TOO MANY STRIPED BASS

 

Up in Canada, some say, they have a problem.

There are just too many striped bass.  As a result, the Atlantic salmon population is crashing.

At least that’s what Atlantic salmon anglers claim.

The Canadian Maritimes host separate, geneticallyidentifiable striped bass stocks.  The largest spawns in the Miramichi estuary, which is located in the Province of New Brunswick.  The Miramachi has, historically, also hosted a strong run of Atlantic salmon, which has declined substantially in recent years.  Salmon anglers blame a resurgent striped bass population for the salmon’s ills.

The salmon fishermen argue that the bass are eating most of the smolts—the young, recently-hatched salmon that have grown large enough to leave the rivers and head out to sea, where they will spend most of their lives.  They claim that a 20-year study, which found that between 55 and 75 percent of the smolts made it out of the rivers and into the open Atlantic in the early 2000s, but less than five percent did so in 2022 and 2023, demonstrates that the bass are killing off the Atlantic salmon population.

For, in the same Canadian waters, striped bass have staged what, to striped bass fishermen, at least, has been a magnificent recovery. 

In the late 1990s, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans believed that the entire female striped bass spawning stock biomass was composed of fewer than 5,000 individuals, and closed the commercial and recreational fisheries as a result.  Perhaps in response to that action, female spawning stock biomass quickly increased, and was estimated at about 900,000 fish in 2019. 

The increasing striped bass population led the Department to reopen the recreational fishery in 2013, and to allow some commercial fishing, first by indigenous Tribes, and later by others.  Last year, it increased the Tribal quota from 50,000 to 175,000 bass and also increased the recreational bag limit from three fish to four (there is also a slot size limit of 50 to 65 centimeters, or roughly, 19.7 to 25.6 inches).  Earlier this year, the Department ordered the 43 commercial gaspereau (the regional name for the alewife, Alosa pseudoharengus) fishermen in the region to retain the first 500 striped bass measuring between 50 and 65 centimeters that they incidentally capture this season.

A 2024 stock assessment update suggests that the reopened fisheries may have had a significant impact on the female spawning stock, which had declined to an estimated 334,900 individuals.

That reduction was not enough to satisfy the Atlantic Salmon Federation, an organization of recreational fishermen that argues for salmon conservation, and insists that Canada reduce the female striped bass spawning stock to just 100,000 fish.

But, despite the one study that the salmon advocates quote, the science doesn’t necessarily support the claims of out-of-control striped bass predation on salmon smolts. 

A survey of striped bass stomach contents, conducted in 2022 by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, found that 68 percent of the bass sampled had nothing in their stomachs at all, suggesting that they didn’t feed heavily when they congregated in the Miramichi estuary to spawn.  Of the bass that did have something in their stomachs, alewives—gaspereau—and some smelt dominated.  Although some salmon smolt were present, they made up a very small proportion of all stomach contents.

A scientific paper, titled "Multi-species Considerations for Defining Fisheries Reference Points for Striped Bass from the Southern Gulf of St. Lawrence,” written by Department of Fisheries and Oceans biologist Gerald Chaput, advised that

“It is not clear from the available studies that reducing striped bass spawner abundance to a level of the mid-2000s, i.e. 100,000 spawners or less (as requested by [the Atlantic Salmon Federation]), would improve the acoustic tagged smolt survival estimates or the population level relative survival rates derived from the cohort model, nor landings of gasereau [sic] and rainbow smelt in the commercial fisheries.”

But the Atlantic salmon anglers were not to be deterred.  When the Department of Fisheries and Oceans declined to cull the bass population back to just 100,000 spawning-age females, they formed an organization, Save Miramichi Salmon Inc., which sued the Department, seeking to compel it to reduce the striped bass population.

A spokesman for the organization alleged that

“DFO mismanagement and bad science over several years are destroying a National and Provincial treasure—the Miramichi Atlantic Salmon—and immediate remedial action is required now.”

The complaint—what in Canadian jurisprudence is known as a “Statement of Claim,”—makes for interesting reading.

For example, when describing the Atlantic salmon, it alleges that

“Atlantic salmon (salmo [sic] salar), referred to as the ‘King of Fish’, are a species of salmon native to waters throughout the North Atlantic Ocean.  Atlantic salmon is endemic to the Miramichi River system.

“Atlantic salmon have frequented the Miramichi River since the end of the last ice age and are of significant cultural and economic importance to Canadians, including, but not limited to, Indigenous Canadians and non-indigenous communities on the Miramichi since European settlement…  [numbering omitted]”

But when describing the striped bass, the allegations are far less fulsome, stating only that

“Atlantic striped bass (Morone saxatilis) are a species of rockfish which live throughout the Atlantic coast of North America, including the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

“Striped bass are commercially and recreationally significant fish, and, historically, were subject to significant commercial harvest.  [numbering omitted]”

No mention of bass being endemic to the Miramichi estuary, and no mention of their long presence and well-established role in the estuary’s ecosystem.  And no mention that Atlantic salmon, too, were “historically…subject to significant commercial harvest.”

The Claim’s language strives to make it clear to the court that while Atlantic salmon are the “King of Fish,” striped bass are nothing but an upstart commoner, and more, a commoner that is committing acts of treason against the crown.

The Claim makes allegations like

“Because of geographical separation and historic numbers, and standing net and sport fisheries, striped bass did not, historically, have a significant impact on the number of Atlantic salmon smolts migrating to the ocean, feeding only on a limited number of smolts during the annual migration, primarily from the Northwest and Little Southwest Miramichi systems.

“In the 1980s, populations of striped bass in the Miramichi River were considered stable and healthy despite being significantly lower than they are today.  [numbering omitted]”

The problem is that the phrase "historic numbers" is vague enough to mean whatever the plaintiff might want it to mean.  It’s a particularly amorphous concept when it comes to natural resources such as salmon and bass, when “historic” conditions, due to intentional and unintentional human manipulation of the environment, may be very different from what the default—the pre-human or, in a North American context, the pre-European—conditions of the resources might have been.

In that regard, it’s not the “historic,” but instead the prehistoric, conditions that should be used as a benchmark.

Applying that benchmark to the Miramichi’s salmon and striped bass, it’s impossible to note that both lived in apparent harmony for many centuries—for millennia—without bass driving down the Atlantic salmon population.  

For thousands of years before there were significant net fisheries—other than those of the Tribes, once they arrived—and before there were any recreational fisheries at all, Atlantic salmon and striped bass both utilized the Miramichi estuary and, given by the numbers of fish the first explorers found, somehow managed to thrive.

Maybe it was because the bass and the salmon were geographically separated, as the plaintiffs contend, although that seems unlikely, as healthy populations tend to expand into all suitable space.  

The fact is that we have no idea what the spatial distribution of either species was when Jacques Cartier first explored what is now the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1534.  Any allegation that the species were spatially separated at that time is the merest speculation, without supporting facts; it is far more likely that any separation that occurred happened later on, after human influence drove down the region’s salmon and striped bass populations.

In any event, the 1980s hardly define either “historical” times or a healthy striped bass population, and to try to define ecological relationships on the basis of what has occurred in the past 50 years, or even the last century, is a fool’s errand. 

But where things really get interesting is in the Claim section, “Atlantic Salmon—Decline and Cause”, which alleges

“In or around 2010, Atlantic salmon returns to the Miramichi River began to decline rapidly.  Between 2010 and 2024, the river’s salmon population declined by approximately 96%.

