SOME ANGLERS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: SECTOR SEPARATION LOOMS IN THE MID-ATLANTIC

 

Those of us who can still recall our high school—and maybe even junior high school—English classes can probably remember reading George Orwell’s Animal Farm, and that novel’s oft-quoted line,

“All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others.”

It now appears that the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Bluefish and Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass management boards are considering extending that sort of "equality" to anglers in New England and the mid-Atlantic regions.

They expressed such intent in the Public Information/Scoping Document, Recreational Sector Separation and Data Collection Amendment, An Omnibus Amendment to the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass and the Bluefish Fishery Management Plans, which advises that

“The Commission and Council will consider whether recreational sector separation could help tailor management to the varying preferences, data availability, and economic considerations of each component of the recreational fishery.  Currently, the private and for-hire recreational sectors are managed as a single unit and are held to a single, combined recreational harvest target.  Management measures are typically developed and adjusted for the recreational fishery as a whole.  However, the two sectors have different motivations, preferences, fishing behaviors, operational needs, and data reporting requirements.  Some recreational fishery participants have expressed an interest in recreational sector separation, which would entail managing the for-hire and private sectors of the recreational fishery separately.  This could potentially allow managers to better tailor management to the needs and preferences of each sector while allowing for improved utilization of the data provided by the for-hire sector.  Through this amendment, the Council and Commission intend to explore whether recreational sector separation is appropriate for these fisheries.”

Before looking at sector separation more closely, it might make sense to consider the roles of the shore, private boat, and for-hire fisheries with respect to the four managed species.

Using the most recent Marine Recreational Information Program data available, from the years 2021 through 2023, we find that the for-hire fleet is responsible for surprisingly few trips that primarily target any of the four species.  The for-hires’ proportion of trips taken runs from a high of 6.4%, in the case of black sea bass, to a low of 0.9% in the case of bluefish.  The for-hire fleet’s share of trips primarily targeting scup or summer flounder is, in both cases, about 2.3%.

Although some of the MRIP data used to derive such percentages includes a very substantial degree of uncertainty, the percentages are very consistent from year to year, so are probably fairly accurate.  The greatest variation is found in the scup estimates, where the percentage of for-hire trips ranges from a low of 1.3% to a high of 3.3%, but even there, it is clear that anglers on for-hire vessels comprise a very small part of the overall recreational fishery.

On the other hand, those for-hire anglers can account for a disproportionately large proportion of the catch.  That is particularly noticeable in the bluefish fishery where, despite accounting for only 0.9% of all direcrted recreational trips, the for-hire fleet accounts for 5.3% of the recreational bluefish landings; scup also sees a significant disparity, with the fleet accounting for 2.3% of the trips, but 9.2% of the entire recreational harvest.

And yet, the for-hires seem to want more.  As noted by Eric Burnley, a long-time outdoor writer who also sits on the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Advisory Panel,

“Recreational fishermen have a serious problem brewing within our ranks.  There is a small segment of the for-hire recreational fishery that would like to steal fish from the rest of us because they believe having more fish added to their bag limit would put more people on their boats.  They did this with bluefish by dividing the bag limits so that private boats and those of us who fish from shore may only keep three blues per day while charter and head boats may keep five blues per person.”

Mr. Burnley lives in Delaware, a state that lacks a significant scup fishery, but if he fished up here in the northeast, he would also know that scup anglers on for-hire boats also get special privileges denied to the other 97% of the scup fishing community, in the form of a so-called “bonus season” that runs for 60 days and allows for-hire anglers in states between New York and Massachusetts to retain 40 scup per day, as opposed to the 30 scup limit that applies to everyone else.

Given such special privileges, it’s not surprising that for-hire anglers account for such a disproportionate share of the recreational scup and bluefish harvests.  The last thing we need is to see the same thing happen in the summer flounder and black sea bass fisheries.  Because in the end, fisheries management is a zero-sum game.  If you give someone more fish, either through an increased allocation or more liberal regulations, it means that someone else is going to have to get less.

And the public shouldn’t have to accept a lesser share of a public resource just because a portion of that resource has been taken away from them in order to subsidize a handful of private businesses.

Using scup as an example, there can be a very big disparity between the number of fish retained on each trip by anglers belonging to the various sectors.  For the period 2021 through 2023, shore-based anglers kept an average of 2.5 scup per trip, while private boat anglers retained an average of 9.7.  However, the per-trip retention rate for the for-hire fleet was far higher, with party and charter boat anglers keeping an average of 21.6 and 28.7 scup per trip, respectively (it should be noted that, because not all scup are caught on trips primarily targeting them, the per-trip numbers for all four sub-sectors of the recreational fishery, which are based on directed scup trips, are skewed to the high side; nevertheless, there would still be a  big difference between the per-trip harvest of the private versus the for-hire sector even if fish caught on non-directed trips could be filtered out).

That’s all fine if overall recreational landings remain low enough that recreational management measures may remain unchanged.  However, should it be necessary to reduce recreational landings, no distinction is made between the private and for-hire anglers; even if for-hire anglers made a proportionately higher contribution to the overage, harvesting more fish per angler than other recreational fishermen, they are not required to make the same proportionately higher contribution to any resulting reduction.  Thus, one of the scenarios considered in the recently-released scoping document, an option that

“would focus only on processes for setting different management measures by recreational sector, without separate allocations of catch or harvest,”

is inherently inequitable, to the extent that it does not link more liberal management measures for the privileged for-hire sector with more restrictive management measures for that same sector, compared to less-privileged anglers, should an overage occur.

Anyone who attends fisheries meetings of any kind, but perhaps particularly including advisory panel meetings, knows that the for hire-fleet regularly seeks smaller size limits, bigger bag limits, and the longest possible seasons.  

It could, in theory, get all of those things under a sector separation protocol, that merely adopts different management measures for for-hire anglers, but allows them to fish on the same allocation as other recreational fishermen.  In such case, regulations for shore-based and private-boat anglers would have to be made more restrictive to avoid exceeding whatever limitations on catch and/or landings might apply.

