It’s not unusual to find the United States taking a
different position on fisheries matters from the one staked out by Japan and
China. That scenario repeated itself
again at last week’s annual meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas, but with an interesting and disturbing twist.
Typically, the United States assumes the role of conservation
advocate, while China and Japan are usually among the nations most resistant to
conservation measures. But when protections
for the badly overfished shortfin mako shark were discussed that year, that
historical relationship was stood on its head; while China
and Japan joined a host of other nations that supported a complete ban on mako
landings, the United States staked out the most conservation-averse position of
any country at the meeting, although the European Union and Curacao also
opposed a landings ban.
As author
David Shiffman noted in a recent article that appeared in Gizmodo, the ban on
mako landings
“failed to pass…due to objections from the European Union
(EU) and the U.S., two political bodies not traditionally thought of as ocean
conservation ‘bad guys.’”
Shiffman went on to explain that
“The specific proposal that ocean conservationists were
closely following called for a total prohibition on landing mako sharks. Any sharks accidentally caught by tuna
fishermen would have to be released (or discarded dead, because saying ‘you can’t
sell them unless they’re dead when they reach your boat’ creates some perverse
incentives). ICCAT’s scientific advisory
committee recommended the total prohibition, and noted that it might take up to
50 years for overfished mako shark populations to recover even if all fishing
stops now. The measure, which was led by
Senegal and Canada, was ultimately defeated because the EU and the U.S. (the
top- and third-ranking fishing nations that are parties to ICCAT for mako sharks
by landings) didn’t want a total prohibition on landings, preferring to still
allow some fishing.”
“It is vital to this [EU pelagic longline] fleet to keep
retaining on board individuals that arrive dead to the vessel in order to limit
the socio-economic impacts of the non-retention policy,”
Shiffman observed that
“the nation that proposed the most troubling alternative to
the scientist-recommended total ban on keeping mako sharks caught as bycatch
was the U.S.”
That observation was supported by the
comments of an attorney representing one of the conservation groups supporting
the retention ban, who said
“Of three ICCAT proposals to limit the catch of mako sharks,
the U.S. proposal was the only one that would allow killing of makos that make
it to the boat alive.”
“The United States advanced a no retention measure that
offered an incentive to member nations if they reduced their mortality of
shortfin mako by 80%, which would have resulted in less mortality than a simple
no-retention policy.”
Exactly how a proposal that permitted some killing of sharks
would lead to less fishing mortality than a proposal which did not permit such
killing at all was not explained in any way, although the claim is certainly
counterintuitive--which in this context can be read as synonymous with “dubious.”
Given that the statement also notes that one of the United
States’ priorities for the ICCAT meeting was
“A one-year extension of current management measures for
North Atlantic shortfin mako shark while the Commission works toward adoption
of a comprehensive rebuilding program,”
it’s easy to believe that the U.S. wasn’t all that
interested in reaching consensus on mako management measures at the recent
ICCAT meeting, and that it was probably happy to torpedo other members’ efforts
to adopt stricter measures this year.
The big question is why the United States was on the wrong
side of the shortfin mako conservation issue.
Although it has the third-highest landings of all the ICCAT contracting
members, it’s commercial fishery for shortfin makos isn’t really that big; in
2017, the last year for which data is available, such landings only totaled about
270,000 pounds,
and had an ex vessel value of about $360,000.
However, the United States, unlike other ICCAT nations, also
hosts a significant recreational fishery for shortfin makos. It’s difficult to compare the landings in
that fishery to those in the U.S. commercial fishery, for mako landings aren’t broken
out in the Marine Recreational Information Program. The best available source in the National
Marine Fisheries Service’s Large Pelagics Survey, even though that survey is
limited to anglers fishing from ports between Virginia and Maine, and only
to those fishing during the months of June through October.
The Large Pelagic Survey’s limited geographical coverage
means that it undercounts recreational mako landings, because some such
landings do occur in waters south of Virginia, even if most recreational shark fishing is concentrated in the New England and
Mid-Atlantic regions.
