THE COST OF DEPLETED FISH STOCKS

 

Any time fisheries managers suggest that a stock of fish—regardless of species—is becoming depleted, and that more restrictive regulations are needed to reverse the decline, someone will always rise in opposition, to claim that harvest reductions will cause economic harm.

A perfect example of that occurred at the October 2024 meeting of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, when John Clark, a Delaware fisheries manager, objected to further restrictions on the commercial striped bass fishery, saying

“…I mean it just seems like as a management [sic] has to weigh both sides of this, of course we want to be cautious, but there is a point where you might be foregoing fish that could be caught in the pursuit of trying to keep a stock at a level that you think is necessary.

“But in the meantime, as we’ve heard, people are going out of business and we are seeing a lot of people that are hurting.  I mean I know we hear it from our commercial guys all the time, they’ve taken since 2014 the quota has been cut almost in half.  You know that definitely comes out of their pockets…”

He then questioned the need for additional restrictions on the recreational fishery, saying

“…I mean we have been very precautionary about the size of the stock.  But we also have to be precautionary about what we’re doing to the people who depend on these fish…

“I just think that we do have to start looking at the socioeconomic side of this at this point too.”

However, he never even tried to explain what constituted “the socioeconomic side” of the striped bass fishery.

We saw similar concerns expressed in a letter, signed by six fishing tackle and boating industry-aligned groups (the American Sportfishing Association, Coastal Conservation Association, Boat Owners Association of the United States, Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, Center for Sportfishing Policy, and National Marine Manufacturers Association), which opposed the reductions in recreational striped bass landings, achieved through closed seasons, proposed in the Draft Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Public Comment, and was submitted ahead of the October 2025 striped bass management board meeting.

Even though such reductions would make it more likely that the currently overfished striped bass stock would be fully rebuilt by the 2029 deadline mandated by the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan, the six industry groups opposed them because

“The economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery cannot be overstated:

·       In 2016, striped bass trip and equipment spending across Atlantic coastal states generated approximately $13 billion in total economic output, supported over 104,000 jobs, contributed more than $7.7 billion to regional GDP.

·       On a per-pound basis, the recreational sector generates 17 times more retail sales value, 8 times more economic activity, and nearly quadruple the jobs compared to the commercial sector.

“The proposed season closures—whether prohibiting harvest or targeting—will undoubtedly erode these substantial economic benefits and disproportionately impact coastal small businesses, bait and tackle shops, marinas, boat manufacturers, charter operators, and the entire recreational boating and fishing supply chain.

“…Maintaining consistent seasons is the most equitable solution:  it preserves both regional economic stability and angler access across preference lines, without inflicting unnecessary economic hardship.  [emphasis added, references omitted]”

Similar comments, made by both stakeholders and state fisheries managers, can be found whenever harvest reductions are proposed, regardless of the species involved and regardless of how badly more restrictive management measures are needed.

But no one ever seems to consider the harm caused by the stock decline itself.

To examine that harm, let’s go back to the industry letter quoted above, and note that in the first bullet point, it references various economic statistics from 2016, nearly a decade before Addendum III was ever proposed.

And that’s a little misleading, because things change over time.

National Marine Fisheries Service data tells us that, in 2016, recreational fishermen on the northeast and mid-Atlantic coasts took about 17.4 million fishing trips primarily targeting striped bass, but by the time the industry letter was sent, in 2025, striped bass abundance had declined from an estimated 328.5 million fish in 2016 to just 177.9 million in 2023 (no abundance data is yet available for later years).  And in response to declining abundance, the number of directed striped bass trips taken by anglers declined as well, falling to 13.9 million by the time 2025 rolled around.

That’s a 20% decline in fishing trips, and it can probably be assumed that the economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery dropped by a similar percentage over those years.

But even that doesn’t tell the whole story, because by 2016, the striped bass stock was already in trouble, and the number of directed trips was already falling.  Directed trips peaked in 2006 at 25.8 million, at a time when female spawning stock biomass was estimated at 107,341 metric tons, compared to just 69,211 mt in 2016, and the population contained about 13.6 million fish that were at least 8 years old, compared to 2016’s 6.7 million.

So it would seem that striped bass abundance drives recreational fishing effort, and effort clearly drives the economic value of the striped bass fishery, because if people don’t fish, they don’t buy bait, fishing gear, or fuel, and they don’t spend money on charter and party boat fares.

Thus, when the recreational fishing and boating industry oppose management measures that would increase striped bass abundance in an effort to maintain short-term profits, they’re shooting themselves in the foot, because by opposing rebuilding, they’re effectively foregoing the increased long-term income that would be generated by a rebuilt stock.

To some extent, we can see the same thing happen in the commercial fishery, although there, profit doesn’t necessarily track abundance, since abundance can flood markets and drive down the price per pound paid to the fishermen.  So while commercial striped bass landings declined over time, from roughly 6,284,000 pounds in 2006 to 4,634,000 pounds in 2016 and 3,844,000 pounds in 2024, the overall ex vessel value of those landings didn’t follow the same pattern, going from about $13,745,000 in 2006 to $18,661,000 in 2016, before falling to $14,806,000 in 2024—although it’s probably worth noting that those prices are not inflation-adjusted, and so don’t perfectly reflect relative earnings over time.

Yet striped bass, as economically important as they are to the East Coast’s recreational fishery, are not the most notable example of lost economic opportunity caused by the decline of a fish stock.  That dubious honor probably belongs to the winter flounder.

In 1984, anglers in the mid-Atlantic region took about 5.625 million trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and took home about 22,925,000 of the small flatfish (winter flounder were also an important recreational species in New England, particularly in Massachusetts, but the mid-Atlantic, with its larger angling population, provides a starker example).

Winter flounder were the first fish that most anglers caught in the spring.  The fish began stirring in late February or early March, with St. Patrick’s Day the unofficial start of the season.  Because the fishery was prosecuted in sheltered inshore waters, and because flounder could be caught from shore, from docks and piers, and from both private and for-hire vessels, it drew large numbers of anglers who targeted flounder before other inshore species were readily available.

But all the fishing pressure came at a cost, and by the late 1980s, it was clear to state fisheries managers that if it wasn’t more closely regulated, the flounder would be headed for trouble.  Yet it was also clear that, because flounder could be caught at times when few other fish were biting, and because they were so popular with inshore anglers, both the local fishing tackle shops and, in particular, the party boat fleet would oppose the needed regulations, arguing that even if fish were less abundant, their customers had to have the “perception” of being able to take quite a few home if they happened to have a good day, or else they wouldn’t go fishing.

As a result, and perhaps as a result of environmental conditions as well, the winter flounder population soon went into decline.  By 2009, recreational flounder trips in the mid-Atlantic had declined to just 362,000 trips, while landings fell to a mere 160,800 fish, just 0.7%--that’s seven tenths of one percent—of what they were 25 years before.  It seemed impossible to argue against very strict management measures had to be imposed to avert a complete stock collapse—if averting a collapse was even possible by that point.