Typically, fishery managers employ a combination of three tools—bag limits, size limits, and seasons—to manage a recreational fishery.  It is thus easy to argue that if managers truly believe that the for-hire fleet needs a larger bag limit, then equity requires that such managers impose an offsetting size limit or season to create what the ASMFC might deem “conservation equivalent” regulations that maintain overall parity between for-hire and shore-based and private boat anglers.

It is highly unlikely that the for-hire sector would be pleased with whatever conservation equivalent regulations might result from such approach.

Arguably, the other option proposed in the scoping document, separate allocations for each sector, would provide a more level playing field than would a grant of special and exclusive privileges to for-hire anglers.  As the document explains,

“There are several ways in which separate allocations could be created for the for-hire and private recreational sectors.  Separate allocations would ultimately result in managing these components of the fishery differently, using differing management measures.  Potential allocations could be made on the basis of catch (includes both harvest and dead discards; e.g., separate annual catch limits) or landings (harvest only; e.g., separate recreational harvest limits).  Options to be considered may include separate annual catch limit (ACL) allocations, separate recreational sub-ACL allocations, or separate recreational harvest limits (RHLs). These options may require development of corresponding accountability measures.”

 

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act recognizes three separate sectors, defining not only “recreational fishing” and “commercial fishing,” but also “charter fishing,” which is defined as

“fishing from a vessel carrying a passenger for hire…who is engaged in recreational fishing.”

Given that definition, if managers insist on imposing sector separation on the recreational fishery, it would make the most sense to completely separate the sectors, and provide separate Annual Catch Limits, along with associated Accountability Measures, for commercial fishermen, recreational fishermen, and charter fishermen, so that an overage by any one of the sectors would be addressed by sector-specific Accountability Measures. 

Thus, if the charter fishing sector successfully argued for overly liberal regulations that led to that sector catching too many fish and exceeding its Annual Catch Limit, the shore-based and private boat anglers would not have to give up fish to feed the for-hires’ hunger; instead, only the charter fishing sector would be held accountable—and, of course, should the recreational sector catch enough fish to trigger accountability measures, which often occurs, those accountability measures would not affect the for-hire fleet.

Of course, allocating fish between the recreational and charter fishing sectors would be a contentious process, as allocation debates are always among the most rancorous of any in fisheries management.  Common sense would just base the allocation on recent—say, the past five years'—percentages of the overall angling catch taken by the recreational and charter fishing sectors, but it’s not hard to predict that the for-hires would want a bigger slice of the pie, and argue that the allocations should consider an earlier time when there were more for-hire boats in operation, those boats drew more passengers, and the charter fishing sector’s share would thus be higher.

But a new allocation—all fisheries measures, really—should be looking forward and not backwards, and consider what the fishery looks like today, and will look like in the future, and not what it looked like thirty or forty years ago.  And by those standards, the allocations allotted to the charter fishing sector would be very small, as appropriate for a sector that accounts for such a tiny proportion of overall trips, and so generates a very, very small percentage of the social and economic benefits gleaned from the angling industry.

Yet even a separate allocation doesn’t solve all the problems created by sector separation. 

Consider, for example, the black sea bass fishery off New Jersey and the South Shore of Long Island.  For the most part, the ocean floor off that coast is composed of some combination of mud, sand, and gravel, with very few natural rocky formations.  Since black sea bass are a structure-oriented fish, most of the fishing takes place on artificial reefs established to enhance recreational fishing or on the remains of ships, barges, and aircraft that were lost, due to war or mishap, somewhere off the coast.

Although some fish more on and off such man-made structure throughout the season, for the most part, black sea bass—and, in particular, legal-sized black sea bass—are far more abundant on the first few days of a newly-opened season than they are later on in the year, as recreational fishing pressure quickly cleans the larger fish off the wrecks and reefs, leaving behind mostly undersized sea bass with just a handful of individuals large enough for anglers to retain.

Regulations that opened a for-hire season before the season for private-boat anglers began could quickly strip the structure of most of the larger black sea bass, leaving little for the great majority of recreational fishermen to enjoy.  If for-hire anglers were gifted with a higher bag limit than that allowed the rest of the angling community, it wouldn’t take long before a few party boats, with forty, fifty, or more anglers on board, picked a wreck clean of most of its legal fish, leaving little more than undersized sea bass and a small handful of larger individuals for everyone else.

Considering how likely such outcomes would be under any sort of sector separation scheme, and the very small proportion of recreational trips that might benefit if such a scheme was adopted, any upside sector separation might provide would seem to be far outweighed by its downsides. 

The scoping document tries to justify adopting different management measures for for-hire and shore-based/private boat anglers by claiming that “the two sectors have different motivations, preferences, fishing behaviors, operational needs, and data reporting requirements,” but for at least the three demersal species—summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass—those assertions are dubious at best, for all three are what anglers deem “meat fish,” species that are primarily pursued because of their food value, are usually retained when caught, and do not support meaningful catch-and-release fisheries.

In the case of all three species, anglers who pursue them, whether from shore, from private boats, or from for-hire vessels, go out with the intention to kill their catch and bring it home for personal consumption or, perhaps, to share with family and friends.  All anglers would prefer the smallest minimum size, largest bag limit, and longest season that the science, regulators, and common sense might provide.  

In motivation, preferences, and fishing behavior, there is little separating them, regardless of the platform they may choose, or be forced by circumstances, to fish from.  (I will concede that the situation is different in the case of bluefish; during the same 2021-2023 period used to determine effort and landings for the various recreational sectors, shore-based and private boat anglers released far more bluefish than they landed, a smaller proportion was released by anglers on charter boats, while party boat anglers kept significantly more fish than they released.)

I’m not sure how the “operational needs” of for-hire anglers differs from those of the great majority of recreational fishermen, although I suspect many might travel for longer distances to get to the dock, and once there, they only need to find a seat and a place at the rail, and not need to maintain and operate a vessel like private boat anglers do.  