“The decline in Atlantic salmon in the Miramichi River corresponds to the rapid growth of striped bass, a known predator of juvenile salmon, in the same areas.

“In 2019, the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans [which is composed of politicians serving in Canada’s Parliament, and not of fisheries scientists] issued a report identifying the rapid increase in the Gulf of St. Lawrence striped bass population as placing strain on struggling Atlantic salmon populations.  The Parliamentary committee recommended [the Department of Fisheries and Oceans] implement management measures that prioritize the long-term balance of fish species in the Miramichi River, including establishing upper and lower limit reference point thresholds which should be adjusted according to justifiable scientific evidence.  [numbering omitted]”

Apparently, the recreational fishing interests bringing the lawsuit are trying to blame the striped bass for the Atlantic salmon’s woes.

But the salmon’s problems, across the entire North Atlantic basin, run deeper than that.

One paper, published in 2022 in Reviews in Fisheries Science & Aquaculture, was titled "The Decline and Impending Collapse of the Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar)  Population in the North Atlantic Ocean:  A Review of Possible Causes”.  It blames illegal open-ocean fishing for the widepread salmon declines, saying

“Adult returns to many Atlantic salmon wild and hatchery stocks of the North Atlantic have declined or collapsed since 1985.  Enhancement, commercial fishery closures, and angling restrictions have failed to halt the decline…The decline and collapse of stocks has common characteristics:  1) cyclic annual adult returns cease, 2) annual adult returns flatline, 3) adult mean size declines, and 4) stock collapses occurred earliest among watersheds distant from the North Atlantic Sub-polar Gyre (NASpG).  Cyclic annual adult returns were common to all stocks in the past that were not impacted by anthropogenic changes to their natal streams.  A flatline of adult abundance and reduction in adult mean size are common characteristics of many overexploited fish stocks and suggest illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fisheries exploitation at sea.  Distance from the NASpG causing higher mortality of migrating post-smolts would increase the potential for collapse of these stocks from IUU exploitation…Distribution in time and space of former, legal high-sea fisheries indicated fishers were well-acquainted with the ocean migratory pattern of salmon and combined with a lack of surveillance since 1985 outside Exclusive Economic Zones or in remote northern regions may mean high at-sea mortality occurs because of IUU fisheries.  The problem of IUU ocean fisheries is acute, has collapsed numerous stocks of desired species worldwide, and is probably linked to the decline and impending collapse of the North Atlantic salmon population.”

Whether or not that conclusion is correct, the paper reminds us that the decline in salmon populations isn’t limited to the Miramichi River, and is occurring even in places where there are no striped bass.  A United Kingdom-based conservation group, the Missing Salmon Alliance, notes that

“Wild Atlantic salmon have declined by around 70% across the North Atlantic over the last few decades.  In Great Britain the species was listed as endangered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in December 2023, with British salmon having suffered an additional 30-50% decline since 2006 and a projected 50-80% decline between 2010 and 2025.”

The Alliance suggests that changes in the marine environment, which have caused a decline in the zooplankton, have also created food chain issues for juvenile salmon.

The North Atlantic Salmon Fund, an conservation group originally founded in Iceland, to address the steep decline in that nation’s Atlantic salmon population, has now extended its reach to include the entire North Atlantic ocean.  It notes that

“Like elsewhere in the world, Canadian stocks have been in rapid decline for the past 40 years…Human interference, industrial aquaculture included, is the considered the [sic] largest threat to Canadian stocks…

”…While the historic decline of salmon stocks is largely due to low survival rates at sea, there are always larger declines where fish farming is close to wild salmon…”

And climate change also plays a role.  Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans notes that

“Rising water temperatures, lower water levels, and more frequent extreme weather events are all contributing to the decline of salmon populations.”

Specific to the Miramichi, an article authored by a graduate student at the University of New Brunswick—Saint John noted that

“With warmer summers, the water temperatures are beginning to stray away from the Salmon’s optimal temperature (4-12^o C), approaching the upper threshold temperatures in which they can survive (28^o C being lethal, and anything over 20^o C impeding survival).  Over the summer of 2017, the Miramichi River contained periods where water temperature readings exceeded 30^o C!”

The Department of Fisheries and Oceans went on to advise that

“in the Miramichi River, the annual abundance of the past decade have frequently been at record lows, particularly for the earlier maturing one-sea-winter salmon.  Salmon populations in the southern regions are impacted by rapidly changing marine, estuarine and freshwater environments, and by anthropogenic stressors, including land-use and the spread of invasive species.”

So it’s clear that there are many factors causing the decline of the Miramichi’s salmon.  Striped bass do not bear the sole responsibility.

Still, it would be wrong to completely discount striped bass predation.  When any fish is at a very low level of abundance, any removals, regardless of cause, will have an adverse effect on the stock.  As the Department of Fisheries and Oceans observed,

“Migrating smolts face predation from species such as striped bass and cormorants, while adult salmon may be preyed on by seals or other larger predators.  Though natural, predation can exacerbate challenges associated to human activities, climate or ecosystem shifts for Atlantic salmon throughout its range.”

In other words, striped bass predation didn’t cause the Atlantic salmon runs to collapse, but they may be making it more difficult for such runs to be restored.

A similar view was expressed in the 2024 paper, “A Review of Factors Potentially Contributing to the Long-Term Decline of Atlantic Salmon in the Conne River, Newfoundland, Canada”, which appeared in Reviews in Fisheries Science & Aquaculture, where the authors observed that

“Impacts on Atlantic salmon due to predation are more likely to be a result of cumulative effects by a variety of species along with other anthropogenic factors rather than any one individual component.  [One team of researchers] state that predation is a natural phenomenon and one that does not necessarily imply that it is a particular driver of the current population declines of salmon.  [Another team of researchers] have similarly noted that predation impacts on Atlantic salmon are not likely to be the primary cause for population declines in the North Atlantic but as others have noted predation may act to keep depressed populations from recovering.  [citations omitted, emphasis added]”

Another, comprehensive study of the Atlantic salmon’s decline, “The quest for successful Atlantic salmon restoration:  perspectives, priorities, and maxims”, which appeared in the ICES Journal of Marine Science in 2021, even suggested that efforts to control predation could be bad for the salmon, noting that

“Control or removal of predators may have similar counterproductive effects.  Predators often select slow, weak, or sick prey such that predation is compensatory and, in some cases, may allow disease to spread, in instances where predation of diseased animals is more frequent.”

So, taking all of the above into account, it’s clear that the striped bass is not responsible for all of the ills besetting the Miramichi’s Atlantic salmon runs.  But the bigger point of this post is to examine, in detail, why the striped bass ought not to be blamed for the ills besetting any other marine resource, even though the bass might eat a few fish every once and again.

Yet that’s a theme that we hear again and again.

For many years, New York’s striped bass anglers were dismayed to hear one of the state’s representatives on the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board repeatedly suggest that striped bass were too abundant, and were driving down the populations of other managed species, saying things like

“is this an attempt by the state to maybe address the concern that the stock of striped bass in Chesapeake Bay is growing much greater than anticipated and is having an additional negative effect on menhaden?..

“…I was concerned about your concern that there are a greater number of larger and older fish within the body—or residing here year after year.  The question is has that increased significantly, to have a detrimental effect on the menhaden that are available, as we heard in the report yesterday that they appear to be under duress.”

