On
September 5, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
issued a decision upholding the use of the so-called “Percent Change Approach”
to manage summer flounder, scup, black sea bass and, eventually, bluefish. The decision was a victory for supporters of
“alternative” approaches to recreational fisheries management, that would allow
anglers to regularly exceed hard-poundage catch limits, and a rebuke to
conservation advocates who believed in the disciplined management approach that
has arguably made the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act the most successful fishery
conservation and management law in the world.
I freely admit to being a member
of the latter group; in fact, when I learned that the Natural Resources Defense
Council was planning to initiate the lawsuit, I agreed to let them list me as a
member and as an injured party in order to assure that they had standing to
bring the action. I was particularly
aggrieved by what I saw as the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council’s and
the National Marine Fisheries Service’s lax management of the black sea bass
resource; while black sea bass biomass remains very high and the fish are
extremely abundant, over the last decade or so I have been observing a steady
decline in the size of the sea bass available to fishermen, an indication that
the older and larger fish may be being removed from the population more quickly
than before, and a possible precursor to future problems.
Part of the problem was that the
black sea bass population was expanding, and so attracting more and more
angling effort. Part of the problem was
that the Council never really tried to constrain landings; it knew that there
was significant uncertainty in the recreational catch, landings, and effort
data, which translated into significant management uncertainty when setting the
annual management measures, yet it ignored NMFS’
guidelines which state that
“[Annual Catch Targets], or the functional
equivalent, are recommended in the system of [Accountability Measures] so that
[the Annual Catch Limit] is not exceeded.
An [Annual Catch Target] is an amount of annual catch of a stock or
stock complex that is the management target of the fishery, and accounts for
the management uncertainty in controlling the catch at or below the [Annual
Catch Limit]…”
Instead of recognizing the substantial
management uncertainty that existed in the recreational black sea bass fishery,
and setting an annual catch target to account for it, the Council proceeded as
if there was no uncertainty at all, setting the Recreational Harvest Limit
equal to the sector Annual Catch Limit minus the estimated release mortality. The result was a chronic pattern of
recreational landings exceeding the Recreational Harvest Limit, which led to recreational management measures being constantly tightened at a time when
the black sea bass biomass seemed to be steadily increasing.
The recreational fishing industry constantly hammered the Council and NMFS for steadily tightening restrictions in the face of growing abundance, and the Council and NMFS eventually grew weary of the incessant criticism. By 2019, they effectively stopped trying to control recreational overages, unless action was clearly required by law, and even then they were heavily criticized.
At about the same time, the
Council began work on a new management approach intended to
“Allow for more regulatory stability and
flexibility in the recreational management programs for summer flounder, scup,
black sea bass, and bluefish by revisiting the current annual timeframe for
evaluating fishery performance and setting recreational specifications to a new
multi-year process.”
A
memo describing the possible new approach noted
“In recent years, status quo
recreational measures despite projected harvest exceeding the recreational
harvest limit (RHL) have been justified on an ad hoc basis. The steering committee is exploring the
development of pre-determined guidelines that could be followed to
determine if measures could remain status quo in the future. [emphasis added].”
Thus, the Council’s priority shifted from preventing overfishing and ensuring the long-term sustainability of fish stocks to preventing disruptions to the recreational fishing industry, even if that meant that Annual Catch Limits might be exceeded, and that overfishing might occur from time to time.
The new approach introduced some
worthwhile innovations.
It provided that management
measures would be adopted for two-year intervals which coincided with biennial
stock assessments, so that any changes in management would be based on the most
recent relevant science. And it
introduced something called a “recreational demand model,” which predicted how
anglers were likely to respond to changes in regulations, and didn’t merely
assume that angler behavior would remain constant from year to year.
However, particularly in the case
of very abundant fish stocks, the Percent Change Approach allowed recreational
landings to exceed not only the Recreational Harvest Limit, but also the sector
Annual Catch Limit, and set up situations where the combined commercial and
recreational landings permitted by the annual fishery specifications could
exceed not only the overall Annual Catch Limit, but also the Acceptable
Biological Catch established by the Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee,
and perhaps lead to overfishing.