Yet, when I made a motion at the September 2009 meeting of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council, recommending that New York completely shut down its winter flounder fishery for an indefinite period, it met with immediate and intense opposition.  As reported in the Advisory Council’s bulletin,

“…Councilor Dearborn agreed [that the fishery shouldn’t be closed], further noting that the recreational fishing community is in trouble and they need to have the opportunity to fish.  She pleaded that the Council not take the more conservative approach (i.e., harvest moratorium).  They need to keep the shops open…Mr. Arnold Leo of the Town of Easthampton Fisheries Consultancy disagreed with Councilor Witek.  He said fishery management should also be guided by the considerations of the socioeconomic impact of management measures.  He realizes that the focus is on the health of the resources, however, socioeconomic impact is one of the considerations…Councilor Jordan stated that we shouldn’t inflict more pain on New York fishermen, commercial and recreational, than is already necessary.  A closure is not required in the winter flounder fishery and it should not be instituted…”

My motion failed in a lopsided vote.  Short-term economic concerns prevailed.

In 2025, anglers throughout the mid-Atlantic region supposedly made about 42,000 trips primarily targeting winter flounder, and landed approximately 600 fish, or 0.0026%--twenty-six ten thousandths of one percent—of what they landed in 1984—although the NMFS surveyors found so few flounder fishermen to interview that those numbers, and in particular the estimate of recreational trips, are so clouded in uncertainty as to be nearly meaningless.

While it’s impossible to say with certainty that early and decisive intervention would have prevented the collapse of the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder stock, as a warming ocean might have made a decline, if not a complete collapse, inevitable, the loss of 5.6 million fishing trips per year, many of them made at a time of year when few other alternative targets are available to recreational fishermen, undoubtedly had a significant impact on the recreational fishing industry—enough of an impact that, even if success was far from certain, one would have expected rational businessmen to at least try to prevent the predictable long-term harm to their shops and for-hire boats.

But they didn’t, and instead, focusing only on the short term, did all they could to hasten the flounder’s collapse.

Whether we’re talking about the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery (724,000 recreational trips and 102,486,000 pounds commercially landed in 1981, 56,000 recreational trips and 1,426,000 pounds commercially landed in 2024), the loss of the recreational whiting fishery in the New York bight, which was primarily prosecuted from for-hire boats and collapsed in the late 1970s, before reliable estimates of fishing effort was made, or the loss of other, popular recreational fisheries on other coasts, it is impossible to deny that the failure to put timely and effective management measures in place has had real, negative consequences for fishing-related businesses and coastal economies.

Yet even today, the focus remains on the negative short-term impacts of restricting fishing activity, and not the much greater long-term losses that too often occur when such restrictions are not put in place.

WHAT ARE THEY THINKING AT THE ASMFC?

 

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) plays a big role in East Coast fisheries management. It has the primary responsibility for drafting and updating management plans for important commercial and recreational species such as striped bass, red drum and menhaden, while also working with the regional fishery management councils to develop management measures that will complement federal regulations in state waters, where the National Marine Fisheries Service’s management authority is extremely limited.

Consequently, the ASMFC also comes in for a big share of blame when the stocks that it manages fail to thrive. It has been heavily criticized for allowing the Atlantic striped bass stock to again become overfished, after it had collapsed, and then been rebuilt, a few decades ago, as well as for its more recent decision not to reduce Atlantic menhaden landings after a stock assessment update revealed that the stock was substantially smaller, and fishing mortality significantly higher, than previously believed.

Yet, while it’s not hard to find fishermen who are willing to provide their opinions about how well the ASMFC is doing its job, it is far more difficult to learn how those who are actually making the ASMFC’s fishery management decisions feel about the organization’s actions. But at the beginning of every year, the ASMFC publishes the results of its annual survey of commissioners, giving people a look at the insiders’ views.

Unfortunately, the most recent survey elicited a much poorer response than its immediate predecessors, with only 23 commissioners responding, compared to 28 in 2024 and 33 in 2023. The memorandum reporting on its results asserted that “The lower sample size from this year’s survey has exaggerated some of the trends in commissioner’s responses,” and that certainly could be true, although it is also possible that the respondents, although fewer in number, still provided a representative sample of all the commissioners’ views.

But even assuming that the respondents did present an exaggerated or somehow skewed view of commissioners’ opinions, it is tempting to speculate why they answered the survey when many of their colleagues did not. Were other commissioners just too busy at the end of the year to bother? Or did the respondents just feel a particularly deep obligation to try to improve the workings of the ASMFC? Do the survey results represent the views of concerned commissioners who are actively trying to change the status quo, or merely reflect the ire of commissioners who are displeased that one or more management actions didn’t turn out the way they had hoped?

There is no way to be certain, but many of the most recent responses suggest that the ASMFC might benefit if some changes were made.

The survey’s very first questions address the basic issue of how well the ASMFC is carrying out its mission: “How comfortable are you that the Commission has a clear and achievable plan to reach the Vision (Sustainably managing Atlantic Coast Fisheries)?” and “How confident are you that the Commission’s actions reflect progress toward the Vision?”

Those questions, like most of the other questions on the survey, are scored on a 10-point scale. The scores for the first two questions were disappointingly low, 7.18 and 6.90, respectively, and were, in both cases, the lowest scores ever received in a time series dating back to 2009.

The questions received their highest scores over a decade ago, with the first reaching 8.37 in 2014 and the second reaching 8.52 in 2013. Both have been declining in fits and starts ever since, with the most recent scores notably lower than they were in 2024. Whether that drop was “exaggerated” due to the low number of responses, or whether the scores accurately reflected commissioners’ evaluation of the ASMFC’s effectiveness over the past year, remains an open question, although some written comments provided toward the end of the survey suggest that, at least for some commissioners, the latter was probably the case.

Responses to other questions could explain why commissioners are pessimistic about the ASMFC achieving its goals.

ASMFC declares on its website that “As a partnership of coastal states, we work together to protect essential marine species, ensuring vibrant fisheries, thriving communities, and resilient ecosystems, all through science-driven, cooperative management, [emphasis added]” and its approach to fisheries management assumes that all states will be willing to collaborate and manage species on a coastwide basis. Yet when the survey asked, “How satisfied are you with the cooperation between Commissioners to achieve the Commission’s Vision?” the question only scored a 6.55.

While not the lowest score in the time series (the same question scored a 6.45 in 2018), it was far below the 8.20 that the same question scored in 2012, and the 8.00s it scored in the two subsequent years. Yet such score shouldn’t surprise anyone who has listened in on the various species management board meetings, such as the January 2024 Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board (Bass Board) meeting, when fisheries managers from Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia attempted to delay full implementation of an important addendum to the striped bass management plan, merely because their commercial fisheries were already open, and they didn’t want to take the bureaucratic steps needed to reduce fishermen’s quotas mid-season.

Similarly, the question “How satisfied are you with the Commission’s working relationship with our constituent partners (commercial, recreational, and environmental)?” scored a time series-low 6.15, a notable decline from the 7.92 it scored in 2013, the drop probably reflecting both how some commissioners feel about certain elements of the fishing community as well as how members of the fishing community feel about some commissioners. Either way, a poor relationship between the commissioners and the public can only make it harder for the ASMFC to do its job.