And

“I’ve often asked the question as how many more striped bass do we have to have in the ocean and do the surplus, quote-quote, above the threshold—and there are some folks that are not going to like what I say, but the reality is what kind of damage are these fish doing to the sub-species [sic] below them, including the forage fish that other species are feeding on?..

“The bottom line is that they’re opportunists, whatever is there they’re going to eat, so to speak…

“The question that still remains open and unanswered is what are the extra fish above and beyond the threshold doing to the other sub-species?  I’m not trying to start a fight with anybody.  I’m just saying it is a question.  Look at what happened to winter flounder.  We blame weather conditions and water conditions, lack of eelgrass, lack of phytoplankton, zooplankton, et cetera, on that end, and yet what is eating them?”

His answer, of course, to purported declines in the menhaden and winter flounder populations was the same one that the Atlantic salmon anglers have to declines in their favorite fish:  There are too many striped bass.  They’re eating them all.

And far too many other folks also feel that way.

At the October 2014 meeting of ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board, as the Board debated adopting Addendum IV to Amendment 6 to the Atlantic Striped Bass Interstate Fishery Management Plan, the Board’s first, hesitant effort to address what was a clearly declining striped bass stock, Kelly Place, then the Chair of the Striped Bass Advisory Panel, argued that

“there could be a trophic collapse if the striped bass abundance increases…

“…if you have record young of the year, you’re going to have record competition for the same food resources…we’ve got an amazing abundance in the Chesapeake Bay of channel bass, puppy drum, red fish.

“They are in the same trophic level, they’re eating the same things, they’re eating the same thing all the way up into freshwater and all the way down to the ocean…”

Clearly, there are too many striped bass.

Because, at the same meeting, Russel Dize, Maryland’s Legislative Proxy, complained

“I’ve been a commercial fisherman for 55 years in Maryland.  I’ve watched the striped bass come and go.  At this time, we’ve probably got more striped bass in the bay than I have ever seen in my life.  We’ve got so many striped bass that it’s affected our crab-catching industry.  We are probably down to a low ebb last summer on crabs.

“One of the predators is rockfish, striped bass.  When the charterboats catch the striped bass and they clean them, you can count anywhere from ten to forty striped bass in the belly of a rockfish.”

  Too many striped bass once again.

It’s not overharvest by Maryland’s watermen that’s the problem with the Bay’s blue crab population.  It’s not hypoxia, or the loss of seagrass, or any other possible cause that caused the Bay’s crab population to drop.

It’s too many striped bass.

It’s always too many striped bass.

From Maryland to the Miramichi, too many striped bass are the cause of all our fisheries problems, starting out with Atlantic salmon and ending up with winter flounder. 

They do so much harm that you have to wonder how any fish survived in those thousands of years between the retreat of the Wisconsin Glacier and the arrival of the first European settlers, who came to North American shores and, finally, put out their nets in the spawning rivers and began to save the the continent's marine resources from the ravages of the striped bass.

Or, perhaps, you have to wonder whether some of these folks are getting things backwards, and that the fish didn’t need the Europeans to save them from the striped bass, but rather that the fish needed someone to save them from the rapidly multiplying Europeans and their generations of progeny, who merely find it convenient to blame the striped bass from the consequences of their own actions.

 

 

 

 

AUGUST AT THE MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL: SHORT-TERM GAINS, BUT LONG-TERM QUESTIONS

 

The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council’s August meeting is arguably the most important meeting of the year, for it is the time when the annual specifications—the overfishing limit, acceptable biological catch, annual catch limits, etc.—will be set for the following year.  It’s when the commercial fishery’s rules will be finalized although, with the exception of bluefish, recreational management measures aren’t typically set until the December meeting, after managers have a better idea of how current regulations impacted recreational landings.

For the important recreational species--bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass--the Council meets jointly with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Bluefish and Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass management boards.  The current rules require that both the Council and the appropriate management board agree on management measures for those four species, although nothing prevents an ASMFC management board from going rogue and refusing to cooperate with the Council. 

We saw that last year in the case of black sea bass, whenthe Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board refused to adoptthe Acceptable Biological Catch set by the Council’s Scientific and StatisticalCommittee, which would have lowered black sea bass landings by approximately 20percent.  The Management Board had the flexibility to do so since it, unlike the Council, is not bound by the provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which compels the Council to follow the SSC’s harvest advice.

However, such divergences are unusual, and this year, none occurred, perhaps because the SSC recommendations allowed more liberal landings of all four species, something that the management boards, and many Council members, often strive to promote.

The increased landings limits will make fishermen happy in 2026 and, in the case of the recreational fishery, where regulations are maintained for two consecutive years, in 2027 as well.  Whether they will benefit fishermen in the long term is probably up for debate.

In the case of bluefish, which are still in a rebuilding program, the increase in the recreational harvest limit will be substantial, increasing from 15.7 million pounds in 2025 to 22.02 million pounds in 2026 and 22.5 million pounds in 2027.  That will allow the bag limit to be increased from 5 to 7 fish for anglers on for-hire vessels, and from 3 to 5 fish for the now second-class anglers who fish from their own boats or from shore.

Although that’s a big increase, the really big jump was in the acceptable biological catch, which increased from 21.83 million pounds in 2025 to 44.61 million pounds in 2026 and 45.41 million pounds in 2027.  However, the commercial and recreational harvest limits didn’t jump nearly that much, as they were constrained by management uncertainty buffers imposed by the Council and the Bluefish Management Board.  Such uncertainty buffers reduced the commercial annual catch limit, which set at 14 percent of the acceptable biological catch, by 25 percent, and the annual recreational catch limit, set at 86 percent of the ABC, by 30 percent, to allow for management uncertainty.

That is a very big deal, and should be seen as a very welcome move in the right direction.

The guidelines for setting harvest limits, established by the National Marine Fisheries Service, call for reducing the annual catch limit to account for any management uncertainty.  However, in the past, the Council has been very reluctant to do so, as such buffers reduce the amount of fish that could be landed over the course of the year.  But this year, in the case of bluefish, the Council and Board adopted buffers which

“are intended to prevent management volatility and ensure the continued rebuilding of the stock.  Council and Board members also noted that the upcoming changes to the [Marine Recreational Information Program] estimates are a significant source of uncertainty.  [emphasis added]”

(Remember that highlighted language, as we’ll be coming back to it in a while.)

Hopefully, the Council’s and Board’s willingness to finally acknowledge management uncertainty will set a precedent that we will see in future years and with other species, although I’m somewhat skeptical about such a fortunate outcome.

In any event, even with the uncertainty buffers, the 2026 commercial quota will be 50 percent higher than it was in 2025, while the recreational harvest limit will rise by about 40 percent.

It’s going to be interesting to see fishermen’s reactions to the increased harvest limit.  Even at 2025 harvest levels, commercial fishermen needed to be careful that they didn’t land too many bluefish, flood the market, and drive down the price.  So how much they might benefit from more quota is an open question.

On the recreational side, the calculated increase in bluefish spawning stock biomass has had an irregular impact along the cost.  In some places, bluefish have been abundant, and anglers are catching a lot of them.  In other areas, fishing for bluefish has been sporadic at best, with a lot of slow days.  In my own experience, which mostly takes place offshore, I still haven’t had a bluefish—with the exceptions of some 12-inchers in July 2023—in my shark slicks since 2017, even though I often chum in places where bluefish swarmed two decades ago.