As far as “data reporting requirements” go, while for-hire operators often point to their mandatory vessel trip reports as providing better data than the estimates provided by MRIP, we must always remember the acronym “GIGO”—Garbage In, Garbage Out—coined in an earlier era of computer use.  While we can hope that the for-hires’ trip reports are accurate, we know that, in the past, for-hire captains have seemed oblivious—or, perhaps, were willfully ignorant—of the fact that their customers were keeping fish far in excess of the legal limit, with one New Jersey party boat operator reportedly commenting that he

“did see fishermen keeping [out-of-season] black sea bass, but said ‘I didn’t think it was that many [at least 819 illegal fish on a single trip].  And I’m not getting paid by the state of New Jersey to take fish out of people’s buckets.”

In another incident,

“Marine enforcement officers…saw what they estimated was hundreds of pounds of fish being thrown overboard from a Montauk party boat…

“As they continued the inspection of the starboard side, there was a massive fish kill on the port side, with dead sea bass floating all over the place…anglers who had [supposedly] not caught anything during the trip [were] filing off the boat…

“When the dust cleared…there were a dozen coolers left with no owners, which held more than 1,000 sea bass [although the bag limit at that time was just three].”

With for-hire captains casting a blind eye on such goings-on, one must wonder whether all of the legally caught fish, not to mention any of the illegal ones, make it onto the vessel trip reports that are supposedly accurate enough to justify special rules.

Yet despite all of the arguments that can be made against sector separation, there is a very good chance that it will be adopted in some form, and the reason is simple.

In George Orwell’s novel, of the assemblage of rebellious livestock that established “Animal Farm,” all but a few were subordinated to a handful of pigs who seized control of the farm and decided its fate.  A similar situation exists at the Mid-Atlantic Council where, out of six seats held by representatives of the recreational sector, five are held by members and/or former members of the for-hire fishing industry; on most issues, such for-hire representatives tend to be supported by the commercial representatives, who see them as fellow watermen in the business of catching fish for their customers. 

Thus, there are few, if any, people sitting around the table to advocate for and represent the interests of the shore-based and private boat anglers responsible for well over 90% of all recreational trips taken in pursuit of Council-managed species; while state fisheries managers try to represent all of their constituents fairly, private anglers’ lack of representation is repeatedly evidenced by decisions that favor the for-hire sector.

Yet there is still reason to hope that sector separation can yet be defeated, and that all anglers might still be allowed a level playing field on which to pursue their preferred avocation.  The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council will be accepting comments on the Scoping Document until 11:59 p.m. on March 20.  Anglers can get a copy of the Scoping Document merely by clicking on this paragraph, and then respond by commenting online, by email, or by regular mail, to the addresses provided in the document.

While there is some momentum behind sector separation, the matter is still at the scoping stage, where the issues are still being defined and stakeholder comment still has a real chance to influence the outcome.

I encourage everyone to make their views known.

Unless, of course, you’re completely content with some anglers being more equal than others, and understand that the “others” means you.

STRIPED BASS: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE...

 

I recently came across an article on striped bass on National Fisherman magazine’s web page.  It's header was a photo of a commercial fishing crew and the caption,

“Where have all the stripers gone?”

It then began,

“One of the most commercially important fish species in the United States seems to be disappearing from the Atlantic seaboard.

“The question, of course, is:  Why?

“A dramatic decline in East Coast striped bass landings during the past decade has now combined with three consecutive years of dismally low reproduction in the fish’s major spawning ground, Chesapeake Bay…”

It goes on to observe that

“Commercial net fishermen continue to resist restrictions that would ‘put them out of the bass business,’ but they say they are under increasing pressure as the battle deepens over this most highly coveted inshore species.  The conflict over bass has pitted fisherman against fisherman, state against state, and in some cases, even region against region.

“The age-old fight between sport and commercial fishermen is most intense in the states where the latter still earn a living netting for bass.  This list includes Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, Virginia, and, to a lesser degree, North Carolina.

“Lately, debate has focused on implementing a pending interstate plan to manage the species…”

The article later notes that

“While sport and commercial fishermen and fishery officials lock horns over regulations, the real culprit—pollution—is being ignored, contends…a third-generation Chesapeake fisherman and  the president of the Maryland Waterman’s Association.

“’The problem is not that we don’t have a good brood stock,’ [he] says, ‘After the fish hatch, they don’t materialize.  From a waterman’s point of view, weather and environmental factors control almost everything.’

“…Harvesting and environmental pressures are involved, and the latter may affect both predation by other species and food availability.  Bass stocks are also affected by meteorological conditions over which man has no control…

“Many ask about the health of Chesapeake Bay itself and wonder about its ability to sustain future populations not only of striped bass but also of kindred anadromous species such as perch and shad.

“…Water quality in the bay is deteriorating…

“The submerged aquatic grasses that nurture marine life in the bay have virtually disappeared.  Nutrient levels enhanced by nitrogen and phosphorus have doubled in the last 20 years, causing algae blooms and cutting the amount of sunlight reaching the bottom.  Dangerous toxins are present.

“Moreover, nearly one-third of the bay is oxygen-deficient from late spring through [fall]…

It’s depressing reading, and I suspect that more than a few folks who read the above lines are putting their personal spin on them, thinking either “Yes!  That’s exactly why the ASMFC should have taken some action last month!” or “That’s just what I’ve been saying.  Fishing regulations won’t improve spawning success.  We need to address the real problems facing striped bass in the Bay.”

So before I go on, I ought to point out one more thing.

The article that I’ve been quoting first appeared in the 1983 Yearbook of National Fisherman.  It addresses the last striped bass stock collapse, which occurred over 40 years ago.  It has nothing to do with the striped bass’ current distress.

Still, it is instructive, for as Mark Twain may (or—more probably—may not) have said,

“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”

So whether or not the striped bass is in exactly the same place it was in four decades ago, there are nonetheless lessons to be learned from the past stock collapse.

One of the biggest lessons may be that it is better to take decisive action, even if that action is somewhat imperfect, than to spend months, perhaps years, looking for the perfect solution.