The commissioners’ views on other gauges of the ASMFC’s effectiveness were mixed.

They had a fairly positive view of the ASMFC’s progress on ending overfishing, awarding a score of 7.29, just slightly below the time series average of 7.39. However, when asked whether tracking the number of stocks where overfishing no longer occurred was “a clear metric to measure progress,” some commissioners apparently were no longer sure, as that question garnered a score of just 7.17, the second-lowest in a time series that ranged from 7.09 to 8.25. The high score was awarded only last year, and it’s not clear why the 2025 score was more than a full point lower.

Finally, there was the question, “Are you satisfied with the Commission’s ability to manage rebuilt stocks?”

It’s a key issue. It’s often easier for managers to adopt the measures needed to rebuild a stock that everyone agrees is in trouble, than it is for them to keep sustainable measures in place once successful rebuilding takes place, and fishermen yearn to increase their landings. The commissioners have never given the ASMFC high scores on the question; the long-term average is only 6.86, and the time series high is just 7.21, so the recent score of 7.06, as low at it is, suggests that the ASMFC might be having a little more success in recent years.

The scored questions provide some insight into what commissioners feel is going right and going wrong at the ASMFC, but they don’t do anything to explain why the problems are occurring, or offer any thoughts on how to overcome them.

Those questions are best answered by another set of questions, which seek more detailed written comments, such as the one which asked, “What is the single biggest obstacle to the Commission’s success in rebuilding stocks?”

Nine of the 19 people who answered that question replied with some variation on “politics,” with some of them citing the closely related issues of “Short-term stakeholder interests prioritized over resource impacts,” “balancing stakeholder desires vs taking stronger conservation measures,” and “Lack of will power to take action to restrict fishing mortality when stock status suggests action. Perfect recent examples striped bass [when the Bass Board voted against landings reductions that would make it more likely that the stock would fully rebuild by the deadline dictated by the management plan] and [Gulf of Maine] lobster [when objections by fishermen and some local politicians became so intense that the American Lobster Management Board reversed course and did not impose the measures called for in the management plan].”

Some elaborated on their views, saying that obstacles included “Not following the science due to political and/or commercial/recreational sector pressure,” and “Political impediments at both the state and Federal level are complicating efforts. Lobster, Menhaden, and Red Drum are examples.”

One commissioner provided a more detailed comment that helps to explain the drop in the survey scores described earlier, writing,

Many of my responses are lower than usual and that is because I have a few recent things on my mind, notably the menhaden/ERP action from the annual meeting [where the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board failed to reduce menhaden landings, even though such landings should have been reduced by over 50% to meet the fishing mortality target] and Striped Bass. There has always been a measure of this in what we do of course, but I think there is an element of politics that is creeping in to levels that we have not seen before, which is having negative repercussions to our making sound, consistent decisions to promote sustainability for our important stocks.”

It seems that politics has become a serious problem at the ASMFC.

The only other obstacle to ASMFC success cited by more than two commissioners was climate/environmental change, which was mentioned in six responses. But as some of the respondents noted, that is a problem that is far beyond the ASMFC’s ability to solve.

The survey also asked, “What issue(s) should the Commission focus more attention/time on?”

The answers were diverse, but most shared one common characteristic: Although the commissioners had already acknowledged that there were obstacles making it difficult for the ASMFC to reach its goals, few said that the ASMFC should focus on finding ways to overcome them. Instead, the most common suggestion, raised by four of the 13 respondents, was for some sort of outreach to constituent groups.

One commissioner suggested “Outreach to create greater understanding of what we do and cannot do.” Another expanded on that theme, writing, “Educating the public on how the commission is structured and that it is a state based compact not as federal body. Perhaps a series of PR pieces that are light hearted a [sic] speak to the realities of the job and complexity of it.” But while such outreach might help reduce the amount of criticism aimed at the ASMFC, it’s hard to see how they might remove obstacles to the ASMFC achieving its goals.

Four other commissioners suggested that commissioners should be provided with more and/or better information; while that wasn’t a direct counter to the obstacles faced by the ASMFC, better informed commissioners probably would lead to better management decisions.

There were also three commissioners (one responding to a different question) who complained about the problems caused by a lack of cooperation between the commissioners, and between the ASMFC and other management bodies. To that point, one comment noted, “We have lost the ability to work together and compromise in best interest of the resource that we manage. We need to figure out a different/better way to work together with the [Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council]. Joint meetings are generally a waste of time and money as most of the recommendations are for status quo and it is impossible to get 60 individuals to do something different when one body or the other has veto power over the result.”

A more detailed, and more troubling, response, which reflects the realities of the current, conservation-averse approach to federal fisheries management, read,

I was shocked and alarmed by some of the votes and comments made by our federal partners at the annual meeting. Very inconsistent with previous positions and counter to achieving sustainability goals. I don’t envy these partners right now, so I think that it will be very important for us to guard against putting them into positions where they will have to make comments/votes like this again to the extent this is possible. This will require some strategic thinking on how best to bring things forward into the process for the foreseeable future. We are also going to have to bolster ourselves against the loss of resources from the federal government (assessment support, objective advice, data collection) so that we can continue to serve our states as well as we can. The states can step up, we have the expertise, so we should look for the opportunities to do this.

But commissioners don’t blame federal managers and federal management bodies for all of the cooperation problems. As another noted, “Commission Employees are amazing. However, the decorum of the states representatives have [sic] eroded over the past 10 years and the ability to work with states to protect everyone’s interests has declined as a result.”

Commissioners also addressed the need for better socioeconomic data. “Socioeconomics” is a term often heard in ASMFC debates, but there is little agreement on what it means, or how it ought to be measured. Far too often, it seems to mean little more than “If the ASMFC does X, then I, my company, my friends, or my sector might end up making less money.”

That sort of discussion probably hit its low point at the Bass Board meeting held on December 16, 2024, when New Jersey’s Legislative Proxy, Adam Nowalsky, made a motion to initiate a new addendum to the striped bass management plan, “in consideration of 2024 recreational and commercial mortality while balancing socioeconomic impacts…” After another commissioner asked, “What is it that we’re going to be balancing those socioeconomic impacts against?” Nowalsky declined to provide an answer, responding only that “I would defer to the Board specifically for that…I think every one of the options that we are potentially contemplating today, or we would contemplate in this Addendum, has a socioeconomic impact,” and undoubtedly causing some Bass Board members to wonder why he raised the “socioeconomic” point in the first place.

In hopes of someday obtaining more meaningful socioeconomic information, one commissioner wrote,

I’d like to see more emphasis on economic concerns. We’ve seen economic issues take on prominence for several species, for example, striped bass management hurting the for-hire sector in the Chesapeake and lowering the menhaden [total allowable catch] affecting the reduction fishery workers, but we don’t have analyses of these issues. Continuing on those issues, what are the factors affecting an angler’s decision to go out on a for-hire boat—is the regulations, the cost per trip or a combination of those factors (e.g. I’ll pay $80 for a trip if I can keep X number of fish)? How much menhaden quota does the reduction industry need to maintain employment—was the situation as dire as they claimed?