Also, now that the recreational bag limit has increased to five fish, it’s somewhat disturbing that the Council and Board have decided to grant for-hire anglers special privileges, and increase their bag limit to seven, thereby arbitrarily creating winners and losers within the recreational fishery.  As noted by Michael Waine, a spokesman for the American Sportfishing Association, the largest fishing tackle industry trade group, in a letter to the Council and Board,

“…ASA recommends increasing the private angler bluefish bag limit to 5 fish, aligning it with the current limit for for-hire anglers.  This change would reunite all anglers under a 5-fish bag limit, ensuring consistent management and equitable access ahead of the joint Sector Separation Amendment, which is expected to address mode management more formally…  [emphasis added]”

Unfortunately, the for-hire sector’s dominance of the management bodies, and particularly of the recreational seats on the Council, assured that such consistent bag limit and equitable access would not occur.

Summer flounder also saw a very large increase in the acceptable biological catch, which jumped by 55 percent from its 2025 level.  Once again, that increase was tempered by a decision to apply a 12 percent buffer for management uncertainty to both the commercial and recreational annual catch limits.

In recommending that buffer, the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Monitoring Committee, composed of biologists from NMFS, the ASMFC, and the various states sitting on the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board, acknowledged that it was

“concerned about the implications of such a substantial increase, particularly given the volatility of ABCs over the past several years…The Monitoring Committee emphasized the importance of maintaining quota stability and ensuring the specifications process remains responsive to uncertainty and stock dynamics without overcorrecting from one specifications cycle to the next.”

In addition,

“The Monitoring Committee expressed reservations around the stock projections used to inform the ABC.  The [Scientific and Statistical Committee’s] recommendation relied on short-term projections from the most recent management track assessment, which were based on the recruitment stanza from 2011-2024.  The Monitoring Committee noted that while 2023 and 2024 recruitment appear stronger than those in the preceding decade, recruitment in nearly every year since 2010 has remained below the long-term average.  This persistent pattern raised concern about whether the recent increase reflects a meaningful shift in stock productivity or merely a short-term fluctuation, as it appears to have in the past.  The Monitoring Committee emphasized that recruitment has been highly variable over time, and the stock has yet to demonstrate a consistent return to higher recruitment levels…”

Thus, the Monitoring Committee recommended precaution, and the Council and Board agreed.

Even so, the commercial quota will increase from 8.79 million pounds in 2025 to 12.78 million pounds in 2026 and 2027, while the recreational harvest limit will change from 6.35 million pounds to 8.79 million pounds over the same period of time.

Of course, that doesn’t mean that 2026 or 2027 recreational regulations will allow landings that are higher than those predicted for 2025.  That’s because summer flounder spawning stock biomass is currently at 83 percent of the target level, and the so-called “Percent Change Approach” used to set recreational management dictates that, if a stock is at “low” abundance levels—defined as not overfished, but less than 90 percent of the biomass target—even if 2026 and 2027 recreational landings are predicted to be below the recreational harvest limit for those years, no increase in the recreational landings limit will occur.  

However, that doesn’t mean that recreational management measures might not change; if 2026-2027 recreational landings are likely to fall well below the recreational landings limit under the current rules, regulations could be liberalized to make it more likely that landings will approach the landings limit in those years.  At the same time, should 2025 recreational landings be likely to exceed the 2025 landings limit, regulations could become more restrictive.

We won’t know that until the December joint Council and Management Board meeting.

But if the August meeting saw managers take a more precautionary approach with bluefish and summer flounder, it saw them exercise their usual profligacy with black sea bass and scup, undoubtedly because, while the former species are at 89 percent and 83 percent of their target levels, respectively, the two latter species are at levels approaching or exceeding 300 percent of target, which makes it a little easier to recover from management mistakes.

Still, there are warning signs in the data suggesting that the future for both scup and black sea bass might not be quite as favorable as conditions are today, and that a little bit of precaution might also be justified.

In the case of scup, the fish are almost embarrassingly abundant.  The 2025 management track stock assessment calculated the spawning stock biomass to be 235,613 metric tons (519.4 million pounds), which is 323 percent of the SSB target, with fishing mortality low, at only 55 percent of the biomass target.

That allowed the acceptable biological catch to be increased by two percent.  However, that increase was not reflected in the commercial quota, which will decrease from 19.54 million pounds in 2025 to 17.70 million pounds in 2026 and 15.57 million pounds in 2027.  The recreational fishery, on the other hand, will see the recreational harvest limit increase from 12.31 million pounds in 2025 to 13.17 million pounds in 2026, before declining to 11.58 million pounds in 2027.

However, despite all the seemingly good news in the short term, there is some troubling information in the management track assessment, in the form of continued low recruitment.  Scup recruitment peaked in 2015, an exceptionally productive year, when nearly 696 million Age 0 fish entered the population.  But recruitment has been down since then, dropping to about 319 million in 2016, to 160,000 the year after.  Recruitment fell to 88 million in 2019 before rebounding to 153 million in 2021, but then fell to its lowest levels in the last 10 years in 2023 and 2024, at 40 million and 16 million, respectively.

Managers can only hope that recruitment improves to more typical levels.  Even if it does, the last two years are going to be felt once the fish that recruited in those years grow into the minimum size.  Given that, perhaps a little precaution now might have helped moderate the shock when rules need to be tightened again, perhaps for 2028, perhaps not until 2030.

In addition, there is the question of the revised Marine Recreational Information Program estimates of anglers catch, landings, and effort, which we first encountered in the bluefish discussion.  The problem is that in 2023, a pilot study conducted by NMFS suggested that MRIP might be overestimating angler effort, and so recreational catch and landings, by as much as 30 percent.  That created significant management uncertainty, since if the pilot study’s findings were even close to accurate, the true level of recreational catch and landings can not be known with any reasonable degree of precision.

That might seem OK at first glance, since if recreational landings were overestimated, then it’s easy to believe—falsely—that such overestimate built a margin for error into the process of designing recreational management measures.  If the actual recreational removals were less, one might think, then fewer fish were being killed, and no harm was being done.

But that’s not true, because recreational landings aren’t only used to set recreational management measures.  They are also one of the data sets that are used in stock assessments, and contribute to the calculation of things like spawning stock biomass.  So if recreational landings are high, and fishery-independent surveys seem to show that the stock can sustain that level of removals, then biologists assume that the stock must be larger than previously believed, increase their estimates of spawning stock biomass, and also their estimates of things like the spawning stock biomass target, the overfishing limit, the acceptable biological catch, and the annual catch limit for both the recreational and the commercial sectors.

That’s where things start heading downhill, for while the increase in the recreational catch limit doesn’t really matter—the overestimate of recreational landings and the overestimate of stock size more-or-less offset one another—overestimating the biomass also leads to commercial quotas that are set higher than they ought to be, which could be the case with scup.

Yet neither the Monitoring Committee nor the Council and Board chose to adopt a buffer for the management uncertainty that very definitely exists for scup, as they did for bluefish and summer flounder.  One has to suspect that it was the political aspect of reducing landings for a fish of very obvious abundance that stayed their hand.

