The best fisheries management ideas are essentially
worthless if they aren’t enforced.
Thus, when the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act was reauthorized a decade ago, it
included the provision that
“establish a mechanism for establishing annual catch limits
in the plan (including a multiyear plan), implementing regulations, or annual
specifications, at a level such that overfishing does not occur in the fishery,
including
measures to ensure accountability.
[emphasis added]”
Prior to the adoption of such provision, there was often a
real incentive for fishermen to fight against the sort of restrictive fishery
management measures that were sometimes needed to constrain harvest within
biologically appropriate levels.
While
some commercial fisheries, managed on a hard-quota basis even before such
reauthorization took place, did require paybacks of harvest overages in
previous years, fisheries without hard quotas faced few consequences, other
than an increasing shortage of fish, for chronically overfishing target stocks.
The groundfish stocks managed by the New England Fishery
Management Council, which eschewed hard-poundage quotas for such so-called “input
controls” such as limiting days at sea, probably provides the best example of
unaccountable fisheries. Overfishing such stocks was not subject to any sort of
meaningful penalties. As a result, a 2008 assessment
of groundfish stocks found important fish such as cod and various
flounder to be badly overfished.
Recreational fisheries, too, were historically immune to any
sort of meaningful payback program; overages might result in tightened
regulations, but the annual recreational catch limit was not reduced as a
result. The recreational red snapper
fishery in the Gulf of Mexico was a prime example of anglers not being held
accountable for overfishing; even
though they chronically exceeded their annual catch limit, they did not face
any sort of payback until a framework amendment to the fishery management plan
was adopted in 2014.
Such accountability measures help to assure that NMFS’ conservation
and stock rebuilding measures remain on track, and that United States citizens
can enjoy the benefits that flow from healthy, fully-restored fish stocks.
However, while it is important to hold fishermen accountable
in order to properly manage fish stocks, it is even more important to keep
fishery managers accountable to the public for their obligation to restore and
properly manage fish stocks. It is in
this realm of accountability that Magnuson-Stevens shines particularly bright,
and where it is far superior to any state’s fishery management laws.
Much of that superiority arises out of Magnuson-Stevens' clear guidelines. Overfishing must
be ended. Stocks must be rebuilt as
quickly as possible, within a time certain that is very clearly set out in the
law. Annual catch limits must
be established, and the best available science must be used to establish
management measures.
Those clear standards make it relatively easy for aggrieved parties
to put federal fisheries managers back on their proper course should they veer
astray for any reason.
As early as 2000,
a federal appellate court decided the case of Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Daley, where such court found that
“’to assure’…achievement of the target [fishing mortality
rate], to ‘prevent overfishing,’ and ‘to be consistent with’ the fishery management
plan, the [total allowable landings] must have had at least a 50% chance of
attaining a [fishing mortality rate] of 0.24 or lower…
“The disputed 1999 [total allowable landings] had at most an
18% likelihood of achieving the target [fishing mortality rate]. Viewed differently, it had at least an 82%
chance of resulting in [a fishing mortality rate] greater than the target
[fishing mortality rate]. Only in
Superman Comics’ Bizarro world, where reality is turned upside down, could the
[National Marine Fisheries] Service reasonably conclude that a measure that is
at least four times as likely to fail as to succeed offers a ‘fairly high level
of confidence.”
With those words, the court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Daley established a legal
standard for federal fisheries managers, requiring that any federal fishery
management plan had to have at least a 50-50 chance of achieving its goals,
including the goal of preventing overfishing.
Such a standard could never have been established without the clear
guidelines established by Magnuson-Stevens.
Recently, the United States Department of Commerce, acting
through its subsidiary agency, NMFS, has taken an action that should qualify
the people involved as permanent residents of Bizarro world comics.
Magnuson-Stevens includes, in its
National Standard One, a crystal-clear requirement that
“Conservation and management measures shall prevent
overfishing,”
“The stock is still overfished,”
and
“the approach will necessarily mean that the private
recreational sector will substantially exceed its annual catch limit, which was
designed to prevent overfishing the stock.
[emphasis added]”
And once again, the private sector is rallying to put the
public-sector fisheries managers back on course, challenging the patently
illegal agency action in court.
The
matter, Ocean
Conservancy v. Ross, has been brought in federal district court in
Washington, D.C.; the Ocean Conservancy, the Environmental Defense Fund, and
Earthjustice, which provides litigators skilled in conservation advocacy, are
collaborating in the effort.
“The Commerce Department decision puts red snapper recovery
at risk, jeopardizing fishing businesses and recreational fishing for the
species. It also violates several
provisions of federal law. No scientific
analysis accompanied the decision, but publicly available data and conservative
assumptions show the extended season will result in private anglers catching
three times their science-based limit.
The lawsuit does not seek to change the length of the 2017 season, but
instead seeks to prohibit the Department of Commerce from taking future similar
actions that continue to jeopardize the species.”
An Ocean Conservancy blog relates a similar message, saying
“The department has set a dangerous precedent by deliberately
undercutting the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(MSA), which requires science-based limits to prevent overfishing and rebuilding
plans to return vulnerable fish stocks back to healthy levels. It is
ignoring the proven success of the science-based strategies that have put
America at the forefront of sustainable and economically productive
fisheries. Made behind closed doors, the
public was not given the usual opportunities to weigh-in on this decision. And it benefits only one sector of a fishery
used by many, turning a blind eye to years of hard sacrifices made by fishermen
and coastal communities.”
“Of course they sued, that’s what the environmental groups do…They
hate it when Americans enjoy America’s plentiful public resources.”
In that e-mail, Mr. Cresson seems to have carefully avoided the legal or
biological implications of the season reopening, both of which might have
proved difficult for his organization to defend.
Mr. Cresson and the
Coastal Conservation Association, which he represents, have been frequent
critics of federal management of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. CCA has endorsed the Commerce Department’s
decision to reopen the season, and has also long endorsed the concept
of turning all authority for red snapper management over to the states.
State management appears attractive to groups such as CCA
because states are not bound by Magnuson-Stevens, and thus are under no legal
requirement to end overfishing or rebuild overfished stocks.
While they are arguably subject to litigation if they act
irresponsibly, state law does not contain the clear management standards
included in the federal statute.
Instead, state litigation would be governed by the general principles of
administrative law, in which agency decisions would stand if they are not
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to existing law.
Whether a state agency action is arbitrary or capricious is
governed by a principle known as the “substantial evidence rule.” Although its particulars differ in every jurisdiction, the rule stands for the principle
that courts will not second-guess agency decisions if there is any
evidence at all on the record that would support the agency action, even if
such evidence is contradicted by other evidence that the court might deem far more
convincing.
Thus, a substantial body of scientific data could be ignored
by an agency that prefers to believe a few fishermen or tackle dealers who tell
them that “there are plenty of fish out there; you just need to know where to
find them.”
The fact that CCA and allied organizations are supporting H.R.
2023, and its language
“facilitating greater incorporation of data, analysis, stock
assessments, and surveys from State agencies and nongovernmental sources,”
including fishermen, is another clue as to what such groups are
trying to achieve and why they oppose current federal fisheries law.
And that’s why it’s so important to keep the conservation
and stock rebuilding provisions of Magnuson-Stevens intact.
They provide objective standards that
managers must employ when setting regulations.
They require that the best science available be used.
And on those rare occasions when fishery managers act
contrary to the public interest in maintaining healthy, fully restored fish
stocks, they provide a way for the courts, acting on behalf of that public
interest, to provide the ultimate accountability measure, a legal decision that
compels federal fishery managers to maintain healthy and sustainable stocks.
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