Those are all good questions, but they only scratch the surface of what might be asked.

As part of the recent debate over Addendum III to the striped bass management plan, there were proposals to award anglers fishing from for-hire vessels with regulations that were more favorable than those governing anglers fishing from shore or from private boats. A proposed new amendment to the summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass and bluefish management plans would similarly favor for-hire anglers over other recreational fishermen. Yet the for-hire fleet is responsible for less than 2% of all striped bass trips, and for-hire anglers also generate only a small proportion of the trips targeting other species. So, would management measures that discriminate against most anglers, who take the great majority of fishing trips, be a net economic positive because it might shore up the for-hire fleet, or a net economic negative because it comes at the cost of, and perhaps discourages, most members of the angling community?

And what is the cost of the ASMFC’s failure to maintain robust fish populations?

Commissioners often argue against more restrictive management measures because of the immediate harm such measures might cause to the fishing industry. Yet no one has ever asked how much harm is caused by not adopting management measures that maintain stocks at higher levels.

In 2006, when the striped bass biomass was near its peak, recreational fishermen took approximately 25.8 million trips primarily targeting them; by 2025, with the stock overfished and abundance declining, that figure had dropped to just under 14 million trips. How much greater would the economic benefits from the fishery have been if the Bass Board had made the hard decisions needed to keep striped bass abundance high enough to support nearly 26 million directed striped bass trips per year, as was the case in 2006, instead of just the 14 million trips that were taken in 2025?

If the ASMFC developed the capability to conduct real socioeconomic analysis, questions like those could be answered, to the benefit of both fish and fishermen.

The ASMFC’s annual survey of commissioners provides an important insight into the organization. It provides a look at the problems that make it harder for the ASMFC to achieve its goals, at why those problems occur, and at how they might be addressed.

And it provides at least a partial roadmap to making the ASMFC a better and more effective organization than it is today.

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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/.

THE TYRRANY OF THE MINORITY

 

In last Sunday’s edition of One Angler’s Voyage, I wrote about a pair of Maryland legislators who, at the apparent request of the charter boat industry, are holding up new regulations that would potentially benefit both the striped bass and the state’s striped bass fishermen.  (NOTE:  As I was preparing to publish this post, I learned that the hold had ended, the relevant legislative committee approved the new regulations yesterday, and that such regulations will be printed in the Maryland Register on March 20, allowing them to go into effect on March 30, in time for the spring catch-and-release season to extend through the full month of April.)

About a month before, I focused on a piece of Maryland legislation, introduced to appease the charter boat industry, that would allow the charters’ clients to retain two striped bass per trip instead of one, dictate the length of the season, and outlaw catch-and-release seasons in the striped bass fishery.

And in 2024, a group of waterman, including the Maryland Charter Boat Association, Inc., brought a legal action against the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, challenging the validity of Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, claiming that its harvest reductions, and in particular, its reduction of the Maryland striped bass bag limit for charter boat customers to one fish from two, hurt the for-hire business.  Shortly after the courts dismissed that action, the original plaintiffs initiated another in a different court, but this time they were also joined by three other charter boat groups, the Cape Cod Charter Boat Association, the Connecticut Charter and Party Boat Association, and the Montauk Boatmen and Captains Association.

Once again, the goal of the suit was to invalidate Addendum II, and reverse its mandated landings reductions so that the charter boat groups’ customers could kill more striped bass, regardless of how that action impacted the currently overfished striped bass stock.

Robert Newberry, a spokesman for the Delmarva Fisheries Association, another plaintiff in the lawsuits mentioned above, expressed his support for the Maryland legislation that would increase the bag limit for charter boat customers and take away the Maryland Department of Natural Resources ability to set striped bass seasons in the Chesapeake Bay, saying

“We have said this adversely affects our industry, but there’s been no economic study done.  You know, all we get from DNR.  Well, you know, some of the guys are going to get hurt, not some—everybody’s hurt.”

With all of the pending legislation, the lawsuits, and the comments about “everybody” being hurt, one might get the impression that the charter boat fishery for striped bass in the Maryland portion of the Chesapeake Bay is a huge industry or, at least, a huge part of the region’s striped bass fishery.

But nothing could be farther from the truth.

For the truth is that, in all of 2025, anglers fishing from Maryland charter boats took an estimated 66,278 fishing trips targeting striped bass, a figure that shrinks into near-obscurity when compared to the estimated 1,135,664 striped bass trips taken by Maryland’s private boat anglers, or even the estimated 317,507 bass trips taken by anglers fishing from shore.

Yes, that’s right.  Despite all the noise that they make, based on the number trips taken that primarily target striped bass, the Maryland charter boat fleet only accounted for 4.4% of the state’s striped bass fishery last year.  And even that number is deceptive, because not all of the Maryland charter boat fleet seeks to kill more fish while eliminating the catch-and-release seasons.  While the Maryland Charter Boat Association still relies on a century-old business model that emphasizes putting dead bass on the dock, and unsuccessfully sued to block Addendum II’s landings reductions, the Maryland Light Tackle Fishing Guides Association embraced Maryland’s proposed spring catch-and-release season, with members’ businesses built around the overall angling experience, and not just around harvest.

Thus, the Maryland charter boat operators who are trying to increase striped bass harvest while eliminating the catch-and-release season undoubtedly accounted for far less than 66,000 trips last year.

Still, they act as if they were the dominant sector in the Maryland striped bass fishery.

We see the same thing on a coastwide basis.  

In the runup to the adoption of Addendum II in early 2024, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board solicited public comments on issues such as landings reductions and the question of whether passengers on for-hire vessels should be singled out for special regulations that would allow them a wider slot size limit than that governing shore-based and private boat anglers.  In supporting the special regulations for charter and party boat anglers, a group calling itself the East Coast Fishing Coalition wrote

“The East Coast Fishing Coalition (ECFC) membership consists of many of the charter boat associations along the east coast from Maryland to Massachusetts.  We are unified in our representation of hundreds of Charter and Party-Boat operators engaged in the for-hire industry along the Eastern seaboard.  Our mission is simply to preserve the recreational harvest of marine fish through responsible and sustainable management.  It is our belief that most recreational fishermen have the distinct goal to ‘fish4dinner’ as a primary objective when they embark on a recreational fishing trip.  The for-hire fleet has the expertise and infrastructure in place to offer that opportunity to those recreational fishermen.”

Once again, we see the for-hire fleet posturing as if they have the right to speak for “most recreational fishermen,” even though for-hire striped bass trips only accounted for 1.45% of all directed striped bass trips taken between Maine and North Carolina in 2025, and claiming that most anglers want to bring home striped bass for dinner, even though the ASMFC recognizes that

“The recreational fishery is predominantly prosecuted as catch and release, meaning the majority of striped bass caught are released alive either due to angler preference or regulation…Since 1990, roughly 90% of total annual striped bass catch is released alive…”

Once again, we see the very small for-hire sector try to dictate fishery policies that will impact the much larger universe of anglers.

And such efforts aren’t limited to striped bass.

