EXECUTIVE ORDER COULD IMPACT MID-ATLANTIC RECREATIONAL FISHERIES

 

As many readers of this blog already know, on May 7, President Trump issued the “Executive Order on American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth,” which, among other things, directed the Secretary of Commerce to

“request each Regional Fishery Management Council to submit, within 180 days of the date of this order, a prioritized list of recommended actions to reduce burdens on domestic fishing and increase the production within sustainable fisheries, including a proposal for initiating each recommended action within 1 year of the date of this order.”

Although the Executive Order made no distinction between commercial and recreational fisheries, the feeling at the time that it was issued was that it was not directed at the recreational sector.  A press release issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration stated that one purpose of the Executive Order was

“Regulatory reform to maximize commercial fishing,  [emphasis added]”

which served to exacerbate concerns that the response to the Executive Order might elevate the commercial over the recreational sector.  However, at the time that it was issued, the Executive Order’s applicability to the recreational sector was not at all clear.

The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council resolved such ambiguity by deciding that the Executive Order applied to both the commercial and recreational sectors.  Its Executive Committee

“discussed whether it would be appropriate to include recreational-focused recommendations in the Council’s response [to the Executive Order] and ultimately agreed that nothing in the EO precludes recreational issues…the Committee directed staff to develop two additional recommendations to address (1) the Council’s ongoing Recreational Reform Initiative and any resulting actions, and (2) a request for clarification regarding the application of the Modernizing Recreational Fisheries Act within the constraints of National Standard 1 guidelines.”

While neither of those issues necessarily create problems, largely because Council actions will remain subject to the provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, they need to be monitored closely, because there are Council members, and various industry and “anglers’ rights” organizations, who are intent on using both as vehicles to undercut the Council’s generally good record on fisheries conservation and management. 

I wrote about the Council’s “Recreational Reform Initiative” a few weeks ago.  Pursuant to that initiative, the Council is looking at a lot of things that, if addressed correctly, could prove worthwhile, particularly new statistical approaches that will allow scientists to better address imprecise or inadequate data. 

It’s also considering changing recreational specifications—the annual catch limit, recreational harvest limit, and similar factors that are used to set regulations—less often, to coincide with stock assessment updates rather than on an annual basis.  

At one time, I would have opposed such an idea, as the Council typically assesses stocks on about a five year basis, and five years is a long time to go before taking a look at whether fish are being adequately protected, particularly in the case of stocks which are overfished or declining in abundance.  However, the Council now plans to update the bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass assessments every two years, and so long as it keeps to that schedule, setting specifications after each update should not be unduly risky.   

Yet a comment made at a Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Monitoring Committee meeting illustrates why there is reason to approach “recreational reform” with caution.  A report of that Committee’s May 28 meeting states that

“One Monitoring Committee member noted that it could be difficult to explain to stakeholders why they may have to forego potential liberalizations in the interim years under this approach.  [emphasis added]”

There were no reported concerns of having to explain why, if the Council (and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, which is the Council’s partner in the reform endeavor) failed to implement more restrictive measures in the face of what might be a quickly declining stock, it shouldn't also be concerned with public opinion, particularly if such inaction caused a stock to become overfished.

Such asymmetrical concerns—worrying about the consequences of not allowing anglers to kill more fish when the stock is expanding, but not seeming particularly concerned about failing to rein in the kill when the same stock declines—says a lot about what, and who, is driving the “recreational reform” movement at the Council.

While professional fisheries managers may be driving the effort for better statistical approaches to utilizing imperfect data, the drive for “flexibility,” and getting around the strict application of data-based recreational harvest limits, is largely being supported by various elements of the recreational fishing industry, including some industry voices who sit on the Council and ASMFC.  As is often the case which such efforts, industry proponents of recreational reform seem far more concerned with the short-term economic impacts of fisheries management than on the long-term health of fish stocks.

Thus, at least some aspects of the reform initiative are tainted by a bias toward increasing or, at best, maintaining harvest levels, rather than toward taking prompt action to reduce landings if such action is in the best interests of the fish stock.

That is most apparent in a so-called “control rule” proposal being pushed by the same folks who have spent the last six years or so trying to undercut the federal fisheries management system in the Gulf of Mexico—the Center for Sportfishing Policy, and its constituent organizations, the American Sportfishing Association, Coastal Conservation Association, National Marine Manufacturers’ Association, and Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation—along with the Recreational Fishing Alliance, which are now bringing their self-indulgent opposition to firm recreational harvest limits and angler accountability out of the Gulf and into other regions, including the mid-Atlantic.

The contemplated control rule, while loosely tied to the health of fish stocks, would forego proven, data-driven management measures, in favor of a sort-of touchy-feely standard that would set regulations, when fish were at very high levels of abundance, at the

“most liberal measures preferred by anglers when biomass is high,”

while regulations for an overfished stock would be the

“most restrictive measures that could be tolerated without major loss of business,”

whether or not such measures, while grudgingly accepted by business, would be restrictive enough to be tolerated by a stock of fish that was already overdue for meaningful regulation.

