DEFENDING POOR DECISIONS: GULF OF MEXICO RED SNAPPER

 

Recreational red snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico may be one of the clearest examples of what happens when values conflict, and the precautionary approach of federal fisheries managers attempting to fully rebuild the stock clash with the more permissive philosophy of state managers trying to satisfy the fishing tackle and boating industries as well as “anglers’ rights” advocates, which seek to maximize harvest even if it harms the long-term health of the stock.

Currently, the membership of the most relevant management body, the Gulf Fishery Management Council, is slanted toward the recreational industry, resulting in management actions that favor exploitation over conservation.

As a result, there are signs that the Gulf’s red snapper population may be suffering from excessive recreational fishing pressure, as anglers and charter boat operators see the average size of the red snapper they catch decline, and find it necessary to run farther and farther from port to locate quality fish.  I’ve written about this trend before, and how party and charter boat captains in the eastern Gulf have grown concerned that overly liberal regulations, and in particular overly long seasons, may be doing harm to the red snapper stock.  My most recent essay on the subject, published early last month, was titled “Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper:  Are States Setting Themselves Up to Fail?”

Now, it looks like some states are asking themselves the same question.  But instead of taking a long look at the management actions they’ve taken, and asking themselves whether they might have gone too far too fast when lengthening seasons, they’re digging in and defending past decisions, even in light of strong indications that they’re on the wrong course.

Alabama provides a good example.

The first comments came not from the state, but in an article written by an ally of the industry and anglers’ rights groups.  Titled “Alabama Red Snapper Population Booms to 7M:  Best In a Decade,” it appeared on Wired2Fish.com,

“Finally, there’s solid proof that Gulf red snapper populations are in superb shape, with 7 million fish found along just the 50-mile-wide Alabama coastline.  This is precisely what many Southern marine anglers, guides, and charter captains have been yelling to anyone who would listen for over a decade.

“Research scientists at the University of South Alabama’s Marine Sciences school have proven that red snapper populations are the healthiest they’ve been in at least 14 years…

“Much the same healthy snapper populations are touted in Gulf waters off Florida’s Panhandle, and off Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas…

“Ted Venker, Vice President of the Coastal Conservation Association (CCA), says federal fisheries managers governing snapper at the federal National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) have been at odds with anglers and state and regional fisheries managers for years.

“They have gone back and forth in opposing positions with the federal Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council and state agencies regarding red snapper stock assessments that dictate snapper limits and seasons for fishermen.

“’Like a good federal government agency, NOAA Fisheries [NMFS] believes its data is the only right data,’ says Venker.  ‘Rather than continue to insist that it is always the smartest entity in the room, NOAA Fisheries should work on being a better partner to the Gulf states as well as the angling public, before cramming down damaging, punitive measure[s].’”

As is so typical of such intentionally slanted articles, the Wired2Fish piece leaves much unsaid.  Most notable is that it never mentioned that Gulf red snapper were severely overfished during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s,  and were still found to be overfished as recently as 2014; while the 2018 red snapper stock assessment found that the stock was no longer overfished, that was only because the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council moved the goalposts, and reduced the level of spawning stock biomass needed for a “not overfished” finding.  So, the 2018 assessment stated that

“An important caveat to this result [that the stock is no longer overfished] is that under the previous definition of [Minimum Stock Size Threshold] the red snapper resource would still be considered to be overfished.”

Thus, the fact that “red snapper populations are the healthiest they’ve been in at least 14 years” is hardly remarkable; the stock has been subject to a so-far successful rebuilding plan and, thanks to the very “damaging, punitive measure[s] that the CCA’s Venker condemned, as well as to the federal fisheries managers that he criticized, there are definitely more red snapper in the Gulf than there were a decade ago.

But the decline in fish size is a signal that the recovery might stall, although state fishery managers are still doing their best to ignore the red flags.

That was made clear in a second article, this one appearing in Outdoor Alabama, the publication of the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, which declared that the “Start of Alabama Red Snapper Season Confirms Abundance.”

The Outdoor Alabama piece began by celebrating the number of red snapper caught by local anglers, who had managed to land 135,193 pounds of fish—about one-fifth of the state’s 2025 quota—by June 1.  It also heralded the findings of the University of South Alabama study, and quoted Dr. Sean Powers, the Director of the University’s School of Marine and Environmental Sciences, who said,

“The trend in both surveys indicates a higher number of red snapper since the surveys began, [one] in 1998 and [the other, using a remotely operated vehicle to photograph the life on bottom structure] in 2011.”

But, once again, that is what one would expect to see once a badly overfished stock begins to respond to a rebuilding plan.

Dr. Powers then addressed the shrinking fish size, finishing with a surprising comment:

“During the last five or six years, we’ve seen the average size of red snapper decrease.  We believe that is because of fishing pressure.  But we have tons of new fish coming in every year.  It may very well be that, without the large snapper on the reef, it makes more room for the small snapper…”

And maybe it does, but that doesn’t mean that the more abundant small snapper take the place of the big ones, particularly when it comes to maintaining the health of the stock.

Red snapper are one of those fish that engage in “batch spawning,” producing eggs on multiple occasions during the year instead of in a single spawning event.  And there is little question that larger red snapper produce more eggs, both on an absolute and on a proportionate basis, than do the smaller ones.  A paper published in 2022 by Nancy J. Brown-Peterson and Anna K. Millender, titled "The Reproductive Biology of Red Snapper in Mississippi Waters,” reported finding as few as 596 eggs in a female red snapper that was 376 millimeters (14.8 inches) long, and as many as 349,754 eggs in a 568 mm (22.4 inch) individual.  The paper goes on to state that

“Batch fecundity [the number of eggs produced in a single spawning event] is significantly, positively correlated with fish length…There was a significant difference in [batch fecundity] by age…with [batch fecundity] generally higher in fish > 4 years.”

Such finding raises the question of how many of the allegedly abundant “small snapper” it takes to replace each missing “large snapper,” from the standpoint of maintaining recruitment levels and best ensuring the long-term health of the stock.  For, apparently, a lot of large snapper are missing, as Dr. Powers observed that

“The other thing we can calculate in our surveys is the weight of all the snapper around the artificial reef.  If you look at the total weight number, it’s about the same over the past five years.  But instead of having big, medium and small snapper, we now have small and medium snapper.”

Which is just what the concerned anglers and charter boat operators are observing.  But Dr. Powers doesn’t seem as concerned as they are over the loss of the larger snapper, perhaps because Alabama has decided to side with the tackle industry and anglers’ rights groups, rather than with the federal managers who are rebuilding the fishery.

Outdoor Alabama reported that

“Powers said that people have asked him what’s wrong with the red snapper fishing because they are discarding more fish because the average size is lower.  However, Powers said a significant change would have to be made the season length [sic] to change the population dynamics.