Black sea bass decisions followed a very similar course to those affecting scup.  With the 2025 management track stock assessment indicating a spawning stock biomass that was 284 percent of the target level, the acceptable biological catch was increased from 16.66 million pounds in 2024-2025 to 21.34 million pounds for 2026-2027.  That led to a 31 percent increase in the commercial quota, from five million to 7.83 million pounds, and a 30 percent increase in the recreational harvest limit, from 6.27 to 8.14 million pounds.

But black sea bass have some of the same threats lurking in the shadows as scup.

The reset of the Marine Recreational Information Program creates the same sort of management uncertainty, and black sea bass recruitment is also headed downhill.  The 2025 management track assessment shows that, over the past ten years, recruitment—which is measured at Age 1—hit its lowest point in 2024, at about 28 million fish, compared to peaks of 62 million in 2016 and 61 million in 2023.  

While the 2024 number could be viewed as merely a one-year anomaly, and thus fairly meaningless, a recent report issued by NMFS informed us that, because of a temporary, southerly jog in the Gulf Stream, cooler, fresher water from northern regions are flowing onto the continental shelf off New England and the upper Mid-Atlantic.  That cooler, fresher water may be present at the edge of the shelf for years. 

That matters for black sea bass, because the strength of a black sea bass year class isn’t determined by the success of the spawn, but by ocean conditions at the edge of the continental shelf during the fish's first winter.  Warm, saline water generally produces large year classes, while cooler, fresher water tends to produce small ones.  Thus, the small 2024 year class may well be the first in a series of low-recruitment years, driven by unfavorable ocean conditions that could persist for as long as a decade.

Another thing that the Monitoring Committee noted was

“comments from several advisors about high numbers of small black sea bass this year.”

Unfortunately, the Monitoring Committee only interpreted those comments to mean that there might be higher levels of release mortality, due to a higher number of undersized fish, and not as a warning that a lack of large black sea bass may be an indication that fishing mortality has risen so high that few fish are surviving long enough to reach larger sizes.  Again, like the cooling water and lower recruitment, the small fish could be a sign that a population decline is on the way.

But despite the uncertainty, as was true in the scup fishery, no buffer was put in place.

And maybe it doesn’t matter.

The best available scientific information for bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass all suggested that higher annual catch limits are justified, and at least in the short term, they almost certainly are.

But maybe managers should also take time to read the warning signs that flash around all of the Mid-Atlantic Council-managed recreational fisheries.  They did so for bluefish and summer flounder, but not for scup and black sea bass.  ‘

Maybe they don’t have to.  Maybe with populations as high as they are, managers can intervene later, and still maintain the stock at or near the biomass target.

But still, we have to ask ourselves, is it better to be a little cautious, even if there’s no immediate need, than to wait until a real problem looms, and then try to fix things all at once?

In the case of scup and black sea bass, future events might well answer that question.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EVERYONE WANTS SCIENCE-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT--JUST NOT FOR MENHADEN

 

Most of the time, nearly everyone agrees that science-based fisheries management is a good thing.

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act states that

“It is further declared to be the policy of the Congress in this Act…to assure that the national fishery conservation and management program utilizes, and is based upon, the best scientific information available… [formatting omitted]”

and requires that

“Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available.”

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission expresses a similar sentiment in its Interstate Fisheries Management Program Charter, which states that

“It is the policy of the Commission that its [Interstate Fisheries Management Program] promote the conservation of Atlantic coastal fisheries resources, based on the best scientific information available, and provide adequate opportunity for public participation.”

The bias toward science-based fisheries management is certainly understandable, since hard data and peer-reviewed stock assessments certainly provide a better basis for management decisions than does anecdotal information and fishermen’s assurances that no management measures are needed because “there are plenty of fish out there…somewhere.  They just went away for a while.”

Of course, one would have to be completely naïve to assume that the rise of science-based management led to a new world where biologists determined the optimum management measures, and fishermen—and fisheries managers—meekly complied.  In many ways, the science just changed the focus of the debate.

Now, instead of merely trying to discredit management actions with anecdotal evidence, fishermen challenge the science itself, arguing that they’re catching plenty of fish, and if biologists can’t find them, it’s because they don’t know where the fish are and/or don’t know where to catch them.  Or, as in the case of striped bass, they might argue that the stock is healthy, because they’re spawning in new places where biologists aren’t looking—for example, in Connecticut’s Housatonic River—even though such places might be completely devoid of suitable spawning habitat.

But, whatever the argument, most fishermen aren’t going to give up killing fish without a fight.

Even fishery managers get in on the act, as happened last December, when the ASMFC’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board chose to ignore the stock assessment update for black sea bass, along with the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee’s advice, and leave management measures at status quo, even though the best available scientific information told them that the stock was more than 20 percent smaller than previously believed.

Usually, when the science is questioned, it’s because the data suggests that fishing mortality has gotten too high and landings must be reduced.  And when fishermen, or fishery management bodies, suggest that the science is better ignored, their arguments are usually countered by a host of conservation advocates, who demand that the best available science be used to develop management measures.

That’s why what we’ve been seeing occur with menhaden over the past couple of years, and more particularly over the last half-dozen months, seems more than a little weird. 

And more than a little hypocritical.

There was a time when menhaden conservation advocates believed in good science, too.

The original Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Menhaden, released in 1981, was a truly awful document designed to serve the needs of the menhaden reduction industry, and not the needs of the menhaden resource.  It’s “Specific Management Objectives” were

“To achieve a reliable, productive capability for the Atlantic menhaden so that harvest may be maintained with confidence at or below the level of maximum sustainable yield (MSY);

“To take cognizance of the role of menhaden in the food chain of predatory game fish when determining MSY;

“To maximize yield per recruit consonant with the geographic distribution of the resource and the historic needs of the fishery;

“To encourage maintenance of a stable business climate.”

To achieve those objectives, the initial management plan created the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, and decreed that such Board

“be composed of the six chief fishery management administrators of states actively participating in the management program, six menhaden industry executives who request membership, and an ex officio member from NMFS…This group will meet a minimum of two times per year to consider recommendations of their Atlantic Menhaden Implementation Subcommittee (AMIS) and take action on the AMIS recommendations and implementation strategy…  [emphasis added]”

The Atlantic Menhaden Implementation Subcommittee

“shall be composed of 3 industry and 3 state administrator members of the [Atlantic Menhaden Management Board] …[and] will provide guidance to the [Atlantic Menhaden Advisory Committee] on specific issues, receive management actions recommendations from the [Advisory Committee], and formulate a strategy for implementation of each recommendation that they approve… [emphasis added]”

Finally, the management plan established an Atlantic Menhaden Advisory Committee that would be

“appointed by the [Atlantic Menhaden Management Board]  and be composed of fishery biologists designated as representatives by the States actively participating in the management program, industry representatives designated by the companies in the purse seine fishery, and a NMFS biologist from the menhaden program who is actively engaged in the research and data base management…  [emphasis added]”

It was a classic case of the fox watching the henhouse which, with the industry representatives at all levels of the management process equal to the number of state biologists present, guaranteed that science would be subordinated to the interests of the menhaden purse seine fleet.

Conservation advocates and members of the recreational fishing community fought for many years to change the system.  I got involved in the fight around 1996, and was a relative latecomer compared to some of the people who had first engaged in the battle years before that.  But, whenever we got involved, we shared a common goal:  Getting the menhaden industry representatives off the management panels, and restructuring the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, so that it looked like  all of the other ASMFC species management boards, with representatives from every jurisdiction with a declared interest, and no seats reserved for special interest groups. 