Right now, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council is working with the ASMFC to develop a “Recreational Sector Separation Amendment” that

“may consider options for managing the for-hire recreational fisheries separately from other recreational fishing modes,”

which would be fine if the for-hires were given their own quota, based on current landings, and allowed to harvest that quota while governed by bag limits or seasons different from those governing private boat and shore-based anglers. 

Unfortunately, the momentum seems to be swinging toward a scenario where anglers fishing from for-hire boats will be granted special privileges, in the form of smaller size limits, larger bag limits, and/or longer seasons than those governing the great majority of anglers who fish from shore or from private boats, but will be fishing on the same pool of fish. 

Fisheries management is effectively a zero-sum game, in which any extra fish given to one sector must be taken away from another.  Although for-hire anglers only accounted for about 2.74% of the summer flounder trips, 5.15% of the scup trips, 10.60% of the black sea bass trips, and 1.23% of all bluefish trips taken in the Mid-Atlantic region last year, managers seem to be leaning toward granting them extra fish at the expense of the great majority of anglers, who generate the majority of the social benefits, and likely also the majority of the economic benefits, generated by the fisheries in question.

It seems that, at both the state and regional levels, the for-hire fleet has a significant influence on the management process, which is all out of proportion to its small contribution to overall fishing effort. 

Perhaps, before adopting management measures that provide more special privileges to for-hire anglers at the expense of the greater angling community, fisheries regulators ought to step back, examine the relative economic benefits provided by the for-hire and shore-based/private boat sectors, and begin to craft measures that provide the greatest overall benefit to the community and to the nation, rather than just to a single sector that seems to believe it is entitled to special treatment, regardless of the species involved.

 

 

 

 

MARYLAND LEGISLATORS STALL STRIPED BASS SEASON RESET

 

When the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board adopted Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fisheries Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass last October, it included a provision that allowed Maryland to either retain the recreational striped bass seasons that it already had in place, or to replace them with a new set of seasons, described in Addendum III, which would supposedly have the same conservation impact.

Amendment III justified taking such action by saying,

“Since 2015, Maryland has modified regulations for Chesapeake Bay recreational striped bass fishery seven times, with changes including size, bag limit, and season modifications as well as gear and targeting restrictions.  These changes have built off regulations that were previously in place for each action, resulting in newer regulations becoming increasingly complicated through time, including a complex suite of season closures throughout the year.  In addition, the current understanding of release mortality rates and environmental stressors within Chesapeake Bay has resulted in some Maryland stakeholders’ desire to adjust seasons to better take advantage of fishing opportunities when conditions are favorable to lower striped bass release mortality (i.e. cooler water with less hypoxia).”

After Amendment III was approved, Maryland initiated a state rulemaking on the proposed new seasons.  If the rule is finally adopted, the end of the spring catch-and-release season, which begins on January 1, would be pushed back a month, from March 31 to April 30.  The current April 1-May 15 and July 16-July 31 no-target seasons would be eliminated and replaced with an open season that ran from May 1-through July 31, to be followed by a new no-target closure that ran for the full month of August.  Harvest would then resume on September 1 and run through December 5, with only catch-and-release allowed through the rest of the year.

The new seasons would provide anglers with 187 fishing days when they were allowed to retain a striped bass, along with another 146 fishing days when only catch-and-release was permitted.  The state’s hopes to increase the amount of time when anglers could participate in the striped bass fishery, while also minimizing release mortality by imposing a no-targeting closure during August, when the warmest, most hypoxic waters increased the likelihood that a released bass would not survive.

Maryland calculated that the new seasons would not impact fishing mortality, based on the assumption that the number of fishing trips made each day would be the same as it was in 2024.  However, as noted in Addendum III,

“The [ASMFC’s Striped Bass Technical Committee] noted that an increase in effort would be expected with a season opening from no-targeting to allowing catch and release; however, the [Technical Committee] agreed that it is very difficult to predict how much effort would increase, especially with out an applicable historical reference period.  In the past when April was open to fishing, there was no harvest allowed for part of the month, not just catch-and-release fishing as proposed here.  Additionally, effort has varied from year-to-year even under the same regulations.  The [Technical Committee] could not develop a quantitative assumption about how effort would change when the season is opened from no-targeting to catch-and-release that was any more defensible then the assumption of constant effort, and so accepted the use of that assumption in this case.”

Anglers are generally supportive of the new seasons, although a few are concerned that the extended spring catch-and-release season might have an adverse impact on the striped bass spawn.  On that point, Addendum III could only note that

“There is also uncertainty around the effect of catch-and-release fishing on spawning success (from the proposed opening to catch-and-release in April) given the very limited information on this topic.”

So there remains a possibility that the new April release season could have an impact on the spawn, although there is no strong evidence that it would.

The possibility was apparently unlikely enough that the Chesapeake Bay Foundation urged the public to support Maryland’s proposal.  The Foundation advised,

“mature striped bass are experiencing high rates of catch-and-release mortality in the hot summer months.  Low oxygen levels and heat-induced stress make striped bass most vulnerable during this time.

“DNR’s proposed August closure could help reduce that stress.  The proposed change would also add a few more days for catch-and-release fishing in April when air and water temperatures are cooler and fish are much less likely to die.

“Lastly, the proposed season adjustment would simplify Maryland’s fishing schedule.  The current calendar is a complex patchwork of some harvest days, some catch-and-release, and some closed entirely for a few weeks at a time.  Simplifying to a sngle month-long closure would leave less margin for error and help angler compliance with fishing regulations.”

Nevertheless, there was also some strong opposition to the proposed new seasons when they appeared in a draft of Addendum III.  That opposition primarily came from the owners, operators, and organizations representing the “traditional” Maryland charter boats, which typically take customers out with the intention of killing a limit of bass and then immediately returning to the dock.

Thus, the Delmarva Fisheries Association, which had already brought unsuccessful litigation against Addendum II to Amendment 7, opposed any change in the Maryland seasons, arguing that

“The proposed closure from July to August [sic] will be detrimental financially, not only to the Charter industry and the recreational industry but will also devastate tourism throughout the state of Maryland…Another issue is bringing in catch and release of the spawning stock in Maryland from January 1^st to May 15^th.  Part of addendum 6 [sic].  And the most important part is to protect the spawning stock biomass.  This Catch and release will not only harm the biomass, but studies have shown that handling and catching these fish in the spawning cycle is detrimental to their egg production and breeding capability…”

The Solomons [MD] Charter Captains Association also feared that the extended spring catch-and-release season would cause harm to the stock, saying

“We are opposed to Maryland’s Comment Atlantic Striped Bass Draft Addendum III porposals [sic]. 

“Catch-and-release in April goes against the very statements Maryland’s DNR (M. Luisi) publicly supported last year…The Maryland Y.O.Y survey has not shown successful spawns.  A single female can carry millions eggs [sic] each year.  Catch and release during the Spring migratory season will impact tens of thousands of juvenile fish each season forward.  Maryland DNR doesn’t address any impact their new proposal may have on failed spawns.

“For every one SSB fish that is killed during the Spring catch and release season, millions of eggs are lost!”