“’If they want to go back to where the average size is 10 pounds, then we have to go back to nine-day seasons,’ he said.  ‘Those big fish are still out there, but it’s not as easy to catch one.  I am confident that everybody can go out there and get their two 16-inch (minimum size) snapper relatively easily.  For really big snapper, you have to target them.  You have to have better sites that aren’t fished that much, and you have to be a fisherman again.’”

It’s clear from that statement that Alabama is intentionally shaping the red snapper stock to be composed primarily of smaller fish, that provide the highest possible landings for the short-term benefit of anglers and angling-related businesses, while ignoring the benefits that older, larger females convey to the population, what another 2022 paper, “Modeling fecundity at age in Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper to help evaluate the best measure of reproductive potential,” calls

“a general acceptance that BOFFFFs, i.e., Big Old Fat Fecund Female Fish are essential for the successful maintenance of long-term fish populations.”

Dr. Powell sets forth the Alabama position very clearly.

“[E]verything is a balance.  If you want a snapper season that consistently lasts through the summer, then you’re going to have to accept that it’s going to be a little more difficult to catch a legal snapper.  You’re really going to have to be a skilled fisherman and do your research to catch a big snapper…

“We also know that some anglers want to catch fish of a certain size.  When we started state management, we knew we could manage for people to fish a lot or we could manage for big fish.  If you’re going to manage for big fish, that means a much shorter season.  We decided on a season where people could go as many days as possible when it’s convenient for them, and they’ll still be able to keep legal fish.”

Of course, whether they’ll still be able to keep legal fish—or, more accurately, whether they’ll still be able to find legal fish to keep—a few years from now is a question yet to be answered.

 

OCEAN COOLING COULD IMPACT NORTHEASTERN FISHERIES

 

In recent years, the Gulf of Maine has been one of the world’s most rapidly warming ocean regions.  But, for a while at least, that may change.

A publication recently released by the National Marine Fisheries Service, titled “2025 State of the Ecosystem, New England,” noted that

“2024 global sea surface and air temperatures exceeded 2023 as the warmest year on record, but colder than average temperatures were observed in the Northeast U.S.  Oceanographic and ecological conditions in the Northwest Atlantic were markedly different in 2024 compared to recent years.

“…Late 2023 and early 2024 observations indicate movement of cooler and fresher water into the Northwest Atlantic, although there are seasonal and local exceptions to this pattern.  Anomalously cold and low salinity conditions were recorded throughout the Northeast Shelf and were widespread across the Slope Sea for much of the year.  These cooler and fresher conditions are linked to the southward movement of the eastern portion of the Gulf Stream and possibly an increased influx of Labrador Slope and Scotian Shelf water into the system.”

The cooler, fresher water wasn’t limited to the Gulf of Maine.  In February 2024, sea surface temperatures along the outer continental shelf were between 2.5 and 5 degrees Centigrade lower than the average February temperature for the years 2000 through 2020, even though waters closer inshore somewhat exceeded the long-term average temperature.  The NMFS publication stated that

“Colder, fresher water detected deep in the Jordan Basin [region of the Gulf of Maine] for the first half of 2024 suggests and influx of Labrador Slope and Scotian Shelf water, which resulted in colder and fresher conditions throughout the Northwest Atlantic and contributed to the increased size and colder temperatures of the Mid-Atlantic Cold Pool.”

A recent, related NMFS news release said that

“Researchers expect the Gulf of Maine to be 0.9 to 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit (0.5 to 1 degree Celsius) cooler this summer [of 2025] compared to the average summer temperature…

“A companion longer-term outlook, also developed by NOAA scientists, suggests that more frequent inflows of cooler deep water may continue to temper warming in the basin for the next several years.”

The 2005 State of the Ecosystem report reveals that

“the center of distribution for a suite of 48 commercially or ecologically important fish species along the entire Northeast Shelf continues to show movement toward the northeast and generally into deeper water.  Habitat model-based species richness suggest shifts of both cooler and warmer water species to the northeast.”

However, since it also notes that

“Long-term oceanographic projections forecast a temporary pause in warming over the next decade due to internal variability in circulation and a southward shift of the Gulf Stream,”

it is reasonable to ask whether the current cooling trend will interrupt the northeastward shift in fish stocks, and how fish stocks will react to the cooling water.

The recent NMFS release provides some insight, stating that

“Bottom-water temperatures influence the productivity of groundfish, like cod, haddock, pollock, and several species of flounder, which prefer cooler water.  Lobster, the most valuable fishery in the northeast, are also temperature-sensitive.  Warming waters along the New England coast in recent decades have contributed to the collapse of the southern New England lobster population while the Gulf of Maine population has boomed.  Researchers expect that cooler waters will impact this economically and culturally important species.”

Given that the cooler water extends into the Mid-Atlantic, it’s hard not to wonder whether anyone might be regretting the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Management Board’s decision not to adopt a moratorium on harvest of the southern New England lobster stock, as recommended by the American Lobster Technical Committee in 2010.  At the time, the Technical Committee only recommended a 5-year-long moratorium, but observed that

“Environmental changes, most notably temperature, likely have forced lobster to seek more suitable habitat in deeper water.  Larvae produced by displaced lobster may be lost to traditional inshore nursery grounds.  The fishery has adapted to the changes in the resource by shifting effort further offshore.  However, fishing continues in most inshore portions of [southern New England], and continued harvest represents lost spawning stock.

“A moratorium provides the maximum likelihood to rebuild the stock to a level that can support a sustainable fishery.  Rebuilding the currently depleted [southern New England] stock may take longer than five years.  Cady and Agnew (2004) reviewed stock recoveries of depleted marine resources and reported that invertebrate fisheries most likely to recover were those with reductions in predator pressure, in the center of their geographic range and under favorable regimes.  They that the predicted length of recoveries should be treated with caution and conclude that a few stocks have recovered within a decade, but that most require longer.”

Such a moratorium, if sustained until the stock showed strong signs of recovery, would have maximized the number of breeding-age adults that might have been able to take advantage of the current cooling trend, and might have been able to take advantage of the cooler waters to increase lobster recruitment.  However, that opportunity was lost a long time ago.  The southern New England lobster stock is now at the lowest level of abundance ever recorded, and continues to decline.

However, the cooling may come soon enough to bail out the lobster fishery in the Gulf of Maine, where fishermen who failed to learn any lessons from the collapse of the southern New England stock, adamantly opposed modest restrictions intended to prevent a similar decline off northern New England, and caused the American Lobster Management Board to back off from imposing such restrictions in the Gulf of Maine and off eastern Cape Cod.  It is very possible that the cooling water will reverse a trend of declining lobster recruitment in the region, and that lobstermen will feel vindicated in successfully opposing science-based management—at least until the cooling trend reverses, and increasing water temperatures drive Gulf of Maine lobster recruitment down once again.

But the most interesting question may be how the cooler and less saline waters flowing along the outer continental shelf will impact the black sea bass population.

