I don’t typically discuss allocation issues in One Angler’s Voyage.
This blog is dedicated to fisheries conservation, and
promoting management strategies that provide a greater abundance of marine
resources. Since conservation
is all about constraining removals to sustainable levels, and not about who gets
to do the removing, allocation is generally irrelevant to the conservation discussion.
I make only one exception to that general rule, and that is when a particular sector, jurisdiction, or other entity feels
entitled to warp the allocation process, in order to gather a disproportionate
share of the resource for itself.
Fishery management is, after all, a zero-sum game; there is a finite
limit to the number of fish that can be sustainably landed, so when anyone
tries to hoard fish for themselves, they are necessarily denying a share of
that resource to others.
Such resource grabs generally take two different forms.
We see them when states, sectors, or similar entities try to corral a higher percentage of landings, not because
conditions have changed, but merely because they feel entitles to a bigger piece
of the pie (think of anglers
seeking “gamefish status” for commercially valuable species, or fishermen on for-hire vessels being
allowed to retain 5 bluefish per day, when all other anglers may only keep 3).
We also see it when conditions change, to the point
where reallocation is called for, but those who have historically accessed the
fish refuse to give up quota to those in the best position to access the fish today.
Ironically, when states are involved, it is often the
jurisdictions that repeatedly demand special considerations for themselves that
most aggressively oppose giving any consideration to others.
We saw just such an issue arise at the winter meeting of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board.
“Over the last decade, the distribution of the black sea bass
stock has changed, abundance and biomass have increased significantly, and
there have been corresponding changes in fishing effort and behavior…Since [the
mid-2000s], the biomass in the northern region has grown considerably. Although the amount of biomass in the
southern region has not declined in recent years, the northern region currently
accounts for the majority of spawning stock biomass…
“In some cases, expansion of the black sea bass stock into
areas with historically minimal fishing effort has created significant
disparities between state allocations and current abundance and resource
availability. The most noteworthy
example is Connecticut, which has experienced significant increases in black
sea bass abundance and fishery availability in Long Island Sound in recent
years but is only allocated 1% of the coastwide commercial quota (this
allocation was based loosely on landings from 1980 to 2001).”
Addendum XXXIII sought to correct Connecticut’s problem by
raising its share of the coastal commercial harvest from 1% to 3%, and reducing
the shares of most other coastal states by anywhere between 0.19% to 0.35% in
order to do so.
That was fine as far as it went, but it didn’t go far
enough.
Connecticut’s case for a larger quota was based on an
influx of black sea bass into Long Island Sound. But Long Island Sound has two shores; the
North Shore of Long Island, along with some coastline in Westchester, Queens,
and Bronx counties, too, also border the Sound. In the past decade or so, black sea bass have
recently become available to fishermen from those regions, too, but the ASMFC’s
Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board didn’t see fit to
give New York’s commercial fishermen the same consideration that they gave
those along the Connecticut shore.
That wasn’t the way that things were originally intended to
be.
“Modified Option B—Increase CT to 3% and NY to 9%, with the
change occurring over 2 years.”
Pursuant to such motion, both Connecticut and New York would have had their
black sea bass quotas increased by 2%, to address the recent movement of fish into
Long Island Sound.
But there were states that, while sympathetic to Connecticut’s
plight, had no sympathy at all for New York, and stripped the increase in New York’s quota out of the final motion.
When you take the time to look at where the most adamant
opposition came from, an interesting pattern emerges.
For
example, the initial effort to strip any increase away from New York was made
by John Clark, the Delaware fisheries manager;
his substitute motion also included additional management provisions intended
to
provide
“necessary stability to harvesters in the southern region
[which includes Delaware], who haven’t been catching their allocations. [emphasis added]”
Effectively, he sought to prevent quota from flowing to New York fishermen, that would allow them to participate in the new black sea bass fishery in Long Island Sound, in order to allow the southern states to retain quota that they weren't using.
That sort of thinking that makes it easy to understand why gluttony was included among the Seven Deadly Sins, because
“gorging by the prosperous may leave the needy hungry.”
Given that the southern states opposed providing some
quota for fishermen on the New York side of Long Island Sound, despite the fact
that they weren’t using all of the quota that they’ had been given, it
makes sense that greed,
which might be defined as
“an
inordinate desire to acquire or possess more than one needs,”
has also long held a place among the same Deadly Seven.
That’s not to say that Delaware—or John Clark—is always
opposed to reallocation.
When the proposed Public Information Document For
Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass
was being discussed at the October 2020 meeting of the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped
Bass Management Board, Clark was 100% on board with including language that, if
ultimately included in Amendment 7, would change the striped bass allocation—and
let Delaware kill some additional fish.
In fact, Clark laid out a clear argument as to why Delaware
was a victim of special conditions, and why Delaware ought to
have a chance at a harvest increase.
So Delaware clearly understands why exceptional
conditions might justify a new allocation that benefits Delaware. It’s only when such special conditions
impacted another state—in the case of black sea bass, New York—that they no longer
justified reallocation.
Of course, when it came to gluttony or
greed, Delaware wasn’t the only sinner in the room.