And a Captain Mike Smolek, apparently representing another charter boat group, stated that

“The Upper Bay Charter Captains Association is against Addendum III and does not support the Maryland Chesapeake Bay Recreational Baseline Season that has been proposed by Mike Luisi DNR.”

Local politicians also tried to intervene on behalf of the charter boats.  The Calvert County Board of County Commissioners opined, after objecting to any reductions in commercial landings, that

“Equally concerning is the proposal to reopen catch-and-release fishing from January through May, directly targeting spawning fish in the Chesapeake Bay at their most vulnerable stage.  This period has been closed for the past six years to protect the spawning stock, and reversing that protection contradicts the Maryland Department of Natural Resources’ own recommendations.  In addition, the proposed non-targeting closure for recreational and charter boats from July 15 through August 31 would compound the damage, undermining the charter industry during its peak season and further destabilizing Maryland’s fishing economy.”

The County Commissioners of Kent County made similar objections, writing

“on the recreational and charter boat side of the issue, it is proposed to open up catch and release from January through May, specifically, targeting spawning fish pre-staged and spawning in the Chesapeake Bay Region.  Historically, this time has been closed for the past 6 years specifically to protect the spawning fish, which completely goes against what the Maryland Department of Natural Resources proposed last year, and to protect the spawning stock biomass of striped bass to accomplish their [stock rebuilding] goal for 2029.  The recreational and charter boats will have a non-targeting closure next summer from July 15^th to August 31^st.  As proposed, these reductions are unnecessary and will cause significant financial hardships for the industry, economic tourism in the County, and income generated by people who fish in Maryland.”

Those sentiments were echoed by the Commissioners For Somerset County and the Commissioners of St. Mary’s County, who also argued against the proposed seasons.

And that seems to be where the Maryland proposal stands now—with the politicians, and not with the Department of Natural Resources, nor with the people of the State of Maryland. 

For the Department has done what the law required it to do.  It took the question of new recreational striped bass seasons out to the public for scoping.  It printed the proposed rule in the Maryland register on January 23 of this year, opening the 30-day public comment period.  That comment period has now closed, and the state was in the process of reviewing the comments and, if it ultimately decided to adopt the proposed seasons, have them in place by April 1.

But now politicians, working to protect special interests invested in the status quo, have intervened.  Jay A. Jacobs (R-36^th District), a member of Maryland’s House of Delegates representing four counties on the state’s Eastern Shore, is doing his best to block the proposed rule.  He has prevailed upon Delegate Samuel Rosenberg (D-41^st District), the House Chair of the Joint Committee on Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review, to delay the final adoption of the new seasons by imposing a “hold” on the rule.

Delegate Rosenberg can do that because, under Maryland law,

“Proposed state agency rules are reviewed by the [Administative, Executive, and Legislative Review] Committee with regard to the legislative prerogative and procedural due process…

“Copies of all regulations of each State agency are received by the Committee.  Unless submitted to the Committee, certain regulations or standards may be invalid…  [citations omitted]”

While submission of regulations to the Committee is usually a routine matter—little more than checking off a box—in this case, because of Delegate Jacobs’ pandering to the Eastern Shore charter boat community, the rulemaking process has been stalled for as much as 60 days, far longer than needed to ensure that there will not be an extended spring catch-and-release season this year.  But beyond that, it will accomplish nothing. 

If the Maryland Department of Natural Resources decides to implement the new seasons, it will—just 60 days later than it would have had the Committee not invoked a hold.  In that case, August 2026 will still be closed to all striped bass fishing in Maryland’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay; the catch-and-kill charter fleet will not have gained a reprieve.  The hold just allows them to spite the new fleet of light-tackle charters who encourage catch-and-release and haven’t made dead striped bass an essential part of their business model, by taking away their spring season this year—but only this year, if the new seasons are ultimately put in place. 

That’s no way to manage striped bass—or any other fishery. 

It’s not impossible that those who believe that the spring fishery will harm spawning striped bass are right, at least in part.  And if that’s what Delegate Jacobs is worried about, then instead of placing a temporary and ultimately purposeless hold on the proposed regulations, he ought to be doing his job as a legislator, and fighting to fund a study that might provide the proof.

Otherwise, he ought to get out of the way and let Maryland regulators do their jobs.

Folks who agree might want to send a message to Delegate Rosenberg, at samuel.rosenberg@house.maryland.gov, asking him to release the hold on the proposed season change.  If enough emails are sent, he might even agree.

 

 

NOAA APPOINTS "FISHERMAN IN RESIDENCE"

 

NOAA Fisheries reportedly appointed Maine lobsterman Dustin Delano as “Fisherman in Residence.”  What that means isn’t completely clear, as the agency isn’t providing much information about the position.  I didn’t learn about it from an agency press release, but rather heard about it while down in Washington earlier this week, speaking to Senate staff on a totally different, if still fisheries-related, manner—even though, according to Delano’s Facebook page, he has held the position since November 1, 2025.

Still, the appointment is apparently real, and both NOAA and the Department of Commerce have received a letter from the ranking member of the House Committee on Natural Resources, Jared Huffman, and the ranking member of its Subcommittee on Oversight and Regulation, Maxine Dexter, questioning whether it was the right thing to do.

It’s a reasonable question to ask.

The fisherman who was selected for the position is Dustin Delano, a lobsterman from Maine (it’s interesting to see that NOAA Fisheries chose  a lobsterman for the position, as American lobster is managed by the states through the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and not by NOAA Fisheries).

Delano also bears the titles of chairman and chief strategist for a group called the New England Fishermen’s Stewardship Association, an organization that is a frequent critic of United States fisheries management and marine policies.  In an essay that appears on the Association’s website, dated February 10, 2026—more than three months after Delano’s appointment—Delano wrote,

“…I speak for people who work these waters every day and for communities that depend on them.

“We see ocean conditions as they exist, not months later in reports.  Yet policy too often prioritizes theory over experience and paperwork over outcomes.  Commercial fishermen are not line items.  We live with the consequences of every decision made in Washington.  On the water, those decisions can make fishing less safe, manage fish poorly and drive American commercial fishermen out of business…

“We cannot credibly claim to support domestic seafood or food security while allowing the industrial takeover of our ocean.  Offshore wind destroys habitat, displaces fishing from historic grounds and embeds permanent industrial hazards into working waters.  It would be like setting our farm fields on fire and calling it progress…

“Our New England groundfish fishery is in turmoil.  Fishermen face quota swings that shift from feast to famine, often driven by incomplete surveys and outdated data.  A stock can be abundant one year and effectively unavailable the next, not because the fish disappeared, but because the survey failed to capture reality.

“When that happens, fishermen cannot simply pivot.  If the fishery they depend on is suddenly closed and they do not hold permits for others, boats tie up, crews are sent home and coastal businesses suffer despite healthy fish in the water…

“…Through President Trump’s leadership, the federal government has recognized that domestic seafood production is a matter of national interest, economic resilience and food security.

