Early in 2014, a group of recreational fishing and boating
industry organizations, organized under the aegis of the Theodore Roosevelt
Conservation Partnership, issued a policy document titled “A Vision
for Managing America’s Saltwater Recreational Fisheries” (Vision
Statement), which noted that “Spending by saltwater anglers generated more than
$70 billion in economic output, supporting more than 450,000 jobs,” but went on
to complain that “in the midst of our success in rebuilding marine fisheries
and the growth in saltwater recreational fishing, the federal fisheries
management system has not adapted to meet the needs of this conservation and
economic powerhouse.”
With those words, the organizations that collaborated on the
Vision Statement launched an attack on the federal fisheries management system
that has continued, unabated, to this day.
The Vision Statement focused on altering the federal fishery
management process, seeking to create “a management system that addresses the
needs of anglers and industry and produces the full range of economic, social
and conservation benefits provided by recreational fishing,” rather than
focusing on the health of fish stocks. It opined that “The laws that govern
federal marine fisheries are primarily designed for and focused on commercial
fishing,” and that “The federal agency tasked with managing marine fisheries
has commercial fishing as its primary focus.”
It made the dubious claim that the primary federal fisheries
law, the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens), “relies on
limited entry and catch share programs, along with fixed quotas that can be
managed in real time” to manage fisheries, and that those tools, while
appropriate for commercial fisheries, should not be used to manage the
recreational sector.
As an example of how recreational fisheries should be
managed, the Vision Statement noted that “Many state natural resource agencies,
especially those in the South, recognize the benefits of a vibrant recreational
fishing community and have managed to promote it while conserving their
saltwater resources. Striped bass, red drum, black drum, summer flounder,
sheepshead, snook, spotted seatrout and tarpon are examples of successfully
managed state fisheries that sufficiently meet the needs of recreational anglers
while providing extensive economic benefits to their state and national
economies.”
It’s probably important to note that, as one of its examples
of a “successfully managed” state fishery, the Vision Statement cited the
Atlantic striped bass, a fish that is currently
overfished, and has been for more
than a decade, and which experienced
overfishing from about 2003 through 2019 before the states took any
meaningful action to address the situation. Yet, during all that time when
overfishing occurred, striped bass nonetheless generated
more angler trips, and presumably more economic activity, than any other
East Coast species. Thus, striped bass provides an interesting insight into
what criteria the Vision Statement, and so the recreational industry, uses to
determine the “success” of state fishery managers.
The Vision Statement’s emphasis on economic concerns rather
than stock health emerged again when it called for “manag[ing] recreational
fisheries based on long-term harvest rates, not strictly on poundage-based
quotas,” and for eliminating Magnuson-Stevens’ requirement that, whenever
possible, overfished stocks must be rebuilt in no more than 10 years, so that
“Instead of having a fixed deadline for stocks to be rebuilt…fisheries managers
set lower harvest rates that would allow fish stocks to recover gradually while
diminishing socioeconomic impacts.”
The recreational industry initially tried to attain their
goals through legislation called the Modernizing
Recreational Fishery Management Act (Modern Fish Act) which, as
originally written, would have weakened the rigorous, science-based management
approach required by Magnuson-Stevens. However, by the time the final
version of the Modern Fish Act was passed, most of the industry’s
proposed changes had been either removed or substantially amended.
At that point, the recreational industry largely abandoned
their efforts to amend Magnuson-Stevens, and took up a new approach, arguing
that state fisheries managers were more qualified to manage recreational
fisheries than their federal counterparts.
Gulf of Mexico red snapper provided the primary impetus for
their new effort.
Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, anglers
had chronically overfished the red snapper stock, causing the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to adopt shorter and shorter seasons in an
effort to rein in the continuing overages. Anglers weren’t happy with those
efforts to end their overfishing, and in 2013 convinced fishery managers in
three states, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, to stop
coordinating state fishing seasons with those adopted by NMFS, and
instead adopt longer seasons in those states’ waters.
That only ended up hurting the anglers, as NMFS
managed all red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico as a single stock, so
when recreational landings in state waters increased, the federal red snapper
season was shortened to compensate, falling to a mere three
days in 2017 (although NMFS later extended the season, knowing that it
would lead to overfishing, a move that led to a lawsuit and an
out-of-court settlement in which NMFS agreed not to knowingly allow
red snapper to be overfished again).
In an effort to end the controversy, the Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council (Gulf Council) adopted Amendment
50 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of
Mexico, pursuant to which NMFS would establish annual catch limits and
annual catch targets for the recreational fishery as a whole, but would then
allocate quotas for each state’s private boat anglers; each state would then be
allowed to craft seasons, bag limits and minimum size limits (that must be
between 14 and 18 inches) designed to constrain catch to that state quota.
For-hire vessels would have a separate quota and be managed solely by NMFS.