That seemed to be a step too far,
which violated a section of Magnuson-Stevens which provides that each regional
fishery management council, including the Mid-Atlantic, must
“develop annual catch limits for each of
its managed fisheries that may not exceed the fishing level recommendations if
its scientific and statistical committee.”
On April 10, 2023, the Natural
Resources Defense Council filed its complaint in Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Raimondo, in which it challenged the validity of Framework 17 and
alleged, among other things, that
“Instead of the recreational ACL, the
harvest target is used as the constraining factor for setting recreational
management measures. This harvest target
may be above the recreational ACL, sometimes by a significant amount, depending
on circumstances in the fishery. Furthermore,
Framework 17 contains no other safeguards to constrain recreational catch to
the recreational [Annual Catch Limit.]
“Framework 17 additionally contains no
safeguard against exceeding the overall [Annual Catch Limit] for the
fisheries. Because the specifications
fully allocate the available catch for each stock between the commercial and
recreational sectors, NMFS’ approval of an overage of the recreational sector’s
ACL pursuant to Framework 17 amounts to approval of an overage for that stock’s
total ACL, risking exceedances of other specifications (such as [Acceptable
Biological Catch] and [Overfishing Limit]) as well…
“The function and effect of Framework 17
are to remove the [Annual Catch Limit] as an actual constraint on management
decisions in these recreational fisheries.
The Council and NMFS published a final environmental assessment in
November 2022, which acknowledged that Framework 17’s percent change approach
would ‘allow for some level of [Recreational Harvest Limit] overages in some
circumstances,’ which ‘carry a risk of [Annual Catch Limit] overages, which in
turn risk [Acceptable Biological Catch] and [Overfishing Limit] overages and
therefore risk resulting in overfishing.
Therefore, [Framework 17] cannot be demonstrated to proactively prevent
overfishing every year in all circumstances.
The [Recreational Harvest Limit] accounts for the best available
scientific information on stock status.
Therefore, even at high biomass levels, [Recreational Harvest Limit]
overages can result in overfishing…’ The
environmental assessment further acknowledged that when [Recreational Harvest
Limit] overages occur, the Framework 17 approach, ‘is expected to have negative
impacts on the stock status of summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass.’ [paragraph numbering omitted]”
It seemed like a convincing argument,
but challenging an agency action is always a difficult proceeding, with the
court giving substantial deference to the agency’s findings of fact and policy
positions. I hoped that the Natural
Resources Defense Council’s arguments would prevail, and believed that they
should, but after the oral arguments were made, time began to drag out, with no
movement from the Court.
Since it would have been relatively
easy to draft an opinion that supported the plaintiff’s arguments, relying on
little more than the plain language of Magnuson-Stevens, the more time that
passed after the arguments were made, the more I began to fear that the Court
was drafting an opinion that tried to get around what seemed to be
the clear language of the statute, and instead interpreted the law in a way
that favored the agency and Framework 17.
And, as we now know, that is
precisely what happened.
Some of the Court's reasoning arose out of the fact that, although Magnuson-Stevens said that regional fishery management
councils had to develop “annual catch limits,” it never offers a definition of
that term, nor did it state how such annual catch limits must function. The Court, looking at that failure, came to
the somewhat surprising conclusion that an “annual catch limit” wasn’t really a
“limit” at all, at least as that word is generally understood.
“a limit on the total annual catch of a
stock or stock complex…that serves as the basis for invoking [Accountability Measures].”
Nothing in the statute or the
guidelines explicitly states that recreational management measures must keep catch
below the Annual Catch Limit.
Thus, the Court noted that the
Council was acting in accordance with the law, as it still sets an Annual Catch Limit, along with an Overfishing Limit and
Acceptable Biological Catch. However,
“The [Harvest Control Rule in Framework
17] simply adds consideration of a new value, calculated independently of the
Specifications Framework, called the ‘recreational harvest target’ (“RHT”). Whereas, under the status quo approach, recreational
management measures were calibrated to result in an estimated recreational
harvest at or below the ‘recreational harvest limit’ (“RHL”), the [Harvest
Control Rule] sets management measures to target an estimated recreational
harvest at or below the ‘recreational harvest target’ (or RHT).”
The fact that such Recreational
Harvest Target might be higher than the Annual Catch Limit didn’t concern the
Court at all, although its reasoning is a little difficult to follow. The decision concedes that
“plaintiff initially argues that
management measures need only ‘manage’ to the [Annual Catch Limit], which
is an uncontroversial position.