The last time the striped bass collapsed, it caught just about everyone by surprise.  Just a few years before the collapse began in the late 1970s, 1970 produced the highest juvenile abundance index ever recorded, up to that time, by the Maryland juvenile striped bass survey.  At 30.59, it dwarfed the next-highest figure of 23.50, recorded in 1964; no other year's index had risen above the teens.  Neither fishermen nor fishery managers had an easy time believing that things could have turned bad so soon.  And plenty of big bass were still being caught, which masked the poor recruitment and made it that much harder to believe that the bass was facing a crisis.

And even as the population began to crash, fishery managers and the broader fishing community were slow to take action.  They talked a lot, and tried to find a cause, blaming everything from polychlorinated biphenyls—“PCBs—to sunspots for poor striped bass spawns.

We’re seeing the same sort of thing today.

The comments submitted to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board ahead of its December 16, 2024 meeting include many—in fact, a substantial majority—calling for additional restrictions on the recreational and commercial fisheries, in order to better conserve the striped bass stock.  But the comments also include many dissenting opinions, including a letter from the Cape Cod Charter Boat Association arguing that

“There have been six weak year classes in a row of striped bass spawning in the Chesapeake Bay.  This poor spawning success is not due to overfishing as there is a strong biomass of striped bass, but rather due to environmental factors such as poor water quality.  We would challenge the ASMFC to strongly focus on trying to improve water quality and spawning habitat in the Chesapeake Bay as this seems to be the critical issue.  No cuts or conservation efforts will be successful if the fish cannot spawn successfully.”

They aso include a letter from the Connecticut Charter and Party Boat Association which opposed new restrictions on the recreational fishery because

“One can see by just looking at the ASMFC’s own graphs the exact timeline in which the decline of the menhaden stock and striped bass stock mirror each other.  There currently isn’t enough forage to sustain the present-day striped bass biomass…We are striving to rebuild to an absolute peak target (98% historical high level).  This [target level] was voted on at a time of a healthier Chesapeake and more abundant menhaden stock.”

Another comment, submitted by New Jersey’s Hi-Mar Striper Club, argued

“Increased restrictions on both recreational and commercial Striped Bass fishing, while having many negative economic impacts, have not addressed the problem of poor recruitment.  There are other factors in Chesapeake Bay that are outside of the responsibility for taking action by this Board but must be considered.  These include increased water temperatures, low water levels and pollution from upstream sources, predation of juvenile Striped Bass by the invasive Blue Catfish and the lack of forage due to the allowed decimation of Menhaden stocks by Omega Protein…”

Reading such comments, it’s impossible not to hear echoes of the same arguments made when striped bass faced collapse in the early 1980s, and impossible not to wonder how people have failed to learn from history; how they have failed to hear history rhyme as striped bass recruitment fails and the fish become more at risk of sliding toward another precipitous decline.

Yet people still deny the need for action.  I still have people respond to my blog posts by arguing that regulators are focused on further restricting, and so aren't addressing the heart of the problem, and aren't taking the sort of actions that might rebuild the stock.

To them I respond, “Heed the voice of history; having been in this place before, it will tell us what must be done.”

For the past provides a perfect example.  With the striped bass stock collapsed, and only a single healthy year class, the 1982, to work with, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board sliced through the Gordian knot of debate and adopted Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.

Amendment 3 might have been the shortest amendment ever adopted by the ASMFC.  It ran only three pages.  Once all of the introductory and supporting material is stripped away, the meaningful language read

“The [Interstate Fishery Management Plan] for Striped Bass is hereby amended as follows.  The effective date of this amendment is October 10, 1985.

“Objective 1.  That the states prevent directed fishing mortality on at least 95% of the 1982 year class females, and females of all subsequent year classes of Chesapeake Bay stocks until 95% of the females of these year classes have an opportunity to reproduce at least once.  This objective is intended to apply to the fishery until the 3-year running average of Maryland young-of-year index attains 8.0.  Management measures which accomplish this objective include combinations of the following which insure that no fishing mortality occurs on the target year classes:

a)      Target closures of striped bass fisheries.  Where a state whose waters border on or are tributary to those which are closed should take complimentary actions to insure the enforceability of such closures.

b)     Establishment of minimum size limits below which 95% of females have spawned at least once.

c)      Establishment of minimum size limits in combination with seasonal closures which insure that sub-adult females are not taken in open fisheries.

d)     Elimination of any allowably bycatch below minimum lengths.

Such measures need to be made effective prior to the time at which 1982 year class females become exploitable under a given jurisdiction’s regulations.

Objective 2.  That the Striped Bass Board support restoration efforts in the Delaware River system including the Delaware Bay and that a moratorium on striped bass fishing in the Delaware Bay system be implemented upon the onset of restoration efforts.”

That’s it.  No mention of pollution, water temperatures, water levels, aquatic vegetations, predation, forage fish, or any of the other factors that might have an impact on striped bass reproduction. 

Just a simple reduction—a very significant reduction—in fishing mortality, the one thing that fishery managers can control.

And it worked.

In 1995, just ten years after the adoption of Amendment 3, the ASMFC announced that the striped bass stock had been fully restored.

So today, as we face problems that are similar to, if somewhat less severe than, those which plagued the striped bass stock in the early 1980s, managers would be wise to respond in a similar manner to how they responded in 1985:  Take decisive action to reduce fishing mortality and protect what remains of the large year classes needed to rebuild the striped bass stock.

No, such action won’t address the meteorological conditions that have probably suppressed reproduction, although we can hope that this year’s cold winter might lead to a cool, wet spring and the sort of conditions that juvenile bass need to thrive.  No, such action won’t eliminate whatever pollution, hypoxic conditions, or excess predation might be limiting spawning success.  And yes, any decisive action is likely to impact some stakeholders more than others, and cause some to call it “unfair.”

But what such strong and decisive action will do is protect the overfished striped bass resource, help it to rebuild, and make it more likely that the stock will remain at sustainable levels as it enters an uncertain future.