“Commercial fishermen stand ready to meet that call.  With a clear vision from the White House and policies grounded in real-world experience, we can protect and strengthen fisheries that are already sustainable, restore working waterfronts, and once again make American seafood a backbone of our national food supply.  We are a nation of fishermen ready to roll up our sleeves, do the work and get the job done with the president’s help, feeding America first and leading the world by example.”

So it’s clear that Delano, and presumably his Association, supports the White House’s fisheries policies, and it wouldn’t be particularly surprising if that support won him his new position of “fisherman in residence.”

But what isn’t particularly clear is exactly what a fisherman in residence’s duties might be, and why a lobsterman from New England is more suitable for the role than a trawler captain from New York, a bandit gear fisherman from the Gulf of Mexico, or a gillnetter from Alaska.

And then there is the question of litigation.  In the past, Delano’s Association has brought legal action against the Department of Commerce, NOAA Fisheries’ parent agency, suing to invalidate the authority of the regional fishery management councils, arguing that, because of the nature of their duties, the United States Constitution requires that all persons nominated to be council members must be confirmed by the Senate.  There was just enough truth in the Association’s argument to have the Court invalidate some very minor provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, while leaving the council system intact.

Should the Association decide to take legal action against the agency again, how could Delano reconcile his roles as chairman and chief strategist of the Association with his role as fisherman in residence at NOAA Fisheries, particularly if the latter role is a paid position?

Such concerns were raised in the March 2 letter from representatives Huffman and Dexter, which read, in part,

“We have learned that in lieu of [the Marine Fisheries Advisory Committee], NOAA appointed a single “Fisherman in Residence.”  We are concerned that this singular position cannot speak for the diverse fishing communities and fishing sectors across our country and we are concerned with NOAA’s lack of transparency regarding the appointment of this position and the role.  For the sake of the 2.1 million jobs that rely upon healthy, sustainably managed fisheries, we seek full transparency regarding the role of ‘Fisherman in Residence.’

“It is our constitutional obligation to oversee NOAA, the primary scientific agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, including whether its federal employees are complying with federal ethics laws governing conflicts of interests, impartiality, and outside activities, and whether ethics screening controls have been adequately implemented and enforced.

“It is our understanding that Mr. Dustin Delano has been appointed as ‘Fisherman in Residence’ at NOAA.  As such, we assume he is a NOAA employee, has been drawing a federal paycheck, and is advising on fisheries policy within NOAA.  However, it is clear from his Facebook posts and other public activities that he continues to serve as an industry association advocate on matters before NOAA, raising questions about his impartiality and ability to serve in the best interests of the American people and fishing interests across the country…

“Mr. Delano presents these affiliations in his advocacy and litigation-facing work in areas where NOAA is a decision-maker and, at times, a defendant.  His resume lists ‘opposition to offshore wind projects in the Gulf of Maine’ as an accomplishment under his ongoing work with NEFSA.  It also reflects his involvement with the Maine Lobstermen’s Association in association with litigation against the U.S. Department of Commerce, including Maine Lobstermen’s Association v. Raimondo, which challenged NOAA’s actions related to endangered species protection, including for the North Atlantic right whale.  In other words, Mr. Delano’s non-government roles and professional work involve representing fishermen in litigation and advocacy that directly implicate NOAA and regulated industries and stakeholders before it…

“These facts raise a straightforward question: did Mr. Delano participate personally and substantially in official matters in violation of federal law, and did [the Department of Commerce] and NOAA implement effective safeguards at the outset of his federal service to prevent disqualifying participation?..”

To help determine the answers to those questions, Rep. Huffman and Rep. Dexter instructed the Department of Commerce and NOAA to provide copies of all financial and other disclosure forms completed by Delano and relevant to the Fisherman in Residence position; any documents or other communications relating to Delano, and dating from his time as Fisherman in Residence, involving any of the agencies’ ethics personnel; any documents or other communications relating to Delano’s ethics and/or conflict of interests training; all documents and other communications relating to Delano’s employment by NOAA, including date of hire, pay grade, job description, reporting and supervisory relationships, and other similar data; any documents or communications maintained or provided by any of the agencies’ ethics personnel, concerning or related to Delano’s participation before the agencies, including participation in regulatory matters, litigation-related matters, policy development, and enforcement; and all calendars, schedules, meeting agendas, or similar matters maintained by Delano in his official capacity as an agency employee.

The agencies were given two weeks to provide the requested materials, which would clearly be relevant to the question of whether Delano’s appointment as Fisherman in Residence created any ethical issues.

Delano has apparently said that, as Fisherman in Residence, he is not paid by NOAA, while a spokesman for the agency reportedly said that there were no ethical violations due to the type of agreement in place between Delano and NOAA.  In addition, Representative Jared Golden (D-ME), heralded Delano’s new position, saying

“I applaud NOAA for identifying the need for a real harvester, not another bureaucrat, to have a seat at the table and to provide input and clarity on fisheries issues…

“These accusations [in the Huffman/Dexter letter], however subtle, reflect the misguided belief that there is nothing government bureaucrats could possibly learn from those working Mainers who actually have lived and fished our coasts for generations.  They could not be more wrong.”

Yet the fact that NOAA only publicly identified Delano’s role this week, the same week that the agency began rewriting an 18-year-old rule originally intended to protect endangered right whales from collisions with vessels, stoked some people’s concerns.

The easiest way for the agencies to allay such concerns would be to promptly respond to the Huffman/Dexter letter, provide the requested materials, and allow them to speak for themselves.

Always assuming, of course, that if the documents were all produced, Reps. Huffman and Dexter wouldn’t find that their worries were justified.

 

 

MANAGERS CONSIDER ATLANTIC BONITO

 

Most people might not remember—or might not have been alive at the time—but back in the 1970s and ‘80s, Atlantic bonito were a regular part of anglers’ catches in the northeast, where they were often targeted not only by private boat anglers but, at least in the New York Bight, by the charter and party boat fleet as well.

But while they were welcome, they were never one of the region’s bigger fisheries.

From time to time, when trolling offshore, a bonito would grab a feather or other small lure meant for school bluefin.  We called them “green bonito” back then, to distinguish them from “oceanic bonito,” which were what some folks called skipjack tuna.  They were always welcome because of their tasty, light meat, but we didn’t target them specifically, because back then, there were plenty of tuna around to keep the offshore crowd busy, and few anglers wanted to be bothered catching bonito when much larger, more interesting fish were available.

It was different on the inshore grounds.  There, anglers chumming for bluefish—which was a common activity back then—often had the odd bonito grab a chunk of menhaden being drifted back in the slick.  But bonito were frequently wary of the wire leaders typically employed in the bluefish fishery, and menhaden wasn’t their favorite bait.  So anglers, both on private and party boats, might bring out some spearing for bait and, tying their hooks directly to their lines, specifically target bonito.  Such anglers would lose their share of terminal gear to the bluefish, but they caught a lot of bonito, too.

In late summer and early fall, when bonito were most abundant, they even attracted attention from the charter boat fleet, as vessels out of New Jersey and western Long Island, fishing with bait and sometimes with jigs, specifically targeted them as an alternative to the stronger-tasting bluefish.