Even with the Large Pelagic Survey’s very real
limitations, it reveals that, in 2017, anglers landed nearly 2,500 shortfin
makos. The survey only reports landings
in numbers of fish, not in pounds, but even if we assume that such makos
averaged a very modest 125 pounds apiece, 2017 recreational landings would have
been well over 300,000 pounds, and thus more than 10 percent higher than the U.S.’s
commercial landings for that year.
And as anyone who has done even a modest amount of offshore
fishing knows, it’s not a cheap sport.
It’s a virtual certainty that the money that anglers spent to capture
those fish totaled well over the $360,000 that the commercially-caught fish
were initially sold for.
Just one offshore-capable fishing boat often costs
far more than that.
When everything is considered, including the cost of boats
and engines, maintenance, dockage, electronics, fishing tackle, fuel, bait and chum, not to mention
the revenues connected with the many mako/shark tournaments that remain at
least somewhat popular throughout southern New England and the upper
Mid-Atlantic, it becomes clear that the recreational shortfin mako fishery currently
confers substantial economic benefits on coastal communities in that region.
And given that recreational fishermen bring virtually all of
their makos to the boat while those fish are still alive and can be successfully
released, there is the real possibility that the prohibition on mako landings proposed at ICCAT could have resulted in real economic losses to some coastal
businesses. Although the U.S. ICCAT representatives haven’t yet made a
public statement as to why they refused to go along with the landings prohibition,
such prohibition’s impacts on the recreational mako fishery was probably high
on their list.
The problem with that sort of thinking is that a continuing
decline in shortfin mako abundance, and a continuing lack of availability of
makos to anglers, is going to have the same sort of impact, and if the stock is allowed to decline further, such impacts
are likely to extend for a much longer time.
But it’s unlikely that any of the fishing-related businesses are
thinking that far ahead. Even if all
shortfin mako harvest was halted today, it would still take around 50 years to
rebuild the stock; given that timeframe, it’s likely that most recreational
fishing businesses are adhering to their usual short-term outlook, and are
trying to take as much as they can out of the fishery before it collapses, because
they know that they won’t live long enough to profit from any eventual
recovery.
That’s a sad way to look at fisheries issues, but it’s the
only management philosophy which might explain the United States’ position at
the recent ICCAT meeting. That U.S.
position, and its underlying philosophy, was widely condemned after ICCAT
failed to follow scientific advice to the contrary.
“A clear and simple remedy was within reach. Yet the EU and US put short-term fishing
interests above all else and ruined a golden opportunity for real
progress. Its truly disheartening and
awful.”
“Conservationists are shocked and distressed that the
European Union and the United States—despite long promoting science-based shark
conservation—were the main obstacles to the adoption of urgently needed
protections for mako sharks at the annual meeting of the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Ten countries, led by Senegal and Canada,
proposed and fought for consensus on banning retention of seriously overfished
North Atlantic shortfin makos, as ICCAT scientists advise. Yet the EU and US refused to give up on
exceptions for hundreds of tons of the Endangered species to be landed. ICCAT scientists estimate this population
could take four or five decades to recover, even if fishing stops. Lack of consensus allows status quo fishing
at unsustainable levels to continue.”
”…No countries spoke in favor of the competing EU or US
proposals, although Curacao added their name to the US proposal.”
That last fact, alone, is eloquent testimony to the fact that the U.S.
position lacked any real worth.
Now that the ICCAT meeting has ended, the mako’s fate is no
better than it was before that meeting began.
The parties have agreed to a special meeting next summer, in an effort
to work out an agreement that will end overfishing and perhaps begin a real
effort to rebuild the stock.
It’s hard to be optimistic about that meeting's outcome.
Given the United States’ new-found hostility to marine resource conservation,
and given the marked decline in mako populations that I’ve seen in my forty or
so years in the northeastern shark fishery, I have a very hard time believing that
anything will change for the good over the next few years.
Still, I hope for the best.
Given the outcome of the latest ICCAT meeting, it seems that
hope is the only thing that I, and the mako, have left.
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