There is no question that the northern black sea bass stock—that is, the fish found north of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina—is healthy, with the biomass at 219 percent of the biomass target at the end of 2023.  However, the 2024 management track stock assessment also predicts that the spawning stock biomass is going to decline significantly over the next few years.

That prediction led to substantial controversy last fall, when the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee, after reviewing the 2024 management track assessment, decided that the allowable biological catch, and ultimately recreational and commercial black sea bass landings, should be reduced by 20 percent.  Members of the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Monitoring Committee, which is composed of biologists from the various states, ASMFC, and NMFS, strongly disagreed with the Scientific and Statistical Committee’s advice, questioning why, after a long period of above-average recruitment, the SSC believed that recruitment would fall to more historically typical levels.

The ASMFC’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board, which is not required to follow the Scientific and Statistical Committee’s advice, agreed with the dissenters on the Monitoring Committee and refused to reduce black sea bass catch limits.  The Mid-Atlantic Council, which was bound to follow the SSC’s guidance, did cut landings by 20 percent, creating a rift between federal and state management measures, that NMFS—which also claims not to be bound by the SSC’s decisions—resolved by ignoring the Council advice and extending the ASMFC decision into federal waters.

It was a strange debate and an even stranger resolution, but now we have to ask whether the Scientific and Statistical Committee was really right all along.

That’s because black sea bass recruitment—the number of young fish that enter the population each year—is not primarily driven by the size or the spawning stock or by the number of juvenile fish that are produced.  Instead, recruitment is driven by the oceanographic conditions that the first-winter fish experience when they spend that first winter at or near the edge of the continental shelf.  Warmer, more saline water typically results in strong black sea bass recruitment.  The very strong 2011 year class, which was most prevalent north of Hudson Canyon, can probably be attributed to such favorable conditions, as the 2025 State of the Ecosystem report revealed that

“2012 had among the warmest surface and bottom temperatures in New England.  A large proportion of the Georges Bank and Mid-Atlantic regions had bottom temperatures above the 15^oC thermal tolerance for most groundfish, with some days in the Mid-Atlantic exceeding the 24^oC potential mortality limit.”

Now, with cooler, less saline water expected to prevail for “several years,” there is good reason to believe that the 2024 stock assessment’s predictions of lower black sea bass recruitment may have been right on target, if not, perhaps, a little optimistic, and also to believe that the current regulations, which failed to follow the Scientific and Statistical Committee’s advice and allowed higher harvest than the SSC recommended, may have left the black sea bass stock more vulnerable to the predicted change in ocean conditions.

We can only wait and watch how the situation plays out, to learn how long the cooler, fresher water maintains its presence off New England and the Mid-Atlantic, and also to learn how that presence will affect the current and future abundance of various speces.

But as is always the case when changing ocean conditions add to the uncertainty in managing fish stocks, managers should definitely practice precaution when setting management measures.

 

 

 

THE FISHING TACKLE INDUSTRY VERSUS FISHERIES MANAGEMENT--PART II: CURRENT EVENTS

 

In 2017, in connection with further efforts to weaken Magnuson-Stevens’ conservation and management provisions, one of the top officers of a New Jersey fishing tackle wholesaler/manufacturer—perhaps not coincidentally, the same company that employed the individual who had threatened me a few years before—stated

“These amendments [to Magnuson-Stevens] need to not only support the existing population of recreational anglers and fishing related businesses but also allow for new entrants to come into the fishery and businesses to grow and expand.  The law needs to recognize that in its current form, our tradition of fishing cannot be passed on to our children without [Magnuson-Stevens] taking away opportunity from the rest of the fishing community.  [Magnuson-Stevens], as it applies to recreational fishing, is a flawed law, one that stifles growth of our industry and challenges the very future of our tradition.”

Such comments made it clear that the tackle industry’s problem with Magnuson-Stevens was the law’s emphasis on science-based conservation and management, which restricted recreational harvest to levels that are sustainable in the long term, and thus “tak[es] away opportunity from the rest of the fishing community” if the number of anglers increases.  What the speaker was obviously arguing for was a management approach that would allow anglers to both increase in number and overfish as they did so, and so theoretically increase tackle industry sales and profits—until that point where the bill for the overages comes due, and fish populations fall low enough that few bother to pursue them.

Thus, striped bass fishermen shouldn’t have been surprised last year, when Michael Waine, the East Coast spokesman for the American Sportfishing Association, got on a podcast during which he seemed to suggest that additional striped bass management measures should not be adopted, in order to maintain anglers’ ability to keep killing fish (and to keep the tackle industry selling stuff to those anglers).  In the podcast, Waine characterized the striped bass fishery as

“Another scenario where management has gotten more strict with time,”

then went on to say,

“We’re in a rebuilding period for the striped bass population.  The trajectory is good right now, the rebuilding trajectory.  (Remember that you’ve got to take all this with a grain of salt.  I think it’s better to talk about trajectories rather than talk in absolutes given the uncertainties.)

“So we have an increasing trend in the striped bass, but we know on the horizon there’s been poor recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay, which is a major spawning area for striped bass and that’s been a good indicator of future, or what the fishery will look like in the future, right.  You cannot catch an adult striped bass without starting with a lot of babies.  We know these, what we call ‘poor year classes,’ that have been spawned over the past five years are coming down the road, meaning when the fish get large enough to be a part of our fishery, that we’re catching, there are going to be fewer of them, and so the question becomes, like what do we do in the meantime, to plan for that?

“And so that coupled with very ambitious conservation goals, very ambitious, like we’re trying to rebuild the striped bass population to a level that it has rarely ever been to in the history of striped bass, that we’ve been measuring.  And so the question becomes like how far are we willing to go from a management and policy side to meet these very ambitious conservation goals, and you can see the byproduct of that, we have a very narrow slot limit.  And so where we, where we’re currently focused is where do we go from here?  We want to avoid the scenario like southern flounder [a badly overfished stock that saw North Carolina anglers overfish their quota so badly in 2023 that, after paybacks were considered, there was too little quota left to support a 2024 season] and a scenario like red snapper [where, in the South Atlantic, anglers are killing so many of the still-overfished snapper as bycatch in other fisheries, and so badly overfishing the stock, that the National Marine Fisheries Service has been sued multiple times for failing to properly address the problem, and the recent recreational seasons have been limited to somewhere between one and three days].  We want to make sure…that management is aware of the headwinds but also allows for access for anglers to go out and catch a fish, and so how do we balance these values?  How do we balance building back a population to a conservation level that we call all agree on, which we never likely will, with fishing access, with the ability to actually go out and catch these fish, and what worries me, worries me specifically is like we’ll go too far, meaning we’ll actually tell people to stop fishing for striped bass, which is where I think everyone loses…”

Waine’s comments make it clear that the American Sportfishing Association is more concerned with maintaining an active and profitable fishery than in restoring the striped bass stock to a level that’s sustainable in the long term.  