And maintaining a healthy fish stock, regardless of species, should always be the first priority of fisheries managers.  While it is understandable why managers might be concerned about an action's impact on fisheries-related businesses, over the long term, those businesses need, more than anything else, healthy and sustainable fish stocks; thus, in the long run, the fish should always come first.

It was disappointing that the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board failed to put the bass first and take such decisive action when it met last December 16, although given the uncertainty surrounding the 2024 stock assessment update and the Technical Committee’s advice, it’s not surprising that it did not.

But as the Management Board begins the process of drafting the proposed new Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, it needs to heed one important lesson from the past:  Above all else, take care of the bass.

That might not solve all of the problems.  It might not feel “fair” to everyone in the fishery. 

But as we learned a full forty years ago, if we put bass on the road to recovery, we’ve accomplished the biggest part of the job.  Compared to restoring a healthy and sustainable stock, any other issues are minor, and can wait to be addressed until the primary job is done,.

THE PROBLEM WITH STRIPED BASS HATCHERIES

 

The recent drought in striped bass recruitment has now reached all four of the major striped bass spawning areas, spanning the past six years in Maryland, the single most important such spawning area on the East Coast, four years in Virginia, at least three years in the Delaware River (2024 data has not yet been released) and two in the Hudson River. 

The impact of that drought is now being felt by anglers, with coastal anglers between Maine and Virginia noting a dearth of smaller fish—say, bass under five pounds or so—while recreational fishermen in the Chesapeake Bay tell me that striped bass fishing is the worst that they’ve experienced in decades.,

With fishing that slow, and concerns for the future of the striped bass stock growing, it was probably inevitable that some anglers would start talking about the possibility of replacing at least some of the missing natural reproduction with fish grown in hatcheries.  And that can seem like an attractive option, a future where striped bass factories located up and down the coast would flood coastal ecosystems with millions upon millions of manufactured rubber fish—a term that I admittedly stole from conservation writer Ted Williams, because it describes hatchery fish so well—to entertain anglers and support commercial fisheries. 

There would be no need for current, restrictive regulations, because if you started running low on striped bass, you could just whip up a few million more, release them into various bays and estuaries, and have numbers back up in just a few years.

It’s basically what western states have done with steelhead and salmon, and more and more southern states are doing with seatrout and red drum.  The Texas Parks and Wildlife Department admits that its hatcheries are

“a tool used…to manage the marine fishery along the Texas coast to ensure that harvest levels are sustained and stocks are replenished,  [emphasis added]”

and Coastal Conservation Association Texas, by far the largest anglers’ rights advocacy group in the state, declared the release of such hatcheries one billionth fingerling a “monumental conservation achievement.”

Yet, despite such declaration, the conservation value of hatcheries is very open to question. 

A 2022 article in Hakai magazine noted that the first salmon hatchery was built in 1872, and that there are now at least 243 salmon hatcheries located between California and Alaska, and more in Russia, Japan, and South Korea, which collectively release over five billion salmon per year into the Pacific Ocean.  Yet, despite 150 years of hatchery operations, wild salmon stocks are still struggling, while hatchery fish cause real damage to wild populations, with streams

“crowded with juvenile wild and hatchery fish, living fin to fin, competing for food, and ripe for disease and parasites…Hatchery fish also diminish the genetic robustness of wild salmon when, later in their lives, they enter spawning grounds and interbreed.”

Hatchery salmon are also expensive, with the Hakai article noting that

“How much a hatchery salmon costs varies per hatchery, but 20 years ago, a researcher calculated that to keep salmon swimming in the Columbia and Snake River basins in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, the price tag was US $400 per fish.”

 None of those things bode well for a hatchery-supported striped bass fishery, should such a thing ever come to pass, yet some people are urging the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to give striped bass hatcheries serious consideration.  The December 2024 newsletter of the Jersey Coast Anglers Association carries a long column by Tom Fote, a member of the ASMFC’s Striped Bass Advisory Panel, which addresses the striped bass hatchery issue and notes that

“Hatcheries might be the only way to rebuild the stocks.  This will come down to money and I don’t hold out much hope.  But I feel this may be the only way.”

The column was submitted to the ASMFC as one of the written comments intended to inform its Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board of shareholder sentiment ahead of the Board’s December 16, 2024 meeting, and to the extent that the column also advised that

“Unless we begin really addressing the real reasons we are having low recruitment of striped bass in Chesapeake Bay, just more regulations on fishermen will have no positive impact,”

and given that the Management Board decided to take no action to further conserve the striped bass resource in 2025, it might have had its intended effect. 

But so far, no one at the ASMFC is seriously considering striped bass hatcheries, and that’s a good thing, first because they’d be horribly expensive—far too expensive to be a serious option in today’s political environment.  In addition, it’s not clear that they could make a meaningful contribution to the coastal striped bass population; at a December 2024 meeting of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council, Martin Gary, Director of the Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Division, told the Council that, as a young biologist, he worked at a striped bass hatchery that operated in Maryland during the 1980s and that, even though such hatchery produced a lot of young bass, its production was trivial compared to the number of juvenile bass produced naturally, even in a “mediocre” spawning year.

Finally, striped bass genetics would get in the way, for from a genetic standpoint, a striped bass is not just a striped bass.  There are separate genetic strains, which are particularly suited to specific nursery areas and, in some cases, particular waterways.

North Carolina has learned that the hard way.

For many years, the North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries had stocked striped bass into the lower Cape Fear River, in an effort to supplement natural reproduction that has been impaired by pollution, the construction of dams, and the introduction of non-native predators.  However, the stocked fish failed to spawn successfully, and North Carolina biologists think they know why.  Prior to 2010,

“the broodfish used for hatchery production were taken from the Roanoke River.  The introduction of Roanoke River fish (and their genetics) likely led to the replacement of the original wild strain of Cape Fear River Striped Bass.  Environmental conditions in these two North Carolina rivers are quite different.  Additionally, Striped Bass populations south of Cape Hatteras [including that in the Cape Fear River] typically remain in their home rivers and do not migrate to the ocean, whereas older Striped Bass from the Roanoke River system have been documented migrating as far north as the Gulf of Maine.”