The Atlantic Menhaden Implementation Subcommittee would be abolished and replaced by a Plan Development Team and Technical Committee made up of ASMFC staff and scientists from the several states, and not from the menhaden industry, while the Atlantic Menhaden Advisory Committee would be reshaped into an Atlantic Menhaden Advisory Panel, with seats for stakeholders from all the interested states, and again no reserved seats for the industry, although industry members could apply for seats on the panel, subject to their state’s and the Management Board’s approval.

It took many years to get to that point, but in July 2001, the ASMFC adopted Amendment 1 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Menhaden, which removed the industry seats from the Management Board and related bodies, and created a management structure no different from that used to manage other species within the ASMFC’s jurisdiction.  As part of the process, Amendment 1 deleted the old “Specific Management Objectives” and replaced them with a new set of objectives, one of which was to

“Base regulatory measures upon the best available scientific information and coordinate management efforts among the various political entities having jurisdiction over the fisheries.”

Science-based menhaden management had just taken a big step forward.  However, the debate over what constituted a “healthy” menhaden stock continued. 

Were the current biomass and fishing mortality reference points correct?  And, perhaps more important, should menhaden be managed pursuant to a traditional, single-species model that only considered the fish’s ability to maintain spawning stock biomass at or near the target level, or should the menhaden’s role as a forage fish, and thus its importance to the marine ecosystem, be considered as well?

At its March 2011 meeting, the Management Board initiated an addendum to investigate both of those issues, and so began what would become a long effort to manage the menhaden resource through so-called “ecological,” rather than “single-species,” reference points.

That concept was very new.  No other ASMFC-managed species, and probably no other marine species managed anywhere in the United States, was managed primarily to preserve its role in the ecosystem.  Thus, it was clear that the process of defining, much less adopting, ecosystem reference points would take a while.  Even so, Amendment 2 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Menhaden, adopted in December 2012, explicitly stated that the single-species biological reference points contained in that amendment were merely interim standards put in place until ecological reference points could be established.

The breakthrough came in 2019, with the release of the 2019 Atlantic Menhaden Ecological Reference Point Stock Assessment Report, the first menhaden stock assessment based on ecological reference points.  After reviewing the applicable ecosystem-based models, the biologists performing the assessment determined that

“All of the models explored by the [Ecological Reference Points Working Group] agreed on the current status of Atlantic menhaden: in 2017, overfishing was not occurring and the stock was not overfished, even when Atlantic menhaden’s role as a forage fish was taken into consideration.  Current levels of Atlantic menhaden removals were unlikely to cause a decline in predator populations.  [emphasis added]”

Those findings were confirmed in the 2022 Atlantic Menhaden Stock Assessment Update, which revealed that

“The Atlantic Menhaden Management Board (Board) adopted [Ecological Reference Points] in Amendment 3.  Thus, stock status was determined using those benchmarks.  The fishing mortality rate for the terminal year of 2021 is below the ERP threshold and target…, and the fecundity for the terminal year of 2021 is above the ERP threshold and target…Therefore, overfishing is not occurring that the stock is not overfished.

“The uncertainty in the stock status was evaluated through the [Monte Carlo bootstrap] analysis.  The terminal year [fishing mortality rate] was below the ERP threshold for all of the MCB runs and the terminal year fecundity was above the ERP threshold for all of the runs…  [emphasis added, internal references omitted].”

That would seem like good news.  Atlantic menhaden are being managed by a largely unbiased—or, at least as unbiased as a fishery management body ever gets—Management Board, which has agreed to manage menhaden based on its ecosystem role as an important forage fish.  And, even according to that standard, which is presumably more demanding than the use of single-species reference points would have been, the best scientific information available, even after rigorous statistical analysis intended to root out any anomalies, tells us that the Atlantic menhaden stock is very healthy and not threatened by current levels of harvest.

One would think that the menhaden conservation advocates would be happy, because the Atlantic menhaden stock is clearly in good health.

But it seems that the menhaden advocates aren’t happy at all, and they’re trying to stir up a storm of public discontent.  But just why isn’t completely clear.  The only thing that is clear is that their campaign has little to do with science, and a lot to do with emotion.

Consider the group that calls itself “Save Our Menhaden.”  The Save Our Menhaden webpage, once you get through all the initial hype, makes the statement that

“Menhaden evolved on this earth to be eaten by other marine species.  That is their purpose in life.

“Menhaden are the ‘Keystone’ prey fish species in our coastal and bay waters.  Menhaden average less than 12” in length and a pound in weight.  But they pack an enormous amount of Omega rich protein in their bodies, and they congregate in vast schools measured in metric tons.

“Predator and scavenger species on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts from Humpback Whales and Dolphins, Osprey, Eagles, Pelicans, Gannets, Striped Bass, Tuna, Crabs and countless others depend on Menhaden for their survival.  They are the number one source of prey protein in these ecosystems.”

It’s a nice sounding story, but it’s just not true.

First, and probably a minor point, evolution just doesn’t work that way.  No plant or animal has ever “evolved to be eaten.”   As noted in one paper appearing on nature.com,

“evolution does not progress toward an ultimate or proximate goal.  Evolution is not ‘going somewhere.’  It just describes changes in inherited traits over time.”

So that entire passage begins with a false premise, and it’s accuracy doesn’t get any better as one reads on.  Although menhaden advocates often claim that menhaden are a “Keystone” prey species and “the most important fish in the sea,” that other fish “depend on Menhaden for their survival,” and that “they are the number one source of prey protein in these ecosystems,” a recent study performed in Louisiana pretty well debunks all such blather.  Instead, the study found that

“nearshore predators are generalists using the diverse prey base, and in concordance with previous findings, there is no single Menhaden-dependent predator.”

and that

“Despite its biomass and widespread spatial overlap with many predators, we did not find that Gulf Menhaden constituted large proportions of many predators’ diets…The finding that high trophic level [northern Gulf of Mexico] fishes have a diverse diet aligns with those of [other researchers] who did not identify any predators that they considered to be highly dependent on Gulf Menhaden.  Similarly, [a researcher] showed that Gulf Menhaden contributes to only 2 to 3% of the diets of most predators.  [emphasis added]”

There is little reason to believe that Atlantic menhaden are significantly more important than their Gulf counterparts.

Thus, the best available scientific information doesn’t support the notion of menhaden being a “keystone” prey species, that any fish depends on menhaden for its survival, or that menhaden “are the number one source of prey protein” in marine ecosystems.

And that poses a problem for a number of marine fisheries-oriented consultants, who pay their mortgages and their children’s tuitions with fees earned by advocating for additional restrictions on, or even the complete abolition of, the menhaden reduction fishery.

So at least some have adopted a new approach:  They have completely abandoned the science, and are now asking President Trump to issue an executive order outlawing reduction fishing for menhaden.

It’s an interesting ask.

The best-publicized push for an executive order is being made by a group calling itself “Make America Fish Again,” which appears to have at least some support from anglers, charter boat operators, and commercial fishermen in Virginia, Maryland, Louisiana, and perhaps other coastal states.  Who is managing and financing the effort is not completely clear.  The organization has a website, cynically addressed http://www.oceanherotrump, that features a series of short videos opposing large-scale commercial fishing for menhaden, herring, and other forage fish, but fails to identify any individuals who might be responsible for its content.