Despite the fact that NMFS set the annual catch limit and
assigned each state’s quota, and despite the fact that states that didn’t stay
within their assigned quotas faced pound-for-pound paybacks of any overage in
the following year, spokespeople for various recreational angling
organizations declared
victory, saying things like, “Today’s passage of Amendment 50 (state
management) by the Gulf Council is HUGE news for coastal anglers as it will
allow Louisiana and the other Gulf states to manage their own private red
snapper anglers.”
And the red snapper furor calmed down for a while, although
over the past two years, for-hire vessel operators in the eastern Gulf of
Mexico have expressed
real concerns that overly-long state seasons have sharply reduced both
the size and the number of red snapper, particularly on the more accessible
inshore fishing grounds.
But new issues, and new calls for state management of
species currently managed by NMFS, are arising in the southeast.
In 2024, recreational fishermen badly
overfished greater amberjack in the Gulf of Mexico, at a time when the
stock was already considered
to be overfished. NMFS determined that anglers landed 218% of their 2024
annual catch limit, and since the
management plan calls for overages to be paid back, on a
pound-for-pound basis, in the next fishing year, that meant that the 2025
season should never have opened at all.
The
Gulf Council acknowledged the consequences of the big 2024 overage,
but as the season’s opening day, September 1, 2025, approached, the council
noted that it had not received notice of a season closure from NMFS, even
though it had sent a letter, unanimously approved by all Gulf Council members,
to the agency, requesting clarity on the issue. So, the season opened on the
scheduled date, even though, with an adjusted annual catch limit of zero
because of the previous year’s overage, overfishing began the second the first
greater amberjack was tossed into someone’s cooler.
Pressure from the Gulf Council, and from others concerned
with the future of the greater amberjack stock and the greater amberjack
fishery, apparently persuaded NMFS to finally close
down the fishery on September 27, 2025. However, as was the case with red
snapper a few years before, NMFS had no authority to shut down whatever greater
amberjack fisheries might exist within state waters, and while most of the
states adopted closures that mirrored NMFS’ action, Louisiana did not, but
instead kept its season open until October 31, 2025.
In
the notice announcing that it would not adopt an early greater
amberjack closure, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries opined
that, “Prior to state management of Red Snapper, anglers were faced with
shortened seasons and reduced access. This untimely closing of federal waters
for Greater Amberjack is another prime example of the need for state management
using state data programs.”
The same notice stated, “Governor Jeff Landry and Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) Secretary Tyler Bosworth sent a
letter to NOAA Fisheries earlier this month, requesting that management of
Greater Amberjack be transferred to the state level…State management of Greater
Amberjack would provide more flexibility in setting seasons and regulations,
allowing greater ability to tailor state-specific management.”
Just how much “flexibility” was needed to tailor regulations
that limit recreational landings to zero was never explained.
Louisiana’s actions were praised by that state’s chapter of
the Coastal Conservation Association (CCA Louisiana), an organization that was
at the forefront of efforts to turn Gulf red snapper management over to the
states. On its Facebook page, CCA Louisiana stated that it
applauds the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
and Governor Jeff Landry for their actions and stance on Greater Amberjack.
Our Department of Wildlife and Fisheries is truly one of the
best in the country, and they have proven their expertise through their
successful management of the Red Snapper fishery.
Unfortunately, NOAA has now closed the commercial harvest of
Greater Amberjack and is considering closing the recreational season. This
closure threatens our anglers’ access to the fishery for no reason.
It is not difficult to read that message as the first step
in an effort to foment a crisis similar to that which occurred when states
failed to coordinate their state waters red snapper seasons with those in force
in federal waters, in what will become another effort to discredit federal
fisheries managers and, this time, limit their ability to effectively manage
the greater amberjack stock.
Something similar is happening in the South Atlantic, and it
again involves red snapper.
In 2008, South Atlantic red snapper were found to be severely
overfished. Spawning stock biomass had fallen
to just three percent of its potential, while in 2006, the terminal
year of the 2008 stock assessment, fishing mortality was more
than twelve times the level associated with a sustainable fishery.
In 2009, NMFS
proposed emergency regulations that would shut down both the
recreational and commercial fisheries for 180 days, a closure that might be
extended for an additional 186 days; NMFS also considered shutting
down a large area of the ocean to all bottom fishing in order to
prevent large numbers of out-of-season red snapper from being killed as
bycatch, most particularly in the recreational fishery, although such closure
was never put in place.
Since then, NMFS
has partially rebuilt the South Atlantic red snapper stock. It is no
longer overfished, although it is not yet completely restored. Overfishing
continues despite extremely
restrictive recreational fishing seasons which, since 2017, have only
lasted between
one and nine days, and a very small commercial quota. The main problem is
that recreational fishermen are catching and killing large numbers of red
snapper while fishing for other species when the red snapper season is closed.