His comments also incorporate the fallacy, that we’ve seen pushed by both the recreational and commercial fishing industries in many different fisheries discussions, that it’s possible, and even desirable, to “balance building back to a conservation level…with fishing access,” a fallacy that, if incorporated into policy, only paves the road to failure and potential stock collapse, regardless of the species involved.

For in the end, you can’t negotiate with nature. 

If the fishing mortality rate of striped bass, or any other species, must be maintained at or below a certain level to avoid exceeding maximum sustainable yield and pushing the stock into long-term decline, you can’t “balance” management measures needed to achieve that rate with maintaining a certain level of harvest; if the fishing mortality rate exceeds the threshold, the stock will inevitably, eventually decline.  

Any attempt at “balancing” conservation with continued harvest might result in an overfishing rate that is lower than it might be if harvest was the only concern, and slow the rate of depletion, but overfishing at any level will still have its inexorable effect on the stock.  The fish will disappear.

The only difference might be that the tackle industry profits a bit more before the inevitable end.

If there was any doubt that Waine—and so, presumably, the ASA—was seeking to stymie efforts to tighten striped bass management measures, his comments at the December 2024 meeting of the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, shocked many striped bass anglers listening in, removed any doubt.

Serious striped bass anglers have long been one of the loudest voices calling for striped bass conservation.  In recent years, each time striped bass management changes have been on the table, the ASMFC has received thousands of comments supporting some of the most restrictive management measures that were proposed, a marked contrast to the mere handful of comments that support more liberal regulation.  Aware of that fact, Waine commented, in his opposition to measures that would have provided protection for the important 2018 striped bass year class this season,

“I think giving the [then-proposed] addendum the opportunity to consider this more thoroughly [rather than adopting regulations that would go into effect in 2025 to protect the 2018 year class, which will otherwise be very vulnerable to recreational fishermen], really develop options that the public can consume and provide input on is the best way best path forward [sic]. You know, I think about you guys know I am a part of a lot of these fisheries management discussions, and this is probably the most unique fishery that ASMFC manages, especially recreationally. 

“I look at the public comments, and I know that there’s millions of striped bass anglers out there.  Millions.  And I’m only seeing twenty-five hundred comments from a lot of the same people that we know have been commenting.  And so, as an organization, we’re going to work with our members to try to get more people integrated into this process.  We know that the recreational fishery is very diverse, and I don’t feel the public comments really are a good reflection of that diversity.  And so, where is the opportunity to get those individuals into the process? 

“Where is the opportunity to give folks the chance to get involved and engaged?...Don’t talk to the same folks that you’ve been talking to all the time.  Find the people who care about this resource, and value it in a way that their voices should be heard too.  And that’s what we’ll do as an organization ourselves.  [emphasis added]” 

Waine’s comments fairly drip with hypocrisy, and more than a little irony.

He effectively tells the Management Board to discount the comments of the thousands of conservation-minded anglers who clearly “care about this resource, and value it” (to borrow Waine’s own words) enough to learn about the issues and attend hearings and/or submit public comments, because they are “the same people that we know have been commenting.”  Yet Waine himself admits that he is “a part of a lot of these fisheries management discussions”—he is, in truth, one of “the same people that we know have been commenting”—but he clearly expects the Management Board to hear and value his comments, while disregarding the comments of others. 

It's only the “same people” who disagree with Waine and the American Sportfishing Association who should be ignored…

And, of course, to counter those thousands of “same people” who have taken the time to learn about the issues and how to comment on them—information that is freely and publicly available to everyone on the ASMFC website—Waine announced what seems to be an American Sportfishing Association effort to create an astroturf movement (defined as “the use of fake grassroots efforts that primarily focus on influencing public opinion and typically are funded by corporations and political entities to form opinions”) to advocate against needed striped bass conservation measures.

But this is where the tackle industry is trying to take fisheries management, and they’re not just targeting striped bass.

On June 1, a South Carolina publication, the Post and Courier, carried an opinion piece titled "States must lead on red snapper management and conservation.”  It was written by Dave Pfeiffer, an employee of Shimano, one of the world’s largest manufacturers of fishing tackle, and a leading member of the American Sportfishing Association.  Not surprisingly, the piece praised South Carolina’s recent adoption of a law setting a year-round red snapper season, two-fish bag limit, and 20-inch minimum size, suggesting that such state management measures should replace the current federal management of red snapper in the South Atlantic.

I wrote about that bill a couple of weeks ago, explaining how it arose out of frustration with federal management measures that, because of tremendous recreational red snapper bycatch and discard mortality during the closed season, recently amounted to a one-day season and one fish bag.

But that short recreational season isn’t the whole story.  As I also wrote, in an essay published last January, NMFS has proposed a regulation that would substantially increase recreational red snapper landings—from a little under 30,000 fish to 85,000—while also nearly tripling the commercial quota and substantially reducing the recreational red snapper bycatch and discard mortality.  But the angling industry has opposed it, because it would require a closed season for all reef fish in a stretch of ocean off Georgia and northern Florida and, clearly, you can’t sell anglers stuff if the season is closed. 

And, just last Friday, it became clear that the industry won this round.  In a press release announcing “NOAA Fisheries Announces Changes to the Management of Red Snapper in the South Atlantic Region and the 2025 Fishing Seasons,” NMFS stated, among other things, that

“During development of Amendment 59, NOAA Fisheries held multiple in-person hearings and received extensive comments during the public comment period; most of which opposed all or part of a discard reduction season proposed in the draft amendment to increase commercial and recreational red snapper catch limits and the recreational fishing season length.  In response to this input, and because a new red snapper stock assessment is underway, which will take into account the results of the South Atlantic Red Snapper Research Program and other new information about the red snapper stock, NOAA Fisheries removed the discard reduction area closure and several other proposed actions from further consideration.  [original formatting omitted]”

The recreational annual catch limit for 2025 will be 22,797 South Atlantic red snapper, substantially less than the 29,000-plus red snapper catch limit in 2024, to be caught during a 2-day season in July.  It is not clear whether that reduction in annual catch limit, coupled with a two-day fishing season, will be enough to prevent recreationally-driven overfishing in 2025, as NMFS promised to do in the agreement settling a lawsuit brought by members of the commercial fishing industry last year.

Still, given the choice between continued overfishing and interrupted sales, it’s pretty clear which option the industry prefers--even if the overfishing is so severe that members of the commercial fishing industry have sued NMFS multiple times in an effort to end it, and NMFS has agreed to settle one of those lawsuits by finalizing new regulations—which will include the closed season—later this month.

Thus, industry representatives have come out in favor of the new South Carolina law, and similar state management measures, which state politicians clearly hope will eventually apply to snapper in federal waters, even though such state measures are not supported by any hard scientific information and will almost certainly lead to continued overfishing, even though an option that would end overfishing and benefit the red snapper stock is on the table and readily available. 