It makes one wonder what someone might be trying to hide.

In any event, the executive order that the group is seeking would reportedly take four related actions, 1) banning the use of midwater trawls for forage fish species, 2) ending the reduction fishery for menhaden and other forage fish, 3) directing the National Marine Fisheries Service to manage forage fish for ecosystem health, and 4) setting science-based catch targets (presumably for forage fish) to protect predator species.

Some of those goals might be justifiable, although it’s noteworthy that, when the New England Fishery Management Council attempted to ban midwater trawling for Atlantic herring in a defined area off the coast a few years ago, supposedly to provide more forage for bluefin tuna, whales, and other predators, a court invalidated the resulting regulation, finding that it lacked scientific support.

Any executive order banning midwater trawls might run up against the same legal issue.

Given that menhaden are currently the only fish, at least on the Atlantic coast, that are subject to a reduction fishery, there is also a question of how well that provision would fare.  Generally, executive orders have the force of law unless contravened by an action of Congress, so it might very well survive a court challenge.  At the same time, given that the challenge is to the ultimate use of the menhaden—reduced into fish meal, etc.—and not to the menhaden quota itself, which determines how many fish may be killed, one might reasonably question the motive behind the request for executive action.  If the menhaden currently killed and reduced into fish meal were, instead, killed and used for, say, lobster bait and fertilizer, would the impact on the stock be any different?  Logically, it would seem not, which then raises the question of whether the ban on reduction fishing might be motivated by a philosophical distaste for large-scale fish harvest by corporate entities, rather than any concern that too many fish are removed from the stock.

And when it comes to menhaden harvest, at least, the ASMFC, as noted earlier, already manages the species for its ecological role, and has already adopted science-based catch limits based on the needs of marine predators.  Given that the stock assessment, based on ecological reference points, gives the Atlantic menhaden stock a clean bill of health, it’s hard not to suspect that something other than a concern for the menhaden population is driving this effort.

But whatever that “something other” might be, it’s clear that it has no roots in the best available menhaden science.

All that aside, it’s necessary to look at the potential impact of the executive order itself.  For example, as noted a few paragraphs ago, executive orders generally have the force of law unless contravened by an act of Congress.  So the first question is whether any menhaden-related executive order would have to be consistent with the provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which governs all fishing in federal waters—perhaps including the provisions that require management actions to be initiated by one of the eight regional fishery management councils.

Whatever the ultimate answer, should the executive order be issued, litigation would certainly ensue.

There would also be the question of whether the President has the authority to restrict fisheries within state waters.  Certainly, Congress would have such authority, as the menhaden fishery has a sizeable impact on interstate and international commerce, and Congress has the authority to regulate both pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, which specifies that

“The Congress shall have Power…To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”

But does the President, acting on his own initiative, have similar authority?  Nothing in the Constitution says so, and litigation, again, would likely ensue should the White House try to interfere with state water fisheries.

There’s also the possibility that, if the executive order banned the reduction fishery in federal waters, the ASMFC might reallocate Virginia’s unused quota among the various states, and move the entire menhaden harvest into those states’ waters.  While the big purse seiners are banned from the waters of all states save Virginia, nothing would stop inshore fishermen from using trawls, gill nets, pound nets, haul seines and any other legally acceptable gear to catch the entire quota, and ship it by the trailer-truck load (about 40,000 pounds) to the reduction plant in Virginia or to lobstermen in New England, depending on who was willing to pay the best price.

Such a situation would probably ensure that the entire 51 metric ton quota for the Chesapeake Bay would be caught every year, because the reduction fleet wouldn’t be allowed to fish anywhere else, and that the Gulf of Mexico menhaden fishery would be prosecuted only in states’ shallow inshore waters, where the seines would do the most harm.

Unintended consequences can sometimes be ugly.

And then there’s the biggest question, which is why President Trump should want to sign an executive order ending the menhaden reduction fishery in the first place, particularly given the executive order that he signed on April 17.  That executive order, “Restoring America’s Seafood Competitiveness,” sought to end the overregulation of the seafood industry, reduce the seafood trade deficit, support maritime jobs and, above all, promote domestic fishing.

When viewed in the light of that earlier executive order, the menhaden reduction fishery appears to be just the sort of fishery the President would want to promote.  The science assures us that the menhaden stock is healthy, even when assessed in the context of its ecological function, so the harvest causes no harm to the United States.  Most of the product is being shipped overseas, while the revenues from the fishery flow into the United States, helping to reduce the seafood trade deficit while not only supporting many American jobs, but supporting jobs in regions of Virginia and Louisiana where good-paying jobs can be hard to find.

From the perspective of restoring America’s seafood competitiveness, then, shutting down the reduction fishery would seem to be a foolish thing to do.

Yet, there is another perspective to consider.

While the overall menhaden population may be healthy, both along the Atlantic coast and in the Gulf, the question of local depletion remains.  Although localized depletion has never been conclusively established, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that suggest that it might exist.

That is particularly true in the Chesapeake Bay, where Maryland fisheries officials claim that there are too few menhaden to support the traditional pound net fishery, and some biologists have argued that a lack of menhaden is causing osprey’s nests to fail.

So maybe the folks who are seeking to shut down the reduction fishery are, to use an old expression, putting the cart before the horse.  Maybe what they ought to be doing, instead of ignoring the science and preemptively seeking to shut down fisheries, is trying to develop new science, specific to the localized depletion issue, to determine whether the menhaden fishery is, in fact, doing harm to the Bay, before they attempt to ban it.

At one time, everyone hoped that Virginia would fund such a study, estimated to cost about three million dollars, but the state legislature hasn’t come through with the funds.  So, it might be time to redirect all of the energy, money, and time currently spent attacking the reduction fishery to petitioning Congress, and asking it to fund the needed research.  It’s not unreasonable to hope that a Congress that had no problem allocating 12 million dollars for the so-called Great Red Snapper Count, to determine how many red snapper resided in the Gulf of Mexico, and 3.3 million dollars for another study dubbed the South Atlantic Great Red Snapper Count, might also be willing to cough up another 3 million to determine whether there is localized depletion of menhaden in the Chesapeake Bay.

That way, if the study found localized depletion, there would be a scientific basis for throwing the reduction fleet out of the Bay.

Of course, there is always the chance that such a study would find that no localized depletion takes place.

But, should that happen, the menhaden advocates could just ignore the science one more time, and seek another executive order to shut down the fishery.  At worst, they’d be in the same place where they find themselves now.

 

 

 

 

 

GULF FISHERMEN HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT APRIL EXECUTIVE ORDER

 

When President Donald Trump released the Executive Order “Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness” on April 17, commercial fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico were generally pleased.  The order sought to

“unburden our commercial fishermen from costly and inefficient regulations,”

and ordered federal fisheries managers to

“consider suspending, revising, or rescinding regulations that overly burden America’s commercial fishing.”

The Gulf of America Reef Fish Shareholders’ Alliance, one of the largest commercial fishermen’s organizations in the Gulf, put out a release the day after the Executive Order was issued, which said, in part,

“The Gulf of America Reef Fish Shareholders’ Alliance…and commercial fishermen across the Gulf commend President Trump for recognizing the vital role of the American seafood industry in our nation’s economy, food security, and cultural heritage…

“The Shareholders’ Alliance looks forward to our role in the process as this Executive Order is implemented.  We stand ready to work with federal agencies like the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration…and the Gulf Council so that all Gulf commercial fishermen can have a seat at the table…

“We are encouraged by the President’s commitment to shining a national spotlight on the challenges and opportunities faced by commercial fishermen.  His support sends a strong message that American fishing jobs and coastal economies matter.”