For quite a while—perhaps from around 1990 up until 2020 or so—we saw fewer bonito in the upper mid-Atlantic, although a few were always around.  But they now seem to be coming back, to the point where, last August, one party boat fishing out of Long Island’s Captree State Park reported that their customers landed “over 1,000 Bonito” on a single trip.

With that number of fish available, bonito are again a viable target.  The National Marine Fisheries Service reports that anglers in the mid-Atlantic region took over 38,000 trips primarily targeting Atlantic bonito in 2025, compared to zero trips twenty years earlier, and about 14,000 in 1985.  While 38,000 trips is a drop in the bucket compared to the number of trips targeting other species (mid-Atlantic anglers made more than 7 million trips targeting striped bass last year), and while there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the estimates just because they are so small, it seems clear that anglers’ interest in Atlantic bonito is increasing.

Thus, before that increase gains much momentum—which can happen if bonito are available when other species, such as fluke, bluefish, or striped bass are not—and with the occasional boat already landing over 1,000 bonito in a single trip, it might make sense to put some precautionary management measures in place while the population is still completely healthy.

And some states are doing, or at least considering doing, precisely that.

Massachusetts has been a leader in that effort.

Over the past five years, Massachusetts anglers have caught between 24,000 and 588,000 Atlantic bonito per year, with an average annual catch of slightly under 220,000 fish.  To put that in context, during the same five-year period, bonito landings for the entire Atlantic seaboard ranged between about 175,000 and 1,250,000 per year, with an annual average of approximately 593,000 fish, so Massachusetts accounts for a big part of the entire recreational bonito fishery.

The growing importance of Atlantic bonito to Massachusetts anglers led that state’s Division of Marine Fisheries to adopt precautionary regulations in 2025, establishing a 5-fish bag limit (of Atlantic bonito and false albacore, combined) and a 16-inch curved fork length minimum size.  The regulations apply to both commercial and recreational fishermen, although commercial weir operators and commercial fishermen who target Atlantic mackerel with mechanical jigging gear who land bonito as bycatch are exempt from the new rule.

In explaining its decision to adopt the regulations, the Division of Marine Fisheries wrote,

“Fishing for these Atlantic bonito and false albacore is growing in popularity, particularly along Massachusetts’ southern coast.  Late summer fishing in this area now focuses on these species as they have become more seasonally available while other target species, such as bluefish and striped bass, are not as plentiful locally…The local growth of the fishery is significant and occurring without the benefit of population assessments, extensive understanding of species life history, or fishery management plans to control fishing mortality.

“With this in mind, DMF has opted to adopt precautionary management measures for these species until a time when a more robust science and management program has been implemented.  The new possession limits are designed to constrain recreational harvest approximately at current levels and discourage further expansion while curtailing the development of a directed commercial fishery.  The size limit reflects estimated size-at-maturity for both species…”

Adopting precautionary regulations in time to maintain a stock’s health, rather than waiting for a stock to decline before taking action, is a wise approach.  However, when dealing with species that migrate along the coast, one state can only do so much.  To maximize the effectiveness of management actions, all states must share in the management process.

That hasn’t yet happened with Atlantic bonito, but other states are showing interest in managing the bonito resource.

On February 20, the North Carolina Marine Fisheries Commission voted to approve a draft rule that would set a 5-fish bag limit for recreational fishermen, and give the Director of the state’s Division of Marine Fisheries the ability to adopt additional recreational and commercial bonito management measures by proclamation, provided that the Marine Fisheries Commission had given such measures their prior approval.

The Marine Fisheries Division now must perform a financial analysis of the proposed rule.  Once that is completed, the Commission will vote to approve the proposed rule’s text.  If the text is approved, the formal rulemaking process, which includes a 60-day period for public comment, will begin.  However, because of North Carolina's rules of administrative procedure, the final rule will not go into effect until 2027, and perhaps not until 2028.

The Rhode Island Division of Marine Fisheries is also considering management measures for Atlantic bonito, and held a hearing on its proposed measures on February 17.  There, fisheries managers presented two different options.  The first would set the recreational size limit at 16 inches, and the bag limit at 3 (bonito and false albacore combined), with no commercial harvest (an initial effort to cap commercial harvest at either a 3-year or 5-year average produced quotas so small that they would be impossible to manage).  The second proposal would establish a 16-inch minimum size for both the commercial and recreational fisheries, set a recreational bag limit at 5 fish (again, combined with false albacore), and not cap the commercial fishery at all.

It is too early to know what path Rhode Island’s fisheries managers will choose to take.

No other Atlantic coast state has yet proposed possible management measures, although New York did bring the question before it’s Marine Resources Advisory Council about a year ago for very brief preliminary discussions; it has not yet taken any further action.

Public reaction to bonito management measures have been somewhat mixed.  Anglers have been generally supportive, with the American Saltwater Guides Association asserting that

“This is a pivotal moment to maintain management momentum for two undervalued and undermanaged species [false albacore were also included in the comments].  Without clear and simple guardrails, we’re leaving the door wide open for the wrong kind of future: one where short-term exploitation replaces long-term sustainability.”

And writer Mike Wright, in a column in the Southampton [NY] Press, favorably commented on the Rhode Island proposal, saying,

“Rhode Island is the latest state to take under consideration imposing limits on the harvest of false albacore and Atlantic bonito.

“If the state listens to the pleading voices of thousands of sportfishermen who collectively pump millions of dollars into its economy, the very modest regulations on the small tuna harvests that have been proposed will be another block in the first layer in a foundation for coatwide protections of two species that have come to play an outsized role in the fishing industry of the entire Northeast.”

But angler support was not universal.  When On the Water magazine ran an article on the new Massachusetts regulations, there were some less-than-thoughtful comments that read

“Regulate everything till [sic] it’s not fun anymore…stop the regulations,”

and

“There is absolutely no reason for this regulation…same with shark fishing from shore…screw these unvoted on regulations.”

In North Carolina, there were some complaints from people who seemed averse to the idea of precautionary regulation unsupported by science, and perhaps to regulating any fish stock that wasn’t already in decline.  Dare County Commissioner Steve House opined that

“I don’t see where there’s a need for regulatory being placed on that fish because there’s no defined biological triggers for it.  There’s no conservation targets for it.”

Another negative comment came from Woody Joyner, a resident of Hatteras Island, who complained,

“over-management on something like this, without any type of population survey, without any science at all, is a reminder that over regulation does not necessarily translate into protecting public trust.”

But such comments were challenged by Commission member Alfred Hobgood, who said,

“a lot of times I feel like we’re reactive and not proactive.  Being proactive for a specific fishery [is] one of our duties…protect and preserve fish stocks and resources.”

That comment, and the context in which it was made, pretty well sums up the current state of bonito management measures.  While there is little scientific information to guide Atlantic bonito management, there is an existing fishery that seems to be increasing in popularity.  That gives management the choice of either adopting precautionary measures intended to maintain the sustainability of the bonito stock, or to do nothing and wait until the stock shows signs of distress before even considering action.

Having observed how other species, from striped bass to shortfin makos, suffered from a lack of precautionary management, the former approach seems like the right way to go.