It seems to be a classic example of putting the wrong fish in the wrong place, something that happens quite often when hatchery fish are involved.  So, North Carolina fishery managers now plan to use broodstock from South Carolina’s Cooper River.

“The Cooper system in South Carolina is home to the nearest population of river-resident striped bass.  The switch to South Carolina broodstock is intended to help improve genetic diversity and promote natural reproduction by re-introducing Striped Bass that share a similar riverine life history and experience similar river flows and environmental conditions.”

There is no guarantee that the change will successfully create a naturally-reproducing Cape Fear River population of bass, although hopefully that will occur.  However, the problems that North Carolina fishery managers faced in the Cape Fear River emphasize how important regional differences in genetics can be to the striped bass population, and makes it clear that any hatchery program will have to consider genetics should a striped bass stocking program begin anywhere on the coast.

The South Carolina Department of Natural Resources advises that

“In order to ensure responsible stocking of a species, managers must understand how populations are connected in order to identify appropriate management units.  Over time, populations that are isolated from each other will become genetically different through random processes as well as becoming adapted or best suited for a particular habitat.  If two populations, or rivers in the case of striped bass, have little to no migration of individuals occurring between them, stocking fish from one system into another creates an unnatural migration and could be deleterious to unique beneficial adaptations of the stocked system.”

We should note that, although South Carolina seems to be talking about the geographic isolation of different fish populations, what matters from a genetic standpoint is reproductive isolation; various genetic strains of striped bass might share the same summer feeding grounds, but so long as they spawn in distinctly different areas, they will still be genetically isolated.

South Carolina also informs us that

“Even if fish are stocked into their own system, it is preferable to capture a large number of new broodstock from the wild every year as opposed to maintaining the same broodstock and their offspring over multiple years.  The longer fish are held in captivity, the greater the risk of artificial selection in individuals who survive captivity, which may negatively affect survivability in the wild.  Additionally, if too many few broodstock are used there will not be much diversity in the system since most fish will belong to just a few parents.  Genetic diversity (i.e., genetic health) can be thought of as a toolbox a population has—the more tools in the toolbox the more problems a repairman can fix; similarly, the higher the diversity of a population the more stressors or problems the population can withstand (such as higher summer temperatures the state is experiencing).

While the foregoing comments were specifically intended to address the needs of non-migratory striped bass that reside in southeastern river systems, they are equally applicable to any hatchery program that might be created to augment the migratory population that spawns in the Chesapeake Bay and in the Delaware and Hudson rivers, as those fish also exhibit region-specific genetic adaptations.

About five years ago, the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries released the results of a genetic study that examined the genetic signatures of striped bass sampled between Canada’s Gulf of St. Lawrence and North Carolina’s Cape Fear River.  The study revealed six genetically distinct groups of striped bass.  Three were unique to Canada; the study distinguished between groups of bass in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, New Brunswick’s St. John’s River, and Shubenacadie River in Nova Scotia.

Three distinct groups were also identified along the United States’ East Coast.  One consisted of fish originating in New York’s Hudson River; the same genetic signature occurred in fish from Maine’s Kennebec River, which was stocked with Hudson River fish during the 1980s.  One consisted of fish from both the Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware River.  Ben Gehagen, a Massachusetts biologist, explained that seemingly surprising finding by noting that

“In several tagging studies we’ve observed adult striped bass migrating between upper Chesapeake Bay and the head of Delaware Bay using the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, which was constructed in the early 1800s.  Before the canal was built, fish from each of these estuaries may well have been genetically distinct.  Alternatively, the Chesapeake Bay population may have contributed to the recovery of the Delaware Bay population after the latter collapsed decades ago.”

The third genetic group on the U.S. East Coast consisted of fish from North Carolina’s Roanoke and Cape Fear Rivers; in this case, the stocking of fish from the Roanoke River into the Cape Fear explains why the genetic signatures in bass from the two very different waterways would be the same.

Any striped bass hatchery program would have to keep fish from those three groups separate, or risk introducing bass into the ecosystem that were less genetically fit to survive and reproduce than the natural population.

And even that level of separation might not be enough.  An article in On the Water magazine that discussed the Massachusetts study noted that

“within each of these [genetically distinct] populations, there is likely far finer-scale structuring down to the level of individual tributaries; indeed, the team found some differentiation between fish sampled from eastern and western Chesapeake Bay.”

Although such distinctions are very small and very difficult to determine, and could be masked if just a few individuals from one Chesapeake tributary drifted into and spawned in another, it’s impossible to say whether they might make a significant difference in a bass’ spawning success in one tributary over another.  The question might well depend on whether any fine-scale genetic differences were the result of reproductive isolation and random genetic drift, or whether they represented adaptation to the prevailing conditions in a particular waterway.

Thus, to avoid doing harm while making a meaningful, positive difference in the striped bass fishery, any hatchery program would, first, have to be very large, in order to provide the number of one-year-old (the age at which bass are deemed to recruit into the population) bass needed to substitute for lost natural reproduction.  To do that, without causing long-term genetic harm to the striped bass stock, such hatcheries would have to remove large numbers of broodstock from the population each year, while at the same time assuring that whatever broodstock are taken share the same genetic signatures, not only with respect to the three broad genetic groups, but perhaps down to genetic markers shared only by bass that reproduce in a single river.

Any such hatchery program would, necessarily, be very expensive.  It’s not clear where the funding would come from, as the states are financially strapped, Congress wants to reduce federal spending, and with anglers in New York and New Jersey, at least, unwilling to spend even a trivial amount on a saltwater fishing license, it’s hard to believe that many recreational fishermen would be willing to support a striped bass stamp or similar mechanism that might cost 25, 35, or perhaps 50 dollars or more to build, and then maintain, the hatchery infrastructure.

And hatchery operations would, in themselves, be expensive.  Beyond the cost of breeding the adult fish and growing out fingerling bass until they reached a size likely to survive in the wild, the hatchery would have to engage in an annual effort to obtain fresh broodstock, along with ongoing genetic analysis of such broodstock, to assure that the hatchery wasn’t mixing strains and creating bass less fit to survive in the wild.  And that doesn’t count the ongoing costs of feeding and maintaining the health of the fish as they develop from eggs into fingerlings large enough to release.