There was, for example, Tom Fote, the Governor’s Appointee
from New Jersey, another state in the southern region for black sea bass. He argued, in part, that
“when I look at New York, I don’t hear them saying, well we’ll
take 8 percent or 7 percent [which would have been pointless, as 7 percent is what New York already had] instead of going
to 9 percent. They’re just looking for an
increase, the same way they have looked at summer flounder and other
species. They use the excuse of climate
change and those fish are moving north, and a lot of the time it’s just because
there are bigger fish up north, and they’re landing by the size of the fish,
and you pushed us out.”
Michael Luisi, the Maryland fishery manager, called the
increase in New York’s allocation a “handout,” and said
“I do not support the handout to New York with its base
allocation increasing it to 9 percent.”
But what about handouts when Maryland or New Jersey is the
beneficiary?
Those, it seems, are OK.
New Jersey certainly has a long history of them.
Consider summer flounder.
“imposes a de facto moratorium in recreational summer
flounder fishing in my state,”
and proposed less restrictive regulations for the ASMFC’s approval. But
the scientists on the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Technical Committee
found that the New Jersey proposal fell short of the required reductions, and
the Management Board let the proposal die, with no one willing to even second
New Jersey’s motion and allow discussion.
It was a “handout” that New Jersey had no problem with—no problem
at all.
Even though Fote, the New Jersey Commissioner, had a big
problem with New York getting a little more black sea bass quota.
And then, there’s New Jersey and striped bass.
In
2019, a benchmark stock assessment found striped bass to be both overfished and
subject to overfishing. The ASMFC
initiated an
addendum that was intended to reduce coastwide fishing mortality by 18%, and
reduce it to or below the fishing mortality target. On the recreational side, a one-fish bag and
28- to 35-inch slot limit was expected to get the job done.
Except that New
Jersey thought it was special, and shouldn’t have to make such reduction. Instead, it fought for—and eventually got—a broader,
28- to 38-inch slot, that allowed it to kill more bass than its
neighbors.
The results of that were striking.
New Jersey had no problem with that, although they did
have a very big problem with New York getting a mere 2% of
additional black sea bass quota.
In Maryland, something very similar also unfolded.
Amendment 6 to the
Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass says that
“If the Management Board determines that the fishing
mortality target is exceeded in two consecutive years and the female spawning
stock biomass falls below the target within either of those years, the
Management Board must the striped bass management program to reduce the fishing
mortality rate to a level that is at or below the target within one year.”
Maryland
agreed to that language when Amendment 6 was adopted in 2003.
After
that effort failed, Maryland voted to approve Addendum IV to Amendment 6 to
the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan
which, among other things, required recreational fishermen in the Chesapeake
Bay to reduce fishing mortality by 20.5%.
As things turned out,
recreational fishermen in the Bay, and particularly in Maryland, failed to meet
that reduction. In fact, they actually increased
their fishing mortality by more than 50% in 2015. Maryland felt no remorse, nor felt any
need to revise its fishing regulations. Its fisheries manager, Michael
Luisi, actually argued that such obvious failure represented successful fisheries
management, since the coastal fisheries cut mortality far more than they needed
to, and thus more than covered Maryland’s excesses.
At
a later meeting, Luisi went so far as to say that
“I don’t think it was ever anybody’s expectation that we
would maintain some sort of a constant harvest strategy while we have the
influence of year class strengths that we do.
It would suggest to me that this conversation about finding or
maintaining a harvest level at or below the 2012 harvest, it wasn’t something
that was going to happen…”
Or, to put it another way, “Yes, Maryland voted for Addendum
IV, which said that we were going to reduce fishing mortality in
the Chesapeake Bay by 20.5%, compared to 2012.
But just because we said that would happen didn’t mean
that we actually had any intention of doing it. If you were stupid enough to believe we’d be
true to our word, that was your problem.”
So yeah, Maryland felt completely entitled to all of the fish
its anglers took in excess of the Addendum IV benchmark—but giving New York
another 2% of the black sea bass quota was clearly a “handout.”
Given the sort of things described above, it’s somewhat
disconcerting, perhaps even shocking, to see how some people at the
ASMFC think. They feel perfectly comfortable claiming
special harvest privileges for themselves, with little or no justification, but
are resistant to and resentful of giving even a modicum of relief to other
states, regardless of the justification.
They are greed—perhaps to the point of gluttony—and entitlement
personified.
That sort of entitlement hurt New York’s would-be black sea
bass fishermen in Long Island Sound, and will continue to do so if an appeal that
New York filed is turned down by the Interstate Fishery Management Policy Board
on this coming Thursday.
But that same sort of entitlement also threatens
other fisheries, such as the striped bass, as commissioners
from states such as New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, which I understandably
characterized as an “axis of evil” in an earlier essay, prove willing to put the
long-term health of the stock at risk in order to increase their fishermen’s
short-term landings.
“Sustainable and Cooperative Management of Atlantic Coastal Fisheries.”
But such sustainability can only be achieved if states are
willing to truly cooperate with one another, and not just look out for
themselves.
And such cooperation can only be assured if the states that
are willing to work together fiinally stop tolerating that states willing to work only for
themselves.
“
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