And that’s because, despite allowing continued overfishing, the state management measures would accomplish something that no current or currently contemplated federal regulation will:  They would let the tackle industry sell more stuff.

Which, finally, brings us to Atlantic bluefin tuna.

Anyone who fishes offshore knows that the 2024 bluefin tuna season was very good.  

In fact, it was a little too good.  

At the last Highly Migratory Species Advisory Panel meeting, held about a month ago, NMFS managers informed attendees that Angling Category permit holders substantially exceeded their 2024 quota, with landings 152 percent of the base quota amount.  The overage extended throughout the various size classes, with school bluefin (27 to 47 inches) landings 14 percent over quota, large school/small medium (47-73 inches) landings over by 83 percent, and large medium/giant “trophy” (73+ inches) over by 102 percent.

The largest commercial categories went over quota as well, resulting in the United States exceeding its overall quota, which is set by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, by nine percent.

Since NMFS regulations require that any quota overage, by any category, must be repaid pound-for-pound in the following year, and since ICCAT rules require the same sort of payback of national quotas, except that, if a nation exceeds its quota for two consecutive years, the payback isn’t merely pound-for-pound, but may be 125 percent of the original overage, it was pretty clear that the Angling Category was going to take a big quota cut this year. 

NMFS wasn’t only going to impose the required payback, but it will clearly do everything it can to avoid the additional penalty that could be imposed for consecutive overages.

Originally, NMFS had decided to allow permitted Angling Category vessels to land one bluefin, between 27 and 73 inches long, on each fishing day.  While such limit was expected to reduce recreational landings, if bluefin availability in 2025 approached what it was the year before, it was expected that landings would approach the Angling Category quota, and force NMFS to close the fishing season, at some point in late summer.

The for-hire fishing industry wasn’t pleased about the one-fish bag limit, complaining that they wouldn’t be able to convince customers to go out for just a single fish.  The probable need for an early season closure also caused discontent.  NMFS eventually tried toremedy the problem by amending the 2025 Angling Category regulations, limitinglandings to school bluefin, and placing the large school and small medium fishoff limits (the Trophy category had already closed), while continuing torestrict private vessels to a single fish per day, but allowing for-hirevessels to retain two.

It seemed like a not-unreasonable compromise.  For-hire boats would get a second fish, and by restricting landings to the smaller school bluefin, the season would probably extend later into the year, as the small fish, individually, contribute far less to the quota than the larger ones do.  (In 2024, school bluefin comprised about 75 percent of the total number of bluefin landed by anglers, but only about 34 percent by weight.) 

Nonetheless, many anglers were unhappy that the large school and small medium bluefin were put out of their reach.  Very few understood the reason why such regulations were adopted.

And the tackle industry stepped in to fan the flames.

One of the first shots fired was a badly slanted article that appeared in On the Water magazine, titled “NOAA’s New Bluefin Retention Limit Leaves Anglers Reeling,” which began with the provocative line,

“Is it worth the time—and the fuel bill—to run offshore to the tuna grounds if the most your crew can bring home is one small bluefin tuna?”

The rest of the piece does little more than echo the American Sportfishing Association’s party line.

It quotes the organization’s president, Glenn Hughes, as saying

“We’re disappointed in NOAA’s revised 2025 retention limits for the bluefin tuna Angling category because of its associated negative economic impacts.  These restrictions threaten revenue, jobs, and fishing opportunities for the sportfishing industry.  [emphasis added]”

And as you ought to realize by now, the sportfishing industry considers any regulation that threatens revenue to be really, really bad, and will fight doggedly against it, regardless of the underlying reasons that the rule was put in place.

Maybe that’s why the article doesn’t really explain why the bluefin regulations were adopted.  If the author made any effort to contact and interview scientists at NMFS’ Highly Migratory Species Division, he didn’t mention it, and he certainly didn’t quote anyone from NMFS in the article.  Instead, the only mention of the underlying reason for the new rule was

“Reports from the 2024 season paint a picture of a thriving fishery, with abundant bluefin catches across the Northeast…Ironically, that abundance appears to be the driving factor behind the new restrictions.  According to NOAA’s 2024 Large Pelagics Survey (LPS) estimates, recreational anglers exceeded their quota due to what appears to be an unprecedented level of success on the water.”

But the author immediately put even that brief statement into question by adding

“But, the accuracy of those survey results is under scrutiny,”

stating that the American Sportfishing Association was calling for a review of the Large Pelagics Survey data and raising the possibility of “flawed data” and “overly restrictive regulations,” and quoting a portion of a letter from a Massachusetts for-hire organization which said,

“We recommend that the recreational angler catch data for 2024 be further reviewed to assess any outliers and avoid a regulatory response that could unnecessarily restrict U.S. fishing opportunity…Given the uncertainty surrounding the angling category catch, we strongly urge NOAA to decertify and initiate a review of the 2024 recreational BFT harvest estimates…”

Another somewhat unrealistic comment from the American Sportfishing Association’s Hughes finished the whole thing off:

“As the bluefin tuna stock rebuilds, securing additional access is reasonable and necessary to reflect improved stock health and maximize the fishery’s value to America’s sportfishing economy.  [emphasis added]”

Because, of course, maximizing the bluefin’s value to the tackle industry is the only thing that matters, although Huges didn’t quite explain why Canada, Japan, or any of the other nations that also receive quotas of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna ought to give up some of their quota to the U.S., just so that ASA members might profit a little more.

But that certainly seems to be the way those members think, because there was another piece published last week that echoed the same sort of thoughts.  Appearing in Fishing Tackle Retailer, the article was titled "Updated Bluefin Tuna Retention Limits To Negatively Impact Northeast Retailers.”  It was written by Tom Fucini, the northeast sales representative for Folsom Corp., a large New Jersey fishing tackle wholesaler/manufacturer.  The article mentions the new regulations, notes how, over the past five years, northeastern anglers have experienced a “Tuna Boom” that saw new anglers, attracted by more abundant bluefin tuna, enter the fishery, and how tackle shops have experienced “a nice boost in sales” as a result.

It then warns that

“These new regulations threaten to slow that momentum…This new rule is a dramatic step backward,”

and, in a conclusion that suggests that industry members might still be able to get such regulations overturned, states,

“NOAA’s data suggests an abundance of small Bluefin and classifies the species as “Least Concern” in terms of conservation status.  They claim recreational anglers exceeded quota by more than 50% in 2024 and retained more small fish than in 2023.

“A key issue cited was underreporting by recreational anglers.  Many have been hesitant to report catch data, fearing that doing so would lead to more restrictions—ironically, exactly what we are now facing.  Unfortunately, NOAA has not done enough to educate the recreational community on how reporting directly impacts quotas and regulations.