In theory, that is all possible, but getting a hatchery program right would take a level of funding and effort that goes far beyond the effort and costs needed to properly manage striped bass by traditional means.  And knowing how government works, it’s all too easy to believe that, even if a hatchery program got off on the right foot, it wouldn’t take long before politicians began cutting corners in the name of “efficiency” and “cost reduction,” so that eventually the striped bass fishery, like that for Pacific salmon, would be dominated by genetically mixed hatchery fish, while native runs languished and perhaps—again like 28 populations of wild salmon and steelhead trout—even earning a listing pursuant to the Endangered Species Act.

Striped bass hatcheries, in the end, would be just lead to new problems, and not to answers.

We already have a wild, reproducing striped bass stock.

The only answer that we need is a good, precautionary management program that will restore it to health, and then ensure that it survives.

 

NMFS SEEKS TO SHARPLY INCREASE SOUTH ATLANTIC RED SNAPPER LANDINGS

 

On January 14, the National Marine Fisheries Service released a proposed rule that, if adopted in its current form, would increase the annual recreational red snapper catch limit in the South Atlantic from 29,656 to 85,000 fish, nearly tripling what it is today, while instituting a comparable increase in the commercial catch limit, raising it from 124,815 to 346,000 pounds.

The same proposed rule, if adopted, is expected to reduce dead discards of red snapper—which represent the primary source of all red snapper fishing mortality in the South Atlantic—by at least 24 percent.

The tradeoff for those benefits is the implementation of a time and area closure, which NMFS euphemistically calls the “Snapper-Grouper Discard Reduction Season,” that would shut down all federal waters between Cape Canaveral, Florida and the Florida/Georgia border to recreational fishermen who seek to fish for, harvest, or possess any species belonging to the South Atlantic snapper-grouper fishery management unit, a complex that includes not only snapper and grouper, but some other reef fish species such as black sea bass, amberjack, and hogfish, for the months of December, January, and February.

Last September, I wrote a piece for the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which explained how recreational bycatch of red snapper in the South Atlantic, and the resulting dead discards, have led to extremely restrictive management measures being imposed on both the recreational and commercial fisheries.  The same piece notes how the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council has refused to take action to reduce such dead discards, how NMFS has failed to step in to end the resulting recreationally-driven overfishing in the red snapper fishery, and how members of the commercial fishing industry ultimately sued NMFS and convinced the agency to enter into a settlement agreement, in which the agency agreed to adopt regulations to rein in the destructive recreational bycatch no later than June 6, 2025.

The proposed rule represents NMFS initial efforts to abide by the terms of its agreement.  In its explanation of the proposed management measures, the agency noted that

“This action is intended to end and prevent overfishing of red snapper while reducing dead discards and providing additional fishing opportunities…

“In the past 2 years, NMFS has been sued three times for the continued overfishing of South Atlantic red snapper.  On August 22, 2024, a Federal District Court approved a settlement agreement between NMFS and the plaintiffs in one of these lawsuits [which requires that a final rule ending such overfishing be published in the Federal Register on or before June 6, 2025]…

“Most of the red snapper fishing mortality is attributed to dead discards in the recreational sector…Recreational fishermen discard red snapper recreational open fishing season and during the closed season when fishers are targeting snapper-grouper species that co-occur with red snapper…approximately 98 percent of all red snapper discard mortalities during 2021-2023 were from the recreational sector.  The current level of discards is resulting in less younger fish, which are more abundant, surviving to the older ages necessary to sustain the population in the long term, particularly if recruitment decreases back to more historical levels.  Additionally, the high level of mortality from discards is reducing and limiting the amount of landed catch.”

It seems like a reasonable argument for the proposed regulations, and even though a lot of folks in northern Florida might not appreciate being singled out for a closed snapper-grouper season, no one has yet come up with a better approach to end overfishing and reduce discard mortality. 

That seems particularly true when once considers that the recreational fishing season for the most important grouper species is already closed in January and February, meaning that the proposed regulation only adds December to the closed grouper season; however, the proposed rule would create a new three-month closure for amberjack, tilefish, and some deep-water snappers, which can currently be caught during that time.

But, reasonable or not, anglers and the angling industry want nothing to do with the proposed regulation.

Some of that resistance comes from anglers choosing not to believe the science, which suggests that the stock is currently on a path to successful rebuilding, but could easily be thrown off that path should recruitment of new fish into the population, which has recently been atypically high, declines to more normal levels.  As noted in an article recently published on the Outdoor Life website,

“anglers say those [red snapper] populations are doing just fine, and that the Feds are trying to fix a problem that doesn’t exist.”

But those angler attitudes are being fed by industry and anglers’ rights organizations that are not presenting a complete nor an entirely honest picture of what NMFS is trying to accomplish, but who are nonetheless being given a lot of free ink by friends in the angling press.

For example, an article in the Daytona Beach News-Press was titled

“NOAA proposes (threatens?) annual 3-month ban on snapper-grouper hookups,”

a heading that would appear intended to predispose readers against the proposed regulations.  But while that article dwells on the downside of the proposed rule—the seasonal closure of the snapper-grouper fishery off northern Florida—it is reasonably honest compared to some of the statements being released by various organizations.

For example, the Outdoor Life article says that

“the American Sportfishing Association points out that the three-month closure would affect all hook-and-line fishing, including trolling,”

but that’s not true.  The proposed regulations would not impact all hook-and-line fishing, but only fishing for species listed as part of the snapper-grouper complex.  Hook-and-line fishing, including trolling, for other species would not be affected.