As a result of such continued overfishing, NMFS has been
sued on multiple occasions by commercial fishermen seeking to get recreational
discards under control, as NMFS is obligated to do pursuant to
Magnuson-Stevens. Recognizing that it was at fault, on August 22, 2024, NMFS
entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs in one of
those actions, Tilman Gray v. Raimondo, in which it agreed, among
other things, to “complete and submit to the Office of the Federal Register for
publication by June 6, 2025, a final rule implementing a Secretarial Amendment
to stop overfishing on the South Atlantic red snapper stock under 16 U.S.C.
[section] 1854 (c) & (e).”
NMFS
did publish a new rule, Amendment 59 to the Fishery Management Plan
for the Snapper-Grouper Fishery (Amendment 59), on the agreed-upon
deadline, which revised the specifications of the overfishing limit, acceptable
biological catch, and annual catch limit for red snapper, along with the proxy
for determining overfishing. But it did not include any measures to reduce red
snapper bycatch in the recreational fishery, and thus is unlikely to end
overfishing. Thus, it is also unlikely to fulfill the agency’s obligations
under the settlement agreement in Tilman Gray.
As a result, NMFS was sued once again, with the plaintiffs
in the new action, Slash Creek Waterworks v. Lutnick, challenging
Amendment 59 on grounds which included the allegation that it did nothing to
end the problem of dead recreational discards leading to overfishing.
Faced with extremely short seasons and unwilling to take
responsibility for their own sector’s overfishing, recreational organizations
in the South Atlantic are now falling back on a tactic that they used
successfully in the Gulf of Mexico, and calling for the states to take over
management of the red snapper fishery. As in the Gulf, they are successfully
convincing state leaders to support such a change.
Congressmen John H. Rutherford (R-FL), Buddy Carter (R-GA),
Russell Fry (R-SC), and David Rouzer (R-NC) have formed something they call the
“House
South Atlantic Red Snapper Task Force (Task Force).” In announcing the
Task Force’s formation, Rep. Fry said, “This task force will focus on enhancing
data collection, expanding state authority, and ensuring more predictable and
longer seasons that benefit anglers and local businesses alike. It’s time we
bring local expertise and common sense back to the forefront of fisheries.”
Fisheries managers in North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida subsequently provided the Task Force with a
so-called “Action
Plan” that would radically alter South Atlantic red snapper
management.
Following the blueprint used in the Gulf red snapper
fishery, the Action Plan calls for NMFS to issue exempted fishing permits to
each state, to allow the states to conduct data-gathering programs that will
pave the way for the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council to set the
annual catch limit and, presumably, individual state quotas, while allowing the
states to determine the recreational bag limits and seasons, and gauge landings
through their own data collection programs.
On November 10, 2025, Florida
Governor Ron DeSantis declared that his state had submitted its
application for an exempted fishing permit, saying, “I was proud to announce
that Florida anglers will soon be able to enjoy more Atlantic Red Snapper
fishing…The Trump Administration has taken action to rein in the bureaucracy
and return the power to the states, where it belongs…Just as it has on the Gulf
coast, Florida’s management of Atlantic Red Snapper fishing will boost local
economies along our Atlantic coast, supporting our tackle and bait shops,
hotels, restaurants, and the entire recreational fishing community.”
Not surprisingly, the various recreational fishing industry
organizations enthusiastically supported both the Task Force and the Action
Plan. Jeff
Angers, president of the Center for Sportfishing Policy, gushed, “State
management of South Atlantic red snapper is the right idea at the right time.
We’ve seen in the Gulf of America that when states lead with sound science and
local common sense, everyone wins—anglers get more days on the water,
conservation outcomes improve, and coastal economies thrive. The leadership
shown by Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina offers real hope
that the broken federal system will finally give way to a management model that
reflects the reality on the water.”
However, federal red snapper management may soon run into a
very large roadblock that does not exist in the Gulf.
In the Gulf of Mexico, most red snapper fishing mortality is
caused by commercial and recreational landings, while in the South Atlantic, it
is caused by recreational discard mortality, and that discard mortality won’t
go away just because the states and their anglers would like it to. NMFS is
still responsible for managing red snapper in federal waters, and
Magnuson-Stevens still governs NMFS’ actions. It is NMFS that will set the
overall recreational catch limit in the South Atlantic, as it does in the Gulf,
even if the Action Plan is ultimately enacted.
And in setting the recreational catch limit, dead discards
will still have to be considered in order to prevent overall fishing mortality
from exceeding the overfishing limit. The states may try to adopt data
collection programs that underestimate discard mortality, but absent a
significant closed season that lets managers get recreational discard mortality
under control, NMFS’ management of South Atlantic red snapper is likely to face
continued legal challenges, and those challenges will have a very good chance
to succeed.
As the process drags on, we can expect the recreational
fishing industry’s assault on federal fisheries managers to continue, as the
industry and “angler’s rights” groups work together to sell more fishing tackle
and put more fish in anglers’ coolers, regardless of the harm that might cause
to the nation’s fish stocks.
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This essay first appeared in “From the Waterfront,” the blog
of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which can be found at http://conservefish.org/blog/
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