“If you’d like to voice your concerns about how these changes will affect retailers, charter boats, and manufacturers in the fishing industry, you can contact NOAA directly.  [emphasis in original]”

It was a remarkable closing statement for a few reasons.  It starts out by mentioning the current abundance of bluefin tuna, a claim that is probably true, but is also entirely irrelevant.  The issue is not that 2025 recreational bluefin landings threatened the health of the stock, but only that they exceeded the quota, and contributed to the United States exceeding its overall 2024 quota, which it was obliged to comply with as a contracting member of ICCAT.

The reference to recreational underreporting was a second red herring.  While recreational underreporting was acknowledged at last May’s HMS Advisory Panel meeting, no one ever suggested that such underreporting had anything to do with the calculation that anglers had exceeded their 2024 quota; in fact, exactly the opposite was true.  I am a member of the Advisory Panel.  I attended the entire May meeting.  And what I heard was that the majority of the recreational bluefin tuna catch estimate—an amount equal to a little over 78 percent of the estimated landings—came from information provided by anglers in NMFS’ Large Pelagics Survey, a telephone survey that contacts Atlantic Highly Migratory Species permit holders.

The underreporting issue relates to the reports of bluefin tuna landings that anglers are legally obligated to make within 24 hours of returning from any trip on which a bluefin tuna is either landed or discarded dead (listed as "ALRS" in the above chart). 

Since anglers have a legal obligation to report bluefin landings, it’s not clear why the article’s author was castigating NMFS for not “doing enough to educate the recreational community”—an angler shouldn’t have to be “educated” as to why they need to comply with the law—and in any case, raising the underreporting issue was only misdirection, as such mandatory reports only accounted for about 11 percent of the 2024 landings estimate.

But perhaps the most egregious failure of the article was its failure to inform readers of the consequences, should the current bluefin tuna regulations be abolished in favor of rules allowing a higher catch.

For while the 2025 recreational bluefin regulations are a bit onerous, so long as they’re not exceeded, Atlantic Coast anglers should see more liberal regulations put in place for the 2026 season—it’s even possible, if not likely, that regulations might be relaxed a little later this year, if recreational bluefin landings are lower than managers currently expect.

But if the industry spokesmen get their way, bluefin regulations are prematurely relaxed this year, and the angling sector, as well as the United States, exceeds its quota again, then instead of seeing more relaxed rules in 2026, anglers will again be facing paybacks.  And those paybacks might not be merely pound-for-pound; if the U.S. exceeds its quota for a second consecutive year, anglers might have to give back 1 ¼ pounds of 2026 quota for every pound that they go over in 2025, and it’s hard to see how that would be good for anyone.

Yet the article never warns of the downside of relaxing the 2025 recreational management measures.  Instead, it merely ends with the statement,

“Let’s work together to ensure that our voices are heard and that future policy decisions reflect both conservation goals and economic realities for small businesses like ours,”

a statement that perpetuates the false narrative that conservation and economic concerns have parity, and should be given equal consideration by fisheries managers.

That’s just not true.  For as I noted back in April 2014—just three months after this blog began—if you want to have a fishing industry, it helps to have fish.

Yet, for all of their corporate sophistication and their political contacts, the fishing tackle industry hasn’t yet accepted that basic truth.  Regardless of the species in question—they might be as different as striped bass, red snapper, or bluefin tuna—the industry mantra is always the same, some version of

“Discount the science, discount the data, discount the needs of the resource.  We need to have liberal regulations that keep people fishing, and keep them buying our stuff.”

If that means letting overfished stocks remain unrebuilt, languishing at depleted levels, in order to keep landings high for another few years, that’s OK.

If it means perpetuating overfishing, and even wasting most of the annual catch through discard mortality, to avoid a closed season where gear can’t be sold, that’s OK, too.

And if it means pressuring fisheries managers to ignore their obligations under international agreements, well, maybe such obligations should be ignored.

At least that’s the way, judging by its actions, the industry seems to feel.

But a nation’s fish stocks belong to its people—all of its people—and not merely to those who profit from their exploitation.  Anglers should not be forced to fish on diminished populations just to keep the industry solvent.  Divers should be able to visit reefs that have their entire ecosystems intact.  And a person who has never even seen the ocean should find comfort in the knowledge that the country is holding its natural heritage in trust for everyone, including those yet to be born.

The fishing industry, in its incessant battle with fisheries managers and its efforts to bend the management system to suit its purposes, is concerned with none but itself.  Yet even there, it should think twice before continuing its fight.

For the fish can survive very well without a fishing industry.  But a fishing industry without fish will quickly die.

THE FISHING TACKLE INDUSTRY VERSUS FISHERIES MANAGEMENT--PART I: IN THE BEGINNING

 

Ever since I began writing this blog over a decade ago, I have occasionally come back to the topic of how the fishing tackle industry attempts to manipulate the fishery management system to benefit the tackle business, whether or not such manipulations are in long-term interests of the nation’s fish stocks or even of the nation’s recreational fishermen.

In the beginning, the opposition to needed regulation was usually concentrated at the local level.

My first experience with that came in the mid/late 1970s, when I spent my summers fishing—mostly for striped bass—just about every morning and/or evening—and working in a tackle shop in the Cos Cob section of Greenwich, Connecticut during the day.  It was a time when anyone who cared to look could see warning signs coming from the Chesapeake Bay, where striped bass spawning success had declined markedly, a trend I could see illustrated every morning by a lack of smaller fish.

One day, Bob Pond, the creator of the Atom line of striped bass lures and a stark exception to the rule that the industry generally opposes regulation—he spent much of the money he made from his lure business promoting striped bass conservation—stopped by the store, and after an hour or two of conversation convinced me that there was a real need to start conserving striped bass and minimizing both the recreational and commercial kill.  So from time to time I talked to the shop’s customer’s about it, focusing on those who spent a lot of time bass fishing and were skilled enough to put some fish in the boat.

The shop’s owner quickly became angry, telling me to drop the conservation talk because it was bad for business and, when I talked about it anyway (I've never been very good at doing what my supposed superiors tell me to do), would start ranting to everyone in the store, the typical outburst sounding something like, “There’s plenty of bass out there.  Plenty of bass.  Go out there and catch them, and bring them all in to the store.  I’ll take your picture and put it up on the wall.”

Two or three years later, the striped bass stock collapsed.

But as soon as the stock was declared rebuilt in 1995—I was living here on Long Island by then—the tackle shops began calling for the least restrictive management measures that the regulators would allow, even though the vast majority of the striped bass fishermen were opposed to relaxing the rules at all.

Eventually the shops got their way; New York abandoned its 36-inch minimum size in favor of a 28-inch size limit, and while shore-based and private-boat anglers could still only retain one bass per day, those on for-hire vessels were allowed to keep two.  Five years later, I had started working with a national advocacy group that, for a while, was doing good conservation work that affected a number of important fish stocks.  The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission was drafting Amendment 6 to the Interstate FisheryManagement Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, and one of the key issues was whether the striped bass stock should be managed for yield, with a higher annual harvest, a smaller population, and few older, larger females in the population, or for abundance and a more natural age and size distribution.