I raised that point at a recent meeting of a committee of the National Academy of Sciences, that was convened to consider the Marine Recreational Information Program, used to estimate anglers’ effort, catch, and landings, and possible use of “alternative” fishery management measures.  It turned out that a proponent of the control rule approach, who is also a member of the Council and a delegate to the ASMFC, took exception to my comments.

He said that the lower bound of the control rule, to be used when a stock is overfished, wasn’t merely the most restrictive regulations that could be “tolerated without major loss of business,” but also those that would be used when, as he explained it, more restrictive regulations wouldn’t rebuild the fishery.  

He used the overfished weakfish stock as an example.

And that, too, demonstrated why the control rule proposal is a bad idea; it would allow members of the Council or ASMFC, who have no scientific training but do have industry affiliations, and not qualified fisheries biologists, decide when more restrictive management measures won’t do any good.

Because he got the weakfish story a little bit wrong.  

A 2009 stock assessment found the stock to be badly “depleted,” due not to overfishing but to a sharp increase in natural mortality.  The stock assessment noted that

“little stock growth is possible with current high mortality levels, even under a harvest moratorium.  This is because current fishing mortality represents a small component of total mortality, thus reducing the management ‘leverage’ considerably.”

My non-science-minded critic, I suppose, took that to mean that additional management measures wouldn’t do the weakfish any good.  But that’s not exactly what the scientists said.  In fact, information provided in the assessment indicated that, for two out of the three levels of natural mortality considered, if a moratorium was imposed in 2009, by 2020 the stock would be more than twice the size it would be under status quo management.

Dr. David Pierce, of the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries, looked at that information and said

“If we have a moratorium we double the current biomass and we get approximately, well, a little over halfway, towards our target spawning stock biomass.  If natural mortality decreases for any good reason, then obviously we will be rebuilding faster than the projections indicate.  So it’s easy for me to say…that a moratorium seems to be the right way to go, but that’s the conclusion I draw.”

That’s the difference between a scientist looking at the data, and coming to a reasoned conclusion about how to best manage the stock, and an untrained layman with industry connections looking at the same data, and making the possibly self-serving decision that further management measures—management measures greater what “could be tolerated by business”—will to be no avail.

And that’s why key management decisions, such as harvest levels, need to be set by formally-trained fisheries managers, and not the untrained members of management bodies.  One sees the data, and acts accordingly, while the other sees what he or she wants to see, and acts in accord with his or her supposed best interests.

Yet by incorporating the Council’s Recreational Reform Initiative into the list of matters that falls under the Executive Order, which makes no bones about the fact that it emphasizes “economic growth,” there is the risk that the focus of management could shift from the health of fish stocks to short-term profits, and give the untrained amateurs too much authority to decide issues better decided by experts.

Incorporating the Modernizing Recreational Fisheries Management Act (Modern Fish Act) issues into the list of matters impacted by the Executive Order is far less problematic, because the Modern Fish Act always was about elevating the short-term desires of anglers and the angling industry above the long-term health of fish stocks.  Although the version of the Modern Fish Act ultimately adopted by Congress was far less malign than some of its earlier iterations, it was all about the recreational sector killing more fish—mostly red snapper—than they were allowed to kill before.

The law that Congress eventually passed contains language that gave regional fishery management councils

“the authority to use fishery management measures in a recreational fishery (or the recreational component of a mixed-use fishery) in developing a fishery management plan, plan amendment, or proposed regulations, such as extraction rates, fishing mortality targets, harvest control rules, or traditional or cultural practices of native communities in such fishery or fishery component.”

It’s not surprising that the Council is seeking clarification of such language, because nothing in Magnuson-Stevens, and nothing in the Guidelines that the National Marine Fisheries Service has published to assist such regional fishery management councils to comply with Magnuson-Stevens, suggests that such management measures couldn't be used before—so long as such measures don’t allow overfishing, provide for the timely rebuilding of overfished stocks, don’t lead to the annual catch limit being exceeded, and provide for fishermen to be held accountable for excessive landings.

The Modern Fish Act doesn’t change those requirements at all, as Section 301 of that law specifically provides that

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as modifying the requirements of sections 301(a), 302(h)(6), 202(a)(15), or 304(e), or the equal application of such requirements and other standards and requirements under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) to commercial, charter, and recreational fisheries, including each component of mixed-use fisheries.”

Given that language, which seems to make the previously quoted provision of the Modern Fish Act largely pointless, one might expect the Council to seek a bit of guidance.

But, once again, what might seem like a routine inquiry could give rise for concern when it’s made in connection with an Executive Order that raises economic considerations over concerns for healthy and sustainable fish stocks.

Which, in the end, points out why we need a strong and clearly-worded Magnuson-Stevens, that makes conservation its first priority, implicitly recognizing that the U.S. can only have healthy fisheries if it first enjoys fish stocks that are sustainable in the long term.