The National Fisheries Institute, a national commercial fishing trade organization, sounded a similar note, saying

“…[The National Fisheries Institute] commends the President and his Administration for taking a thoughtful, strategic approach to supporting American seafood production and consumption.  The [Executive Order] outlines key actions to benefit every link in the supply chain—from hardworking fishermen to parents who serve their family this nutritious and sustainable protein at home.

“Importantly, the Order calls for reducing unnecessary regulatory burdens on fishermen and seafood producers while also promoting the many benefits of eating seafood as part of a healthy, balanced diet.

“NFI stands ready to support the Administration in advancing this important policy initiative and improving the lives of all those who depend on the commercial seafood industry.”

However, it didn’t take too long for Gulf fishermen to begin having second thoughts.

An article that appeared last June in the Houston Chronicle was titled

“How Trump’s plans to boost catch limits could hurt Gulf fishermen.”

It noted that even as Gulf fishermen publicly cheered the Executive Order,

“behind the scenes, many were concerned.

“The limits, set up by Congress 50 years ago to manage how much fishermen could catch [Author’s note:  Congress did not actually set up the limits, but instead passed what is now known as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which established the framework and process for setting such limits], helped critical species like red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico rebound after overfishing through most of the 20^th century.

“And Trump was proposing to raise them while cutting fisheries staff at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which is charged with conducting the fish counts that determine catch limits, at a time when some fishermen say they’re suddenly seeing less stock in the sea.”

Thus, although the Gulf of America Reef Fish Shareholders’ Alliance offered strong support for the Executive Order when it was first issued, the Houston Chronicle article quotes its deputy director, Eric Brazer Jr., voicing support for fisheries managers who exercise caution.

“We support measured and reasonable increases when the stocks can handle them.  You want there to be enough fish in the ocean to run your business 30, 40 years, so you can pass this business on to your children.  Conserve a few more fish today to have more fish down the road.”

It’s not clear that such sentiments are entirely in tune with the Executive Order which, with the except of a single reference to Magnuson-Stevens, does not mention conservation at all.

Fishermen also find the Administration’s cuts to the National Marine Fisheries Service’s staff, and its scientific staff in particular, very troubling.  Relaxing regulations at the same time that the Administration is reducing the staff needed to evaluate the effect of such regulations can have serious, negative consequences for Gulf fish stocks.  Mr. Brazer has noted that

“Bad data, or no data, or gaps in the data means disruption for commercial fishermen down the road.”

He also observed that good data and adequate regulation are not inconsistent with the Executive Order’s goals, saying

“In order to implement the President’s vision, we need to maintain core services for NOAA.”

He is concerned that, without the good science provided by NMFS, the future of Gulf fisheries could be in doubt.  A May 15 article in Civil Eats notes that

“Brazer…worries that the consequences of cutting or reducing surveys, dockside monitoring, and other data collection activities today won’t show up for years to come—and by then it may be too late to prevent a fishery from crashing.”

Such worries are particularly justified when catch limits are increased at the same time that regulations are being relaxed, increasing the likelihood of overfishing.

Those concerns are not limited to Mr. Brazer and his associates.

The Houston, Texas-based television station, KHOU-11, observed that local fishermen were saying

“’We’re seeing less fish,”

and that

“Galveston fishermen push back on deregulation, warning it could sink industry.”

An article on the station’s website describes one such fisherman’s concerns.

“At Pier 19 in Galveston, it’s business as usual for Buddy Guindon, a veteran Gulf fisherman with more than four decades on the water.  His market, Katie’s Seafood, is the main destination for red snapper caught in the Gulf and a lifeline for the local seafood economy.

“’We were in really bad straits when I started,’ Guindon said.  ‘Fish stocks were depleted, and fishing was pretty tough.’

“That all changed, he said, thanks to federal oversight.  Strict, science-based catch limits helped Gulf fisheries recover.  But with Trump’s executive order rolling back regulations and reducing oversight, Guindon fears the progress may be reversed.

“’We’re highly regulated and we want to be.  We want to be accountable,’ Guindon said.  [emphasis added]”

Certainly, not every fisherman feels that way.  Some would prefer that fisheries returned to the old, “Wild West” days, when fishermen could sell everything that they could catch, and a fisherman’s income depended solely on how hard they worked and how much time they were willing to put in, even if that level of fishing was unsustainable and ultimately left far fewer fish for everyone.

I met Buddy Guindon once, nearly a decade ago, when I was down in Galveston fishing for red snapper with Capt. Scott Hickman, and gathering information for a piece I was writing on Gulf red snapper issues. 

It didn’t take more than a few seconds to realize that Mr. Guindon was one of the new breed of commercial fisherman, who perhaps came of age in the old rough-and-ready days of commercial fishing, when the only thing that mattered was piling fish on the dock, but has since come to recognize that good science, good regulations, and accountability for every participant in the fishery was, in the end, the best way not only to manage commercial—and recreational—fisheries, but also to support viable, profitable and sustainable fishing businesses such as his.

So when Mr. Guindon discusses the state of Gulf fisheries, it probably makes sense to listen.

The Station KHOW-11 article went on to report

“Guindon remembers what the industry looked like before regulation and doesn’t want to return to a time of empty nets and uncertain futures.

“’When I started fishing, there were no limits.  And it wasn’t good.’

“…[S]ince the executive order, the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, has cut nearly 30% of NOAA’s staff, including key scientists who monitor fish stock data, much of which is already years behind.

“’They’ve got fewer people now,’ Guindon says.  ‘There’s a worry there.  A little bit of a worry.’

“…For Guindon, the stakes are personal.

“’To have a business to pass on to your family, you can’t take all the fish out of the ocean this year and expect them to make a living next year,’ says Guindon.  ‘So we want this balance.’”

It seems like a sensible, and sensibly cautious, stance.  But the National Marine Fisheries Service, bound as it is by the Executive Order, apparently disagrees, for it dismissed Mr. Guindon’s concerns in its response, alleging

“The President’s Order Unleashing Seafood Competitiveness has and will continue to make a positive impact on the U.S. seafood economy.  NOAA data is helping us responsibly increase allowable catch, and NOAA fisheries will continue to ensure a healthy balance between managing the marine environment and increasing access to abundant resources for our great American fishermen.”

Maybe.

But with the target biomass in most fisheries already based on maximum sustainable yield, and the acceptable biological catch, and so annual catch limits, in most fisheries also based on MSY, but reduced to account for scientific uncertainty, it’s difficult to understand how that’s going to happen.  

Cuts to NMFS' scientific staff can only lead to a dearth of data needed to manage fish stocks, increasing the uncertainty surrounding heavily-prosecuted fisheries.  With good data harder to come by, increasing the allowable catch will only increase the probability of exceeding maximum sustainable yield, and driving down the abundance of the most heavily fished stocks.

Thus, the Gulf fishermen are wise to worry, because without healthy and abundant stocks, their businesses will suffer, and the Executive Order’s goal of increased U.S. seafood production will never, in the long term, be achieved.