One of the folks I was working with, who served as president of the advocacy group’s New York chapter, also published a weekly saltwater angling newspaper and related website.  So he put up a poll on that website, asking whether his readers would prefer more relaxed regulations and a higher recreational striped bass harvest, or more restrictive regulations, and greater striped bass abundance.  His readers overwhelmingly supported more restrictions and greater abundance.  His advertisers—the tackle industry and for-hire fleet—did not.  They thought that it would be better for business if people could kill more bass to bring home.

So immediately after the publisher attended a hearing on Amendment 6, and told the ASMFC what his readers wanted, the industry took their revenge, pulling their advertisements and threatening the future of his newspaper.  Faced with such an attack, he was forced to back down, and end his conservation efforts.  Which, of course, suited the industry just fine.

I found myself in the industry’s sights a decade later, when I received a private Facebook message from an employee of a big New Jersey fishing tackle manufacturer/distributor.  Apparently, a casual comment I made on a Facebook thread irked some industry folks, who  seemed to find it their last straw, and so figured they’d threaten to have me blacklisted as a writer for the outdoor press.  The message read, in part,

“So how do you reconcile your stance with the advertisers who support your writing?

“…Your stance is not popular with a lot of folks on the rec side who are also well informed and whose businesses support many.

“You are certainly entitled to your position, but it galls some of us quite a bit that you promote it while being active in a recreational fishing publication.  That is not opinion, it is a fact.”

I politely informed him that I would write what I pleased, and had no intention to become a prostitute for the tackle industry.  Which, of course, eventually cost me a decent writing gig, but also distinguished me from a lot of folks who write for the saltwater angling press, and are more than happy to serve as industry whores (note that those who write for publications specializing in freshwater angling, and particularly for the flyfishing press, generally don’t face as much anti-conservation sentiment as we see in the saltwater publications, although it would still take a brave author to criticize the various professional tournament trails).

I tell these stories only to demonstrate how the industry’s arrogance, and its efforts to mold the fishery management process to its short-term economic goals, has a long history, and to show how it has accelerated in recent years.

Years ago, most fishing tackle was manufactured here in the United States by small, often family-owned companies such as Pfleuger, Shakespeare, Penn Reels, Van Staal, Fenwick fishing rods, Fin-Nor offshore tackle, and the like.  Today, as has been the case in so many industries, those companies have been taken over by corporate conglomerates, who have laid off many of their U.S. workers and moved much of the production offshore to China and various third-world nations, in order to keep costs down and boost corporate profits.

The efforts of the Amerian Sportfishing Association and other industry members, to influence the fishery management process to keep recreational harvests high and so maximize short-term sales, regardless of the long-term impact on fish stocks, is just another element of the industry's strategy to maintain, and if possible increase, the corporate bottom line.

The tempo of those efforts remains high and, if anything, seems to be increasing.

The watershed moment probably occurred in early 2014, when the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, working with a number of industry-related organizations that included the American Sportfishing Association (the primary fishing tackle industry trade association), the National Marine Manufacturers Association, and the Center for Sportfishing Policy (then known as the Center for Coastal Conservation, an umbrella group of industry organizations formed to engage in the political process) issued a manifesto titled "A Vision for Managing America’s Saltwater Recreational Fisheries,” which proposed downplaying the conservation-oriented provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act in favor of a more harvest-oriented policy that

“addresses the needs of anglers and industry.”

In the eleven years since, the tackle industry has grown ever more aggressive in its efforts to push legislators and regulators, at the state, regional, and federal level, to adopt policies focused on elevating industry interests above those of the resource or the general angling public.

The second half of this essay, The Fishing Tackle Industry Versus Fisheries Management—Part II:  Current Events, will be published on Sunday, June 8.

STRIPED BASS MANAGEMENT--THE DEVIL'S IN THE DETAILS

 

Striped bass management, and what it ought to look like, has been the subject of a years-long debate that, in 2022, saw the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s adopt the first amendment to its Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass in nearly two decades, and has since been fueled by a declining abundance of fish coupled by six consecutive years of poor recruitment, particularly in the most important nursery area in the Maryland portion of the Chesapeake Bay.

In some ways, it’s surprising that there’s a debate at all.

Fisheries managers have worked with striped bass for a very long time.  The initial Interstate Fisheries Management Plan for the Striped Bass, released in October 1981, is designated “Fisheries Management Report No. 1 of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission”—the very first fishery management plan ever produced by the ASMFC.  

Since then, the ASMFC has produced seven amendments to the management plan and many addendums to such amendments, along with benchmark stock assessments, stock assessment updates, annual reports on the fishery, and special reports of various kinds.  In addition, scientists at various state and federal agencies, and at academic institutions, have investigated various aspects of striped bass biology and published their findings in a host of scientific journals.

Thus, when a stock assessment finds that the striped bassstock is overfished, as was the case last fall, we can be certain that such finding relies on a substantial and diverse collection of reliable data, and is not merely an educated guess, or a conclusion based on insufficient and uncertain information.  Yet the plethora of reliable and consistent data has not prevented some stakeholders, such as Delmarva Fisheries Association head Robert Newberry to make nonsense comments claiming that the striped bass in the Mid-Atlantic region

“has never been more plentiful.”

Nor has the quality of the stock assessment data prevented stakeholders from questioning the need for management measures that will rebuild the overfished stock to something approaching its target level.  Thus, we see Jill Maganza-Ruiz, president of the Montauk Boatmen and Captains association, refer to Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass as a

“needless action [which] also violates common sense”

because the stock is not currently experiencing overfishing, even though it is currently overfished, and has been for about the last decade.

Such comments veer so far from well-established facts that they deserve to be largely ignored.

But when we accept the current state of the stock, and start working out the details of how to make things better, the debate becomes more focused, and the answers aren’t so perfectly clear.  Yet the answers managers finally come up with will probably have a significant impact on the health of the stock.

Consider, for example, the debate currently going on in Maryland, and the corresponding discussion occurring at the ASMFC.

Maryland has long been willing to sacrifice the interests of its private boat and shore-based recreational fishermen in order to shore up its commercial and for-hire fisheries.  Thus, after the adoption of Addendum VI to Amendment 6 to the InterstateFishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass in 2019, we see Maryland proposing a conservation equivalency provision that would allow it to, instead of reducing both recreational landings and commercial quota by an equal 18 percent, cut the commercial quota by a mere 1.8 percent, while slashing recreational landings by 20.5 percent.  

At about the same time, Maryland also proposed closing the April recreational catch-and-release season, which was of little importance to the for-hire fishery, and implementing a no-targeting closure during August, just so it could continue to allow its for-hire fishery to retain two bass per angler, even though private boat and shore-based anglers were limited to taking home one bass per day.

