Thus, when the recreational fishing and boating industry
oppose management measures that would increase striped bass abundance in an
effort to maintain short-term profits, they’re shooting themselves in the foot,
because by opposing rebuilding, they’re effectively foregoing the increased
long-term income that would be generated by a rebuilt stock.
To some extent, we can see the same thing happen in the commercial
fishery, although there, profit doesn’t necessarily track abundance, since
abundance can flood markets and drive down the price per pound paid to the
fishermen. So while commercial
striped bass landings declined over time, from roughly 6,284,000 pounds in 2006
to 4,634,000 pounds in 2016 and 3,844,000 pounds in 2024, the overall ex vessel
value of those landings didn’t follow the same pattern, going from about
$13,745,000 in 2006 to $18,661,000 in 2016, before falling to $14,806,000 in
2024—although it’s probably worth noting that those prices are not
inflation-adjusted, and so don’t perfectly reflect relative earnings over time.
Yet striped bass, as economically important as they are to
the East Coast’s recreational fishery, are not the most notable example of lost
economic opportunity caused by the decline of a fish stock. That dubious honor probably belongs to the
winter flounder.
In 1984, anglers in the mid-Atlantic region took
about 5.625 million trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and took
home about 22,925,000 of the small flatfish (winter flounder were also an
important recreational species in New England, particularly in Massachusetts,
but the mid-Atlantic, with its larger angling population, provides a starker example).
Winter flounder were the first fish that most anglers caught
in the spring. The fish began stirring
in late February or early March, with St. Patrick’s Day the unofficial start of
the season. Because the fishery was
prosecuted in sheltered inshore waters, and because flounder could be caught
from shore, from docks and piers, and from both private and for-hire vessels,
it drew large numbers of anglers who targeted flounder before other inshore
species were readily available.
But all the fishing pressure came at a cost, and by the late
1980s, it was clear to state fisheries managers that if it wasn’t more closely
regulated, the flounder would be headed for trouble. Yet it was also clear that, because flounder could
be caught at times when few other fish were biting, and because they were so
popular with inshore anglers, both the local fishing tackle shops and, in
particular, the party boat fleet would oppose the needed regulations, arguing
that even if fish were less abundant, their customers had to have the “perception”
of being able to take quite a few home if they happened to have a good day, or
else they wouldn’t go fishing.
As a result, and perhaps as a result of environmental
conditions as well, the winter flounder population soon went into decline. By 2009, recreational flounder trips in the
mid-Atlantic had declined to just 362,000 trips, while landings fell to a mere
160,800 fish, just 0.7%--that’s seven tenths of one percent—of what
they were 25 years before. It seemed
impossible to argue against very strict management measures had to be imposed
to avert a complete stock collapse—if averting a collapse was even possible by
that point.
“…Councilor Dearborn agreed [that the fishery shouldn’t be
closed], further noting that the recreational fishing community is in trouble
and they need to have the opportunity to fish.
She pleaded that the Council not take the more conservative approach
(i.e., harvest moratorium). They need to
keep the shops open…Mr. Arnold Leo of the Town of Easthampton Fisheries
Consultancy disagreed with Councilor Witek.
He said fishery management should also be guided by the considerations
of the socioeconomic impact of management measures. He realizes that the focus is on the health
of the resources, however, socioeconomic impact is one of the considerations…Councilor
Jordan stated that we shouldn’t inflict more pain on New York fishermen,
commercial and recreational, than is already necessary. A closure is not required in the winter
flounder fishery and it should not be instituted…”
My motion failed in a lopsided vote. Short-term economic concerns prevailed.
In 2025, anglers throughout the mid-Atlantic region
supposedly made about 42,000 trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and landed
approximately 600 fish, or 0.0026%--twenty-six ten thousandths of one
percent—of what they landed in 1984—although the NMFS surveyors found
so few flounder fishermen to interview that those numbers, and in particular
the estimate of recreational trips, are so clouded in uncertainty as to be
nearly meaningless.
While it’s impossible to say with certainty that early and
decisive intervention would have prevented the collapse of the Southern New
England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock, as a warming ocean might have made
a decline, if not a complete collapse, inevitable, the loss of 5.6 million fishing
trips per year, many of them made at a time of year when few other alternative
targets are available to recreational fishermen, undoubtedly had a significant
impact on the recreational fishing industry—enough of an impact that, even if
success was far from certain, one would have expected rational businessmen to at
least try to prevent the predictable long-term harm to their shops and for-hire
boats.
But they didn’t, and instead, focusing only on the short
term, did all they could to hasten the flounder’s collapse.
Whether we’re talking about the collapse of the Atlantic cod
fishery (724,000 recreational trips and 102,486,000 pounds commercially landed
in 1981, 56,000 recreational trips and 1,426,000 pounds commercially landed in
2024), the loss of the recreational whiting fishery in the New York bight,
which was primarily prosecuted from for-hire boats and collapsed in the late
1970s, before reliable estimates of fishing effort was made, or the loss of
other, popular recreational fisheries on other coasts, it is impossible to deny
that the failure to put timely and effective management measures in place has
had real, negative consequences for fishing-related businesses and coastal
economies.
Yet even today, the focus remains on the negative short-term
impacts of restricting fishing activity, and not the much greater long-term
losses that too often occur when such restrictions are not put in
place.
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