But don’t take my word for it.  Look at the text of the proposed regulation.  It clearly states

“The discard reduction season…is an area closed to the recreational sector for the harvest of South Atlantic snapper-grouper species by hook-and-line fishing gear (including trolling gear) from January 1 through the end of February and from December 1 through December 31, annually.  The recreational bag limit using hook-and-line fishing gear to harvest South Atlantic snapper-grouper within the discard reduction season closed area…is zero.  During the applicable seasonal closure, no person may harvest or possess any snapper-grouper species in or from the discard reduction season closed area within the South Atlantic EEZ that were recreationally harvested by hook-and-line fishing gear (including trolling gear)…  [emphasis added]”

There’s no mention of sailfish or wahoo, of dolphin or mackerel, or of any other fish at all except those managed as part of the South Atlantic Council’s snapper-grouper management plan, and nothing at all to suggest that “all hook-and-line fishing” would be impacted, as the American Sportfishing Association suggests. 

Thus, the ASA’s comments seem to have unnecessarily alarmed people like north Florida charter boat captain Scott Housel, who was quoted in the Daytona Beach News-Press article as saying

“I don’t understand why they wouldn’t allow trolling during a bottom-fishing closure.  I still have to read all the proposals, but it will really hurt the ‘for-hire’ captains during those months.  We still have bills to pay.”

It would be unfortunate if the American Sportfishing Association’s comments caused captains such as Capt. Housel to oppose the proposed regulations would, based on the false impression that such regulations wouldtsomehow, prevent him for trolling for species that aren’t included in the snapper-grouper management plan.

But then, the American Sportfishing Association is the biggest trade association representing the recreational fishing industry, and the proposed time and area closure would undoubtedly cause some industry members to lose a bit of income, something the ASA acknowledged drove its opposition to the proposed rule.  Martha Guyas, ASA’s regional policy director for the South Atlantic, stated that

“The ASA is deeply disappointed to see NOAA Fisheries propose this drastic action, which may cause irreparable economic damage to the coastal communities and businesses that rely on recreational fishing, as well as recreational fishing manufacturers and suppliers across the country.”

While it would have been nice to see ASA to take the long view, and consider how a fully rebuilt red snapper fishery—perhaps one that even rebuilds ahead of schedule—might benefit the Association’s members, a trade association is, after all, about increasing trade, the ASA’s somewhat breathless resistance to any proposal that might impair a few members’ short-term cash flow is at least somewhat understandable.

Less understandable, and far less forgivable, were the comments made by the Coastal Conservation Association which, according to Outdoor Life, said

“the proposal ’drops [a] solution in search of a problem’ and is proof that the federal management system is broken,”

for blaming the "federal management system"—which presumably means NMFS—for the current effort to reduce recreational red snapper discards, without mentioning that the agency was compelled to do so by a settlement in a lawsuit that it otherwise was just about certain to lose, is in my view nothing short of dishonest and intentionally misleading. 

Anglers are killing far more red snapper as bycatch than they are landing and taking home, and one would think that any group that labels itself a “Conservation Association” would like to reduce such waste of an important natural resource.

Of course, it has been a very long time since the Coastal Conservation Association, at least at the national level, has had much to do with conservation.  Today, it seems to have fully transformed itself into an “anglers rights” organization that seeks to do little besides opposing federal fisheries managers and seeking ways for their members to kill more fish; just about everyone concerned with fisheries management in the southeast has heard CCA's “the federal management system is broken” refrain for so long that, except for politicians receiving campaign contributions from the recreational fishing industry, it is largely ignored.

Yet those well-supported politicians remain a thorn in the side of fisheries managers.

Just three weeks ago, I predicted that, in the upcoming year,

“we can expect to see an activist, conservation-averse Congress shutting down important conservation initiatives [and] interfering in the work of professional fisheries managers,”

and that prediction has certainly come true in the case of South Atlantic red snapper.

On January 22, Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) issued a press release that read, in part,

“Senator Rick Scott joined Congressmen John Rutherford and Darren Soto to introduce the bipartisan, bicameral Red Snapper Act to stop the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) from unilaterally closing the Red Snapper fishery in the South Atlantic until a full South Atlantic Great Red Snapper Count study is complete.  A recreational fishing closure would be devastating for coastal economies in the South Atlantic with widespread impacts on charter captains, anglers, and local businesses.”

Not surprisingly, the press release also notes that

“The Red Snapper Act is also endorsed by the American Sportfishing Association (ASA), Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation (CSF), the Center for Sportfishing Policy (CSP), and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC).”

It’s not particularly clear what the bill’s sponsors are attempting to achieve, other than preventing professional fisheries managers from doing their jobs.  The “Great Red Snapper Count” concept originated in the Gulf of Mexico, where that same coterie of industry advocates and anglers’ rights groups managed to convince their favored legislators to fund such a study there; although it did provide some surprising new information on red snapper distribution, it ultimately had little impact on management decisions.  In fact, independent scientists questioned whether the Gulf’s Great Red Snapper Count should be incorporated into the population model used in Gulf red snapper stock assessments.

The South Atlantic Great Red Snapper Count could easily meet the same fate. 

While it may—or may not—provide significant new information about South Atlantic red snapper, the South Atlantic Great Red Snapper Count’s usefulness as anything more than a public relations tool for the recreational fishing industry has yet to be demonstrated.  Even now, with the Count not yet completed, biologists seem to believe that they have a good handle on red snapper science; the proposed regulations would set the Acceptable Biological Catch for South Atlantic red snapper only eight percent below the overfishing limit, with that small difference constituting a buffer accounting for any scientific uncertainty.

Thus, by any objective measure, the regulations recently proposed by NMFS seem to represent a rational solution to the problem of recreational red snapper bycatch in the South Atlantic.

There may be better solutions out there, but so far the groups that oppose the proposed rule have not proposed them; instead, they have done nothing more than impede any progress toward resolving the issue.  The angling industry and related organizations have not yet even owned up to the problem posed by recreational bycatch, much less propose their own solution to address the issue, other than to demand that, instead of killing fish and then returning those fish to the water, that they instead be allowed to kill more fish and take them home.

So long as those organizations provide no constructive input to the management process, but choose to merely cast stones at those trying to conserve and rebuild the South Atlantic red snapper stock, the proposed regulation, with its increased landings and reduced recreational discards, is probably the best solution that we’re going to see.