[citation omitted, emphasis added]”
But it then goes on to say that
“Plaintiff, however, then criticizes the
[Harvest Control Rule] for ‘severing’ the development of recreational
management measures from and ‘ignor[ing]’ the [Annual Catch Limit] in violation
of the MSA. The [Harvest Control Rule],
however, does no such thing.
Accountability measures, or AMs, are still triggered only when the ACL
is exceeded, and the lynchpin in the decision is the decision whether to
liberalize or restrict management measures remains the recreational harvest
limit, or RHL…The [Harvest Control Rule] merely introduces the RHT, an
additional reference point that has newly accounted for data uncertainty and a
stock’s biomass, in an effort to temper the degree of change in
management measures from year-to-year—not to prevent a change in expected
harvest in the direction of the RHL.
[citations omitted]”
Thus, the Court seems to be
saying that if catch exceeds the Annual Catch Limit, Accountability Measures
will still be imposed, but nothing stops the Council or NMFS from setting a
Recreational Harvest Target that exceeds the Annual Catch Limit and triggers
Accountability Measures—even though the very nature of AMs is to penalize a
sector that lands too many fish, and that triggering AMs ought to be avoided.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s
arguments, the Court goes on to say that
“Plaintiff’s principal argument is that
the MSA’s Section 1853 means what it says:
providing for ‘annual catch limits’ means setting ‘caps not to be
exceeded.’ By focusing primarily on the
definition of ‘annual catch limit,’ plaintiff ignores that the question in
dispute concerns not the ACL itself, but the means that NMFS and the Mid-Atlantic
Council must adopt to achieve the ACL; specifically, whether recreational
management measures must be calibrated exclusively to the ACL. The three words ‘annual catch limits’ do not
answer the question. [citation omitted]”
At that point, the Court writes that
Magnuson-Stevens requires a fishery management plan to “establish a mechanism
for specifying annual catch limits…at a level that overfishing does not occur,”
then correctly states that, in the case of the species affected by Framework
17, such mechanism exists. But it next elevates form over substance, making the remarkable statement that so long as
the mechanism for specifying annual catch limits exists, the Council and NMFS
have satisfied the requirements of Magnuson-Stevens, regardless of the
relationship between the ACL and the recreational management measures.
Instead, the Court referenced
National Standard 1, which requires that
“conservation and management measures
shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum
yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry,”
and argues that while the ACL is
relevant to preventing overfishing, other considerations may bear on the
adequacy of management measures. Once
again, it makes an effort to set the Recreational Harvest Target outside of the
ACL framework, stating
“First, as explained, recreational
management measures do not have to be calibrated exclusively to the ACL, or the
corollary [Recreational Harvest Limit].
Second, the [Recreational Harvest Target] is used to determine
management measures—not as a substitute for the RHL, which is a limit on the
year’s catch. The [Harvest Control Rule]
still looks to the RHL whether and to what extent management measures need to
be liberalized or restricted, the HCR merely imposes limits to cap the percent
change from year-to-year, resulting in the [Recreational Harvest Target], which
reflects an effort to make more methodological and iterative the process of
reaching the RHL. Importantly, when the [Recreational
Harvest Target] is exceeded, nothing happens, given the RHT is simply an
estimated harvest, used to develop management measures. In contrast, when the RHL is exceeded, the
HCR imposes consequences, and when a year’s recreational harvest is greater
than the recreational ACL, recreational [Accountability Measures] are triggered.”
So what the Court seems to be saying is that there are consequences for exceeding a Recreational Harvest Limit or Annual Catch Limit, but despite that, it is perfectly fine for Framework 17 to establish a Recreational Harvest Target above either of those values, and use such RHT to set management measures that are likely to lead to landings so high that such consequences will be imposed.
That might not seem consistent
with a rational management system, but it is now, nonetheless, the law. Perhaps understanding the seeming
inconsistency, the Court then wrote,
“Having established that the MSA does not
require the ACL to be the exclusive target of management measures, review of
what the MSA requires of management measures is helpful to avoid any
implication that management measures may be set willy-nilly.”