In doing so, Maryland has created a patchwork of open and closed seasons that becomes more and more difficult to work with as additional management changes come on line.  So, in an effort to rationalize the current muddle, Maryland has proposed changes that would, among other things, reinstate the April catch-and-release season, open the season to harvest beginning May 1, expand the no-targeting season to the entire month of August, and reduce the December harvest season by a few days, replacing them with a no-harvest—but not a no-target—closure.

An argument can be made that such changes will benefit the striped bass, while also benefiting striped bass anglers.  Still, not everyone agrees that the changes are good.

According to an article in the Bay Journal, Maryland’s Department of Natural Resources

“said it wanted to simplify its regulations and align the state’s striped bass fishing season more closely with Virginia and the separately regulated Potomac River.  It also wants to give anglers more incentive to fish in the spring.  Mike Luisi, DNR’s fisheries assessment manager, said the closures currently in effect in Maryland have essentially driven all anglers off the water and hurt the business of tackle shops and some fishing guides.”

Some folks whom I know down in Maryland like the idea of getting their spring catch-and-release season back, and believe it’s reasonable to exchange a catch-and-release season in April, when the water is cold and release mortality is low, for a no-target closure that encompasses all of August, when water temperatures and air temperatures are both high, and dissolved oxygen levels can be depressed, conditions which all make it more likely that released fish will not survive.

Research tends to support the advantages of an April catch-and-release season coupled with an August no-target closure.  According to the Bay Journal article,

“Reid Nelson, a fisheries ecologist with George Mason University, studied the issue in the Patuxent River and estimated that as many as 11% of striped bass released back into the water in summer died within about eight weeks, compared with a 6.8% death rate in spring, when temperatures are lower.  The risk of killing fish before they could spawn under those circumstances is relatively low, he said.”

Given that, it appears that the new regulations would be good for the striped bass, for most striped bass anglers, for tackle shops and other businesses providing products and services to such anglers, and for those guides/charter boat captains who participate in the catch-and-release fishery.

However, as I have often noted in this blog, fisheries management is a zero-sum game, and when all of those stakeholders enjoy new benefits, it’s pretty likely that some other group of stakeholders is taking a loss.  In this case, that group includes the traditional Maryland charter boats—those that, collectively, comprise what some of my Maryland contacts refer to as the “meat fleet”—boats that take their passengers out only to kill their limit of striped bass, and quickly return to the dock once that killing is done.

In their case, the Bay Journal reports,

“Brian Hardman, the heard of the Maryland Charter Boat Association, charged that Maryland’s proposal would expand striped bass fishing greatly for anglers who practice catch-and-release while further restricting those who want to bring their catch home to eat.  Charter captains have reported declines of up to 70% in bookings in 2024 after a rule change deprived their customers of the ability to keep two striped bass per trip.”

The Maryland Charter Boat Association has repeatedly—and so far unsuccessfully—sued the ASMFC and, more recently, other entities as well, arguing that the loss of a second fish is illegally preventing them from practicing their trade, and depriving them of the value of their business investments.

But the counter to that argument is that, when striped bass abundance is declining—and, particularly, in a place like Maryland’s section of the Chesapeake Bay, where striped bass spawning success over the past six years has been the lowest ever recorded, and fish less than six years old make up a very large part of the fishery, with most bass moving out of the Bay to join the coastal migratory stock sometime between the age of 5 and 7 years—promoting catch and release probably makes a lot of sense, from both a social and an economic viewpoint.

After all, in a catch-and-kill fishery, a legal-sized bass is typically removed from the population, and no longer available to other anglers, the first time it is caught.

On the other hand, in a catch-and-release fishery, even given the currently-accepted estimate that nine percent of all released fish do not survive, the average striped bass can be caught 11 times before it is removed from the population, and can provide additional social and economic benefits each time it is encountered by an angler.  Even if it is not caught, its very presence provides an incentive for anglers to spend money on fishing because it is still in the water and available to catch.

Put more simply, the available supply of bass will last longer if individual fish aren’t removed from the water at the very first opportunity.  And effort data clearly demonstrates that, the more fish that are in the water and available to anglers, the more often anglers will fish.

Thus, from a social and economic perspective, managing striped bass primarily for a catch-and-release fishery makes the best use of a limited natural resource.  And, despite their often-loud claims, such management doesn’t push the traditional catch-and-kill fleet out of the fishery, so long as they are willing to be a little more flexible in how they go about their business.

So long as they choose to operate their boats like floating grocery carts, heading back to the dock as soon as all of their fares have boxed a limit of fish, a one-fish bag limit probably will cost them a substantial amount of business.  After all, who wants to pay hundreds of dollars, and perhaps travel hundreds of miles, just to go out on the water for an hour, perhaps less, toss a bass in the cooler and then go back home?

On the other hand, if they start focusing less on dead fish and more on encouraging their customers to enjoy the live ones—that is, if they start actively promoting and participating in a catch-and-release fishery themselves, while still enabling their customers to keep whatever legal bass they might land—and fishing out the entire half-day charter even after a limit of fish has been boated, they might find more people willing to book trips, even with the more restrictive rules now in place.

How such details are finally resolved—that is, whether new regulations will favor catch and release, and how stakeholders might adapt to any new rules—probably won’t have too much on an impact on the striped bass themselves, if Maryland’s current estimates of fishing mortality turn out to be true, but they could have a big impact on the economic value of Maryland’s recreational striped bass fishery.

However, the Maryland charter fleet has raised another issue that might be more difficult to analyze and address:  A claim that the stress caused by catch-and-release fishing during the spawn might cause females to drop their eggs prematurely, and so result in lower recruitment.

It’s not an unreasonable concern.

Again turning to the Bay Journal article,

“Dave Secor, fisheries ecologist with the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, said he thinks that ‘catch-and-release of fecund females does [increase the risk] of failed reproduction for that fish.  It’s a very energetically taxing period [of] provisioning eggs, migrating and courtship behaviors.”

The article also notes that the same Reid Nelson who conducted the Patuxent River release mortality study weighed in on the question, and noted that studies of other species have found that fish may produce lower-quality eggs, which produce lower-quality larvae, if they are caught and released before spawning.

It’s another detail that managers must consider when deciding whether Maryland’s proposed changes make sense.

Fortunately, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board has instructed the Striped Bass Technical Committee to consider Maryland’s proposal, and advise the Board as to how it compares to the management measures the state currently has in place, with respect to striped bass mortality.  It is unlikely to be approved if mortality would increase.

Which illustrates why striped bass management is as challenging as it is.

It’s not just about the current biomass size, or biomass trends, or recruitment levels, although all those things matter.  It’s also about the details, and getting the small things right.

For, in the aggregate, small details can make a real difference, and if managers get them wrong, it’s likely that the larger-scale issues won’t be quite right, either.