Because the Court’s analysis up
to that point could easily give that impression.
The Court shifted
its focus from Annual Catch Limits to National Standard 1, and particularly on
its requirement that management measures achieve optimum yield, which Magnuson-Stevens
defines as
“the amount of fish which will provide the
greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food
production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the
protection of marine ecosystems; is prescribed as such on the basis of the
maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant
economic, social, or ecological factor; and in the case of an overfished
fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the
maximum sustainable yield from such fishery.
[formatting omitted]”
The Court stated that
“[optimum yield] must be achieved ‘on a
continuing basis’ and a stock is not deemed overfished unless its fishing
mortality rate risks the species capacity ‘to produce the [maximum sustainable
yield] on a continuing basis.’ Read
together, these provisions indicate that the setting of management measures
should consider sustainability and longevity, as well as results. The [Harvest Control Rule] attempts to strike
this balance, by eliminating extreme fluctuations in management measures and
adopting an incremental approach in conforming harvest to the RHL, which
remains the goal of the [Harvest Control Rule].”
It then builds on that argument
by stating, in the case of a stock with a very high biomass,
“When the RHL is equal to the estimated
harvest, the [Harvest Control Rule] recommends a 10 percent liberalization, and
when the RHL is less than the estimated harvest, the [Harvest Control Rule]
recommends a 10-percent reduction. In
these two circumstances, the [Harvest Control Rule] could set management
measures that, alone, result in a harvest that is greater than the RHL, In permitting such outcome, however, the
[Harvest Control Rule] heeds [National Standard 1’s] guidance that preventing
overfishing must be balanced with achieving [Optimum Yield] on a continuing
basis and decides that, for species in more abundance, the balance is best
struck as such…
“NMFS struck a different balance under the
status quo approach—one that tilted more in favor of preventing overfishing,
but with less regard for producing [Optimum Yield] on a continuing basis, even
for fish with very high biomass…”
Such language implies that, at
least in the case of a very abundant stock, it is permissible to increase the
likelihood of overfishing occurring, in order to also increase the likelihood
that Optimum Yield will be attained. Arguably,
it condones the adoption of management measures likely to lead to a temporary
fishing mortality rate higher than that which would produce maximum sustainable
yield, provided that such rate did not continue for so long that it threatened
the stock’s ability to produce maximum sustainable yield “on a continuing basis.”
Such an interpretation would
significantly weaken Magnuson-Stevens’ conservation mandates.
Thus, the Court’s decision in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Raimondo can be seen as a step backward with
regard to sustainable fisheries management.
Yet, not surprisingly, it is being hailed by the recreational fishing
industry, which undoubtedly believes that it will open the door to a better
business environment. In a press release dated September 25, 2024,
the American Sportfishing Association, the primary trade organization of the
recreational fishing industry, which also intervened as a defendant in the
action, expressed its approval of the decision, saying
“…The overall goal of the Percent Change
Approach is to provide more stability for the recreational sector by
iteratively adjusting management measures to achieve the Recreational Harvest
Limit, while minimizing potential overreaction (overcorrection) to annual
variability in the harvest estimates.
“’This ruling reinforces the progress made
in developing alternative recreational fisheries management that still adheres
to the conservation ethic of the MSA and highlights the significance of
innovative strategies like Framework 17,’ said Mike Waine, ASA’s Atlantic
Fisheries Policy Director. ‘Such
measures are essential for addressing inherent imprecision in recreational fisheries
data, providing predictability for anglers, and supporting a robust
recreational fisheries sector.”
It’s probably important to note
that maintaining healthy and sustainable fish stocks was not one of the
benefits listed in Waine’s statement.
But that’s to be expected. The decision in Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Raimondo represents an important win for the angling industry
and the “anglers’ rights” organizations that have long been trying to undermine
Magnuson-Stevens in order to put more dead fish on the dock and more profits in
industry coffers.
We will undoubtedly see more “innovative
strategies” and “alternative recreational fisheries management” measures
proposed and, most likely, adopted in regional fishery management councils on
every coast as, emboldened by the recent court decision, council members seek
ways for anglers to evade all or part of their conservation duties, and further
undercut effective fisheries conservation measures.
And, given the decision in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Raimondo, such efforts will most likely
succeed.
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